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China’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Casually Slanders the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal

by Julian Ku

I have been trying to move on from writing about the blockbuster UN Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitral award on the South China Sea.  As our readers know, I have written way too much on this topic lately.  But the Chinese government’s outrageous statements criticizing the award deserve one last post from me before I head out for a South China Sea-free vacation this summer.

In particular, I wanted to turn our readers’ focus on statements such as those made by China’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Zhenmin, shortly after the award was released.  In his remarks denigrating the arbitral tribunal, Liu implied that the arbitrators may have been bribed to adopt the views of the Philippines in the award.  Below is an excerpt of a transcript of his remarks:

Besides, who supported the Arbitral Tribunal? The arbitrators are paid by certain parties, but who? Maybe by the Philippines or other countries. This system is completely different from the ICJ or the ITLOS.

Judges of the ICJ or the ITLOS receive salaries from the UN for the sake of independence and impartiality. But these five judges of the Arbitral Tribunal are doing it for a profit, and their payments come from the Philippines and probably others, too. We are unsure about the details but they do provide paid services.

These comments are outrageous on so many levels.   Liu knows, or should know, that the arbitrators were paid by the government of the Philippines.  The tribunal announced publicly in its Rules of Procedure Article 31-33 that it was exercising its treaty powers under Article 7 of Annex VII to UNCLOS to require payment from both parties. But Liu also knows that the only reason the arbitrators received all of their compensation from the Phillippines government is because China refused to participate and refused to pay its share. If China had actually showed up, it would have been obligated under Article 7 of UNCLOS Annex VII to pay half of the fees.  There is no evidence, and Liu cites none, that any government other than the Philippines paid the arbitrators.  Liu also conveniently fails to mention his own government’s failure to pay its fair share.

Such payments are almost always made in advance of the award being issued, or even before the proceedings begin.  In other words, the payments could not influence the award’s contents because the Philippines did not know the content of the award before they made their payments.

This manner of compensating arbitrators is so standard and unremarkable that China’s own leading commercial arbitration organization, CIETAC, allows in Rule III.C.1 for one party to pay fees for the entire arbitration even if the other party does not show up and refuses to pay its own share.   This is essentially the situation that the Philippines found itself in.  It could continue to demand that the Tribunal seek money from China for its share of the expenses, or it could pay up. It chose to pay China’s share as well, and (as a reward) is now being lambasted by China for doing so.

Vice-Minister Liu is not a party hack who doesn’t know anything about arbitration.  He is, in fact, on the roster of arbitrators available for appointment by the Permanent Court of Arbitration and he is a arbitrator of the aforementioned CIETAC.  In other words, Liu knows exactly how arbitration works, and he is feigning ignorance in order to defame the character of the UNCLOS arbitrators.

In the same press conference, Liu also claimed that UNCLOS arbitration is some sort of aberration that has never happened before, unlike the more established ICJ or ITLOS systems.  On this point, Liu is flatly incorrect. In fact, there have already been seven UNCLOS arbitrations convened under the exact same rules that were applied to the Philippines/China arbitration.  In fact, as Liu well knows, the Chinese government freely chose arbitration instead of the ICJ or ITLOS for any dispute settlement under UNCLOS.

When acceding to UNCLOS, China could have chosen under Article 287 to specify the ICJ or ITLOS as its preferred forum for dispute settlement.  It did not do so, thereby forcing any dispute involving China to be sent to UNCLOS arbitration pursuant to Article 287(5).  In other words, the Chinese government made a conscious choice to avoid the ICJ and ITLOS for disputes arising under UNCLOS.  It is astounding for one of China’s leading diplomats to denigrate the integrity of a system of dispute settlement that China freely chose and in fact demanded.

Liu’s borderline defamatory remarks matter even if China and the Philippines eventually work out a settlement of their dispute.  Liu has knowingly denigrated the integrity of five arbitrators – three of whom continue to sit on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – using facts he almost certainly knows are false. As the esteemed Professor Jerome Cohen of NYU has noted, in many jurisdictions, this could be enough to constitute defamation or slander.  Since Liu would have immunity for his remarks, perhaps the softer sanctions could be imposed, such as demanding his resignation from the PCA’s roster of arbitrators or perhaps his removal from the position as an Associate Member of UNIDROIT.  At the very least, this sort of casual character assassination should not be forgotten nor forgiven.

Russia and the DNC Hack: What Future for a Duty of Non-Intervention?

by Duncan Hollis

There are lots of important issues implicated by this morning’s above-the-fold story in the New York Times that U.S. officials and certain cybersecurity experts (e.g., Crowdstrike) have concluded Russian government agencies bear responsibility for hacking the Democratic National Committee’s servers and leaking internal e-mails stored on them to Wikileaks (Russian responsibility for the hack itself was alleged more than a month ago).  The domestic fall-out is already on evidence with the resignation of Debbie Wasserman Schultz and I’m sure we’ll see other impacts here in Philadelphia at this week’s Convention (although Senator Sanders so far is not using the event to walk back his endorsement of Hillary Clinton). U.S. national security officials are treating the news as a national security and counter-intelligence issue (as they absolutely should).

