See it here. As usual, it’s full of great panels. Also, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin of the Canadian Supreme Court and U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh will each give a keynote address.  A list of program highlights is here.  And, by the way, today is the last day for early-bird registration…

The current issue of Foreign Affairs has an article called A Few Dollars at a Time: How to Tap Consumers for Development, which describes the “innovative financing” movement in which private companies find ways for their customers to contribute to international development. This morning, I came across an example that I guess you could call “innovative aid” as it isn’t so much development financing but rather disaster relief to Haiti.

Zynga is a software company that makes (wildly successful, as I understand) games playable via Facebook and MySpace. They have started a Haiti Relief Fund in which the Zynga gaming community can contribute to disaster relief by purchasing “virtual goods” within their games. They explain on their foundation’s website:

Three of our top games are participating in a special relief campaign to help earthquake survivors in Haiti. Zynga is donating 100 percent of the proceeds from non-withering white corn within FarmVille [one of their games], a Haitian drum on Mafia Wars, and a special chip package in Zynga Poker to support emergency aid in Haiti through the Zynga Haiti Relief Fund. Users can also support the fund by donating directly through Zynga.org…

All contributions will benefit the World Food Programme (WFP), which has set up an emergency response team to distribute food and other relief to thousands in Haiti affected by the devastating earthquake.

Elsewhere, they write:

“The devastation in Haiti is unimaginable, and anything we or our users can do is tiny compared to the utter loss for this nation,” said Mark Pincus, Zynga’s founder and CEO. “In our small way, I hope we can enable our users to help and touch Haiti in a meaningful way where every dollar raised can make a difference.”

Zynga and socially-conscious companies like it should be applauded for dreaming up new ways to respond to perennial problems. I should note that Zynga’s aid to Haiti began before the earthquake; they had already linked the sale of virtual seeds in their FarmVille game to development aid for school construction in Haiti. Sales of that one virtual item, in one game, before Haiti was making headlines, raised over a million dollars. A few dollars at a time can add up to a lot of money.

But, given the magnitude of the disaster that has befallen Haiti, the unfortunate truth is that even a million dollars is a drop in the bucket. So, I hope other companies follow Zynga’s lead and nudge more people (who might not have done so otherwise) into contributing to the relief effort.

With all the talk about the environment and climate change and the with success of eco-themed TV show Life After People, I was struck by this blog post/ photo essay at BLDGBLOG on the degradation of Biosphere 2, the experiment in building a self-contained ecological biosphere in a set of buildings in the Arizona desert. (You can see it in better condition here, with the cheery tag “Biophere 2: Where Science Lives”).

It’s a haunting set of images, punctuated by the possibility that the whole site will be converted into a suburban development called “Biosphere Estates.” No punchline needed after that.

I know this sounds like the title of a movie franchise, but Brad Roth of Wayne State has alerted me to an op-ed in today’s New York Times that deals with both Somali piracy and unrecognized separatist regions. Jay Bahadur writes:

There might be another way to make greater strides against pirates. However, it would involve allying ourselves with a place that doesn’t exist: the autonomous region of Puntland, Somalia…

Contrary to the oft-recycled one-liners found in most news reports, Somalia is not a country ruled by anarchy. Indeed, it is a mischaracterization to even speak of Somalia as a uniform entity. It is an amalgamation of quasi-independent regions like Puntland, which was founded in 1998 as a tribal sanctuary for the hundreds of thousands of Darod-clan people fleeing massacres in the south. Puntland comprises one-quarter to one-third of Somalia’s total land mass (depending on whom you talk to) and almost half of its coastline…

In any serious attempt to combat piracy, Puntland must play an integral role. Yet it is not recognized as a legitimate actor in the region and has been financially abandoned by the international community, which continues to ignore the reality on the ground in favor of the flimsy transitional federal government, a 550-member parliamentary hodgepodge ruling over a few checkpoints in Mogadishu, hundreds of miles from any real pirate activity…

By contrast, argues Bahadur, the separatist region of Puntland is making efforts at providing coastal security.

Despite Puntland’s limited capacity, Mr. Farole [Puntland's leader] is committed to taking the fight to the pirates. Indeed, the government of Puntland has been advocating a strict policy of nonnegotiation with pirates since the beginning of the crisis. On those occasions that Puntland’s tiny (and now defunct) coast guard has been given the authority by shipowners to liberate hijacked vessels, the pirates have tended to melt away, content to keep their lives rather than their prize.

