Beyond Only Intent

Beyond Only Intent

[Dr. Gregory Stanton is Founding President of Genocide Watch, was Professor of Genocide Studies at George Mason University, President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, and in the State Department drafted the UN Resolutions to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rules for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.

Fitry Hamidah, Htet Htet Hliang, Anita Lesniak, Maximilian Millington, Emma Op het Veld, Tami Tasaki, Aymen Zehra, Natalie Kasper, and Omar Kausar are part of the Genocide Watch Legal Team.]

Introduction

Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), requires a determination that acts of genocide are committed by an individual or a state with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such. 

Unlike other international crimes, the occurrence of one or more of the prohibited acts of genocide is not enough to prove commission of the crime of genocide. A disputing state accusing another state of violating the Genocide Convention must also prove that such acts were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a protected group. 

Since evidence of genocidal intent is often not evident in statements by an individual or the leaders of a state, the ICTY, ICTR, and other international courts have recognized that intent to destroy a protected group may be inferred from patterns of conduct and the surrounding circumstances of actions.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that, when genocidal intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence. This doctrine has come to be known as the only intent test.

The Court repeated this test of intent in Croatia v. Serbia (2015). The only intent test sets a very high evidentiary threshold, making it almost impossible to prove genocidal intent to destroy a specific group. Especially for states, such specific intent usually coexists with military, political, or territorial intents. 

The only intent test raises a crucial question: should the existence of another reasonable intent by a State automatically rule out genocidal intent?

This article argues that the ICJ’s “only reasonable inference” approach should be reconsidered and modified in its judgment in the Gambia v. Myanmar case. The court should correct its rulings in the Bosnia and Croatia cases and hold that genocidal intent can be conclusively proven even though it coexists with other intents. 

What is the ‘Only Reasonable Inference’ Standard?  

To understand the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard, it is necessary to look at the laws of evidence in proving genocidal intent. The ICTR and ICTY only tried individuals, not states. These courts characterized the specific intent for genocide as “the conscious desire to achieve the destruction of the targeted group through the commission of the prohibited acts.” (Akayesu, paras. 544-547; Kupreškić, para. 636; Krstić, para. 584). 

Establishing specific intent to destroy a group presents considerable evidentiary challenges. Direct evidence or explicit manifestations of genocidal intent are rarely available (Krstić Appeals, para. 32).

Accordingly, the ICTR and ICTY accepted that the intent may be inferred from the context, scale, systematic targeting and surrounding circumstances of actions (Akayesu, para. 523; Jelisić Appeals, para. 47; Rutaganda Appeals, para. 525). The ICTY in Tolimir recognized that genocidal intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (Tolimir, para. 745).

In Bosnia v. Serbia, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted that dolus specialis may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, but it set a demanding threshold. In Bosnia v. Serbia, the Court held that, “for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent” (Bosnia, para. 373, emphasis added).

The ICJ’s stated rationale was that allegations of exceptional gravity against a State must be established by evidence that is “fully conclusive” (Bosnia, para. 209). 

By requiring a “fully conclusive” standard of proof, the ICJ imposed a standard normally only required in criminal trials of individuals: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard had never been applied in the ICJ before Bosnia v Serbia. 

The ICJ is not a criminal court. It is a court that decides disputes between states. In all its other cases, it used the usual standard of proof in civil cases: the preponderance of the evidence standard.

While both the ICJ and the international criminal tribunals have relied on the ‘reasonable inference’ approach, they have applied it dramatically differently. In determining individual intent, the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, ICC and other international criminal tribunals have applied the reasonable-inference rule to individuals as part of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed genocide. But these tribunals have never insisted that genocide be the only intent of the defendants.

In trials of individuals at these international tribunals, the defendant was often charged with several crimes requiring proof of different intents. Defendants have been convicted of both crimes against humanity and genocide in the same trials.”

In contrast, the ICJ has judged the intent of states, using a “fully conclusive” standard of proof, to determine whether intent to destroy a protected group was the only intent of the state charged with violating the Genocide Convention. That standard to prove intent led the ICJ to rule in both Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia that there was insufficient proof that Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention.

In Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia, the ICJ ruled that although Serbia may have been complicit in the crime against humanity of “ethnic cleansing” (forced displacement), genocide was not Serbia’s only intent. Therefore, Serbia could not be found responsible for violating the Genocide Convention.

Viewed in the context of State responsibility, the only intent test makes the Genocide Convention unenforceable against States. 

States always have more than one intent for their actions. They have multiple leaders. States also do not have “minds”, making analogies to “mens rea” inapplicable.

Although the ICJ in Bosnia and Croatia did not expressly hold these alternative intents to be legally incompatible with genocidal intent, the ICJ’s application of the only intent test treated them as mutually exclusive. 

Can Genocidal Intent Coexist with Other Intentions?