But what does international law have to say about a foreign government obtaining and leaking e-mails about another country’s on-going election processes? This is obviously not a case violating Article 2(4) since that only prohibits the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and there’s no force at work in the current distribution of data otherwise intended to remain confidential.  But alongside the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, customary international law has long recognized a ‘duty of non-intervention’ that applies to State behavior in cases falling short of the use of force.  The question then becomes whether the duty applies to this case and if so to what end?  For my part, I see at least three distinct sets of issues:  (i) attribution; (ii) the duty’s scope; (iii) the relevance of international law more generally to cyber security incidents like this one.

1. Attribution — Did Russia do this?  Attribution has both a factual and a legal element, both of which are at issue in the DNC case.  Factually, there’s the question of who actually perpetrated these hacks — the hacker(s) named Guccifer 2.0 claims responsibility but cybersecurity investigators suggest two separate penetrations tied to two different Russian hacker groups, “Cozy Bear” and “Fancy Bear” (international lawyers take note of how much more fun cybersecurity officials have in naming stuff than we do).  Making the factual case of who did what in hacks such as this is always difficult even as recent technological advancements have improved the ability to trace-back in certain cases. Just as importantly, however, there’s always the possibility of a ‘false flag’ where the true perpetrator goes to great lengths to make investigators think some other actor was responsible (i.e, planting evidence/code in a particular language or using coding patterns associated with a particular group of actors).  Ironically, the potential for a false flag means that a State caught red-handed can always invoke plausible deniability and suggest that they are themselves a victim as some other, unknown super-sophisticated actor is trying to frame them.  One can safely assume, for example, that Russia will make this argument in the DNC case.  Indeed, even in cases that appear clear cut like Sony Pictures, there are still those who resist FBI’s assertions of North Korean responsibility.

A second aspect of the attribution inquiry is a more legal one — namely, assuming the individual actors who perpetrated the hack can be identified, when can their actions be attributed to a State? This is not really at issue if the perpetrators are in a State’s direct employ (e.g. military officers or intelligence officials).  But what happens if the perpetrators are nonstate actors?  How much control would a State like Russia need to exercise over the DNC hack and later leak for it to bear responsibility?  That question is one that different international fora have answered differently in different contexts (the ICJ’s Nicaragua case and ICTY’s Tadic case‘s competing tests of effective versus overall control being the most famous examples).  As such, it’s difficult to say at present what relationship a State must have with nonstate hackers or hacktivists to bear responsibility for what they do.  That may not be a bad thing overall, as one can imagine how a clear line might incentive States to proliferate behavior just short of crossing the line in lieu of being chilled from acting generally if the whole area is cast as a truly grey zone.  That said, the ability to debate what international law requires in terms of the State-nonstate actor relationship complicates any application of the duty of non-intervention in individual cases.

2. Scope: What behavior violates the duty of non-intervention?  Assuming that Russia was responsible (which I should be clear at this point is just an assumption), the next question is whether its hacking and leaking of DNC data violated the duty of non-intervention?  Here again, international lawyers will encounter some uncertainty as the precise scope of the duty has never been fully resolved.  To be clear, there’s widespread consensus that a duty of non-intervention is customary international law.  The problems are more the duty’s contents.  The most famous formulation is undoubtedly that put forth by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (para. 205), prohibiting interventions

bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.

The ICJ’s take suggests that intervention requires methods of coercion, forcing the victim State to make different choices than it might were it free of coercive interference.  This pairs with key parts of the earlier 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.

No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.

Thus, much of the debate over the duty of non-intervention has focused on identifying which coercive measures below the use of force threshold are covered by the prohibition. But, looking at the DNC hack, there’s little evidence that Russia is trying to coerce any particular result. Indeed, it’s not even clear that the goal of the hack was to support Trump’s candidacy.  The operation could have other purposes; for example, I’ve seen suggestions that it might have been a response to Russian presumptions that the United States bears responsibility for the Panama Papers, a data breach that caused some discomfort to Putin’s administration.  Given this, might we not simply write this hack-off as a particularly visible form of espionage?  Is this case equivalent, for example, to the OPM hack?  That hack, while clearly contrary to U.S. national security interests, was not terribly susceptible to claims of an international law violation given international law’s longstanding, complicated relationship with surveillance (for more see Ashley Deek’s recent article).