Successful land operations in Puntland’s coastal towns have accompanied these marine assaults…

Bahadur argues that financial aid the to Somali federal government is money wasted; a smaller amount of aid to cash-strapped Puntland could significantly increase its ability to undertake such anti-piracy operations.

The U.S. has been exploring increasing ties with Somaliland, another separatist region with aspirations of statehood with which Puntland has had occasional military clashes. These cases show an interesting nexus in regional security initiatives and the politics of recognition. The Somaliland case has had more attention, as Peter Pham wrote, after a January 2008 visit, then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer

was careful to emphasize that the recent flurry of activity did not imply diplomatic recognition was imminent, noting that while “we have said on many occasions that the U.S. will continue to work with Somaliland, in particular, in the strong democratic values which Somaliland has succeeded in implementing,” the issue of recognition should be left to the African Union (AU), while America would “work with the AU and will respect whatever decision it makes on Somaliland’s status.”

Pham also noted that the AU’s report regarding Somailand stressed the uniqueness of the case. The AU report stated:

The fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s Box’. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case…

So now Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Somaliland are all “unique” cases…

Anyway, it will be interesting to observe how security policy and recognition issues affect each other.

The New York Times has a very interesting article on the mining of rare earths, a group of elements that are particularly important for green technologies.  The Times piece begins like this:

Some of the greenest technologies of the age, from electric cars to efficient light bulbs to very large wind turbines, are made possible by an unusual group of elements called rare earths. The world’s dependence on these substances is rising fast.

Just one problem: These elements come almost entirely from China, from some of the most environmentally damaging mines in the country, in an industry dominated by criminal gangs.

Western capitals have suddenly grown worried over China’s near monopoly, which gives it a potential stranglehold on technologies of the future.

In Washington, Congress is fretting about the United States military’s dependence on Chinese rare earths, and has just ordered a study of potential alternatives.

Here in Guyun Village, a small community in southeastern China fringed by lush bamboo groves and banana trees, the environmental damage can be seen in the red-brown scars of barren clay that run down narrow valleys and the dead lands below, where emerald rice fields once grew.

Criminal gangs, geopolitics, and environmental collapse, make for a dangerous cocktail. This article highlights an important issue that (as far as I can tell) has been under-reported .

Britain’s New Scientist has a short piece on the arrival of non-Latin script Internet addresses in 2010. They explain:

Net regulator ICANN - the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers - conceded in October that more than half of the 1.6 billion people online use languages with scripts not fully compatible with the Latin alphabet. It is now accepting applications for the first non-Latin top level domains (TLDs) - the part of an address after the final “dot”. The first national domains, counterparts of .uk or .au, should go live in early 2010. So far, 12 nations, using six different scripts, have applied and some have proudly revealed their desired TLD and given a preview of what the future web will look like.

The first Arabic domain is likely to be Egypt’s and in Russia orders are already being taken for the country’s hoped-for new TLD. The address HOBЫЙyЧеНЫЙ.pф - a rough translation of “newscientist” with the Cyrillic domain that stands for Russian Federation - can be registered today.

Though they will be invisible to many of today’s users, these changes are a bellwether for the web’s future. Today Latin-script languages predominate. But before long Chinese will overtake English as the most used language, and web use in other places with scripts of their own, such as India and Russia, is growing fast. The Middle East is spawning new users faster than any other region.

On the one hand, the use of non-Lain script will likely make the web accessible to many more people who will not have to learn a new script in order to navigate the web.  The New Scientist piece argues that this is a step towards making the web truly worldwide. Others have reached a different conclusion, based on concerns that injecting non-Latin  scripts into the URLs  will cause  the World Wide Web to be less worldwide rather more regional, national, or linguistic. These subwebs may have deeper interconnectivity within themselves but there will only be lighter connections from one linguistic web to another.

Time will tell whether 2010 will mark a sea change of the Internet, or whether this is much ado about nothing.

Hat tip: io9

Since 1955 NORAD (and its predecessor CONAD) has tracked Santa’s each Christmas Eve and has answered questions for boys and girls about his progress. NORAD’s Santa tracking service uses interactive maps updated every few minutes at http://www.noradsanta.org. As Santa stops in each location, you can click an icon to learn more about that part of the world. There is also a 3D option using Google Earth. Moreover, there are links to update clips being posted on YouTube.

