[The following is a guest-post written by Ifeoma Ajunwa, a human-rights attorney who is beginning a PhD at Columbia University in the fall.  Our thanks to her for contributing -- KJH]

In April of 2007, as a representative for the NGO, Human Rights Advocates (HRA), I was privileged to attend the 4th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland where I presented research before the Council regarding the various ongoing cases of the illicit transfer and dumping of toxic waste in developing nations. Among the cases I presented before the Council was the 2006 dumping of chemical waste in Abidjan, Ivory Coast by the Dutch company, Trafigura. The dumped toxic waste resulted in the death of at least 15 people and the hospitalization of thousands more. This past Friday, a Dutch judge ruled that Trafigura was responsible for the dumping and should be held accountable for the deaths. The judge also issued a fine of 1 million euros against Trafigura. The verdict was based in some part on the 2009 report of U.N.’s top expert on toxic waste, Okechukwu Ibeanu. Ibeanu’s report concluded that “there seems to be strong evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences are related to the dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala” ship, which was chartered by Trafigura.

Human rights groups such as Amnesty International and The National Federation of Toxic Waste Victims in Ivory Coast have rightfully hailed the ruling as a victory. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications in ensuring the future corporate accountability of corporations that operate in a multinational manner. For one, the Trafigura case establishes firm precedence that multinational corporations may be brought to justice, in their home countries, for acts that were committed extra-territorially.

There are extant international law instruments that affirm the human right to a healthful environment. The Stockholm Declaration, adopted on June 16, 1972 was the first to explicitly recognize the right to a healthy environment. In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly once again stressed the need to ensure a healthy environment for the well-being of all. Several multi-lateral treaties or agreements have also sought to prohibit or limit the illicit dumping of toxic waste. Among those agreements are, the Aarhus Convention, the Basel Convention, The Ban Amendment, and the Bamako Convention. However, a major limiting characteristic of these instruments is that they only bind sovereign governments and not corporations. Therefore, these agreements may only be used to hold State actors responsible and do not apply to corporate entities (unless they act in a public service capacity).

The 2007 report I presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council proposed the extra-territorial application of environmental laws. At the very least, the Trafigura case indicates a means for immediate relief for victims of the dumping of toxic waste. Those victims should now directly bring a case against corporate entities in courts in the home country of the corporation.

The report also proposed a universal and enforceable declaration of corporate responsibility. Although the corporate code of conduct proposed by the U.N.’s Human Rights Sub-Commission in August 2003 is one good example of a starting point for stronger regulation of multinational corporations, the unfortunate fact is that current codes of corporate conduct, which are voluntary, are largely ineffective at deterring abuses. Following this case, the U.N. should continue to work towards formulating a code of corporate conduct that delineates environmental restrictions for corporate entities that operate in its member states and which would be also be endowed with enforcement mechanisms such as fines, loss of corporate charter, imprisonment and more. The abuse of the environment is a human rights abuse as it impacts the human rights to food, clean water and housing. The U.N. should continue to intensify its efforts to stem the illicit dumping of toxic waste and its detrimental impact on the environment.

[John Cerone is Professor of International Law, and Director of the Center for International Law & Policy at New England Law | Boston]

The World Court’s conclusion that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not unlawful is being with a resounding “duh” by most international lawyers. The International Court of Justice, in the narrow advisory opinion, simply found that the making of the declaration was not itself an act contrary to international law. Similarly, if I were to stand in my living room and declare it to be an independent state, I would have violated no rule of international law. Even if I were to broadcast that declaration to the world, it would still not be unlawful. It would also not have any legal effect.

It is essential to clarify what the Court did not find. The Court did not find that Kosovo had a right to secede. It did not find that Kosovo’s declaration was legally effective, that the attempted secession was successful, or that Kosovo is otherwise an independent state. It did not find that other states acted lawfully in recognizing Kosovo as an independent State. Indeed, the Opinion does not in any way support Kosovo statehood. It merely cuts off one possible avenue for arguing that the attempted secession is unlawful.