I’m not so sure, however, that the duty of non-intervention can be dismissed so quickly.  For starters, the hackers did not just take the data and use it to inform their own policies or behavior. They also leaked it, and did so in a way where the timing clearly sought to maximize attention (and corresponding impacts) on the U.S. domestic political campaign process.  Perhaps we need to separate out this incident into two parts — the espionage (i.e., the hack itself) and the interference in the U.S. campaign using the fruits of that espionage.  Doing so suggests the leaking might be the problematic act under a less quoted paragraph of the 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration’s description of the duty of non-intervention:

Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.

Interference in ‘any form’ is clearly a broader formulation than coercive acts, suggesting that actions designed to impact public support for not just a particular candidate, but an entire “political” party, could implicate the duty of non-intervention here.  That said, there are others who’ve been thinking much more carefully on the question of non-intervention and cyberspace than I have.  Later this year, for example, we should be able to read the fruits of Tallinn 2.0, the much-anticipated follow-up to the Tallinn Manual and its take on international law applicable to cyberwar.  Tallinn 2.0 will offer the views of an independent group of experts on how international law regulates cyberspace outside of the use of force and jus in bello contexts, including the duty of non-intervention.  I imagine I’m not alone in wanting to know whether and how its contents will speak to the current DNC crisis.

3. Remedies:  Does International Law Really Matter Here? Talking about this case in the last 24 hours, I’ve had a couple of non-lawyer friends express skepticism over international law’s relevance to the DNC hack.  Given our age, my friends hearken back to the Cold War, suggesting that Russia can and will ignore international law with impunity here (one of the more sanguine among them, also pointed out that the United States has its own history of interfering in foreign elections, a point Jack Goldsmith made earlier today at Lawfare). And, to be sure, there’s some merit to this critique.  After all, Russia’s Security Council veto ensures the inability of that body to respond to these events in any way. And U.S. resistance to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals precludes any real chance that a third-party would review the case.

Still, I think it’s important to raise the international legal issues for at least three reasons.  First, and perhaps most obviously, international law does provide self-help remedies in cases of state responsibility, including retorsion (otherwise legal acts done in response to unlawful behavior) and counter-measures (behavior that would otherwise be unlawful but for the fact that it is itself in response to unlawful behavior).  Thus, if Russia was responsible for the DNC hack and that hack did violate the duty of non-intervention, it would free the United States to engage in counter-measures vis-a-vis Russia that would otherwise be unlawful.  Time and space preclude me from surveying all the various counter-measure options that the United States might have, although I’d note there’s an interesting ancillary question of whether international law might limit the U.S. from pursuing certain counter-measures — such as interfering in Russia’s own domestic political process — if doing so is analogous to humanitarian obligations, which are non-derogable (i.e., you cannot violate the human rights of another State’s nationals just because they violated your nationals’ human rights).  I’d welcome reader thoughts on such limits as well as a more open discussion of the types of counter-measures that might be legally available in this case or any collective measures that could be in play.

Second, there’s the question of what happens if international law is not invoked or applied to this case? To the extent state practice can involve acts and omissions, might silence suggest that this sort of behavior (hacking and releasing political parties’ internal communications) is perceived as lawful (or at least not internationally wrongful)?  In other words, how States react to this case will have follow-on effects on future expectations of responsible State behavior, leading to new norms of behavior in cybersecurity.  This is a topic on which I’ve been spending A LOT of time lately with a forthcoming article in the American Journal of International Law that I’ve co-authored with Martha Finnemore (we’ve not posted it yet, but interested readers should e-mail me if they’d like to see a draft).

Finally, there’s an academic reason to undertake this analysis.  In recent years, scholars have debated and emphasized ways to shrink the duty of non-intervention, under the banner of things like human rights (unseating the old assumption that international law did not care what a State did vis-a-vis its own citizens in its own territory) or humanitarian intervention (the idea that responding to a State’s failure to protect those within its borders is more important than the duty of other States to stay out of domestic jurisdiction matters).  I wonder if these arguments are relevant to the current controversy?  Have they inadvertently created space for additional exceptions or otherwise shifted the scope and reach of any duty of non-intervention?  I might be wrong to worry about any such link, but I do think the issue warrants further study.

Thus, I think this is an important case that bears close attention.  I’d like to see how the United States responds publicly, if at all, to the allegations, not to mention how other States or actors view the behavior in question.  For international lawyers, moreover, I’d hope to see further discussions of how to attribute responsibility in cyber security incidents as well as more detailed analyses of how the duty of non-intervention applies in cyberspace than we have had to date.  To that end, I’d welcome reader thoughts and comments.  What have I got wrong?  What am I missing?

 

Alaskans and Canada’s Transboundary Mining Pollution: Kick-starting the US-Canada Bilateral Pollution Regime

by Kenta Tsuda

[Kenta Tsuda is an attorney at the non-profit law organization Earthjustice in Juneau, Alaska. Earthjustice was involved in the Pelly Amendment process described below in the post.]

