03 Nov Binding Caution: The ICC’s Amended Code of Judicial Ethics and a Bench Under Pressure
[Dr. Tuğba Tosun Çobanoğlu is an independent interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of law, human rights and legal psychology.]
On 16 October 2026, a short amendment entered into force at the International Criminal Court. At their annual retreat on 29 September, the judges agreed to amend the Code of Judicial Ethics. A new paragraph 3 of Article 10 requires them to exercise caution when using social media and other information technologies, and to be aware of the impact on safety, security and public trust in the Court. The amendments also rewrote Article 12: the Code’s standards are now declared binding, and non-compliance “may constitute misconduct or breach of duty as defined in articles 46 and 47 of the Statute and rules 24 and 25 of the Rules” (revised Code; ICC press release). Coming in a year of sustained external pressure on the Court and its judges, the changes carry more weight than their brevity suggests.
The revised Code expressly links ethical compliance to the existing disciplinary framework. That is a sound starting point. The question now is how digital caution should operate within that framework, especially when judges face threats and restrictions on their access to digital services. The Court should accompany the amendment with practical guidance and institutional support that protect judicial independence as well as public confidence.
What Changed
The Code was adopted in 2005 and revised in 2021 and 2022. Before the latest amendment, Article 12 described its principles as guidelines on the essential ethical standards required of judges. That language remained in the 2022 version, although it did not settle the Code’s legal significance. Commenting on the 2021 revision, Michael Karnavas observed that its obligatory character had gone unacknowledged, at least by some judges. The 2026 amendment therefore makes binding force explicit rather than establishing that the earlier Code had no obligatory character.
The new Article 12(2) also identifies the legal framework through which non-compliance may become misconduct or breach of duty. Its reference to Articles 46 and 47 of the Rome Statute and Rules 24 and 25 matters. It locates disciplinary responsibility within existing definitions rather than making every ethical lapse an autonomous disciplinary offence. Article 1(1) already requires the Code to be read subject to the Statute, Rules and Regulations. Article 12(3) retains the assurance that nothing in the Code is intended to limit or restrict judicial independence.
Article 10(3) should be read with these safeguards. Its second sentence expressly applies existing principles of responsible communication, integrity, judicial independence, impartiality and fairness to digital communications. Article 10(2), meanwhile, continues to recognise judges’ freedom to participate in public debate on legal subjects, the judiciary and the administration of justice, while restricting comments on pending cases and views that may undermine the Court’s standing and integrity. Digital caution operates within that combination of permission and restraint.
Giving Digital Caution Practical Content
The remaining challenge is one of application. A duty to exercise caution does not tell a judge how particular platform functions will be assessed. Following an advocacy account may serve a research purpose; sharing a news report may convey information without endorsing its framing. A colleague’s post may combine professional news with political commentary. Identifying oneself as an ICC judge may provide useful context while increasing the likelihood that personal activity will be attributed to the Court.
These are hypothetical examples, not reports of misconduct by ICC judges. Their value is to identify distinctions that guidance should address. Following, sharing and endorsing should not automatically be treated as equivalent. The content, context, audience and connection to judicial duties may affect how an activity is understood. Guidance should also explain how reasonable precautions and a judge’s response to an accidental interaction bear on an assessment under the applicable disciplinary rules.
Domestic experience illustrates the importance of those details. In 2024, Deputy Senior District Judge Tanweer Ikram received a formal warning after inadvertently liking a LinkedIn post. The nominated judge accepted that the like was neither deliberate nor the result of carelessness. But the official disciplinary statement also records that he had identified himself as a judge contrary to social media guidance, heightening the risk to public confidence. The final decision considered both the guidance breach and the reputational damage. The example shows why account presentation and surrounding circumstances require attention alongside the interaction itself.
The ICC need not publish an exhaustive catalogue of permissible clicks. It should make the relevant distinctions intelligible. Without guidance, judges may respond to uncertainty by avoiding even participation that Article 10(2) permits. That is a prospective risk, not an established finding about the amendment’s effects. It deserves consideration precisely because judicial restraint should remain compatible with lawful professional and academic engagement.