Concerns have already been raised about the potential effects of the Opinion on separatist movements around the globe. Should the Opinion have any knock-on effect? No. It states nothing unusual; virtually nothing has changed as a legal matter. Will it have a knock-on effect? That depends on how the decision is spun by the various stake-holders.

If the Opinion simply maintains the legal status quo on the question of Kosovo’s independence, does this mean that the Court has in some sense abdicated its responsibility? The Court’s restrictive interpretation of the question posted, and its preservation of the legal status quo, is appropriate in this area of the law – one which is driven primarily by political reality. If the overwhelming majority of states endorse Kosovo’s accession to sovereignty, its factual independence will be given the imprimatur of international law. That is not to say that the Court should eschew matters that are politically sensitive. It has, rightfully, consistently rejected such arguments. But where, as here, the law leaves its conclusions to the political process, the Court should sit back and allow that process to come to resolution.

[The following is a guest-post by Lt. Col. Chris Jenks, the Chief of the International Law Branch in the Army's Office of the Judge Advocate General.  He is blogging in his personal capacity.]

The day ICC supporters and detractors alike hoped would come, albeit for very different reasons, arrived on Wednesday, July 21st — Sudanese President Omar Bashir publicly visited a State Party (Chad) to the Rome Statute for the first time since the ICC issued a warrant for his arrest on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges in March 2009. Perversely or tellingly depending on one’s perspective, the visit comes just over a week after a July 12th pre-trial chamber ruling which led to a second ICC arrest warrant being issued for Bashir, this time for genocide.

Dov Jacobs has an interesting discussion on whether Chad is legally obligated to arrest Bashir.  Jacobs argues that, contrary to media claims that the ICC warrant in and of itself requires Chad to arrest Bashir, the ICC must request Chad’s cooperation under art. 89 of the Rome Statute and that the request must, under art. 91, contain certain information, including the arrest warrant. Jacob notes that the Rome Statute does not link the art. 89(1) obligation to the warrant itself but that “States Parties shall…comply with requests for arrest and surrender” and that it’s unclear whether has requested Chad do so.

That such a lack of clarity on the mechanics of arrest under the Rome Statute may still exist in 2010, and with the number of fugitives whose arrest is still pending, is disconcerting. But Chad’s reticence is hardly due to not receiving a formal request from the Court. Chadian leaders openly welcomed Bashir with the Mayor of Chad’s capital city of N’djamena presenting him a key to the city.

If nothing else, Bashir’s visit should prompt clarification of States Parties’ obligations and the arrest and surrender process. [And what of the members of MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) currently in Chad? The MINURCAT website trumpets the mission's role in "protecting civilians, promotion of human rights, rule of law and regional peace". What if anything is MINURCAT's obligation with Bashir in Chad?]

Sadly, far from contradicting African Union policy, Chad’s flauntingly deliberate inaction seems in accordance with a 2009 AU resolution which stated that AU members “shall not cooperate” with the arrest and surrender of Bashir. The AU however is not a party to the Rome Statute. Chad is. Whether Chad has met its pacta sunt servanda obligations viz the Rome Statute or not, Bashir’s public presence in Chad, and AU tolerance (if not support), re-raises the question of how serious Africa is in supporting international criminal justice and ending impunity. Or, more unfortunately, perhaps it answers the question.

The US Naval War College international law conference, held in June in Newport, Rhode Island, is now online in video format.  It was a terrific discussion, with great panels and discussants, and I counted it as a privilege to be there.  One reason the video for this conference is so interesting, however, is that the audience - and this year it was a very sizable audience - consists of some of the world’s leading experts in the laws of armed conflict.  Their interventions in the question and discussion sections are … lively, to say the least.  My congratulations to all the sponsors and the organizers.  Check it out, at this page.

