How Much Weight for ILO Supervisory Bodies? The ICJ’s One-Size-Fits-All Approach

How Much Weight for ILO Supervisory Bodies? The ICJ’s One-Size-Fits-All Approach

[Leonardo David Lima Valdés is a Mexican lawyer in the Legal Adviser’s Office of Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he works on international litigation and legal issues before international courts and organizations. He was a member of the Mexican delegation in the ICJ advisory proceedings on the right to strike under ILO Convention No. 87. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Mexico or any institution with which the author is affiliated.]

During its 349th bis (special) session, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) decided to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”): Is the right to strike of workers and their organizations protected under the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)?

On 21 May 2026, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion. By ten votes to four, the Court affirmed that the right to strike of workers and their organizations is protected under Convention No. 87. Although this treaty does not expressly mention strikes, the Court held that the ordinary meaning of its relevant terms, in particular Articles 2, 3(1), and 10, read in good faith, in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, indicates that protection of the right to strike is encompassed in the protection of freedom of association. 

The Court also relied on other interpretative tools under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). It found no subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties under Article 31(3)(b) but considered the ICCPR and ICESCR as relevant rules under Article 31(3)(c). It also resorted to supplementary means under Article 32 to confirm its interpretation, reviewing the preparatory work of Convention No. 87, subsequent State practice, regional instruments and case law, and the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies. Against that background, this post turns to the Court’s decision to ascribe “great weight” to ILO supervisory bodies by analogy with its earlier treatment of human rights treaty bodies.

The problem is not that the Court ignored differences between ILO supervisory bodies and human rights treaty bodies; it expressly acknowledged them. The problem is that it did not explain which differences matter, or how those differences affect the degree of interpretative weight to be accorded to their pronouncements. This post argues that a contextual assessment should distinguish two related questions: what institutional grounds and State acceptance support reliance on a pronouncement, and how persuasive is the particular interpretation? The first inquiry considers institutional origin, mandate and State reception; while the second examines independence, expertise, procedures and reasoning. Their interaction should explain the weight attributed, rather than leave “great weight” as a label whose implications remain uncertain.

ILO Supervisory Bodies

The Court treated ILO supervisory bodies as important but not authoritative interpreters of Convention No. 87. It considered that their pronouncements do not themselves create “subsequent practice” under VCLT Article 31(3)(b), contrary to what some participants argued (Advisory Opinion, paras. 78-83). But it affirmed that they matter in two ways. First, if States react to or adopt them, they may help show State practice. Second, even without full State agreement, they may be used as supplementary means of interpretation under VCLT Article 32. The Court then said it could ascribe “great weight” to their pronouncements, while stressing that it was not bound to follow them.

The ILO supervisory system includes regular supervision by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (“CEACR”) and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (“CAS”). The CEACR, composed of 20 experts serving in their individual capacity, reviews State reports on the application of the fundamental ILO conventions, including Convention No. 87, and issues observations, direct requests, and General Surveys. The CAS has a tripartite composition, comprising governments as well as employers’ and workers’ organizations, and reviews States’ compliance with their obligations pursuant to ILO Conventions, including through the consideration of individual cases. 

Additionally, there are special supervisory procedures, including Commissions of Inquiry and the Committee on Freedom of Association (“CFA”). Commissions of Inquiry are established by the Governing Body, pursuant to Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, to consider complaints submitted by an ILO Member regarding the failure of another Member State to give effect to any convention which both States have ratified. The CFA, composed of 18 members who serve in an individual capacity and are drawn in equal proportion from a tripartite composition similar to that of the CAS, was set up by the ILO Governing Body to undertake the preliminary examination of complaints related to alleged infringements of trade union rights.

The “Great Weight” Standard

The Court recalled that it had previously taken account of the practice of supervisory committees established under human rights conventions. In Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, it ascribed “great weight” to the interpretation adopted by the Human Rights Committee, established by Article 28 of the ICCPR, whose members serve in their personal capacity (Merits, Judgment, para. 66). The Court highlighted in that case that the Committee was an independent body “established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty”. The Court made a similar statement regarding the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, established pursuant to Article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in Qatar v. United Arab Emirates (Preliminary Objections, Judgment, para. 101).

In the Advisory Opinion, the Court recognized that the “supervisory bodies of the ILO differ from the expert treaty bodies with which the Court has previously dealt, owing to their specific characteristics” (Advisory Opinion, para. 118). It nevertheless considered that it could, mutatis mutandis, ascribe “great weight” to the pronouncements of ILO supervisory bodies as a supplementary means of interpretation, since they perform a similar function, namely monitoring the proper implementation of the provisions of the convention under their supervision. Therefore, the criticism is not that the Court expressly assigned identical weight to every pronouncement, but that it left the required adjustments unexplained. 

