The Execution of Two Bangladeshi Nationals in Saudi Arabia: The Limits of Human Rights and Consular Protection

The Execution of Two Bangladeshi Nationals in Saudi Arabia: The Limits of Human Rights and Consular Protection

[Oishe Rahman is a Lecturer in law at East West University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Kazi Ayman Awsaf is a Teaching Assistant at East West University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.]

On 14 October 2026, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) executed two Bangladeshi nationals, Nazrul Islam Abdul Basir and Suety Akhter, in Makkah. According to the Saudi Interior Ministry, they were sentenced to death for committing an act of fahisha (indecency) inside a mosque. The punishment was described as qatl ta’ziran, i.e., death imposed as a discretionary punishment, on account of the alleged conduct’s gravity and the sanctity of the time and place. Bangladesh’s consulate in Jeddah had received a list of approximately 2,500 prisoners on 30 September 2026, just two weeks before the executions. Names of both the nationals in question appeared in the list, but the list did not disclose the sentences imposed upon them. Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry later acknowledged that the list had not been properly examined by the Consulate. Bangladeshi authorities learned of the executions through the media, rather than through official notification.

This post examines two distinct but interconnected questions arising from the executions. First, were they compatible with KSA’s international human rights obligations, notwithstanding its non-party status to the ICCPR? Second, did KSA comply with its obligations towards Bangladesh and the two Bangladeshi nationals concerned under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)?

The Legality of the Sentences: KSA’s Obligations Under the Arab Charter 

Although KSA is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2009. The Charter provides relevant protections against arbitrary deprivation of life and restricts the imposition of capital punishment. Article 5 protects the right to life and Article 6 permits imposition of death penalty only ‘for the most serious crimes’ and in accordance with the legislation in force at the time of the offence. Article 15 further provides that no crime or penalty may be established except by virtue of a prior legislative text. 

These requirements raise particular concerns in the context of ta’zir. Unlike hadd offences, for which Islamic criminal jurisprudence prescribes fixed punishments, ta’zir offences and their punishments are generally left to judicial discretion. KSA’s basic law recognizes the application of Sharia, but the existence of a general authority to punish under Sharia does not, by itself, resolve whether the particular conduct and capital punishment satisfy the Arab Charter’s requirement of a prior legislative text. 

The interpretation of Article 6 of the Charter may be informed by the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) interpretation of the corresponding protection in ICCPR Article 6. Under the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, relevant interpretative materials may assist in understanding the scope of comparable treaty language. This does not make the Committee’s interpretation binding on the KSA as an ICCPR non-party. It does, however, provide useful guidance on the meaning of ‘most serious crimes’. General Comment No. 36 explains that this category is limited to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. It also states that adultery may under no circumstances be punished by death (paras 35-36). Further, a death sentence cannot rest on provisions whose application depends on subjective, discretionary and unforeseeable considerations (para 38). 

The precise offence for which Basir and Suety were executed remains unclear. Some Bangladeshi authorities described the conduct as adultery, while the KSA statement referred more generally to fahisha inside a mosque. If the executions were for consensual sexual conduct, the asserted sanctity of the location would not, without more, bring the conduct within the category of crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. Nor does describing the punishment as discretionary answer whether it was prescribed by a prior legislative text. The executions therefore raise serious questions under Article 6 and 15 of the Arab Charter and, consequently, under its protection against arbitrary deprivation of life in Article 5(2). The Charter’s monitoring arrangements, however, provide limited avenues for individual redress. The Arab Human Rights Committee examines State reports but does not receive individual complaints and the proposed Arab Court of Human Rights has yet to become operational.

Violations Before Execution: Article 36 of the VCCR

Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR imposes two interrelated obligations on the receiving State. First, the receiving State’s authorities must inform a detained foreign national, without delay, of the right to have their consular post informed. Second, when the detainee requests it, the authorities must inform the consular post of the sending State ‘without delay’. The available information does not establish whether KSA authorities informed Basir and Suety of their consular rights or whether either of them requested notification. In Jadhav, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’/’the Court’) faced a similar uncertainty. India did not know whether Pakistan had informed Jadhav of his rights, and the Court inferred that it had not, replying on Pakistan’s position and public statements suggesting that Jadhav was not entitled to consular access, as well as its failure to assert that it had informed him of those rights (paras 100-102).

KSA should clarify whether, when and how the two nationals were informed of their rights under the VCCR. If it cannot establish that they were informed, Jadhav supports an inference of breach of Article 36(1)(b). If they were informed, the question is whether either requested notification, triggering KSA’s obligation to notify Bangladesh without delay. Bangladesh received information identifying them approximately three years after their detention. By comparison, the ICJ found a breach in Avena following a 40-hour delay and in Jadhav following a delay of approximately three weeks. A delay of three years would therefore be difficult to reconcile with Article 36(1)(b), provided their Bangladeshi nationality was known or apparent to the competent KSA authorities. 