With an election scheduled for August 21, Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Opposition Leader Tony “Check Out My Speedo” Abbott were set to debate tomorrow night at 7:30 pm.  There was just one problem with that idea…

The debate would have clashed with the Grand Finale of Masterchef Australia.

So what did the political parties do?  They rescheduled the debate for 6:30 pm.

Smart move.  Julia vs. Tony or Adam vs. Callum?  I know which one I would have watched.

UPDATE: Julia and Adam win!

Dave Hoffman has a post today at Concurring Opinions reporting the results of an empirical study of how often law reviews have cited various blogs.  According to the study, blogs have been cited 5460 times since 2006, with the following blogs representing the top-10 in terms of citations:

• FindLaw’s Writ — 618 citations
• Volokh Conspiracy — 402
• SCOTUSBlog — 305
• Balkinization — 259
• Patently-O — 211
• Concurring Opinions — 162
• Sentencing Law and Policy — 160
• JURIST Paper Chase — 130
• PrawfsBlawg — 122
• The Becker-Posner Blog — 104

Opinio Juris has been cited 49 times, which makes us the 27th most-cited blog.  I think that’s pretty impressive, given how much more specialized we are than most of the blogs in the top-10 (and in the top-20).

The full Excel spreadsheet is available here.

P.S. My own search reveals 57 citations, which would place us 25th.

Now that I’ve had a chance to read through the ICJ’s advisory opinion, following are a few initial reactions. (I will consider the separate opinions in another post.) Marko Milanovic has has done a great job parsing the main issues that were at bar, namely

1. Whether the ICJ should exercise advisory jurisdiction in this case;

2. How broadly or narrowly the question posed by the General Assembly should be interpreted;

3. The legality of the declaration of independence in light of the international law of self determination; and,

4. The legality of the declaration of independence in light of Security Council Resolution 1244.

Around the time of Kosovo’s declaration, I had discussed issues (3) and (4), as well as the substantive issue of recognition in an ASIL Insight and in a series of posts on this blog. I will now return to these issues in light of the advisory opinion.(Issue 1, which is a rich topic but primarily dealing with ICJ practice, I will leave for another post.)

Interpreting the Question

The General Assembly asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on this question (as drafted by Serbia):

“Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

I have heard many lawyers who were befuddled by the wording of the question. Why ask this question, when there seems to be general agreement among jurists that secession is neither legal nor illegal under international law? Why not ask the question that not only seemed closer to the real issue but was also one about which there are real differing views of the state of international law: whether there is an obligation on third party states notto recognize Kosovo, given the circumstances of its independence?  In any case, that was not how the question was worded by the General Assembly. Perhaps there would have been fewer votes for a reference to the ICJ if the ICJ’s ruling could have implicated the legality of the actions not of Kosovo, but of the UN member states who recognized it. Serbia’s wording the question this way might have thus been smart tactics in order to get an ICJ reference, but a strategic blunder in regards to final results.

Perhaps, as well, Serbia was hoping that the ICJ would interpret the question more broadly and opine on the issue of recognition as well as. That was not to be. The Court wrote:

50. The Court recalls that in some previous cases it had departed from the language of the question put to it where the question was not adequately formulated…

51. In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of the declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity of legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State. The Court notes that, in past requests for advisory opinions, the General Assembly and the Security Council, when they have wanted the Court’s opinion on the legal consequences of an action, have framed the question in such a way that this aspect is expressly stated.

Opinion, paras 50 - 51.

If anything, the Court seemed set on reading the question as narrowly as possible. Just the fact that it took time to contrast this case to the Canadian Supreme Court’s task in the Reference relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada is quite telling. The ICJ wrote (my emphasis added):

56. The question put to the Supreme Court of Canada inquired whether there was a right to “effect secession”, and whether there was a rule of international law which conferred a positive entitlement on any organs named. By contrast, the General Assembly has asked whether the declaration of independence was “in accordance with” international law. The answer to that question turns on whether or not the applicable international law prohibited the declaration of independence.

