Beyond the Binary of War and Peace: Why the U.S., Israel, and Iran Must Return to Legal Intermediacy

Beyond the Binary of War and Peace: Why the U.S., Israel, and Iran Must Return to Legal Intermediacy

[Hadi Dadmehr is an Assistant Professor of international law at the University of Zabol, Iran. He holds B.A in political science from Allameh Tabatabai University (Iran), M.A. in international relations from Tehran University (Iran) and PhD in international law from National University of Iran (SBU).]

The United States, Israel, and Iran, which had previously cooperated strategically within a common public order system, became adversaries following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, finding themselves in a new relationship that defies classification within the conventional peace–war binary. Decades ago, Georg Schwarzenberger, Philip Jessup, and Myres McDougal emphasized the need to recognize a legal state of intermediacy or status mixtus, between peace and war. Professor Jessup identified three characteristics of this intermediate state which I argue aptly describe post-revolutionary relations among the United States, Israel, and Iran: 

  1. A basic condition of hostility and tension between the opposing parties;
  2. Issues fundamental and deep-rooted that the resolution of a single issue could not terminate them; and
  3. Absence of an intention or at least of a decision to resort to war as a means of resolving those issues.

From Criteria to Case: Iran, Israel, and the United States in the State of Intermediacy

Prior to the 2025–2026 war, all criteria of intermediacy were present in relations among Iran, Israel, and the United States. The hostility between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States dates back to the 1979 hostage crisis and the subsequent severance of their diplomatic relations. The crisis was reinforced by imposing U.S. sanctions on Iran and Washington’s support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War. Despite occasional diplomatic initiatives, relations between the two states were never normalized in the decades following the Islamic Revolution. Iran’s relations with Israel have likewise remained persistently hostile, influenced by the strategic partnership of U.S.–Israel and also the Islamic Republic’s support for the Palestinian cause. Taken together, the first characteristic of Jessup’s intermediacy state was present before the outbreak of the 2025–2026 war.

Second, the disputes separating these states are rooted in so fundamental antagonisms that cannot be overcome through the resolution of isolated issues. The recent failure of mediation efforts to secure a peaceful settlement underscores the depth of the underlying hostilities and the formidable obstacles to resolve them through diplomatic means. Iran’s enmity toward the United States is rooted primarily in the Islamic Republic’s ideological opposition to Western imperialism. Its hostility toward Israel likewise stems from religious and ideological considerations and manifested in its rejection of a Jewish state in the Middle East.

From its very beginning, anti-Americanism became an integral part of the Islamic Revolution’s identity. In line with the leftist discourse of the period, the revolutionaries framed the United States as an imperialist power and the embodiment of capitalism. Ayatollah Khomeini added a religious dimension to this antagonism by designating the United States as “the Great Satan” and denouncing its perceived role in promoting secularism among Muslims. The confluence of these ideological and religious narratives cemented the U.S as the Islamic Republic’s foremost adversary. In this regard, it is sufficient to note that the hostage crisis was of such importance that it came to be dubbed the “Second Revolution” – not merely a manifestation of 1979 Revolution, but a momentous event with its own distinctive impact (see Iran’s Grand Strategy, p.53). 

Like the United States, which was stigmatized as the “Great Satan,” Israel, frequently portrayed by the Islamic Republic as Little America, was branded the “Little Satan.” Opposition to Israel and Zionism became a defining feature of the Islamic Republic’s ideology. Iran continues to reject Israel’s historical claims to the territory under its control, maintaining that the establishment of the state of Israel was founded on the illegal use of force and the denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. 

As is evident, the antagonisms among Iran, Israel, and the United States extend well beyond specific bilateral issues. Indeed they are embedded in a broader ideological and historical context, and any agreement on nuclear or missile issues, however significant, would not resolve the deep-rooted sources of hostility underlying their relations.

Finally, the third criterion concerns the absence of an intention, or at least a decision, to resort to war as a means of resolving the problems. Prior to the 2025-2026 war, notwithstanding repeated threats, the parties held tensions below the threshold of war. This argument, however, is likely to be contested by the United States and Israel, both of which point to the Islamic Republic’s longstanding slogans of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” to the expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities, and to its extensive support for the so-called Axis of Resistance in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It is worth briefly examining the legal strength of these claims.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits both the use of force and the threat thereof. The International Court of Justice has clarified that the legality of threats to use force ultimately hinges on whether the envisaged use of force would itself be lawful under international law (ICJ Reports 1996, P. 226. para. 47). Furthermore, in its work on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission underscored the importance of the threats’ credibility: Threats of aggression consist of declarations, communications, demonstrations of force or any other measures which would give “good reason” to the Government of a State to believe that aggression is being “seriously contemplated” against that State. (Draft Code of Crimes P.297). This is the only way that a threat can be distinguished from “mere verbal excesses” (see here). Legal scholarship has identified at least three principal factors for assessing the credibility of a threat of force: its specificity, proximity, and directness (see here).