And you can also call NORAD and speak to someone there at 1-877-Hi-NORAD (1-877-446-6723) or e-mail the staff at noradtrackssanta [at] gmail [dot] com and get a return e-mail listing Santa’s most recent location. There are now Facebook and Twitter options as well, along with updates that can be sent directly to your mobile phone.

According to the current update (as of this writing):

NORAD has confirmed that Santa and his fully-loaded, reindeer-powered sleigh took off from the North Pole and soared into the arctic sky at 6:00 a.m. EST (5:00 a.m. CST, 4:00 a.m. MST, 3:00 a.m. PST). NORAD radar is tracking Rudolph’s bright red nose, and satellite imagery is providing minute-by-minute coverage of Santa’s location.

Here’s how NORAD does it:

NORAD uses four high-tech systems to track Santa – radar, satellites, Santa Cams and fighter jets.

Tracking Santa starts with the NORAD radar system called the North Warning System. This powerful radar system consists of 47 installations strung across the northern border of North America. On Christmas Eve, NORAD monitors the radar systems continuously for indications that Santa Claus has left the North Pole.

The moment that radar indicates Santa has lifted off, we use our second detection system. Satellites positioned in geo-synchronous orbit at 22,300 miles from the Earth’s surface are equipped with infrared sensors, which enable them to detect heat. Amazingly, Rudolph’s bright red nose gives off an infrared signature, which allow our satellites to detect Rudolph and Santa.

The third tracking system is the Santa Cam network. We began using it in 1998, which is the year we put our Santa Tracking program on the internet. Santa Cams are ultra-cool, high-tech, high-speed digital cameras that are pre-positioned at many locations around the world. NORAD only uses these cameras once a year on Christmas Eve. The cameras capture images and videos of Santa and his reindeer as they make their journey around the world.

The fourth system is made up of fighter jets. Canadian NORAD fighter pilots flying the CF-18 intercept and welcome Santa to North America. In the United States, American NORAD fighter pilots in either the F-15 or the F-16 get the thrill of flying alongside Santa and his famous reindeer: Dasher, Dancer, Prancer, Vixen, Comet, Cupid, Donner, Blitzen and, of course, Rudolph.

There is also a list of FAQs including technical data on Santa’s sleigh, intel regarding his girth, and the following handy fact:

How can Santa travel the world within 24 hours?
NORAD intelligence reports indicate that Santa does not experience time the way we do. His Christmas Eve trip seems to take 24 hours to us, but to Santa it might last days, weeks or even months. Santa would not want to rush the important job of delivering presents to children and spreading Christmas to everyone, so the only logical conclusion is that Santa somehow functions within his own time-space continuum.

And, perhaps most importantly for any of us with excited little ones:

When will Santa arrive at my house?
NORAD tracks Santa, but only Santa knows his route. So we cannot predict where and when he will arrive at your house. But we do know from history that it appears he arrives only when children are asleep! In most countries, it seems Santa arrives between 9:00 p.m. and midnight on Christmas Eve. If children are still awake when Santa arrives, he moves on to other houses. He returns later…but only when the children are asleep!

As the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen enters its crucial week, we will be joined by a few guests who will be blogging about the climate talks, sometimes from Copenhagen itself.

Dan Bodansky of the University of Georgia (and soon to be of Arizona State University) and the author of the book The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law has already sent us a post from Copenhagen (as well as this post and this post from the Barcelona run-up to Copenhagen). We look forward to his further observations.

We are also looking forward to contributions this week from Andrew Guzman of Berkeley Law, co-author (with Jody Freeman) of the recent article Sea Walls are Not Enough: Climate Change and U.S. Interests and author of the forthcoming book Climate Change and the Apocalypse (my kudos on the choice of title). readers may remember that we have previously hosted a book discussion of Andrew’s book How International Law Works.  We welcome him back. 

Finally, we are pleased to have five contributors from the new book Climate Finance: Regulatory Funding and Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development (NYU Press 2009).  The book can be downloaded from the International Climate Finance page of NYU’s Institute for International Law and Justice. The co-editors of the volume Benedict Kingsbury, Richard Stewart, and Bryce Rudyk will all be joining us, as will contributors Arunabha Ghosh and Nathaniel Keohane. I know that at least Benedict and Bryce are at Copenhagen, and I would not be surprised if some of their other colleagues are there as well. 

Benedict Kingsbury is Director of the Institute for International Law and Justice at NYU School of Law. He has written extensively on trade-environment disputes, the United Nations, and interstate arbitration and the proliferation of international tribunals.

