20 Nov Reparation Without Recognition? Denmark, the “Spiral Case,” and the Limits of a Compensation Scheme
[Francesco Seatzu is Full Professor of International Law at University of Cagliari, Italy.]
On 27 August 2026, the Danish Parliament approved, by a large cross-party majority, a tax-free lump-sum payment of 300,000 Danish kroner (around €40,200) to every Greenlandic woman or girl who can plausibly attest to having been fitted with a non-consensual intrauterine device, or otherwise given contraception without her knowledge, between 1960 and 1991. Some 4,500 women and girls, several as young as twelve, are thought to have been affected by what is known in Denmark and Greenland as spiralsagen, the “spiral case”. In the first month, 171 women filed claims before the scheme had formally entered into force.
The following day, 28 August 2026, Greenland published two expert reports, commissioned separately from the 2025 historical inquiry, on whether Denmark’s conduct could meet the legal definition of genocide. It was the first official examination of that question. The experts split: one report found no genocide, the other found that intent could not be established from the contraception cases alone. What interests me is the question that risks getting lost in that debate. Whatever one makes of the genocide question, does the compensation scheme meet what international law already requires of Denmark?
What the “Spiral Case” Was, and Why it is a Colonial Story
The term refers to a campaign run by the Danish health authorities in Greenland, which reached its peak in the second half of the 1960s. Intrauterine devices, called spiraler in Danish, were placed in Inuit women and girls, sometimes even during medical examinations at schools, often without explaining the procedure and without getting an informed consent from the girls and their parents. Around 4,500 devices were placed between 1966 and 1970, making up about half of all child-bearing women in Greenland during that time period. This became a matter of public attention only in 2022, when a podcast created by the Danish national broadcaster came out; this led to the joint government investigation commissioned by the Danish and Greenlandic governments in 2025.
This campaign can only be comprehended against the backdrop of the colonial background within which it took place. Until 1953, Greenland continued to be a Danish colony and its status was changed by a constitutional amendment that made it into a county of Denmark. The following years were marked by “Danization” policy: Greenlandic politics was made in Copenhagen and carried out by Danes who pursued the goal of modernization of Greenland. Healthcare continued to be in Danish hands until 1992. The spiral campaign is comparable with other cases that took place during this period; they include the kidnapping of twenty-two Greenlandic children to Denmark in 1951 for social experiment and the displacement of Inughuit from Thule in 1953, for which Denmark has already apologized. In each case, decisions about the body, family, and territory of Greenlanders were taken by Danes for the sake of welfare or modernization without their consent. There is also a legal dimension to this situation. The victims make up a people entitled to self-determination according to the 2009 Self-Government Act (international law), and the communal character of the policy clarifies why reparation cannot be limited to compensation.
The Contraceptive Campaign and Why the ECHR Violation Was Never in Doubt
Some points are not legally contested. A state health system that inserts a contraceptive device into a woman’s body without her informed consent, in many cases without telling her that anything has been done, violates Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights has said as much three times, in V.C., N.B., and I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, on the non-consensual sterilization of Roma women in Slovak hospitals. The Court’s reasoning in that line of cases rests on two grounds. The first is the incompatibility of non-consensual reproductive intervention with the respect owed to autonomy and dignity under Article 8. The second applies where the intervention causes lasting physical or psychological harm and is compounded by institutional indifference: the treatment then reaches the level of severity required by Article 3. The parallel with the Slovak cases is close, and in one respect Greenland’s case is graver. In both, a State health system intervened in the reproductive lives of women from a minority historically subject to demographic policy, under the label of family planning. The Slovak women knew, at least afterward, what had been done to them. Many Greenlandic women did not, and some were children. If secrecy and age aggravate a violation, as I believe they do, the Slovak judgments set the minimum that Denmark must meet.