These considerations suggest that a threat is credible when its execution is reasonably plausible and the threatening state possesses both the capability and the will to carry it out. From this perspective, Iran’s threat to “wipe Israel off the map” may be no less rhetorical in nature than North Korea’s threats to “sink Japan” or reduce the United States to “ashes and darkness.” Trump and Netanyahu‘s invocation of the Islamic Republic’s threats as a justification for the use of force against Iran may be contested by reference to how the United States and Israel have historically construed such threats: In a striking irony, when Iranian leaders called for Israel’s destruction in the 1980s, Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in Washington – hoping to improve Israel’s relations with revolutionary Iran – pressed the United States not to pay attention to Iranian rhetoric! (Treacherous alliance P. xi. 110.)

Likewise, with regard to Iran’s military build-ups, the International Court of Justice held in the Nicaragua case that in international law there are no rules whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. para. 269). Even in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court did not consider the mere possession of nuclear weapons to constitute, per se, a threat to use force: Some States put forward the argument that possession of nuclear weapons is itself an unlawful threat to use force. Whether this is a “threat” contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 depends upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the United Nations. (ICJ Reports 1996, P. 226. para. 48.) 

By the same token, coalition-building, the establishment of military bases, or other manifestations of military force by Iran do not necessarily signal a decision to use force. To conclude otherwise would entail applying a standard that could equally invoked against the United States, given its comparable deployment of personnel and equipment in the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, in light of the persistent hostility, the fundamental sources of conflict, and the absence of an intention or decision to resort to war, it may be argued that a state of intermediacy characterized relations among Iran, Israel, and the United States prior to the outbreak of the recent war.

The Transition to War and Paths to De-escalation

The United States and Israel have used a range of justifications for their aggression against Iran. These included dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, imposing restriction on its missile capabilities, ending its support for regional proxy groups, and helping the Iranian people to attain liberty and exercise their right to self-determination. There was only one way to achieve these objectives: regime change. This was the objective Trump pursued following the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, when he demanded “unconditional surrender” and called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to “lay down their arms.” His calculations, however, proved mistaken, and Iran’s political system is still standing and, for the reasons set out below, is unlikely to collapse. The following discussion explores the main pathways for terminating the war between Iran and the United States–Israel.

The Ultimate Surrender of One of the Parties

As noted, Iran’s complete defeat is possible only through regime change. The United States and Israel have two main pathways for changing the Islamic Republic’s regime, neither currently available.

A Large-scale Ground Invasion

The Islamic Republic now faces what it perceives as an existential threat, following the killing of its political and military leaders in an ideological conflict. From Tehran’s perspective, resistance is imperative to the regime’s survival, even if it entails the risk of further airstrikes against Iran’s oil and energy infrastructure. The irreconcilable ideological confrontation noted earlier makes it unlikely that Iran would capitulate, as Serbia did in 1999 in response to NATO’s air campaign and the threat of a ground invasion. Indeed, the two phases of the recent war suggest that airpower alone is insufficient to overthrow the Iranian government. Defeating Iran’s armed forces would require a large-scale ground invasion. While the United States would be more likely to prevail in such a confrontation, it would definitely inflict heavy casualties that Trump and the MAGA movement would be highly unlikely to accept; furthermore, the experience of regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan casts serious doubt on the prospects for postwar stability in Iran. 

A Mass Revolution

It has been argued that airstrikes, the decapitation of Iran’s leadership, and economic sanctions were designed to foster a popular uprising that would bring about regime change from within. Political theorists, however, drawing on numerous historical examples, have repeatedly emphasized that revolution is a very rare phenomenon and that popular discontent do not, in itself, trigger the overthrow of a political system. Widespread grievances arising from poverty, corruption, and political repression – even when accompanied by a charismatic leader – supply only the “necessary conditions” for revolution. The “sufficient conditions,” by contrast, are the absence of (a) a coercive military apparatus capable of suppressing street protests and (b) the leaders’ political will to deploy it (see Brinton, Chorley, Trotsky, Russell). Without these conditions, popular unrest, however intense, is unlikely to culminate in revolution. Indeed, violent repression can rapidly transform public anger into public fear.