For millennia the peoples of southeast Alaska have prized the salmon harvests of the Taku, Stikine, and Unuk rivers, three transboundary waterways flowing from headwaters in British Columbia’s Coastal Range through Southeast Alaska to the sea.  Customary harvests continue today, along with tens of millions of dollars’ worth of commercial fishing.  In recent years, however, Alaskan  communities have faced a threat of potentially devastating transboundary pollution from mines in British Columbia.  Hard-rock mines exploiting gold-copper deposits in the headwaters of the three rivers would produce billions of tons of waste rock and tailings.  Each would require indefinite treatment of uncertain efficacy to prevent the poisoning of surrounding watersheds by a toxic cocktail of acidity and dissolved heavy metals.  This contamination could have population-level harms on salmon, both in Canadian reaches of these waters and on the U.S. side of the border.  Downstream communities in Southeast Alaska fear for their economic futures and ways of life, while Canadian authorities are allowing the projects to advance.  Alaskan groups now seek resolution of the dispute at the international level.  To that end, under a domestic statute they have invoked the U.S. Government’s duties to confront these environmental threats, aiming to prompt the Government’s assertion of rights held under international law.

The transboundary nature of the threat limits private legal action on the American side of the border.  The situation requires what Professor Thomas Merrill has described as a transboundary collective action regime.  As Merrill has explained, such regimes are difficult to create, however, “if some mechanism can be devised for inducing mutual cooperation, the situation is potentially a positive-sum game for all.”  In the case of the United States and Canada, a mechanism for addressing transboundary pollution already exists: under Article IV of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty the United States has a right against transboundary pollution from Canada.  This same instrument creates an institution to address potential violations of treaty rights, the International Joint Commission (IJC).  Under Article IX, the parties agree that “any . . . questions or matters of difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier” could be referred to the IJC “for examination and report.”  A referral would entail the governments of both the United States and Canada formally requesting that the commission exercise its investigative powers with respect to specific questions of rights or interests along the frontier.  Such Article IX referrals have been made many times.  Although IJC findings in response to a referral are not automatically binding, historically the parties have abided by them.  For these reasons, groups in Alaska and Canada—indigenous communities, commercial fishing interests, conservationists—as well as Alaska’s congressional delegation, and Washington’s Senators Murray and Cantwell, have requested that the State Department consider referring to the IJC questions regarding the potentiality of and means to prevent transboundary pollution from hard-rock mines in the three watersheds.  So far, both American and Canadian federal governments have demurred, suggesting that an information-sharing agreement between the state of Alaska and Province of British Columbia—which cannot be binding, and therefore includes no liability rule—might eventually yield a solution.

To encourage further consideration and engagement among federal agencies, and ultimately the Federal Government’s referral of the issue to the IJC, Alaska Native and conservation groups recently invoked a domestic legal lever to prompt an invesigation by the Department of the Interior.  The groups, including the environmental law organization Earthjustice, submitted a petition invoking Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell’s duties under the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act.  Under this statute, the Secretary must investigate and certify to the president if foreign nationals act to diminish the effectiveness of a U.S. conservation treaty.  The petitioners describe six mine projects in the transboundary watersheds, detailing how they threaten Pacific salmon and steelhead trout—protected under the 1991 Anadromous Stocks Conservation Convention—as well as the grizzly bear and woodland caribou—protected by the Western Hemisphere Convention.  The petition requests the Department of the Interior to bring its expertise to bear upon the issue via an investigation of the mines and their environmental effects, and for Secretary Jewell to engage her colleagues in the federal executive to seek a referral of the issue to the IJC.

This developing situation demonstrates that parties to an established transboundary collective action regime must actively exercise their relevant rights and privileges to protect the interests of their citizens against transboundary threats.  It also illustrates the potential role that domestic statutory remedies can play in private actors’ efforts to address transboundary threats, even where the domestic law does not afford ample opportunity directly to address sources of transboundary pollution.

Two Postdocs at Melbourne Law School with Adrienne Stone

by Kevin Jon Heller

Are you a new PhD or about to finish your PhD? Do you focus on comparative constitutional law? If so, you will definitely want to apply for one of the two postdocs at Melbourne Law School that Adrienne Stone, now a Laureate Fellow, is offering:

About the role

Professor Adrienne Stone’s Kathleen Fitzpatrick ARC Laureate Fellowship Program aims to address a problem for liberal democracies: the need to reconcile the tensions between the pursuit of diversity and the promotion of social cohesion. The critical problem is becoming increasingly urgent as nations grapple with the challenges of highly diverse multi-cultural societies. The team working on the Fellowship will draw on the experiences of constitutionalism throughout the world to investigate how Constitutions, in their design and in their application, can serve as a unifying force while still nurturing the diversity appropriate for a complex, modern society.