Opinion, para. 56 (emphasis added).

And so, we turn specifically to the narrow question of whether international law prohibits such declarations… [More through the "Continue Reading" link]

According to the Associated Press:

The United Nations’ highest court says Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia did not break international law.

The nonbinding opinion sets the stage for a renewed push by Kosovo for further international recognition of its independence.

Reading the opinion Thursday, International Court of Justice President Hisashi Owada said international law contains no “prohibition on declarations of independence.”

…[snip]…

Kosovo’s statehood has been recognized by 69 countries, including the United States and most European Union nations. Serbia and Russia lead a handful of others in staunchly condemning it.

The opinion is being read at the moment. Once I have had a chance to sift through it, I will post further thoughts. Based on the AP’s pull-out quote, though, it seem that the court has gone for a narrow interpretation of the question that was put before it (“Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”) and has chosen to rule only on the issue of the declaration itself, rather than on the broader (and more politically contentious and legally difficult) question of recognition by third-party states. If that is the case, then this result in favor of Kosovo makes sense as international law is generally silent as to secession and leaves the issue to domestic law. International law can be relevant in issues where a secession would perpetuate an international wrong (such as an illegal international use of force) but that would be primarily on the issue of recognition, as opposed to the declaration itself. In either case, though, it seems that the ICJ may have cabined-off Serbia’s arguments concerning the (il)legality of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign.

Once I have a chance to read through the opinion, I will write again on these issues.

For now, here’s Marko Milanovic’s advisory opinion preview, the ASIL Insight I wrote on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and a later piece comparing the situations in Kosovo and South Ossetia.

CIA director Leon Panetta has named a new National Clandestine Service chief, reports Peter Finn in the Washington Post today.  The new chief, John Bennett, has been serving as station chief in Pakistan, overseeing in particular the expansion of the drone campaign carried out by the CIA there.  One can safely take that as further evidence that the Obama administration does not take senior, deep participation in targeted killings using drones as something to be embarrassed about; quite the contrary.

Bennett, a former Marine and Harvard graduate, had retired in May after a nearly 30-year career at the CIA, but was coaxed back to take charge of the service, which runs human intelligence and covert operations. Among other posts, Bennett previously served as chief of Special Activities Division, the agency’s covert paramilitary unit ….  While station chief in Pakistan, one of the agency’s most sensitive positions, Bennett was deeply involved in the drone campaign that has killed hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives, including at least 20 senior figures.

Two items worth noting.  First, as Julian pointed out the other day, Moreno-Ocampo’s refusal to comply with the Trial Chamber’s order to disclose the identity of an intermediary to Lubanga’s defense team has led the Trial Chamber to order Lubanga’s release pending appeal.  (The OTP filed the appeal today). It is bad enough that the “independent statutory obligation” to protect witnesses upon which Moreno-Ocampo is relying does not actually exist.  Even worse is that the organ of the Court most responsible for protecting witnesses, the Victims and Witnesses Unit, does not even agree with him.  Here is paragraph 17 of the Trial Chamber’s decision:

17. On 8 July at 13.51, the VWU informed the Chamber that the disclosure of the name of 143 to the defence under the conditions ordered by the Chamber does not pose a threat to the intermediary.

It takes a special kind of arrogance to think you know better than both the Trial Chamber and the Victims and Witnesses Unit.

Second, and equally troubling, is an editorial that Moreno-Ocampo published yesterday in The Guardian about Bashir’s genocide charges.  A snippet (emphasis added):

The genocide is not over. Bashir’s forces continue to use different weapons to commit genocide: bullets, rape and hunger. For example, the court found that Bashir’s forces have raped on a mass scale in Darfur. They raped thousands of women and used these rapes to degrade family and community members. Parents were forced to watch as their daughters were raped.

The court also found that Bashir is deliberately inflicting on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction.