CEDAW and the CRC add further obligations. Article 16(1)(e) CEDAW guarantees the right to decide freely on the number and spacing of one’s children, and the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 24 classifies coerced contraception as a form of gender-based violence engaging the State’s due diligence obligations under the Convention. For the many girls who were minors at the time, Articles 3, 12, and 24 CRC bring in the best-interests principle, the child’s right to be heard, and the right to the highest attainable standard of health, none of which a procedure performed in secrecy on a minor could plausibly have satisfied.
In my view, whatever the experts conclude on genocide, Denmark’s obligations under the ECHR were in force throughout, and they are enough to assess the scheme now.
Why the Genocide Question is not an Easy Yes
Press coverage has tended to treat the genocide characterization as close to self-evident. My own view is that the question remains open. The conduct closely fits the Convention; whether the intent can be proved is another matter, and the August reports have not settled it.
Article II(d) of the Genocide Convention captures “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,” and the documented effect of the campaign, a fall in Inuit completed fertility from seven children per woman to 2.3, corresponds closely to the actus reus. The difficulty lies in the dolus specialis. The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia required that specific genocidal intent be “convincingly shown” and, where inferred from a pattern of conduct, be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence; Croatia v. Serbia reaffirmed that standard. In the historical record as currently documented, the campaign was framed in the vocabulary of economic and demographic planning to reduce a birth rate that Danish authorities regarded as outstripping Greenland’s healthcare and welfare capacity. The second report, the one Greenland’s government accepted, did not treat that framing as decisive either way. I think it was right not to. Demographic planning is a motive, not a defense: a State can pursue economic goals and still intend to prevent births within a group. The planning rationale also shows how easily such a policy could have been presented at the time as ordinary public health.
The Krstić reading of “in part” raises a further question. The ICTY required numerical substantiality, the prominence of the targeted group within the larger group, and attention to the perpetrator’s realistic ambition to reach the group as a whole. Public reporting does not show that this criterion has yet been tested against the Greenlandic facts. The genocide inquiry should therefore run its course without serving as the yardstick for the compensation scheme.
Why, then, does the characterization matter? If genocide were established, three consequences would follow. First, Denmark’s responsibility would arise under a treaty whose obligations are owed erga omnes partes, so that any other State party could invoke it before the International Court of Justice, as The Gambia did against Myanmar. Secondly, the Convention imposes duties to punish as well as to prevent, although the passage of time makes individual prosecutions improbable. Thirdly, and most relevant for present purposes, the characterization would identify the group, and not only individual women, as the injured party, strengthening the case for collective forms of reparation and satisfaction. What it would not change is the core obligation. In accordance with Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the injured State is obliged to make full reparation for the injury that was inflicted upon it by the internationally wrongful act, regardless of how it is characterized. The problem with regard to genocide is one of form rather than of the existence of the obligation to make reparation.
The 1991 Cut-Off as a Doctrinal Problem
The scheme has three gaps, none of which depends on Article II(d). The first is temporal.
In the report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2023, following the visit, credible cases of non-consensual insertions were found to be continuing even till 2019 and explicitly stated that an investigation should be made beyond 1991. A similar point was raised by the Human Rights Council in Greenland in April 2026 that the doctors are still finding the presence of intrauterine devices in the women who are unaware of its existence. According to the ILC articles on state responsibility under Article 14(2), if an action is done without the consent of the person and not redressed, the damage will continue to persist. The traditional rationale behind the 1991 date is based on the fact that it was only after 1992 when the responsibility for health care in Greenland was transferred to the local authorities of the country. Even though this rationale could solve the problem at hand within the framework of Danish law, it cannot do so within international law due to certain reasons.
Nor did 1991 end the wrong. An insertion without consent is a completed act, but the State’s failure to trace and inform women who still carry devices they never agreed to continues, and falls under Article 14(2). I find it hard to see why a woman fitted with a device in 1993 should receive nothing while her neighbor, fitted two years earlier, receives 300,000 kroner. Claimants whose devices were inserted after 1991 and those whose earlier devices were never removed may fall outside a scheme presented as fully addressing the wrong.
Individual Compensation Alone Repeats an Incomplete Template
The second gap is the scheme’s purely individual structure. Denmark has faced this issue before.