Richard Stewart directs NYU’s Center on Environmental and Land Use Law and Global Law School Program. He has formerly served as Assistant Attorney General for Environment and Natural Resources, U.S. Department of Justice, and as Chairman of the Environmental Defense Fund.

Bryce Rudyk is Coordinator of the International Climate Finance Project and Research Fellow at the Center for Environmental and Land Use Law at NYU School of Law. His research focuses on financing climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Arunabha Ghosh is Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton; Associate at the Global Economic Governance Programme, Oxford (see this resource guide to climate change governance issues); and Faculty Associate at the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford. He previously worked as Policy Specialist at UNDP’s Human Development Report Office in New York, where he authored the 2006 HDR and co-authored the 2005 and 2004 editions.

Nathaniel Keohane is Director of Economic Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund, and Adjunct Professor at NYU School of Law. He has published articles on environmental economics in numerous academic journals, and is the co-author of Markets and the Environment.

Their Climate Finance project provides some much-welcome “brass tacks” considerations on the financing and regulatory issues of climate change governance. Here’s the short description:

Preventing risks of severe damage from climate change not only requires deep cuts in developed country greenhouse gas emissions, but enormous amounts of public and private investment to limit emissions while promoting green growth in developing countries. While attention has focused on emissions limitations commitments and architectures, the crucial issue of what must be done to mobilize and govern the necessary financial resources has received too little consideration. In Climate Finance, a leading group of policy experts and scholars show how effective mitigation of climate change will depend on a complex mix of public funds, private investment though carbon markets, and structured incentives that leave room for developing country innovations. This requires sophisticated national and global regulation of cap-and-trade and offset markets, forest and energy policy, international development funding, international trade law, and coordinated tax policy.

Thirty-six targeted policy essays present a succinct overview of the emerging field of climate finance, defining the issues, setting the stakes, and making new and comprehensive proposals for financial, regulatory, and governance mechanisms that will enrich political and policy debate for many years to come. The complex challenges of climate ­finance will continue to demand fresh insights and creative approaches. The ideas in this volume mark out starting points for essential institutional and policy innovations.

Remember, you can download the book free of charge from here.

We at Opinio Juris are excited that such a distinguished and varied group of experts will be with us over the next week. We encourage our readers to weigh-in with questions and comments.

I will write on this at greater length in a couple of days after a few of the key parties have made their arguments. For now, I just want to note that the oral proceeding transcripts will be available here. In the Tuesday morning session (which is all that has been posted at the time of this writing), Serbia set out its argument.

Without having gone in depth into Serbia’s argument, I do note that they seem to be staking out a claim that the declaration of independence made by Kosovo’s Parliament is itself illegal under international law, violating both the territorial integrity of Serbia and falling afoul of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (which I have analyzed here). Given that most international lawyers tend to argue that secession itself is neither legal nor illegal under international law (or, put another way, that international law is silent as to the legality of secession), I am interested in both reading the oral statements at greater length, as well as the written submissions to see how Serbia constructed this argument.

More to come…

Following-up on my recent post on commercial space ventures, I note that Richard Bilder has a new article posted to SSRN: A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S. Policy Options. I know that “helium-3″ might sound like the name of some sci-fi show like “Deep Space 9,”  but it is really a great hope for future energy needs. Bilder’s abstract explains:

This article addresses questions of U.S. international legal and space policy arising from current proposals of the U.S., Russia, China and India to establish national bases on the Moon, in part with the purpose of mining and bringing to Earth Helium-3 (He-3). He-3 is an isotope of helium that is available in quantity only on the Moon and could, as an ideal fuel for nuclear fusion reactors, furnish humanity a virtually unlimited source of safe, non-polluting energy for centuries to come. For example, it is estimated that 40 tons of liquefied He-3 brought from the Moon to the Earth – about the amount that could comfortably fit in the cargo bays of two of the existing U.S. space shuttles – would provide sufficient fuel for He-3-based fusion reactors to meet the full electrical needs of the U.S. – or a quarter of the entire world’s electrical needs – for an entire year. However, there is as yet no international consensus on whether, or how, any nation or private enterprise can exploit or acquire title to He-3 or other lunar resources. The article calls attention to what may become a “race to the Moon” to obtain He-3 and discusses: (1) the technical and economic prospects for the development of He-3-based energy; (2) the present legal situation concerning the exploitation of lunar resources such as He-3; and (3) policy options for the U.S. regarding the establishment of an international legal regime capable of avoiding conflict in the exploitation of He-3 and other lunar resources and facilitating the broad scale development of He-3-based energy.