About you

Applicants must have graduated or have met the requirements to graduate with a PhD in Law, or a related field by 1 December 2016. Applicants must provide evidence of the award of their PhD, including date of award. Applicants must be able to commence employment between 1 December 2016 and no later than 1 December 2017.

Melbourne is a great place to live and work — and there is quite simply no one better to work with than Adrienne. She is not only one of the world’s leading comparative constitutional law scholars, she is an extraordinarily wonderful person. She was one of my favourite colleagues at Melbourne, and she remains one of my dearest friends.

Deadline to apply is August 12.

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 25, 2016

by Jessica Dorsey

Here’s your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Middle East and Northern Africa

  • Several people have been killed when a mortar bomb hit a restaurant in the government-controlled ancient quarter of the Syrian capital Damascus on Sunday, a monitor and a witness said.
  • As the war rages on, Syrian children are starving to death.

Asia

  • Southeast Asian nations failed to agree on maritime disputes in the South China Sea on Sunday after Cambodia blocked any mention to an international court ruling against Beijing in their statement, diplomats said.
  • Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has criticized South Korea’s move to deploy an advanced U.S. anti-missile defense system to counter threats from North Korea, saying it harmed the foundation of their mutual trust, news reports said on Monday.

Europe

Americas

Oceania

UN/World

Sarah Kay on What Brexit Means to Her

by Kevin Jon Heller

My brilliant friend Sarah Kay, a prominent human-rights lawyer in the UK and Europe born in Dublin and raised in Belfast, posted the following statement on Facebook about what Brexit means to her. We’ve had some legal and political analysis of Brexit on the blog, but Brexit is also, and perhaps even fundamentally, personal — if it happens, it will have a lasting effect on people’s lives and, as Sarah explains, sense of identity. My thanks to Sarah for letting me re-post her statement.

I am a Cold War kid. I still refer to anything east of Bremen as “the east”; I still have to blink rapidly when the u-Bahn in Berlin stops at friedrichstrasse; I have a vivid memory of sirens howling at noon on an overcast day of primary school for an exercise in surviving a nuclear bomb attack.

I am a Troubles kid; anything east of Belfast Central is foreign to me. Taking the train from Dublin, I inform friends of my arrival by letting them know I have crossed the Border. My phones have all capitalised the fault line, and so does my brain. When exiting Europa station, I always look up and am surprised for a second to see the hotel still standing.

I am a Yugoslavia kid. I always need a map to remember the exact frontier between Bosnia and Serbia; every deployment of blue helmets dries my mouth, as if helplessness was rooted in that very despair. I have never used the phrase “brick and mortar” because mortar has a much different meaning for me.

In a way, I am also a WW2 kid. My grandfather was an Operation Dragoon veteran; I keep a photo of my grandmother with my infant uncle in her arms, after she birthed and nursed him on her own in a military base in Tunisia. My mother told stories of food ration tickets in the mid-1960s. I have kept my grandfather’s uniform and ceremonial sword.

I was too young to vote for the Maastricht referendum; but I came along to the polling booths, and was allowed to place the “yes” bulletin in the envelope, and then ceremonially place it in the box. Exiting the polling place, I was handed a tiny EU flag. I ran around with it all day, and waived it as I watch the results be announced.

I was in law school during the switch to the common currency. I remember my first 2 euro coin, looking at which flag was on the flip side, wondering who used it first, which country it had been forged in. I still do it with all my Euro change. I remember being small in Italy and paying for bread in thousands of lira. The euro changed that; I remember I loved that wherever I went, I could use it.

I also remember Ireland’s No to Lisbon in 2009. I remember wondering why, where my country had it so wrong. I read about Luxembourg, I read about Frankfurt, I read about austerity, I read about Ireland’s lone highway and how we were “the third world of Europe”. I remember reading about opt-outs; I remember thinking that our economically weak but politically strong identity had to fit in somewhere….

Symposium on Mann, Humanity at Sea

by Kevin Jon Heller

I’m delighted to call readers attention to a symposium next week on my friend Itamar Mann’s new book, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, which was just published by Cambridge University Press. Here is the 411:

This interdisciplinary study engages law, history, and political theory in a first attempt to crystallize the lessons the global ‘refugee crisis’ can teach us about the nature of international law. It connects the dots between the actions of Jewish migrants to Palestine after WWII, Vietnamese ‘boatpeople’, Haitian refugees seeking to reach Florida, Middle Eastern migrants and refugees bound to Australia, and Syrian refugees currently crossing the Mediterranean, and then legal responses by states and international organizations to these movements. Through its account of maritime migration, the book proposes a theory of human rights modelled around an encounter between individuals in which one of the parties is at great risk. It weaves together primary sources, insights from the work of twentieth-century thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas, and other legal materials to form a rich account of an issue of increasing global concern.

