19 Nov This is Not South Africa’s Definition: A New Report on Apartheid in the Draft Crimes Against Humanity Treaty
[Lisa Davis is a professor of law at CUNY Law School, and the ICC special adviser on Gender and Other Discriminatory Crimes.
Kirby Anwar is Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic, CUNY School of Law.]
The Trump administration’s Nov 2 notice that it will remove South Africa from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in 2027 is the latest in a series of punitive and often openly racist acts against the country. It tops off erratic tariffs, deadly aid cuts, discriminatory migration policies and false accusations of “white genocide.” The administration’s characterization of South Africa’s mild 2025 land reform act and its affirmative action policies as “racial discrimination” against Afrikaners works only by stripping racism of its social and historical context and reducing race to “objective” markers like skin color. This is the same discredited theory that apartheid’s perpetrators used to build their racist hierarchy. By that sleight of hand, the administration wrongly portrays the policies meant to repair decades of racist deprivation under apartheid as discrimination itself.
In addition to being a diplomatic insult, this portrayal demonstrates what can happen when law’s understanding of race is severed from context. A similar vulnerability sits at the heart of a treaty now being negotiated at the United Nations. States are drafting the first global treaty dedicated to preventing and punishing all recognized crimes against humanity, with the second session of the Preparatory Committee in April 2027 and a diplomatic conference in 2028. Among the crimes the draft treaty defines is apartheid, in a text that can be read to ground race in biology rather than in the systems perpetrators build. The draft definition also obscures apartheid’s full reality, including its gendered dimensions. Our new report for the New Lines Institute, Restoring Meaning, Ensuring Justice: The Definition of Apartheid in the Crimes Against Humanity Treaty, examines where that definition came from and how drafters can better ensure justice for all apartheid victims.
In the first round of proposals, released in June 2026, various states called for revising apartheid’s definition. Much of the discussion has centered on whether to add gender, in order to encapsulate what the Taliban has built in Afghanistan, namely an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination against women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons. We fully support that inclusion.
The current discussion, however, understates the definition’s problems. No one has yet been found guilty of the crime against humanity of apartheid. The compounded racial and gender oppression black women endured under apartheid in South Africa and Namibia was never legally recognized. Meanwhile, the Palestinian people have sought recognition of apartheid under international criminal law for decades.
It would be easy to see these gaps in justice as competing interests, with each impacted community required to press its own amendment to the same provision. The definition’s history, however, tells a different story. These struggles share a common problem. A movement built around their shared interests offers the best chance of changing the definition for the better.
A Definition With a Different History
It would be natural to assume the draft treaty’s apartheid definition comes from the 1973 Apartheid Convention, the instrument largely built by Global South states at the height of the international campaign to eradicate apartheid in southern Africa. Instead, it comes from the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, drafted a quarter century later, which rewrote the crime. That rewriting represented a compromise, extracted in a negotiation South Africa nearly lost. South Africa and its allies had to push to get apartheid into the Statute at all. The final wording was settled in consultations dominated by powerful states. The United States delegation advocated to narrow the provision to limit the court’s reach over conduct by its own nationals, including the practices of white supremacist organizations operating inside the United States. The “institutionalized” regime requirement, which appears nowhere in the Apartheid Convention, in part reflected those concerns. In other words, the bar was raised not to ensure justice but to shelter perpetrators.
The Rome Statute’s structure also shifted the definition. The Statute covers four overarching crimes each built from multiple potential acts. Apartheid had to fit as a crime against humanity. The first loss was context. The Apartheid Convention set the crime against its colonial backdrop, naming in its preamble the colonial domination from which apartheid grew. The Statute’s drafters could have carried that recognition into the preamble. Instead, they severed that framing—a missed opportunity in a treaty whose crimes, from enslavement to deportation to sexual violence, are so often rooted in colonial histories.
The second loss was breadth. The Convention had spelled out the inhumane acts of apartheid in a detailed list of legislative and administrative measures through which apartheid operated, including discriminatory denials of the rights to education, work, and freedom of movement. The Statute traded that list for an open-ended category of acts “of a character similar to” the other listed crimes against humanity, acts such as murder, torture, and rape. Dropping the list looks like a broadening, but in actuality the similar character requirement raises the bar.