In addition to the idea of using helium-3  for power on earth it is also one of the most commonly posited potential fuel sources for crewed spacecraft to the asteroid belt and outer planets. This would open the belt up to the possibility of asteroid mining (if that turns out to be economically feasible) as well as crewed scientific exploration of the outer solar system. Bilder sets out various options including ratifying the present Moon Agreement, establishing an international lunar resource regime outside of the framework of the Moon Agreement, and setting up either an international organization or some other enterprise for mining lunar helium-3.

Underlying this is his argument that significant public or private investment in helium-3 mining would be predicated on a stable legal regime concerning the property and ownership issues of mined lunar resources. Thus, he argues, it is in the U.S.’s interest to take part in the construction of a lunar resource regime (be it treaty, international organization, or other policy option) sooner, rather than later.

For anyone interested in cutting edge issues in space law, this article is a great place to start.

Tomorrow (Friday, October 23rd), the S.J. Quinney College of Law of the University of Utah will host a symposium entitled Freedom from Religion: Rights and National Security. You can watch the symposium online via a link on this page. Here’s the brief description:

Based on Professor Amos N. Guiora’s new book, Freedom from Religion: Rights and National Security (Oxford University Press, 2009), this Symposium will explore the limits of tolerance of religious extremism in five countries and its impact on the current terrorism threat our world faces. By drawing on varied perspectives and disciplines — religion, cognitive science, history, philosophy, and law — the panelists will challenge conventional wisdom by asking whether the threat of future terrorism might be lessened by government’s curtailing religious extremism.

The agenda is as follows (be sure to adjust for your timezone!):

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM Welcoming Remarks: Professor Terry Kogan, Moderator
8:45 AM – 9:15 AM Presentation of Book: Professor Amos Guiora
9:15 AM – 9:40 AM First Amendment Response: Professor Scott Matheson
9:40 AM – 10:05 AM Religious Studies Response: Professor William Deal
10:05 AM – 10:30 AM Religious Practitioner’s Response: Pastor John Lentz
10:30 AM – 11:00 AM Audience Written Questions/E-mails/Tweets Posed by Moderator to Panelists

The U.S. East Coast times would be  10:30 am - 1:00 pm.

Back in July, I had written a post about current issues in governmental space programs and I promised a follow-up on the private space industry. Well, that post never materialized. However, in lieu of that post I want to point to this post by author Brenda Cooper on Futurismic that has a quick and fun tour of the major U.S. players among the new space start-ups. She describes (and has links to) a few of the companies, as well as the new “spaceports,” and also has a link to the Rocket Racing League’s promo video that really should not be missed. By the way, Futurismic also had a post from around the time of the Apollo moon landing anniversary looking at the current state of private (and public) space programs.

The international legal issues generated by such these new space start-ups are as wide-ranging as the business models, which encompass topics such as private satellite launches, space tourism,  private space stations/ hotels in space, energy generation, and moon landings. As more companies move into these areas, the basic framework of the Outer Space Treaty will probably need to be supplemented. It will e especially interesting to see how much of these relations among new space ventures will be circumscribed by new government regulations and international agreements or rather be defined primarily by contractual provisions of an industry that may grow and change faster than the regulators are able to keep up.

And, as incredible as the ventures listed above are, my favorite example is the story of some other balloon boys and girls, four Spanish teenagers and their high school teacher, who used a helium balloon to loft a camera 20 miles to the upper reaches of the atmosphere. (Check out these pictures.) Total cost: about 200 bucks. (Perhaps with some refinements this could provide super-cheap image intel.) When you have teen-aged hobbyists sending payloads as high as NASA research balloons, then you know the regulatory environment is about to undergo a basic change. Overall, the rise of private space ventures is part of the story of how individuals and other substate actors are pushing into areas that before could only be contemplated by governments. 

Like I wrote back in July: it’s a fun time to be a space lawyer.