Author: Dr Itamar Mann (Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law)

Chair: Professor Panos Koutrakos (Professor of Eurpean Union Law, Jean Monnet Professor of European Law, City Law School, City University London)

Discussants: Professor Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (Emeritus Fellow, All Souls College, Emeritus Professor of International Refugee Law, University of Oxford); Dr Hagar Kotef (Senior Lecturer of Political Theory and Comparative Politics, SOAS, University of London); Dr Ioannis Kalpouzos (Lecturer in Law, City Law School, City University London).

The symposium is next Wednesday, the 27th, from 6:00-7:30 at City University. Full information here. I will be out of town, unfortunately, but it should be a great event. Attend!

Self-Aggrandizement Alert: Two New Publications

by Kevin Jon Heller

I’m delighted to announce the publication of two new essays. The first is “The Use and Abuse of Analogy in IHL,” which is a chapter in Jens’s edited book for CUP, “Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights.”

9781107137936

I’m very proud of the essay — and all of the contributions to the book are excellent.

The second publication is my article “Radical Complementarity,” which has just appeared in the Journal of International Criminal Justice. Here is the abstract:

In March 2015, a domestic court in Côte d’Ivoire sentenced Simone Gbagbo to 20 years in prison for disturbing the peace, organizing armed gangs and undermining state security — a sentence considerably longer than any sentence imposed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and twice as long as the Ivorian prosecutors requested. The Court has nevertheless held that Gbagbo’s case remains admissible, because her domestic prosecution was not based on the same conduct as the conduct underlying the crimes against humanity charges issued by the Office of the Prosecutor. This article argues that the Court’s decision in Simone Gbagbois inconsistent with the principle of complementarity. Section 1 criticizes the Court’s jurisprudence concerning Article 17’s ‘same person’ requirement, arguing that the test the judges use to determine whether a state is investigating a particular suspect is both inconsistent with the ICC Statute and far too restrictive in practice. Section 2 explains why the ‘same conduct’ requirement is antithetical to the goals underlying complementarity and should be rejected as a matter of law. The article thus defends what we might call ‘radical complementarity’: the idea that as long as a state is making a genuine effort to bring a suspect to justice, the ICC should find his or her case inadmissible regardless of the conduct the state investigates or the prosecutorial strategy the state pursues.

The published version differs substantially from the one I posted a while back on SSRN. You can find the article here.

Multi-Blog Series: First Thoughts from Academia on the Updated GCI Commentary

by Kevin Jon Heller

[This is the third episode in the Multi-blog series on the Updated Geneva Conventions Commentaries, jointly hosted by the Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, Intercross and Opinio Juris. The first, by Jean-Marie Henckaerts, can be found here, and the second, by Sean Murphy, here.]

It is a great pleasure to contribute to this multi-blog series on the ICRC’s newly-released Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (GC I). Sean Murphy is right that GC I might seem “of lesser significance” than the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions (GC III and GC IV) – and there is no question that IHL scholars everywhere will eagerly await the ICRC’s Commentaries on those Conventions. But that does not detract from the importance of this first Commentary, which represents a remarkable achievement in its own right. As the Introduction notes, the authors of this new Commentary had to analyze nearly seven decades of state practice, a massive and unenviable task. Moreover, they had to address some of the most contentious issues in IHL, such as the scope of application of Common Article 3 (CA 3). Indeed, I have little doubt that the Commentary’s overall Common Article 3 discussion – which runs to 907 paragraphs, approximately 800 more than its 1952 predecessor! – will attract considerable scholarly attention (and cause considerable academic controversy) in the coming years.

 

Flyer cover page - GC I launch

For my part, I generally agree with Murphy’s and Jean-Marie Henckaerts’ comments about the ICRC’s methodological approach in the Commentary. But I think Henckaerts actually underplays one of the most encouraging aspects of the ICRC’s methodology: its willingness to make liberal recourse to travaux preparatoires when interpreting provisions of GC I. Here is paragraph 49 in the Introduction:

Indeed, it seems logical for a thorough examination of all the issues to look at the preparatory work even if the general rule of interpretation yields a satisfactory result. It also helps the commentator to understand ‘the terms of the treaty in their context’ which is a requirement under the general rule (see Article 31(1) and (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Recourse to the preparatory work is particularly important when no recent practice on a topic can be found, such as for Articles 33 and 34 of the First Convention dealing with the fate of buildings and material of medical units of the armed forces and aid societies after they fall into enemy hands.

