19 Nov Who Decides Who Pays for the AU Mission in Somalia? December’s Test for Resolution 2719
[Lincoln Booth is an MSc candidate at the University of Oxford, a member of the Inner Temple and a research contributor to Oxford Pro Bono Publico, and spent more than two decades on cross-border infrastructure and investment transactions across Asia, Europe and the Middle East.]
Resolution 2719 was meant to give African Union peace operations a route to United Nations (UN) assessed financing. The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) still depends on voluntary contributions for the mission’s own budget. In December, the UN Security Council must decide whether to renew AUSSOM. The mission’s mandate and United States funding both end on 31 December 2026. The question is whether the formal, step-by-step approach of the resolution and the UN’s structures for taking decisions hinder accountability and the development or implementation of the financing model AUSSOM needs.
On 1 July 2026 the United States told the African Union that funding would end with the mandate authorised by Resolution 2809. The three-year review of Resolution 2719 required by paragraph 17 falls in December 2026, alongside the decision on AUSSOM’s renewal.
Resolution 2719 does not itself oblige UN members to pay for AUSSOM. Article 17(2) of the UN Charter requires payment once the General Assembly apportions an expense. Before then, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) must request support, and the UN Security Council must authorise access to assessed contributions. The question is whether these separate decisions allow AUSSOM to continue without anyone settling how the mission will be paid. The answer is yes. The Security Council can renew AUSSOM without opening the route to assessed financing. December will test whether the Council does so again.
What Resolution 2719 Does, and What it Leaves Undone
Adopted on 21 December 2023, Resolution 2719 answered a durable grievance. UN peacekeeping is financed by assessed contributions that every member must pay, while African Union missions have relied largely on voluntary contributions for their own budgets. For AUSSOM, those contributions come from a few donors. The European Union approved a further EUR 75 million in April 2026, mainly for allowances, the United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million for 2025, and the African Union contributed USD 40 million. The troop-contributing countries carry the shortfall, and their personnel have gone long periods without stipends.
Two paragraphs carry the mechanism. Paragraph 2 provides that the Security Council “agrees to consider on a case-by-case basis” requests from the AUPSC for assessed financing. Paragraph 6 caps this support at “not exceeding 75 per cent” of the mission’s annual budget, and provides for the remainder to be jointly mobilised by the African Union and the UN from the international community as extra-budgetary resources.
Several further acts are needed before assessed money reaches AUSSOM’s own budget, and paragraph 3 sets them out. Joint strategic assessment and planning by the African Union and the UN must come first. The AUPSC must then decide to request support. The Security Council must next decide whether the operation may receive assessed contributions. Only after this can a budget be proposed for the UN General Assembly to approve and apportion. Paragraph 4 sends the proposed budget through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee before the General Assembly decides whether to approve it under Article 17 of the UN Charter. Article 17(2) requires UN members to pay the expenses apportioned to them by the General Assembly. The obligation attaches to the apportionment, not to the authorisation of the mission.
One qualification belongs here. Assessed money already reaches Somalia. The United Nations Support Office in Somalia, like the office before it from 2009, is financed from assessed peacekeeping contributions apportioned by the Assembly. What does not exist is an apportionment of AUSSOM’s own budget under Resolution 2719.
The Somalia Test
No African Union-led peace support operation has received assessed financing under Resolution 2719 to date. Resolution 2767, adopted on 27 December 2024 by 14 votes to 0 with the United States abstaining, provided for “hybrid” application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025, if the Council confirmed sufficient progress by 15 May 2025. That confirmation never came, and the funding deadline was missed. According to African Union estimates reported by IPI Global Observatory, AUSSOM needed about USD 196 million in 2025. Identified pledges totalled USD 48.6 million, with arrears of USD 93.9 million.
The principal obstacle has been the United States. ISS Today reported in December 2025 that opposition to applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM stood against near-universal support in the Council, and the United States argued the hybrid model would push UN funding above the 75 per cent cap in paragraph 6. In the Senate, S 1583, introduced on 1 May 2025 by Senator Risch with Senators Cruz and Scott, and still in committee, would bar the use of United States assessed contributions to implement Resolution 2719 for AUSSOM and direct the opposition of any Council resolution authorising that support, while exempting funding for the support office and voluntary contributions.
In August 2025 the President sent the United States Congress a proposal, R25-24, to rescind USD 392.5 million of fiscal year 2025 Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities, published in the Federal Register on 3 September 2025 at 90 Fed Reg 42613. In September 2025 the United States Government Accountability Office concluded that the funds could not lawfully be withheld beyond their period of availability. Even so, this contribution to the support office, roughly 25 per cent of the office’s budget, was effectively cancelled.
What the sources show is a pattern rather than a single event. Pledges fell short, the assessed route was never opened for the mission’s own budget, and the United States set a deadline unilaterally.
AUSSOM’s financing problem forms part of a wider contraction in international peacekeeping. In October 2025, UN officials announced plans to repatriate 13,000 to 14,000 troops and police across nine operations amid a cash shortfall, with United States peacekeeping arrears exceeding USD 2.8 billion. The affected missions included operations in Africa, Lebanon, Kosovo and Cyprus. Such reductions diminish the personnel available to implement mandates without necessarily changing the tasks those mandates require. Mission closures involve a separate decision. In August 2025, the Council renewed UNIFIL for a final time, until 31 December 2026, followed by withdrawal over the ensuing year. The United States said this extension would be the last it supported. In Mali, by contrast, Resolution 2690 terminated MINUSMA’s mandate after the transitional government asked the mission to leave. These developments have different causes. They show why decisions about a mission’s tasks, resources and continued presence must take account of one another. AUSSOM presents a particular accountability problem within this wider retreat. The Council can maintain the authorisation while leaving the mission dependent on voluntary funding, without expressly deciding whether the resources available can sustain the tasks it authorises.