Kristen Boon of Seton Hall Law School (and occasional Opinio Juris guest-blogger) has sent in the following call for questions/ topics for a roundtable at International Law Weekend entitled Overlapping Threats / Overlapping Jurisdictions: International Law in the Face of New Threats to Peace and Security. She writes:

Climate change, swine flu, the global financial crisis, and drug trafficking pose significant new threats to international stability. Do they constitute threats to peace and security as a matter of international law, and if so, which organizations will ultimately exercise jurisdiction over these growing challenges of globalization? Do existing global bodies – the UN Security Council, World Health Organization, the World Bank – have the power to respond decisively and effectively? If so, why? Will the private sector, or regional, economically driven entities, such as the G20, emerge as the dominant decision makers?

Please join us to explore these questions, and more, in a roundtable discussion at the 2009 International Law Weekend on Friday Oct. 23 at 2:15pm at Fordham Law School with Amb. Christian Wenaweser (Amb. of Leichtenstein to the UN), Prof. Benedict Kingsbury (NYU Law), Prof. Stephen Marks (Harvard School of Public Health), and Mr. Vikram Raghavan (World Bank).

What do you want to know?

Please email questions in advance to: Prof. Kristen Boon: boonkris@shu.edu.

While I agree with Julian that the interplay of law and politics on questions of statehood can lead to difficult questions, I think his declaration that “we still don’t know when a state is a state,” does more to obscure the issues than actually give a clear picture as to how law and politics affect each other. First of all, Julian is really talking about one specific set of circumstances: contested secessions. I’d like to expand on his post a bit and consider some of the issues.

I think Julian started-off on the wrong foot by asking:

Are the two breakaway sections of Georgia (South Ossetia & Abhkazia) states? If not, why is Kosovo a state?

Formulating the question this way makes it seem that there is a single repository of what is or is not a state. But of course that is not the case: each existing state individually chooses to recognize (or not recognize) other entities as states. To the United States, Kosovo is a state. To Russia, it is not. To Russia, South Ossetia is a state. To the United States, it is not. (That’s the short answer to Julian’s questions.)

It is not that international law is unable to define what is or is not a state, it is that the process of whether or not a particular state actually chooses to recognize another entity as a state is intertwined with politics. This isn’t the conclusion, it’s just the starting point…

The following was sent to us by the American Branch of the International Law Association:

The American Branch of the International Law Association will hold its annual International Law Weekend, in conjunction with its 88th Annual Meeting, in New York from October 22-24, 2009. Registration is free for students, members of the American Branch, and cosponsoring organizations (including the ABA Section of International Law and the American Society of International Law); for others, the registration fee is $75.00. To register, visit www.ila-americanbranch.org.

The theme for the conference is “Challenges to Transnational Governance.” The plenary session for the conference and the opening reception will take place on Thursday, October 22, at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 42 West 44th Street in New York City. The opening session will focus on efforts to reform the United Nations Security Council, including the initiation of intergovernmental negotiations in March of this year. Confirmed participants include: the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Mission of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff; the Permanent Representative of the Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, Ambassador Shekou M. Touray; and Professor Joseph E. Schwartzberg of the University of Minnesota. The panel’s moderator will be Professor Jose Alvarez of Columbia University Law School.

On Friday and Saturday, the conference’s venue shifts to Fordham University School of Law, 140 West 62nd Street in New York City. The conference schedule includes thirty-three panels, traversing a wide spectrum of contemporary international law, including international criminal law, human rights law, international environmental law, international economic law, commercial law, and trade law. Several of the panels during these two days focus on the conference’s theme of transnational governance, including “The Contribution of the International Law Commission to Transnational Governance,” “Transnational Governance/Regulation in Global Competition Law Enforcement, “Democratic Process in International Law: State Practice and Non-State Actor Access,” “Transnational Legal Orders: International Trade Regimes and Domestic Regulatory Policy,” and “The Role of International Environmental Law in Transnational Governance.” The keynote speaker at the annual luncheon on Friday, October 23, at 12:30 p.m., will be Lucy Reed, who will speak on the topic “Not-So-Fine Lines in Transnational Governance: Blurring of Public and Private in the International Legal Order.” Ms. Reed is a partner with Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, co-head of its global arbitration group, and President of the American Society of International Law.

On Friday evening, the Annual Gala Reception will be hosted at the residence of the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 510 Park Avenue, 11A in New York City.

Several organizations are cosponsoring the American Branch’s ILW 2009:

• American Bar Association Section of International Law
• American Society of International Law
• American University, Washington College of Law
• California Western School of Law
• Canadian Bar Association
• Customs and International Trade Bar Association
• Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
• Federalist Society
• Fordham University School of Law
• Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
• The George Washington Law School
• Hofstra University School of Law
• ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law
• Leitner Center for International Law and Justice
• Oxford University Press
• Seton Hall University School of Law

The International Law Students Association is joining the American Branch in organizing ILW 2009.