Bill Schabas explains what is wrong with these statements:

This is quite misleading. The Court did not find ‘that Bashir’s forces have raped on a mass scale in Darfur’. The Court did not find ‘that Bashir is deliberately inflicting on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction’.  The Court did not – and would not – do anything to suggest the issue of whether or not genocidal acts had taken place was actually decided.  It merely issued an arrest warrant.  The Court applied a test set out by the Appeals Chamber, based upon article 58.  It said that there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that rapes were perpetrated.  This test is significantly lower than the ‘substantial grounds’ test of article 61.  It is much lower than the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ test of article 66.  Experts familiar with the Rome Statute and criminal lawyers generally will understand this point.  But the average reader of the Guardian may well be misled by the Prosecutor’s words into believing that the Court actually reached the conclusion that Bashir’s forces raped on a mass scale in Darfur, or that Bashir was deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about the destruction of ethnic groups.

It is unconscionable for Moreno-Ocampo to mislead readers this way.  Indeed, he is simply repeating, in inverse fashion, the mistake that the Pre-Trial Chamber made in its original decision — assuming that Article 58 required the commission of genocide to be the only reasonable inference from the OTP’s evidence, when it only had to be one reasonable inference.  The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that because non-genocidal inferences were possible, Article 58 was not satisfied.  Moreno-Ocampo is now assuming that because Article 58 was satisfied, no non-genocidal inferences are possible.  But the whole point of Article 58’s low “reasonable grounds” standard is to acknowledge that the OTP is entitled to an arrest warrant even if it is reasonable to infer from the OTP’s evidence either that a crime has occurred or that it has not.  Deciding which inference is the correct one comes later, when the relevant standard is “substantial grounds” (confirmation of charges) or “beyond reasonable doubt” (trial).

It has been a very bad week for Moreno-Ocampo.  I’ll say it again: if things don’t get better in a hurry, the Assembly of States Parties needs to consider removing him.

Is this for real? .  A Phillippines newspaper is accusing a sitting Philippines Supreme Court justice with plagiarizing articles published in law reviews on matters of international law when he authored a key opinion for the court on reparations for comfort women.  The articles supposedly plagiarized include this one by Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent in the Yale Journal of International Law (and featured here at Opinio Juris).

In what could possibly a first in the Supreme Court, a magistrate appears to have committed plagiarism in a decision on a diplomatically and politically sensitive case.

Newsbreak’s review of the decision penned by Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo on World War II comfort women showed that numerous parts were copied from three materials written by legal experts abroad without properly attributing these to the authors.

In April 28, the Supreme Court, through Del Castillo’s ponencia in the Vinuya v. Romulo case (G.R. No. 162230), junked the petition of 70 Filipino comfort women to compel the Philippine government to get a public apology from Tokyo and to provide reparation to victims of sexual abuse during World War II.

It sounds to me like some bad bluebooking, but perhaps it is more serious that that.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld this week the conviction of “Chuckie Taylor” for violating the U.S. Anti-Torture Act, which implements U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture. Taylor is the son of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, currently on trial himself in the Sierra Leone Special Court. The opinion is a good and important one since this is the very first discussion of the Anti-Torture Act in a U.S. appellate court.  However, there is one glaring and annoying  (if largely inconsequential error). In rejecting one of Taylor’s appeals, the Court writes:

The only case Emmanuel cites in support of his contrary position is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). The Supreme Court did conclude in Hamdan that a conspiracy to violate the customary international law of war was not an offense punishable under that body of law in a military commission. Id. at 601-12.

Why is this annoying? Because that part of the Hamdan opinion is not a “holding” but merely the opinion of four members of the Court.  (See pp. 601-12 of Part V here).  Justice Kennedy pointedly did NOT join the Court on this point (see p. 638).  So this is a mistake, no doubt by an overworked law clerk (hey, I’ve been there!).  Still, worth a correction, if any law clerks out there are reading! (And don’t forget to cite us when you do!).