It would be a challenging legal argument to persuade a court that closing a school is similar to torture. Yet the Taliban’s edicts banning education and restricting movement are precisely how it is erasing Afghan women and girls from public life. The drafters of the apartheid convention recognized these measures in South Africa. The pass laws which dictated where black South Africans could live and travel, and the Bantu Education Act consigned black children to a separate and inferior school system. For black women apartheid was compounded. The pass laws were extended to them in the 1950s over mass resistance, and racist and gendered influx controls confined many to impoverished reserves where they carried the burdens of subsistence alone. Black women lived under racial and gender domination as one system. While it did not mention gender, the Convention did at least spell out these administrative and legal measures. Under the Rome Statute, prosecutors can bring those within an apartheid charge by cumulatively charging persecution. Charged that way, the severe deprivations the Convention named can re-enter an apartheid case. This strategy would be strengthened through adding a provision like that of Rome Statute Article 21(3), as described in our report.
Scholars have examined the drafting history of both treaties, but no one has tallied the losses or asked what they mean for the CAH text states are about to adopt. That is the point of the report. The definition now in the draft treaty is a narrowed, compromised text. This is not South Africa’s definition.
What Stands the Test of Time
None of this is nostalgia for a flawless 1973 text. The Apartheid Convention has problems of its own. Many of its provisions and its “racial group” language were borrowed from the Genocide Convention, whose drafters understood such groups as defined by hereditary characteristics. That same reading has been used to argue that apartheid’s victims must show something akin to biological proof of group membership and that the Palestinian people fall outside the crime. The Convention is also silent on gender discrimination, not because systematic oppression and domination based on gender was not happening but because no one yet recognized it for what it was. What those drafters did have was a vision bigger than southern Africa. They defined a universal crime that reached beyond South Africa to “similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination” wherever they might arise. They were writing for the test of time.
We now better understand what passing that test requires. Rome Statute Article 21(3) directs the Court to read “racial group” in alignment with human rights law which has long understood race as a social and political construction rather than a biological fact. This ensures victims are recognized according to how the perpetrator’s regime perceives them. By that measure the Palestinian people are among apartheid’s victims, a key understanding now that the question is before the International Criminal Court. Apartheid is reportedly among the charges in the ICC Prosecutor’s arrest warrant applications against Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. The draft treaty needs a provision mirroring Article 21(3).
Human rights law also understands gender to be socially constructed and to encompass sexual orientation and gender identity. We now know, in a way the 1973 drafters did not, what glossing over intersectionality costs. The compounded subjugation black South African and Namibian women endured has never been legally recognized, despite South African feminists’ sustained efforts to raise that history in the Truth and Reconciliation process. Because reparations often follow the categories of victimhood the law recognizes, black women are still paying the price of that silence decades after apartheid formally ended.
Getting It Right This Time
History also teaches how legal definitions are written. The Apartheid Convention was broad because the movement behind it was broad. A coalition of states and peoples insisted the law match the system they were fighting, which they knew could manifest in other ways and in other places. At Rome, where South Africa pressed its case largely alone against better-positioned states, the definition narrowed. The communities and peoples now looking to this treaty for recognition and justice often hear that their claims compete with one another. History shows the opposite. Each struggle has collided with a different flaw in the same compromised text, and each repair helps the others. A movement built on those common interests can do more than amend a definition. It can create a better one.
The good news is that the treaty is still a draft. States have already shown they are willing to reopen the apartheid provision. The sessions ahead are the moment to fix it. Fixing it means adding gender and making sure the definition it enters can deliver for victims. It means defining the crime through the grounds on which a regime organizes its oppression, race and gender, rather than through contested tests of group membership. It means restoring condemnation of the colonialism that gave the crime its meaning, without requiring colonialism as an element. And it means including an interpretive safeguard modeled on Article 21(3), so that the treaty’s terms keep pace with human rights law.
The 1973 Convention was written because states refused to look away from apartheid in southern Africa. Its drafters built a treaty meant to protect people they would never meet, in places they could not foresee. The crimes against humanity treaty is where their work will either be uplifted or quietly undone. If states are going to restore the meaning of apartheid, let the definition they write into this treaty recognize all of the crime’s victims.