The 30 September list raises concerns under Articles 36(1)(a) and (c), which protect consular communication with detained nationals, access to them and the arrangement of their legal representation. In LaGrand, the ICJ treated the rights under Article 36(1)(b) as part of an interrelated regime with those under subparagraphs (a) and (c). Accordingly, the information provided to the sending State must enable it to give practical effects to these interconnected rights. As the ICJ held in Jadhav, notification must be ‘sufficient to facilitate the exercise by the sending State of the consular rights envisaged by Article 36, paragraph 1’ (para 111). By omitting the fact that both nations had been sentenced to death, the list deprived Bangladesh of a meaningful opportunity to seek access, arrange legal representation and explore possible intervention before their execution fourteen days later.  

Violations After Execution: Article 37(a) of the VCCR

Article 37(a) imposes a separate obligation. Where relevant information is available, the receiving State must inform the consular post without delay if a national of the sending State dies. The KSA authorities necessarily possessed information about the deaths. Yet Bangladesh learned of the executions through media reports, not official notification. Public announcement cannot substitute for notification to the consular post under Article 37(a). 

Timely notification is also important beyond the fact of death. Article 5(g) of the VCCR recognizes consular functions concerning the safeguarding of nationals’ interests in matters of succession and the administration of estates. Reports that the families did not know the whereabouts of the bodies further illustrate the practical consequences of the failure to notify. The treatment of the families raises a related human rights concern. In Schedko v Belarus, the HRC recognized that secrecy surrounding an execution and burial, and the refusal to release a body, may cause relatives severe mental distress and amount to inhuman treatment (para 10.2). The uncertainty experienced by the families of the two nationals in question, should not be treated as a merely administrative consequence. 

Bangladesh’s Response and the Remedies Available 

Bangladesh’s own response warrants scrutiny. The Foreign Minister’s acknowledgment that the prisoner list was not properly examined points to shortcomings in the Consulate’s handling of information that could have enabled intervention. Such negligence could reduce the compensation recoverable should Bangladesh claim reparation for the violations. 

A separate question concerns Bangladesh’s possible exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. Under international law, diplomatic protection is a right of the State (ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Article 2). Its significance here lies in enabling Bangladesh to pursue claims arising from injuries suffered by its nationals. Article 19 of the ILC Draft recommends that States give due consideration to exercising protection, particularly where significant injury has occurred. This position is reinforced by Bangladesh’s obligations towards migrant workers. Article 23 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families recognizes their right to recourse to the diplomatic or consular protection and assistance of their State of origin where their Convention rights are impaired. 

The importance of timely diplomatic intervention is illustrated by contrasting experiences. In October 2026, the Saudi Supreme Court overturned the death sentence of Sri Lankan national Anojan Sivarasa following diplomatic and legal intervention by Sri Lanka, including the engagement of a specialized legal team. Conversely, the 2018 execution of Indonesian national Tuti Tursilawati without prior notification prompted Indonesia to seek a bilateral agreement with the KSA on mandatory consular notification. 

Following the executions, the available remedies are necessarily different. Under Article 31 of the Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), a responsible State must make full reparation for injury caused by its wrongful conduct. The ICJ’s decision in LaGrand and Avena establish that a breach of Article 36 of the VCCR may require effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence. Such remedies, however, are no longer applicable following execution. In Avena, the Court made clear that a State need not prove that consular assistance would have changed the outcome of the proceedings and that the deprivation of the opportunity to obtain such assistance is itself relevant (para 99). In LaGrand, the Court also held that an apology would not necessarily constitute sufficient reparation in all cases (para 123). 

Bangladesh may therefore seek reparation by way of compensation for the injury to its own consular rights, including the loss of opportunity to assist its nationals. It may also raise the consequences for the families, while distinguishing their individual harm from Bangladesh’s own injury. However, Bangladesh’s failure to properly examine the prisoner list may constitute contributory conduct relevant to the assessment of reparation under ARSIWA Article 39, potentially reducing the compensation payable. 

A formal claim under ARSIWA Article 43 should identify the alleged violations of Articles 36 and 37(a) of the VCCR, request relevant detention, trial and sentencing records, and seek clarifications on whether the nationals were informed of their rights under VCCR and whether they requested consular assistance. Bangladesh should also seek disclosure of the whereabouts and return of the bodies, appropriate compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition under Article 30(b) of ARSIWA. A bilateral protocol could establish mandatory notification at the stages of arrest, imposition of capital sentence, confirmation of that sentence and scheduling of an execution.  

Conclusion 

This case illustrates how substantive rights may be rendered practically meaningless in the absence of adequate procedural mechanisms to address their violation. The KSA is not a party to the ICCPR, while the Arab Charter, although binding on the KSA, is a regional instrument to which Bangladesh is not a party and provides no suitable enforcement mechanism for this case. Further, although the VCCR has been violated, neither State is party to the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Bangladesh’s only possible judicial avenue may therefore be to seek an ICJ determination of KSA’s internationally wrongful acts under ARSIWA, through a special agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Court, requiring KSA’s consent, which may not be forthcoming. This leaves diplomatic negotiations as the principal available avenue of redress, with the protection of many Bangladeshi migrant workers ultimately depending on their effectiveness. 

Topics
Asia-Pacific, Featured, General, International Human Rights Law, Middle East
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