Three judges addressed specifically the issue of the “great weight” standard. Judge Nolte stated that the formulation used in Diallo should not be used to ascribe “great weight” to all pronouncements made by treaty bodies, since each body has different roles, mandates, procedures, composition and operational contexts (Nolte, Separate Opinion, para. 46). Judge Bhandari emphasized that the case called for the term “due weight” instead, since the ILO supervisory bodies operate within a different institutional framework from the committees previously analyzed by the Court, and their practices do not necessarily reflect the same degree of judicial or quasi-judicial authority (Bhandari, Declaration, paras. 17-18). 

Judge Tomka presented the strongest critique (Tomka, Dissenting Opinion, paras. 58-62). He argued that “the weight to be accorded to the interpretations of treaty bodies can only be assessed by carefully scrutinizing the interpretive reasoning on which those views rest”, and that a closer examination of the ILO supervisory bodies’ pronouncements would reveal that they are not entitled to judicial deference because of their methodology. He also challenged the qualification of these bodies as expert treaty bodies, arguing that this category refers to bodies established under the treaty being interpreted, not to organs of an international organization. 

These objections reveal two concerns: the institutional basis for giving a body’s views particular consideration, and the quality of the reasoning supporting those views. They do not establish that “great weight” is reserved for bodies created by the treaties they supervise, nor would replacing “great” with “due” weight explain how either concern should be addressed.

A Contextual Assessment of Interpretative Weight

The International Law Commission’s 2026 first-reading draft conclusions on subsidiary means support a contextual approach to assessing the weight of expert bodies’ pronouncements, including when used as supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Conclusions 4 and 11 identify criteria including mandate, State reception, expertise, reasoning and methodology. The commentary expressly discusses this Advisory Opinion and connects the weight of a particular pronouncement to those criteria (Commentary to conclusion 10, paras. 21-22). The proposed two inquiries organize these considerations.

The first inquiry concerns the institutional basis for reliance and the relationship between the body’s work and States parties. As Judge Tomka’s concern suggests, a body established by the treaty being interpreted derives its mandate directly from the consent of the States parties to that treaty, at least within the limits of the functions conferred on it. That is different from a body established within the institutional framework of an international organization, whose relationship to the treaty under interpretation, however close in practice, may be more attenuated. The importance of that difference also depends on the functions entrusted to the body and their relationship to the interpretation under consideration.

Within this inquiry, State reception complements the examination of institutional origin and mandate by showing how States parties have responded to the body’s interpretations. Acceptance may strengthen the reasons for reliance, while contestation requires identifying what is disputed: the body’s competence, its reasoning, or the relevant conclusion. These objections have different implications and do not automatically eliminate interpretative value. Meanwhile, silence should not simply be treated as acceptance. 

The second inquiry concerns the persuasiveness of the interpretation under assessment. Independence, relevant expertise and procedures that expose opposing positions to scrutiny provide reasons for confidence in a body’s work. Nevertheless, individual pronouncements may differ in their persuasiveness. The interpreter must therefore examine how the body connects its relevant conclusion to the treaty’s text, context and object and purpose, and how it addresses contrary arguments. Expertise matters through its contribution to sound analysis; institutional reputation cannot substitute for an examination of that analysis.

The factors operate together through the reasons they supply for reliance. A supervisory mandate explains why an interpretation deserves attention; expertise and sound reasoning explain why it should persuade; State acceptance may reinforce both. Conversely, a relevant mandate cannot cure a poorly reasoned interpretation, and State disagreement does not necessarily defeat otherwise convincing reasoning. Where the considerations diverge, the interpreter should identify the disputed point and explain why the remaining grounds justify the weight accorded. 

The limited scope of the ILO’s request for an Advisory Opinion nevertheless calls for caution in applying this approach to the present case. As Judge Nolte observed, the Court’s silence may be explained by the way the question was framed, since the ILO asked whether Convention No. 87 protects the right to strike, not whether ILO supervisory bodies had competence to determine that issue authoritatively (Nolte, Separate Opinion, para. 47). However, an explanation of the grounds for reliance on those bodies’ pronouncements could have clarified the significance of “great weight” without purporting to settle the competence question. This matters for future cases because the pronouncements of different supervisory bodies may warrant different interpretative weight.

In the earlier cases, the Court’s justification was closely connected to the independence and specific supervisory role of bodies established under the treaties being interpreted. In the present Advisory Opinion, the Court extends the same language to institutionally different bodies relying on their similar supervisory function. Although this may not establish a general standard for all expert bodies, it makes it necessary to clarify the grounds for differentiation. Without explaining what justifies the weight accorded in each case, “great weight” risks becoming a common formula that obscures distinct reasons for relying on different bodies’ interpretations. 

Conclusion

The Court was right not to treat ILO supervisory bodies as binding interpreters of Convention No. 87. It was also right not to disregard decades of supervisory practice. The difficulty lies in the step between those two propositions. The grounds for attributing particular weight should be made explicit through an assessment of institutional context, State reception and the persuasiveness of the interpretation. “Great weight” should express the outcome of that assessment, not stand in for it.

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