This is a refreshing deviation from VCLT orthodoxy about travaux preparatoires being unnecessary when the “ordinary meaning” of treaty terms is ostensibly clear. As Julian Mortenson has shown, that orthodox view of the VCLT is impossible to reconcile with the treaty’s own history, becausethe drafters repeatedly reiterated that any serious effort to understand a treaty should rely on a careful and textually grounded resort to travaux, without embarrassment or apology.” Indeed, scholars all too often use a treaty’s supposed “ordinary meanings” as a vehicle to substitute their own political preferences for the will of the states that drafted and concluded it.

I also agree with Henckaerts and Murphy concerning the central role that the ICRC plays in interpreting the Geneva Conventions – the “guardian and promoter of IHL,” in Henckaerts’ words. But that role poses a danger that needs to be openly acknowledged: namely, that those who use the Commentary – soldiers and scholars alike – will be tempted to uncritically accept the ICRC’s interpretation of GC I. There is no question that the authors of the Commentary are among the world’s most expert IHL practitioners and scholars, but they are neither infallible nor objective. On the contrary, both the experts and the ICRC as an institution have political and legal commitments that cannot help but influence how they interpret GC I. That does not mean that their interpretations should be discarded. It does not even mean their interpretations should always be viewed with a skeptical eye. But it does mean that IHL scholars should be willing to challenge the Commentary when they believe that the ICRC is wrong.

To be clear, I am in no way suggesting bias or bad faith on the part of the Commentary’s authors. I am simply pointing out that interpretation is an inherently indeterminate, subjective, and political activity, which means that it matters a great deal who is doing the interpreting. And there is no escaping the fact that the members of the Editorial Committee, the ICRC Project Team, and the Reading Committee come exclusively from states in the Global North – most from states in Western Europe. Again, that does not mean that the Commentary is wrong on any particular point. Moreover, to the ICRC’s credit, the Commentary’s peer-review group, who “reviewed the drafts and provided comments in their personal capacity,” included individuals from dozens of states in the Global South. But it is nevertheless regrettable that the primary authors and reviewers of the Commentary are so geographically homogenous – especially given that the states they represent rarely if ever experience the kind of conflict that is subject to Common Article 3.

Finally, I want to flag a very odd statement in the Commentary, paragraph 10 in the Introduction:

In addition, what sets the updated Commentaries mandated by the ICRC apart from other academic commentaries is that the contributors were able to draw on research in the ICRC archives, while respecting their confidential nature, to assess the application and interpretation of the Conventions and Protocols since their adoption.

I have no doubt this is true – but I find it somewhat troubling to know that the ICRC’s interpretation of GC I is based on evidence that cannot be subjected to scholarly criticism. I hope the ICRC will say more about its reliance on non-public information in future Commentaries, which will deal with even more controversial aspects of IHL.

Assessing the Fallout from the South China Sea Award

by Julian Ku

In addition to my posts here (see below), I have several  pieces over the last week discussing different aspects of the South China Sea award up at various outlets across the web universe (I know, I know, I need to stop writing about this topic, but indulge me just a little longer).  To briefly recap my various takes, here is a quick summary:

As a legal matter, China lost every substantive issue before the South China Sea arbitral tribunal.  I argued here at Lawfare that the award “dramatically widens” the scope of future more aggressive U.S. freedom of navigation operations by, for instance, eliminating any legal basis for a Chinese territorial sea around its artificial island on Mischief Reef.  Since that reef is also within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, the U.S. Navy has (as a legal matter) carte blanche to sail or fly within 500 meters of what is now an artificial island in clear violation of Philippines’ rights under UNCLOS.

On the other hand, I warned here in The National Interest that the arbitral award does not require China to leave the South China Sea or the Spratlys in particular.  The award leaves open the legal possibility for China to claim a series of 12 nautical mile territorial seas around various rocks in the island group. This means that even in China complied with the award, it would have the legal right to maintain a robust presence there.

Taking a step back, I also blamed China’s government (in this piece for Quartz) for exacerbating the negative impact of the award by refusing the participate in the proceedings and then starting a global media war against it.  This drew much more attention to the award than would have otherwise been the case.

Finally, over at Foreign Policy, I offered a very tough critique of the role of Chinese international law scholars in bolstering the Chinese government’s claim that it can legally ignore the arbitration.  It is not so much that Chinese international legal scholars were wrong, but that their unanimity weakens their long-term credibility on the global stage.  I contrast the unanimity within China’s academic community with the much-divided U.S. academic reaction to the U.S. government’s refusal to comply with the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment in 1986.

For any Chinese-language readers out there, I have been engaging in a debate (thanks to the fabulous translation work of my student Weitao Chen) at the Financial Times (Chinese edition) with Professor Liu Haiyang on China’s obligation under UNCLOS Article 288(4) to accept the arbitral tribunal’s determination of its own jurisdiction. Here was my initial essay, here is Prof. Liu’s response, and here is my rebuttal.  Annoyingly, it appears my initial essay has been censored in China, which must mean I am making good arguments!