Greg McNeal has passed along the sad news that Charles Gittings, a long-time commenter on Opinio Juris, has passed away at an untimely 57.  Here is a snippet from his obituary in the Los Angeles Times:

Though not a lawyer, Gittings had a life-long interest in military tactics and law that led him to become an invaluable resource to some of the nation’s greatest experts in the field.

His death prompted an outpouring of tributes from civil liberties attorneys across the nation who worked with him to try to close the prison at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

“How very wrong it seems that Charlie is gone and that Guantanamo continues,” said Thomas Wilner, a Washington lawyer who represented groups of Guantanamo Bay prisoners and often sought Gittings’ advice on their legal rights. “When we finally close that horrible place down, we must put a plaque there commemorating Charlie’s contributions.”

Eugene Fidell, a professor of military law at Yale Law School, said that “when the history of this era is written, Charlie’s contribution and tenacity will be remembered.”

Not long after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Gittings created the Project to Enforce the Geneva Conventions, a website he ran from his home that compiled memos, court filings, amicus briefs and other evidence of what he believed were war crimes.

At the time, Gittings was divorced and had lost his job as a computer programmer. His interest in the military had been ignited long before, when he read Homer’s epic poems “The Iliad” and “The Odyssey” at age 9. He decided to put his knowledge to work helping the lawyers represent the detainees.

“I was resolved to do whatever I could to help in this crisis,” Gittings said in a recent interview. “You can never prove these things, but I do think I made a difference.”

His evidentiary material was often used by detainees’ attorneys to challenge the George W. Bush administration’s justification for harsh treatment and lengthy sentences without trial. After President Obama took office in January 2009, Gittings turned his attention to the new administration.

Charles’ life is obviously a testament to the idea that anyone can affect the law — not just the lawyers.  His voice, controversial thought it often was, will be missed.

Yes, says Daniel Hannan, a journalist and British MEP.  At least under those famous Montevideo factors, now that the E.U. has recently acquired the capacity to sign treaties.

I don’t know if things are quite so easy. For one thing, the E.U. does not itself necessarily consider itself a state, and it is not exactly clear if other states recognize the E.U. as a state.  And if the E.U. is a state, what happens to all those member nations (with all those great soccer teams)?

But Hannan is right that the E.U. is certainly heading in the statehood direction, and that this will further complicate everyone’s relations with it for the near future.

I agree that the relatively slow progress in U.S. treaty-making is not all the fault of the sluggish Obama Administration.  The Senate no doubt is a big obstacle to treaty-making, .  Still, I think the idea that the U.S. should join treaties, simply in order to show the world that we are willing to join treaties, is a really bad principle to govern lawmaking.  Yet this is the main point of this op-ed in Politico.

As the Senate begins debate on the U.S.-Russia New START arms-reduction treaty, we must not lose sight of a glaring problem in our national security: the impact that the U.S. failure to join major multilateral treaties has on our capacity to exercise global leadership. This failure threatens to make us, in a sad parody of Madeline Albright’s famous phrase, the “dispensable nation.”

The world is not waiting for us. As it becomes clear the treaties we negotiate might never be ratified, our power to shape their formation will wane. The rest of the world will continue negotiating multilateral treaties to shape vital international issues — with or without the United States. This position is dangerous. Each of the threats we face today — terrorism, climate change, poverty, infectious diseases — can only be solved through global efforts and global rules.

…

It’s time for the Senate — and the White House — to expend the political capital necessary for treaty ratification. There are at least six multilateral treaties that have a reasonable chance of ratification and would demonstrate that the U.S. is back in the business of working with others: the Test Ban Treaty, the Law of the Sea Convention, the Landmines Treaty, International Labor Convention 111, the Women’s Treaty and the recently signed Disabilities Treaty. It is critically important the Senate moves forward on at least one and demonstrates that the U.S. will have a say in writing the rules of the world. Failure to do so risks undermining our capacity to achieve our national security goals.