The Legal Point
Resolution 2719 offers AUSSOM no entitlement to assessed financing, and Article 17(2) creates no duty to pay before apportionment. The question is what happens when the Security Council renews the mission without taking the decision needed before the General Assembly can consider financing AUSSOM.
Two legal moments must be separated. The first is whether expenses should be apportioned at all, and this decision is discretionary at two stages. The Council decides whether to apply Resolution 2719 to a particular mission, and a single permanent member can prevent that decision. The Assembly decides whether to approve and apportion a budget. The second moment is the obligation to pay what has been apportioned. Once the Assembly apportions, Article 17(2) binds every member to bear the share apportioned to it.
The authority is the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses, delivered on 20 July 1962. The Court held that expenditure authorised for the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East constituted expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17(2), which brought them within the Assembly’s power to apportion, and “the exercise of the power of apportionment creates the obligation” to pay. The opinion therefore presupposes an apportionment, and confirms an apportioned expense must be paid. It does not establish that any particular expense must be apportioned.
Who can stop the money? At the first moment, any permanent member of the Council by veto, and thereafter the Assembly in the budget process. At the second, a member cannot lawfully treat an apportioned share as optional. For the United States, actual payment still depends on domestic budget law, and 2025 showed how much that matters. The Assembly has politics of a different kind. The Fifth Committee works by consensus in practice, and the two largest payers diverge. The United States is assessed about 26 per cent of peacekeeping costs and still owes about USD 4.2 billion across the regular and peacekeeping budgets, while China, assessed about 24 per cent, said on 21 September 2026 it will support the implementation of Resolution 2719.
The Security Council has not settled how AUSSOM would receive assessed financing. The United States insisted on conditions including a “one mission, one budget” arrangement, placing AUSSOM and the UN support office under one budget. The Secretary-General’s options for applying the resolution to AUSSOM failed because of United States opposition. The resolution does not say whether spending by the support office counts towards the 75 per cent limit. Paragraph 8 gives the Council power to choose how an operation will be supported. Nothing requires the Council to settle the question when renewing AUSSOM. Leaving the question unanswered is lawful.
On 15 May 2025 the Security Council’s deadline for confirming assessed financing passed without a decision. AUSSOM remained authorised, while no budget for the mission under Resolution 2719 reached the General Assembly. No vote rejecting financing was needed to leave the mission dependent on voluntary contributions. The Council could leave the funding question unanswered without recording a decision explaining the outcome. The separate approval stages protect each institution’s legal powers, while allowing this result. That is the accountability problem.
Two objections deserve answers. The first concerns whether Resolution 2719 can be used to finance AUSSOM without exceeding the 75 per cent limit. The United States has argued that the hybrid model would push UN funding above the paragraph 6 ceiling, and on a reckoning that counts the support office towards the 75 per cent, a compliant plan is harder to design. That is a constraint on design, not a bar to the route, and it leaves the power to apportion untouched. The second objection is to the claim itself. Once the Council authorises access and the African Union and the troop-contributing countries begin to plan around it, the Assembly’s decision to apportion, the argument runs, is not really discretionary, because such a commitment cannot be withdrawn without cost. Paragraph 4 answers this on the face of the resolution. It sends the proposed budget to the General Assembly for approval before assessed contributions can finance AUSSOM. Certain Expenses adds one limit. Drawing on Effects of Awards (1954), the Court explained that the Assembly must honour obligations the Secretary-General has validly incurred on the Council’s authority. For AUSSOM’s own budget no such obligation exists. The discretion survives the authorisation, which changes the politics of the decision, not the legal character of the decision.
What December Should Decide
In December the Council can renew AUSSOM without applying Resolution 2719, leaving the mission on voluntary contributions, or it can renew while deciding that the mission may access assessed contributions, which requires a request from the AUPSC and an apportionment by the Assembly. The United States has said it would not veto renewal and would block UN logistical or operational support, and in September it signalled support for a 12-month drawdown of the support office “followed immediately by liquidation” (Reuters).
The Council should decide whether to authorise assessed financing when renewing AUSSOM. If it agrees, it should identify how the mission and the UN support office will be financed. It should also explain whether support office spending counts towards the 75 per cent ceiling. Any assessed financing would still require General Assembly approval and apportionment. If the Council declines, it should say so and acknowledge that AUSSOM remains dependent on voluntary contributions.
Close
Resolution 2719 offers AUSSOM a route to assessed financing, not a promise of payment. The Security Council can authorise access following an African Union request, although no provision requires the Council to do so. A duty to pay arises only after the General Assembly approves and apportions the expense. The resolution’s step-by-step process and the UN’s separate decision-making bodies hinder accountability and implementation by allowing the Security Council to renew AUSSOM without deciding how the mission will be paid. In December, the Council should say whether it will open the route. If it will not, the countries supplying troops deserve to know.