In 2003, the Danish Supreme Court unanimously upheld a High Court judgment awarding the Inughuit of Thule DKK 500,000 collectively, in addition to individual non-pecuniary compensation, for their forced relocation in 1953 to make way for Thule Air Base. The same Judgment rejected the Inuit’s claim to recognition as a distinct Indigenous People under ILO Convention No. 169. The subsequent review by the UN Special Rapporteur of that outcome found that the refusal of recognition had left the Inughuit without full redress two decades later, notwithstanding the collective award. Danish law can therefore provide both individual and collective remedies, as it did in 2003. The 2026 scheme adopts only the individual component of that model, which was already found to be incomplete after Thule. Nothing in the parliamentary debate explains why the collective element was dropped. I read this as a missed opportunity, one that the Folketing can still correct.
The colonial background described in the first section gives this point additional weight. The campaign was directed at Greenlandic women because they were Greenlandic, as part of a policy designed in Copenhagen for Greenlandic society as a whole. A remedy limited to individual payments treats as a series of private injuries what was a collective policy affecting a people. Article 40 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that Denmark endorsed in 2007 is related to remedying the violation of individual and collective rights. Interventions at a collective level like funding reproductive health care in Greenland, supporting documentation, and the act of acknowledgment in the colonial context would be addressing this aspect.
Reparation Without Rehabilitation is Not Full Reparation
The third gap concerns rehabilitation. The UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy of 2005 treat “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition” as cumulative forms of reparation. On satisfaction, Denmark has done reasonably well: the prime-ministerial apologies of 2025 and the expert reports of August 2026 both count. Rehabilitation is a separate obligation. A flat payment processed through the ordinary patient-compensation system does not fund the psychological and medical care that several claimants need, including some who required a hysterectomy after complications. Built solely on compensation, the scheme covers one of the five forms of reparation. Where the harm has resulted in lasting impairment, the obligations of habilitation and rehabilitation in Article 26 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which Denmark has ratified, offer a useful yardstick for the services owed to women living with the physical and psychological consequences of the intervention.
The Canadian Comparator
The Canadian experience shows what a fuller response could include.
Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights found, in a June 2021 interim report, that the forced and coerced sterilisation of Indigenous women in Canada was “not confined to the past, but clearly is continuing today”; its final report, The Scars That We Carry (July 2022), confirmed that finding on an expanded evidentiary record and recommended that the underlying conduct be made a distinct criminal offence. Reports there also extend to 2019, as in Greenland. The Committee recommended compensation, the criminalization of the conduct, and structural reform of consent practices in Indigenous health settings. These measures correspond to the guarantees of non-repetition that the Basic Principles list as a distinct component of reparation. Denmark could start by requiring documented, informed consent for every contraceptive procedure in Greenland, audited by a body independent of the health authorities, and by tracing the women who may still carry devices they never agreed to.
A Concluding Thought
Much of my work on the CRPD has taught me how easily reparation debates drift towards symbolic recognition and away from the practical support victims need. The genocide inquiry matters. The scheme, however, should be judged by what it does for the women concerned, under the standards of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR and the 2005 Basic Principles, which apply whatever the outcome under Article II(d). It should also be read against the colonial history in which the campaign took place, which is why its collective dimension matters as much as its individual one.
Three Things This Case Settles
First, the temporal scope of the scheme cannot rest on administrative convenience alone. Under Article 14(2) of the ILC Articles, a hard stop at 1991 is difficult to sustain when non-consensual insertions are reported as recently as 2019.
Second, a collective remedy belongs alongside the individual one. Denmark provided one for the Inughuit in 2003; declining to do so here is a policy choice for which no legal necessity has been shown.
Third, rehabilitation cannot be folded into a lump sum. Under the cumulative structure of the 2005 Basic Principles, a payment routed through ordinary patient-compensation channels discharges the obligation to compensate; the obligation to fund psychological and medical rehabilitation remains.
The Folketing can still widen the scheme in time, extend it beyond 1991, and fund rehabilitation, without waiting for the experts to settle Article II(d).