Search: self-defense

...argument that the declarations actually constitute inadmissible reservations or are otherwise unacceptable). Second, from a U.S. law stand-point there’s the question of the Senate’s ability to make a declaration of self-execution, which I don’t think it has ever done before, at least not in the resolution of advice and consent itself (past SFRC reports have, of course, expressed opinions on whether the SFRC understood the treaty to be self-executing in one or more senses of that term, or otherwise dependent on ex-ante or ex-post legislation in some way). At a...

...the decolonization context. Second, the right to self-determination in most instances authorizes a people to exercise its right to internal self-determination, which is typically reflected in a right to form a regional government and/or have other cultural, linguistic, and religious rights respected by the mother state. The right to self-determination, outside of the decolonization context, may lead to the secessionist type of external self-determination only in extreme instances where the mother state chooses to completely disrespect the people’s right to internal self-determination. According to the Canadian Supreme Court in the...

...State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.’ Obviously, this provision was created in the context of decolonization, but if the right to self-determination is applicable...

...been interesting to analyse this change of view. In relation to the second question, on the potential exercise of self-determination by these rebel groups on behalf of the Libyan and Syrian people, the answer does not seem to be easy, as Redaelli observes. On the one hand, in its external dimension, most authors have stated that the right to self-determination cannot be exercised outside the context of colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes. On the other hand, in its internal dimension, the right to self-determination involves the right to...

...consequently, there will be no international crime of killing those peacekeepers (provided other IHL violations, such as a disproportionate attack, did not occur). Yet, aside from the purely evidentiary challenges and factual complexity of these cases, the Prosecutor’s investigation is also bound to raise more fundamental legal questions about the nature of peacekeeping. Given that many attacks occurred in different locations in the space of a few days (para. 164 and 176), the question is when individual self-defense (allowed for peacekeepers) reaches the threshold of direct participation in hostilities (not...

...the lawyers’ pre-raid analysis – meaning that even if one did not buy the “unwilling or unable” theory, or anything else about the raid, it wouldn’t have mattered. The UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing treaties under U.S. law, the theory is, so the President is not legally bound. This view embraces a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine of self-execution, before and even after the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin. A non-self-executing treaty under U.S. law is one that is not automatically enforceable under U.S. law without...

...Mindua emphasises, was an exercise of the right of self-determination, which he describes as a pillar of international law [15]. In this way, Judge Mindua begins his analysis by focusing on a jus ad bellum in which the fight for self-determination is a legitimate and justified struggle.  Judge Mindua then engages in a theoretical discussion about why non-state actors, such as Ansar Dine/AQIM, are subjects of international humanitarian law. Again, this theoretical question is not at issue in the case. The Prosecution only had to show that Ansar Dine/AQIM demonstrated...

...was delivered by a 13-1 majority: According to the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice in the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, self-determination had emerged as a norm of customary international law between the years 1965 and 1968. These years coincided with the PLO’s self-determination claim to Palestine. And in the colonial context self-determination claims were also claims about sovereignty. It could, of course, be argued that the Palestinian people did not need to base their self-determination claim on customary international law, since the UN had already...

...this approach. In that decision, the Supreme Court interpreted a key provision of the U.N. Charter obligating the U.S. to comply with International Court of Justice as non-self executing, thus relieving U.S. courts from any obligation to implement an ICJ’s judgment. In my view, the relevant language could have been interpreted as either self-executing or non-self-executing, but the structural tensions created by a self-executing interpretation tipped the balance. The decision of whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment was rightly left to either the State of Texas or...

...not self-executing, although it might be a stretch to say it holds as much. The Chief’s majority opinion does strongly reject the dissenters’ opposite presumption, and that is important in itself. But keep in mind that the Chief carefully distinguishes between the different ways that treaties may or may not be self-executing. The Vienna Convention is plainly self-executing in that it binds the Houston police to give warnings without further implementing legislation, and it may be self-executing in the sense that individuals can assert violations on their own in court...

...proceeding in the Military Commissions at Guantanamo on December 5, 2007: ""MJ [Military Judge]: Okay. Well this is a very interesting question and I appreciate your argument. I am not sure what the answer is. Does the defense want to respond to that last question about section 948b subsection (g) [of the 2006 MCA]? CDC [Mr. Joe McMillan, civilian defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor, if I may very quickly. Colonel Britt did indeed correctly anticipate the defense's response to the question from the court concerning subpart (g) of 948b. The...

stand-by counsel. Should a time come when the Trial Chamber feels justified to make such a decision, the Rule 44 list of counsel should be provided to Seselj and he should be permitted to select stand-by counsel from that list. Alternatively, should the full restoration of Seselj’s right to self-representation fail to curb his obstructionist behaviour, the Trial Chamber would be permitted to assign counsel to Seselj. Again, such decision may only be taken once Seselj has been given a real chance to effectively exercise the right to self-representation and...