I think treaties should be judged independently and based on their individual merits. I have simply seen very little evidence that joining treaties irrespective of its policy benefits for the U.S, can itself be a policy benefit for the U.S.  And I really doubt that ratifying the ILO or CEDAW would do much for our ability to write rules on nuclear testing or the law of the sea.  There are ways to get Republican Senators to vote for treaties, but this is not one of them.

The showdown between the ICC and its prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo over the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo continues, as the Court ordered Lubanga’s release.  I assume Moreno-Ocampo will appeal (he has five days), but if his appeal is rejected, this could turn out to be a huge embarrassment for the prosecutor. In any event, it is certainly messy.

Judges at the International Criminal Court have ordered the release of a Congolese militia chief who used child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s civil war.

Sonia Robla, a court spokeswoman, said the decision was rendered Thursday after the prosecution refused to identify the identities of two witnesses during proceedings last week in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.

This web video nearly fooled people into believing France was about to pay Haiti billions in reparations for payments Haiti made to France ensure its independence. Yes, like that was going to happen. France quickly released a statement declaring the whole thing a hoax.

This hoax was so well done that it leads me to wonder what other interesting statements could be next? Japan apologizing to China for the Nanjing Massacre? North Korea apologizing to South Korea for the killing of South Korean sailors?  Palestinians recognizing Israel’s right to exist?

The massive U.S. financial regulation legislation, known as “Dodd-Frank”, is finally heading to President Obama for signature.  In addition to containing a partial reversal of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the bill also contains some rather stern instructions for the U.S. representative at the International Monetary Fund.  The instructions are so stern that they would almost certainly have led President Obama to issue a signing statement refusing to abide by this provision due the president’s exclusive constitutional powers over foreign affairs, as he did last year. But due to a new approach announced in January, the President will no longer attach signing statements. He’ll simply ignore those parts of the law that are unconstitutional without actually saying so when he signs the bill. I am not sure this is an improvement, but it seems to make everyone happy. In any event, this provision seems to qualify as one that the Obama Administration will ignore (although we won’t actually know if they will ignore it or not).

SEC. 1501. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF UNITED STATES FUNDS FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS; PROTECTION OF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS.

The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘SEC. 68. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF UNITED STATES FUNDS FOR FOR- EIGN GOVERNMENTS; PROTECTION OF AMERICAN TAX- PAYERS.

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund—

‘‘(1) to evaluate, prior to consideration by the Board of Ex- ecutive Directors of the Fund, any proposal submitted to the Board for the Fund to make a loan to a country if—

‘‘(A) the amount of the public debt of the country exceeds the gross domestic product of the country as of the most recent year for which such information is available; and

‘‘(B) the country is not eligible for assistance from the International Development Association. ‘‘(2) OPPOSITION TO LOANS UNLIKELY TO BE REPAID IN

FULL.—If any such evaluation indicates that the proposed loan is not likely to be repaid in full, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the proposal.

‘‘(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Within 30 days after the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund approves a proposal described in subsection (a), and annually thereafter by June 30, for the duration of any program approved under such proposals, the Secretary of the Treasury shall report in writing to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate assessing the likelihood that loans made pur- suant to such proposals will be repaid in full, including—

‘‘(1) the borrowing country’s current debt status, including, to the extent possible, its maturity structure, whether it has fixed or floating rates, whether it is indexed, and by whom it is held;

‘‘(2) the borrowing country’s external and internal vulnerabilities that could potentially affect its ability to repay; and

‘‘(3) the borrowing country’s debt management strategy.’’.

The much-awaited ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo will be released on July 22 at 3 p.m (local Hague time):

On Thursday 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, will deliver its Advisory Opinion on the question of the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (request for advisory opinion).

UPDATE: Very fast out of the box, EJIL Talk!’s Marko Milanovic has a long post introducing the issues facing the ICJ in the case.