The Islamic Republic possesses both the coercive apparatus and the political resolve necessary to suppress street protests. Efforts by Trump and his supporters to arm the Iranian people against the government are likewise unlikely to bring about regime change. Rather, such efforts risk escalating the confrontation into a bloody civil war and further increasing the death toll. If the United States and Israel were to contemplate a scenario in which large-scale civilian killings reached the threshold of crimes against humanity – potentially giving rise to calls for invoking the responsibility to protect (R2P) – European participation in such an operation would remain highly unlikely. Several factors would weigh against it: U.S. unilateralism in initiating the war against Iran while sidelining Ukraine; doubts about the sincerity of Trump’s humanitarian intentions, given his statements about the oil reserves of Iran and Venezuela; the risk of re-opening the Greenland case if the U.S. succeeded in resolving the Iran case; and concerns that such an intervention could serve the Israeli government’s strategic interests, a government that been widely condemned in Europe for its alleged war crimes in Gaza. Thus neither of the two conceivable pathways to regime change appears viable.

Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

In light of the foregoing analysis of intermediacy, the prospect of such a compromise among Iran, Israel, and the United States is improbable so long as the Islamic Republic remains in power.

An Armistice Agreement and Return to the Legal State of Intermediacy

Realistically, any ceasefire between Iran and the United States – including the two concluded after the 12-day war (24 June 2025–28 February 2026) and the 40-day war (7 April–17 June 2026) – would, more or less, culminate in an arrangement like the 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU). In the MOU, which is a form of armistice agreement, the parties agreed to terminate hostilities on all fronts without establishing peaceful relations and to respect each other’s political independence and territorial integrity. Although the agreement was breached shortly thereafter and the parties resumed thirteen consecutive nights of tit-for-tat strikes (11 July 2026-23 July 2026), they have now tacitly accepted the limited military operations. In this situation, Iran – whatever its official statements – does not regard the naval blockade as an act of full-scale war and in practice launches no military response to lift it. The United States, for its part, tolerates Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as part of Iran’s asymmetric response to its blockade. To move beyond the current situation, the parties can at best return to the state of intermediacy that preceded the war.

Meanwhile, international law can help manage intermediacy by recognizing it as a distinct situation in international relations. A proper understanding of this situation requires to look beyond the black-letter law and examine more closely the broader political processes in which these hostilities are embedded. It is incoherent to treat war as a legal concept while simultaneously adopting such a narrow conception of law that it precludes regulating the intermediacy among three UN Member States. Equally misguided is the assumption that regulating interstate hostilities in this situation – for instance, the conditional permissibility of reprisals during intermediacy – entails legitimizing the situation itself (see also here). Such an assumption would be as implausible as the notion that, by defining the rules of jus ad bellum, international law has legitimized the war. Jessup rightly reminds us that:

 If the mind is wedded to the idea that there is no alternative between peace and war and the actualities seem to deny that there is “peace,” the argument for war seems to command the support of a certain logic if nothing else. If one were accustomed to the idea of “intermediacy,” it can be argued that the likelihood of the outbreak of “total war” would be diminished. 

In such circumstances, negotiations as the primary means of peaceful dispute settlement are likely to proceed on a more realistic basis, while partial and incomplete agreements such as the 2026 MOU, may be less vulnerable to breakdown.

Conclusion

An examination of Iran–United States–Israel relations since 1979 reveals that, given the parties’ adherence to two conflicting systems of public order, their situation defies the peace–war dichotomy. Between the poles of peace and war lies a continuum of coercive interactions that international law could regulate within the limits of international order. In this way, rather than pursuing the unattainable goal of achieving total victory through Carthaginian peace, the parties must – to borrow Jessup‘s phrase – recognize that the verbs used in relation to war, namely ‘win’ and ‘lose,’ might have no applicability to intermediacy. The problems shaping Iran–Israel–United States relations, like many other intractable problems in the world, have no quick or definitive solutions. The parties must therefore acknowledge that their ultimate challenge may lie not in overcoming intermediacy, but in learning to live with it. In extreme circumstances, where peaceful means of dispute settlement have failed and the Security Council is unable to address ongoing hostilities, the parties may invoke as a last resort to the international customary right of self-defense to carry out the limited military operations. In any event, resorting to full-scale war would be unlawful in the intermediacy situation. This interpretation is more troublesome for lawyers who conceive law as a set of rigid rules than for those who view law as an ongoing process of problem-solving decision-making. In any event, the intermediate points of the war continuum do not disappear simply because they have not been formally recognized by international law.

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