Accountability and Predictable Application
The recent debate over the Court’s disciplinary regime makes this task particularly timely. On 24 July 2026, the Assembly of States Parties removed Prosecutor Karim Khan from office after finding serious misconduct and serious breach of duty (ASP announcement). On this blog, Ezequiel Jimenez Martinez and Sergey Vasiliev questioned aspects of the process, including changes to the applicable rules during the proceedings and the handling of the votes. Their argument links the legitimacy of disciplinary authority to stable norms and predictable procedure.
The judicial amendment expressly refers to the governing disciplinary provisions. The relevant lesson is that a sound textual framework also needs consistent application. Clarifying digital conduct before disputes arise would help judges understand their obligations and assist those responsible for assessing complaints. Any guidance should remain interpretive and should not lower the thresholds established by the Statute and Rules.
Restraint Under External Pressure
The amendment also addresses judges whose public exposure is partly imposed on them. In its statement of 19 August 2026, the Court reported that nine of its eighteen judges were under United States sanctions, including its President. Judge Kimberly Prost described losing access to Google and Amazon accounts in a Guardian interview. Protective guidance should account for disruption of communication channels.
The United States also announced sanctions against the Court itself in October. The Dutch Foreign Minister’s statement of 9 October stressed that those measures would not take effect immediately and identified a six-month period during which service providers could continue their work. That institutional development should be distinguished from restrictions already experienced by individual judges.
External pressure does not suspend ethical duties or justify commentary on pending cases. It does, however, affect the conditions in which restraint is exercised. A judge may face inaccurate personal allegations, threats, or questions about the practical effects of sanctions. An institution asking that judge to avoid direct public confrontation should make clear where assistance can be sought and how a response will be considered.
The Court already speaks publicly in defence of its personnel: its August statement expressly affirmed that support. The issue is therefore how general institutional solidarity translates into accessible arrangements for individual situations. Article 10(3)’s express concern with safety and security provides a reason to address those arrangements alongside the risks posed by judges’ own communications.
Institutional Support for Judicial Restraint
Three practical steps would help implement the revised Code.
First, the judges could publish guidance addressing digital interactions and their relationship to Articles 10 and 12. It should include examples of permitted professional engagement and explain how context, accidental activity and reasonable precautions are considered. The UNODC Global Judicial Integrity Network’s non-binding guidelines on social media use offer a useful reference. They address platform settings, privacy and conduct as well as the need for judicial training. ICC guidance should reflect the particular demands of international criminal adjudication and be reviewed as platforms change.
Second, the Court could identify a confidential point of contact for ethical advice and digital security assistance, using or strengthening existing arrangements where appropriate. Judges should know where to seek help with account compromises, threatening messages or uncertainty about a proposed interaction. Advice on ethical conduct should be distinguishable from the procedure for investigating complaints, with clear terms explaining its scope and confidentiality.
Third, the Presidency could explain how requests for an institutional response to attacks on individual judges will be assessed. The UNODC guidelines advise judges against directly answering online abuse or harassment and encourage judiciaries to provide guidance on handling it. A public response may sometimes amplify an attack or expose sensitive information; in other circumstances, a factual correction may protect both the individual and confidence in the Court. Judges should have a clear route to request that assessment without having to answer publicly themselves.
These proposals concern the clarity and accessibility of institutional support, including arrangements already in place. They ask the Court to make the relationship between ethical expectations, advice and institutional protection clear. States Parties should support the resources needed for those arrangements, particularly where external restrictions impair access to essential services.
Conclusion
The revised Code makes its binding character explicit and anchors possible disciplinary responsibility in the existing legal framework. Its implementation should preserve that discipline while giving practical content to digital caution. Clear guidance can help judges distinguish legitimate engagement from conduct that threatens impartiality; accessible institutional support can help them respond appropriately when they are themselves targeted. The Court should develop those protections together so that restraint remains compatible with judicial independence and personal security.