Search: self-defense

entitled to determine their political fate in accordance with the right to self-determination. Furthermore, this prohibition applies to all territories occupied by force, even if it is claimed that force was initially used in an act of self-defense. The West Bank was taken by force in 1967. It has been consistently recognized by the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the International Court of Justice as an occupied territory, in which the Palestinian people is entitled to fulfill its right to self-determination. This remains so even if bilateral...

...was delivered by a 13-1 majority: According to the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice in the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, self-determination had emerged as a norm of customary international law between the years 1965 and 1968. These years coincided with the PLO’s self-determination claim to Palestine. And in the colonial context self-determination claims were also claims about sovereignty. It could, of course, be argued that the Palestinian people did not need to base their self-determination claim on customary international law, since the UN had already...

...is meant as an argument of opting into “fair” distributions, by means of ones own self-interest (The veil of ignorance aims to extend this self interest to an a-historical situation). Although in later work, Rawls does seem to make concessions to more Kantian and communitarian claims, self-interest remains a primary engine of the original position-construct. There also lies the key issue with which I’m struggling: universal appeal of anything, and thus also ius cogens, seems very far away from the Rawlsian distribution theory. It is rather assumed that there are...

...proceeding in the Military Commissions at Guantanamo on December 5, 2007: ""MJ [Military Judge]: Okay. Well this is a very interesting question and I appreciate your argument. I am not sure what the answer is. Does the defense want to respond to that last question about section 948b subsection (g) [of the 2006 MCA]? CDC [Mr. Joe McMillan, civilian defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor, if I may very quickly. Colonel Britt did indeed correctly anticipate the defense's response to the question from the court concerning subpart (g) of 948b. The...

stand-by counsel. Should a time come when the Trial Chamber feels justified to make such a decision, the Rule 44 list of counsel should be provided to Seselj and he should be permitted to select stand-by counsel from that list. Alternatively, should the full restoration of Seselj’s right to self-representation fail to curb his obstructionist behaviour, the Trial Chamber would be permitted to assign counsel to Seselj. Again, such decision may only be taken once Seselj has been given a real chance to effectively exercise the right to self-representation and...

one who does not accept the claim that a state can use military force prior to the initiation of a process of "armed attack" within the unavoidable language and meaning of UN article 51 and general patterns of practice and opinio juris. Therefore, I would not accept the claim by many that "anticipatory" self-defense (prior to the start of an armed attack) should be permissible; and these claimants do not accept the claim by a few that "preemptive" self-defense should be tolerated even when there is no alleged imminent attack...

...prevail over Charter obligations. My central question is again what is the Security Council saying or doing? Jordan It would fit with the U.N. Charter if the U.S. was engaged in collective self-defense with the consent of the Iraqi government. Self-defense and collective self-defense per a multilateral treaty does fit within the President's constitutionally-based duty faithfully to execute the Laws. See http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061835 A question would also be whether the President is claiming presidential power to faithfully execute the Genocide Convention and relevant CIL. P I don't think so Jordan. Assuming...

In a thoughtful opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, finding that the VCCR is self-executing but does not confer an individual right. For any treaty to be susceptible to judicial enforcement it must both confer individual rights and be self-executing. There is no question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing. As such, it has the force of domestic law without the need for implementing legislation by Congress. But “the questions of whether a treaty is self-executing and whether it creates private rights and remedies are analytically distinct.” “While a...

Now that I’ve had a chance to read through the ICJ’s advisory opinion, following are a few initial reactions. (I will consider the separate opinions in another post.) Marko Milanovic has done a great job parsing the main issues that were at bar, namely 1. Whether the ICJ should exercise advisory jurisdiction in this case; 2. How broadly or narrowly the question posed by the General Assembly should be interpreted; 3. The legality of the declaration of independence in light of the international law of self determination; and, 4. The...

(also claimed by Japan) and the Ieodo/Suyan Rock (also claimed by South Korea). To the extent those territories are “national airspace”, China can argue that it should be allowed to draw an ADIZ around them to ensure any airplanes coming near them will not enter that airspace, etc. As Zachary Keck suggests, China is using the ADIZ to subtly build its legal claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands. Hence, China is probably invoking the UN Charter’s self-defense provision to justify its ADIZ and its need for all foreign aircraft...

...this discussion is, after all, about application of a potential defense. I assume the thrust of the argument is that this is a potential but ultimately ineffective theory of defense for a charge directed towards the CIA personnel who executed these orders. But in the end, isn't that why the judgment on what was "reasonable" in application of the defense is a question of fact for the finder of fact? What I can agree on is that it would be a tough defense to prevail upon, even if the interrogation...

...even its nationals abroad, any one of which falls much more firmly within the scope of presidential authority. Why not? Because he knows his asserted causus belli for attacking Syria falls outside the scope of national self-defense or the defense or rescue of U.S. nationals abroad. Instead, it is a broad protection of ‘national security’ interests that ostensibly triggers inherent Article II war initiation authority. This broad assertion of unilateral executive war making authority is unsupported by either historic practice or generally accepted interpretations of Article II powers. Indeed, if...