18 Nov Human Rights by Renvoi? Not So Fast, Says ITLOS
[Agathe Niveleau is a PhD candidate in public international law at the University of Angers and a member of the Jean Bodin Research Centre. Her research focuses on renvois to external rules in the Montego Bay Convention.
Romain Degorgue is a PhD candidate in public international law at the University of Angers and a member of the Jean Bodin Research Centre. His research focuses on the legal regime of disputed territories in international law.]
On 27 May 2026, a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“The Special Chamber”) delivered its judgment in the M/T “Heroic Idun” (No. 2) case between the Marshall Islands and Equatorial Guinea. This dispute addresses the thorny issue of the content and normative functions of the so-called renvois contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), i.e. a technique by which a legal text points to another rule through explicit reference rather than restating its content.
A growing trend has emerged over the past several years, whereby claimant States increasingly resorted to this legal technique in their pleadings (see for instance Chagos, South China Sea, and San Padre Pio cases). Through these claims, States sought to obtain a declaration that norms falling outside the material scope of UNCLOS had been infringed. Given ITLOS had never previously ruled on this matter in detail, this judgment could have provided much-needed clarification. Most notably, this decision raised the question of whether the jurisdiction ratione materiae of a tribunal competent to interpret and apply UNCLOS could be extended to cover human rights rules set out in other instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
The Special Chamber, in this case, declined to extend its jurisdiction to any rule of international law falling outside the scope of the UNCLOS. The reasoning has already been discussed by Lan Nguyen and Danae Georgoula. These two authors consider that the Special Chamber has adopted a “restrictive and perhaps one-dimensional reading” which tends to add complexity to the functioning of the renvois. The present authors differ on two points. First, they consider that the substantive renvoi clauses do not extend the Special Chamber’s jurisdiction. Second, while they agree that the Special Chamber’s reasoning blurs the line between jurisdiction and applicable law, they consider that this stems from the Special Chamber’s reliance on the Arctic Sunrise award without any attempt to justify the difference between the substantive renvoi clauses and the applicable law clause.
Factual Background and Claims of the Marshall Islands
The M/T “Heroic Idun” is a crude carrier flying the flag of the Marshall Islands. In August 2022, it was denied the right to load crude oil in Nigeria’s EEZ. As a Nigerian Navy vessel approached, the crew of the M/T “Heroic Idun”, mistaking it for a pirate ship, fled. After passing through Equatorial Guinea’s EEZ, the vessel was intercepted in the waters of São Tomé and Príncipe by vessels of the Equatorial Guinean navy on suspicion of involvement in an illegal fuel supply operation. The crew members were subsequently arrested and detained in Equatorial Guinea before being transferred to Nigeria.
In response, the Marshall Islands, having agreed with Equatorial Guinea to submit the dispute to the ITLOS, alleged breaches of rules outside the scope of UNCLOS, such as international human rights law, both conventional and customary (paras. 62, 64 and 70). The Claimant sought to establish the Special Chamber’s jurisdiction on the basis of two distinct arguments. First, pursuant to Article 293(1) of UNCLOS, which authorizes a tribunal to apply “other rules of international law not incompatible with [UNCLOS]” as applicable law. Second, by virtue of the renvois contained in substantive provisions such as Articles 2(3), 58(2) and 87(1) which refer to “other rules of international law” or “other pertinent rules of international law”.
Jurisdiction over External Rules
The Special Chamber, however, declined to adjudicate on these alleged violations. Consistent with prior case law (see, for instance, Arctic Sunrise, paras. 187-198), it reaffirmed the well-established distinction between Article 288(1) of UNCLOS, which circumscribes its jurisdiction to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, and Article 293(1), which only governs applicable law. The latter provision merely authorizes the Special Chamber to draw upon external rules for the sole purpose of interpreting and applying the Convention and cannot, by extension, empower it to find violations of such external rules (paras. 141–145).
Moreover, the Special Chamber held that it likewise lacked jurisdiction to find violations of external rules via the renvois located in substantive provisions, merely stating that it could refer to those external rules solely for the purposes of interpreting and applying UNCLOS (paras. 149 and 154). An arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea case reached a similar conclusion, finding that it could rely on traditional fishing rights and COLREGS to establish a violation of article 2(3) and Article 94 which contained a renvoi to “generally accepted international regulations” (paras. 808 and 1083). It proceeded differently, however, first ruling on the breach of those external rules before inferring therefrom a violation of the Convention’s provisions (para. 1109, see also Chagos, paras. 534-535). This reasoning could still bear some ambiguity as to the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the M/T “Heroic Idun” case, the Special chamber proceeded with greater caution, refraining from formally ruling on the violation of a rule over which it has no jurisdiction. This approach may appear far too cautious, but has the merit of preventing any ambiguity regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae.