I am not done with discussing this award, but I do need to get a life at some point. I am also trying to incorporate all of this into a larger project on China’s overall relationship with international law.  Certainly, this whole dispute will be a significant chapter in my book!

Events and Announcements: July 17, 2016

by Jessica Dorsey

Event

  • For its 10-year anniversary the Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (ICL Journal) will host a conference dedicated to its very scope: The one day event to be held on 23 September 2016 at Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) will focus on the concept of International Constitutional Law. Keynote lectures will be presented by Frederick Schauer and Alexander Somek. To participate please register until Sept 16th 2016 with the conference office at maria [dot] fegerl [at] wu [dot] ac [dot] at Attendance is free of charge. For further information see www.icl-journal.com.

Calls for Papers

  • We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120) special issue on “Non-Legal Adjudicators in National and International Disputes”. This special issue will analyse the current scenario, as well as new trends, developments, and challenges that non-legal adjudicators face when resolving national and international disputes. It will consider litigation; national arbitration and diverse forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR); international commercial arbitration; investment arbitration; inter-State arbitration and the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO).This special issue will be edited by Katia Fach Gómez (University of Zaragoza-Spain) and Weiwei Zhang (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies – Switzerland). More information can be found here. Proposals for papers should be submitted to the editors – contact details here – on or before 31 October 2016. Accepted papers should be submitted to the editors on or before 10 January 2017. Publication is expected in the second quarter of 2017.
  • Call for Papers: Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace: The Jus Post Bellum Project is seeking submissions of academic research papers for presentation at the final project conference on  ‘Jus Post Bellumand the Justice of Peace’ on 29-30 September 2016 in The Hague. Submissions should include an abstract of no more than 300 words and be accompanied by a CV. Submissions must be written in English and sent to j [dot] m [dot] iverson [at] law [dot] leidenuniv [dot] nl no later than 5 August 2016. Draft papers should be submitted by 15 September 2016.

Announcements

  • TDM 2 (2016) Latin America Special (Vol. 1): Prepared by guest editors Dr. Ignacio Torterola and Quinn Smith, this special addresses the various challenges and changes at work in dispute resolution in Latin America. A second volume that continues many of the themes in this special from different angles and perspectives is also nearing completion. (Articles in English and Spanish).

Our previous events and announcements post can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us with a one-paragraph description of your announcement along with hyperlinks to more information.

Call for Submissions: International Law Weekend New Scholars and Practitioners Panel

by Chris Borgen

The American Branch of the International Law Association has sent us the following call for submissions for an “Emerging Voices Panel” that they have added to this October’s International Law Weekend. (Not to be confused with Opinio Juris‘ Fourth Annual Emerging Voices Symposium, which will be starting later this month).

ILW is an excellent conference and I am sure this will be a great addition:

International Law Weekend 2016: International Law 5.0

Call for Proposals for Emerging Voices Panel

Introduction

International Law Weekend 2016 (ILW 2016) calls on scholars and practitioners to address the accelerating nature of change in international law. From technological advances to environmental transformations, international lawyers are forced to confront emerging forces and new scenarios. Even settled principles of law are no longer settled. These tectonic shifts have been felt throughout the geography of international law. Legal professionals at every level – local, national, regional, and international – must change their practice to meet a changing world. Innovation will become necessary for survival.

Emerging Voices Submissions

ABILA invites the submission of abstracts from emerging scholars and practitioners in the field of international law.  We will select several abstracts for presentation at ILW 2016 as part of a panel of new professionals. The abstracts may be based upon ongoing work. While all submissions are welcome, preference will be given to papers not already published. Eligibility is restricted to applicants working in the field of international law for five years or less. Applicants should be ABILA members at the time of the conference.  (To join ABILA, please visit: http://www.ila-americanbranch.org/Membership.aspx.)

 Submission Guidelines

Applicants must submit: (1) a 500-700 word abstract of their paper; (2) a cover letter describing their professional development; and (3) a curriculum vitae. The submission deadline is July 31, 2016. Submissions should be sent to conferences [at] ilsa [dot] org with the subject line “Emerging Voices – ILW 2016.” Questions may also be submitted to: conferences [at] ilsa [dot] org.

Submissions will be competitively selected in a peer review process.  Applicants will be notified by August 31, 2016.

ILW 2016 is scheduled for October 27-29, 2016 in New York City and will be held at Fordham Law School. Accepted applicants will be invited to present their papers at the Emerging Voices panel, which will be chaired by a senior scholar or practitioner. Accepted applicants will be required to pay for their own travel and lodging. However, their registration fees for ILW 2016 will be waived.