Peggy and Julian will be on a Friday panel “Are We Still Allowed to reject Transnational Norms;” I’ll be on a Saturday panel called “Challenging Territorial Sovereignty: Secession, Autonomy or Status Quo: Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Moldova, and Tibet.” If you come by to ILW, please stop by to say hello! (The full list of panels, by the way, is available in a link from this page.

I just wanted to note that I have posted to SSRN The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, which is part of the special issue of the Chicago Journal of International Law about great power politics to which Ken has referred a couple of times. Here’s the abstract:

This Article, written for a special issue of the Chicago Journal of International Law concerning great power politics, seeks to elucidate whether and how international law shapes modern diplomatic discourse and, in particular, how “great powers” use international legal arguments as part of their diplomatic strategies. I use one topic area — arguments over self-determination — and two cases — Kosovo and South Ossetia — to explore this relationship between the language of law and the practice of politics. I argue that international law serves as both a vocabulary and a grammar for diplomacy. International law is a vocabulary in that it defines the words that can or cannot be used in diplomatic discourse, the terminology that is or is not acceptable. Similarly, international law provides a grammar for international relations by setting the rules by which words fit together — essentially, how ideas can be expressed. For example, “we will use our right to attack you” does not easily fit into the grammar of international law or international politics (barring some questionable readings by the Bush Administration). By cabining what can be said in international relations, international law defines norms, shapes expectations, sets the boundaries of what can be legitimized and, ultimately, can make it more or less likely that certain state actions will be successful.

Section II of this Article briefly sets out the background of the Kosovar and South Ossetian conflicts. Section III is a quick primer on the evolution of the concept of self-determination and its at-times difficult coexistence with the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Section IV turns to the analysis of how legal argumentation was used by Russia, the US, and the EU in the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia. Although I note the relative strengths and weaknesses of the arguments, I am less interested in who was right or wrong as opposed to what strategy was used (if any) in deploying the language of international law. I am especially interested in how Russia, in particular, has used the language of international law as a tool of public diplomacy in an attempt to spin the perceptions or “control the narratives” related to both Kosovo and South Ossetia. Finally, Section V considers how the rhetorical use of international legal argumentation goes beyond managing perceptions and can actually affect the evolution of the substance of international law.

On related news, this week the EU will release its much-anticipated report on responsibility for the Russia/Georgia conflict over South Ossetia. Also, the public hearings for the ICJ’s Advisory Proceedings on Kosovo have been scheduled to begin on 1 December.  Stay tuned…

CNN has the story:

“Where do you live?”

Seems like a simple question, doesn’t it?

But the answer is not clear-cut for everyone. Take people who live in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, which is wedged between India, Pakistan and China. India and Pakistan have gone to war repeatedly over the disputed territory.

Technically, it’s “Indian-administered.”

But on Facebook, it’s simply in India.

 Questions like this have been causing Facebook and other social networking sites a headache, because in terms of reactions from current and potential customers, it is “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” CNN explains:

Facebook recently changed its listing for the Golan Heights — which Israel captured from Syria in 1967 — so users there could choose to say whether they live in Israel or Syria.

It was responding to pressure from a pro-Israel group called HonestReporting — and from Facebook users who set up a group on the site itself called “Facebook, Golan Residents Live in Israel, not Syria.”

“It is not for Facebook to decide the national origin of Golan residents,” the group says on its page.

Facebook may have pleased pro-Israel users there by giving them the choice to say where they live, but not all Syrians were happy about the change.

“I think Facebook sort of shot itself in the foot to make it optional for the Golan to say this is part of Israel,” said Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian scholar based in the United States.

“This is against international law,” he said.

 It should come as no surprise to readers of this blog that…

At the risk of being told again that I am writing in “literary Klingon,” I want to return to the issue of virtual worlds and their real world implications. This time, a virtual world is being considered as a way to assist in the management of an international organization, namely NATO. According to Danger Room:

NATO’s got a new plan for training up employees and running the alliance’s day-to-day business: create a virtual world.

That’s right: The organization is after software models that would simulate its real-world headquarters …, as well as NATO’s North American command center, the Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Va. The 3D programs would be used for training purposes and meetings, and NATO hopes they’ll improve staff communication and productivity, while circumventing “the inhibitions to collaboration posed by physical distance and time zones.”