While agreeing with the distinction drawn by the Special Chamber between applicable law and jurisdiction, Lan Nguyen and Danae Georgoula nevertheless argue that this “does not mean […] that an UNCLOS tribunal cannot determine breaches of external rules”. This statement needs to be nuanced, since the Special Chamber has no jurisdiction to state a violation of an external rule in itself. The finding of the arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea case suggests the opposite when it blatantly stated that “China [has violated] Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS” (para. 1109). The Special Chamber could have adjusted this rationale by choosing to recognize, as a consequence of the incorporation of the external rule into the Convention via the substantive renvois clauses, that the rule was violated as an internal UNCLOS rule disjoined from its original treaty source. Regrettably, the Special Chamber missed an opportunity to clarify the consequences of the renvois clauses and the functioning of the incorporation by reference.
The Scope of the renvois to “Other Rules of International Law”
Another issue pertained to the identification of the rules referred to in these renvois. A distinction should be made between renvois contained in Article 293(1) regarding applicable law and renvois contained in substantive provisions. They are examined in turn.
First, article 293(1) of UNCLOS reads as follows: “[a] court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention” [emphasis added]. The Special Chamber reaffirmed that Article 293(1) was not meant to extend its jurisdiction. It was therefore not allowed to establish the violation of rules external to UNCLOS including human rights conventions. However, the Special Chamber admitted that Article 293(1) allowed to “hav[e] regard to such external treaties and rules of international law that are not incompatible with the Convention when resolving a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention” (para. 145). As a result, this Article functions as a catalyst justifying the openness of UNCLOS’ scope, allowing its interpretation to be consistent with both customary and treaty law (see for instance South China Sea, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 176). It therefore functions similarly to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Second and as the Special Chamber itself observed, the renvois contained in substantive provisions employ different terms and have different scopes (para. 154). Certain renvois are sometimes described as “zonal” in nature (see E. Cavalcanti de Mello Filho), insofar as they subject the powers conferred by the Convention in a specific maritime zone “to other rules of international law”, as it’s the case with Articles 2(3), 58(2) and 87(1). Such wording leaves considerable room for uncertainty as to the rules thereby incorporated.
In the present case, ITLOS declined to treat the ICCPR as one of the instruments capable of being incorporated through zonal renvois, admitting however that their scope could include “human rights standards” (paras. 416–417). This finding is coherent with the previous cases that only recognized the incorporation of general rules of international law via renvois to “other rules of international law”. In the Chagos Award, a tribunal refused to accept that bilateral agreements could be incorporated through such renvois, limiting their content to the “general rules of international law” such as the principle of good faith (para. 516). Indeed, the Special Chamber found that pursuant to Article 2(3), the United Kingdom had “to exercise good faith with respect to Mauritius’ rights in the territorial sea” (para. 520). The United Kingdom was therefore under an obligation to respect the Lancaster House Undertakings because that was what general international law so required (para. 517). An arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea case likewise found that Article 2(3) incorporates traditional fishing rights (para. 808, see also M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2), paras. 132-134). In both cases, the functioning of these rules allowed a balancing of the interests of the coastal states on one hand, and the interests of third States on the other hand.
In order to justify its refusal to incorporate human rights treaties into the renvois, the Special Chamber relies on the Arctic Sunrise award, in which an arbitral tribunal had likewise held that it could only “have regard to general international law in relation to human rights” on the ground that the ICCPR “has its own enforcement regime and it is not for this Tribunal to act as a substitute for that regime” (para. 197). In that award, however, the issue concerned only applicable law and not the renvois. The Special Chamber thus considers, without attempting to justify it, that the content of the renvois in the substantive provisions and in Article 293(1) is similar. By only recognizing human rights standards as “other rules of international law”, the Special Chamber conflates the operation and content of renvois contained in the applicable law clause and the substantive provisions The first one allows the Judge or the Arbitrator to consider other rules of international law to interpret the UNCLOS in its entirety, while the second one is contained in provisions that describe the obligations that the States parties to the Convention should respect. They do not share the same functioning and do not need to share the same content.
In addition to the theoretical blurring of the distinction, the issue is compounded by the Special Chamber use of “humanitarian concerns”, which should then only be invoked for the purposes of interpreting the Convention. As Lan Nguyen and Danae Georgoula rightly point out, the Special Chamber subsequently finds violations of the crew members’ rights “without any explanation of how it is linked to UNCLOS provisions” and “which provision of the Convention is being interpreted and applied in this case” (paras. 412-414).
In general, this case illustrates a certain caution for Courts and Tribunals to extend the scope of renvois to treaty law based on human rights. ITLOS has already been quite cautious in its advisory opinion on climate change where it only noted that “climate change represents an existential threat and raises human rights concerns” (Advisory Opinion, 21 May 2024, para. 66). The main reason for this excessive caution is linked to the fear of fragmentation of international law. Unlike Lan Nguyen and Danae Georgoula, we consider that this vigilance may be comprehensible, especially since ITLOS does not specialize in human rights law and UNCLOS is not primarily a human rights treaty. That could also explain why the special Chamber chose to focus its reasoning on considerations of humanity rather than the renvois clauses. In its eyes, these probably suffice to interpret UNCLOS harmoniously with human right law and humanitarian law. It would have been preferable if that reasoning did not instigate additional confusion in the identification of the scope and effects of the manifold renvois contained in UNCLOS.