The ‘only reasonable inference’ standard overlooks the case law in international jurisprudence that acknowledges that genocidal intent can coexist with other intents. The ICJ clarified that “the specific intent is also to be distinguished from other reasons or motives the perpetrator may have.” (Bosnia v. Serbia, para.189). 

The international tribunals have pointed out that intent should not be confused with motive.

This point had already been highlighted in previous judgements (Kayishema and Ruzindana, para. 161; Blaškić, para.694).

In Jelisić, the Appeals Chamber held that “the personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide” (para.49; see also Krnojelac, para.102). 

In Karera the Trial Chamber confirmed that the accused does not need to be “solely motivated by a genocidal intent and having a personal motive will not preclude such a specific intent” (para.534). An alternative motive and genocidal intent can coexist. Often other intents or motives are used by the perpetrator to obscure the genocidal intent.

The coexistence of military objectives and genocidal intent is a frequent example of a “parallel intent”, since genocide is often committed during armed conflict, as Article I of the Genocide Convention recognizes (“whether committed in time of peace or in time of war”).

In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber confirmed that genocide can occur during an armed conflict. “The execution of this genocide was probably facilitated by the conflict…as a pretext for the propaganda inciting genocide against the Tutsi” (para.127). 

Srebrenica illustrates both “instrumental” and “overlapping” intent. The initial intents were both military conquest and forced displacement. But genocide was “part of the means to achieve the objective” of clearing the territory of its Bosnian Muslim population (Mladić, para.4987; see also Krstić Trial, para.572).

“Overlapping intent” arises where the same acts serve both genocidal and other objectives. Targeting fighters served a military objective. Yet Bosnian Serb forces went further and killed almost all ‘military-age’ men and boys in Srebrenica, most of whom were civilians. 

The Appeals Chamber in Krstić (para. 26) and the ICJ (Bosnia v. Serbia, para. 292) found that this course of action could only be explained as intended to destroy part of a national, ethnic, and religious group. Thus, international jurisprudence recognizes that genocidal intent can coexist with other intents. Their simultaneous co-existence does not rule out genocidal intent.

The ‘Only Reasonable Inference’ Standard Must not Exclude Multiple Intents

If the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard is interpreted to require that genocidal intent be the exclusive plausible explanation for a particular pattern of conduct, establishing such intent would become nearly impossible, Available evidence will nearly always support multiple reasonable inferences rather than only point to genocidal intent. 

In The Gambia v. Myanmar, Myanmar’s characterization of its operations in Rakhine State as security measures raises precisely this question: whether a counter-insurgency objective can exclude an inference of genocidal intent.

In its written observations in the same proceedings, Belgium argues that the pursuit of a military objective is not sufficient to preclude the identification of genocidal intent. 

Most allegations of genocide have arisen within the context of an armed conflict, as evidenced by the recent institution of proceedings at the ICJ (South Africa v. Israel; The Gambia v. Myanmar; Ukraine v. Russian Federation). 

If genocidal intent can never coexist with another reasonably inferred intent, situations involving armed conflicts will systematically fail to offer conclusive proof of the intent to commit genocide.  

This outcome is not merely problematic for enforcement. It is directly at odds with the history and purpose of the Genocide Convention, which seeks to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. 

Interpreting the ‘only reasonable inference’ test to mean that the existence of other intents automatically precludes a finding of genocidal intent, will ultimately facilitate State impunity.

Following the only intent test announced by the ICJ in its Bosnia and Croatia cases will lead to the destruction of the enforceability of the Genocide Convention against its Contracting Parties, weakening States’ accountability for their role in the commission of genocide (Dissenting Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 144 & 467).

Developing Jurisprudence in Gambia v. Myanmar

The Gambia alleges that Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention by committing acts of genocide against the Rohingya and by failing to prevent and punish genocide. The Gambia’s case relies substantially on the 444 page detailed report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM), which identified seven definitive indicators from which an intent to destroy the Rohingya, in whole or in part, could reasonably be inferred (The Gambia’s Memorial, para. 4.50).

Myanmar, maintains that the alleged genocidal acts occurred during counter-terrorism operations in response to attacks and the threats they allegedly posed to civilians and national security (Myanmar’s Counter-Memorial, paras. 8.12, 13.96). Myanmar contends that these alternative intents prevent intent to commit genocide from being the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from its actions (paras. 13.76-13.79). 

The intervening Republic of Ireland observes that “[t]hat the pattern of conduct could only point to the existence of such intent is not to say that it could point to such intent only” (Declaration of Intervention by Ireland, para. 36).

The Joint Intervening States emphasize that the existence of a counter-insurgency objective should not rule out an inference of genocidal intent. (Written Observations of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, paras. 43, 45). 

Conclusion

The ‘only reasonable inference’ standard should be reformulated to protect the purpose and enforcement of the Genocide Convention. Multiple intents for State acts may coexist. The ICJ should clarify that the existence of an alternative intent for a State’s acts should not preclude a finding of genocidal intent.

Topics
Featured, General, International Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law, Public International Law
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