See also this post at CTLab. It’s an interesting idea that a virtual headquarters in cyberspace could be used to ease the coordination problems of an international organization.  On the one hand, this sounds like a really fancy version of conference calling, but I think NATO is hoping for something much more elaborate. Consider the following from Danger Room (emphasis added):

This isn’t the first time NATO has toyed with virtual training programs. In February, they requested a computerized replica of Afghanistan, complete with data on Afghan economics, politics and culture, to be used by war planners in decision-making considerations. And two years ago, the Navy asked for the same thing, but with Iraq as the targeted 3D nation.

Of course, mapping an entire country is a much bigger challenge than replicating a few command stations, but NATO’s still got lofty goals for the new training program. They want a world that’s physically realistic and real-time, and continues to run even when users aren’t “in-world.” Plus, each staffer will be represented with an avatar.

I am more sanguine about the use of virtual worlds as a means to aid workflow in a multinational organization than as an effective tool in politico-economic planning. While the first is essentially a complex communications technology, the second is actually a political model, as dependent on assumptions and interpretations as any other political analysis. These two uses of virtual worlds are thus quite different, one is largely content-neutral, the other is all about the content. In the latter case, the virtual world is likely to only work as well as our understanding of the real one.

Following-up on my recent post, I see that the Wall Street Journal reports that President Qaddafi no longer plans to stay in a large tent on the grounds of a home owned by the Libyan government in Englewood, NJ, during the opening of the UN General Assembly this fall. No specific reason is being given for the change, although diplomatic negotiations are the likely reason.  However, it is interesting to note that last week Englewood filed a suit against Libya and the construction contractor that had been renovating the Libyan property (probably in anticipation of Qaddafi’s visit). According to Findlaw (which also has links to the court papers), after an August 24th stop work order by Englewood’s city engineer was ignored:

Englewood Mayor Michael Wildes had the City Attorney Bill Bailey sue to get a temporary restraining order and injunction against the Libyan Government and its Greenwich Village-based New York City contractor, Quattro Construction.

The lawsuit contends that Libya and the contractor:

1. Have “not maintained Soil Erosion and Sediment Control (SESC) measures on site. Based on the amount of disturbance taking place on the property, the applicant will be required to obtain a SESC permit.”

2. “Has not obtained a tree permit for the trees cut down on the property;”

3. Must submit a grading plan to the City for “review and approval,” and potentially a “Soil Movement” permit;

4. Obtain approval for the construction of a wall on the property, which “may require a Stream Encroachment Permit for construction near the pond area.”

I love it when NJ tree permit litigation and international relations overlap!

The local news in New York and New Jersey is abuzz this morning with unconfirmed rumors that, for the opening of this year’s UN General Assembly, Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi is planning to stay in an air-conditioned “Bedouin-style” tent  on the grounds of a residence owned by the Libyan government in Englewood, New Jersey, a suburban town of 30,000. According to the NY Times, he originally wanted to pitch his tent in Central Park, but that idea was nixed by NY city officials.

On the Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC, Congressperson Steve Rothman argued that while the U.S. has obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement to allow Qaddafi into the country to attend UN meetings, that does not extend to his being able to choose to stay anywhere in the country. He may have been referring to Sec.13(d) of the Agreement, which states:

Except as provided above in this section and in the General Convention, the United States retains full control and authority over the entry of persons or property into the territory of the United States and the conditions under which persons way remain or reside there

Rothman, who, as it happens, had been the mayor of Englewood in 1982 when the Libyan government purchased the property, also argues that this issue has already been dealt with by the State Department. In 1982, he had asked the Reagan Administration for a finding curtailing the property’s use, which resulted in a State Department statement that only the Libyan Ambassador could reside there. (I have not seen the document, so I don’t know exactly what it is.)Rothman’s interpretation is that this precludes Qaddafi from staying there for any length. His interpretation is in part based on what he says was the intent of the declaration which was to prevent the land in Englewood from being used to house Qaddafi–or any other head of state–based on the concern that Englewood did not have the means to guarantee security for a head of state and that it would be too disruptive for town residents.

The Times reports that

A State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said on Thursday, “We expect we’ll be able to come to an arrangement that will respect the sensitivities of the local population.”

[REVISION: I have realized that in the version originally posted, I inadvertantly left out that Qaddafi was planning on staying in the tent during the opening of this year's General Assembly. I have corrected the original version of the text.]