Search: self-defense

(also claimed by Japan) and the Ieodo/Suyan Rock (also claimed by South Korea). To the extent those territories are “national airspace”, China can argue that it should be allowed to draw an ADIZ around them to ensure any airplanes coming near them will not enter that airspace, etc. As Zachary Keck suggests, China is using the ADIZ to subtly build its legal claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands. Hence, China is probably invoking the UN Charter’s self-defense provision to justify its ADIZ and its need for all foreign aircraft...

...even its nationals abroad, any one of which falls much more firmly within the scope of presidential authority. Why not? Because he knows his asserted causus belli for attacking Syria falls outside the scope of national self-defense or the defense or rescue of U.S. nationals abroad. Instead, it is a broad protection of ‘national security’ interests that ostensibly triggers inherent Article II war initiation authority. This broad assertion of unilateral executive war making authority is unsupported by either historic practice or generally accepted interpretations of Article II powers. Indeed, if...

...(as US in Afghanistan after 2002 against the Taliban and AlQaeda and Iraq) while an NIAC would be like Yemen with consent against the AQ types or Afghanistan after Karzai had effective control consent against the Taliban and AQ. Pakistan is an NIAC in this setting though the lack of consent for the OBL raid (a very big deal for Pakistan) might be justified by the US as self-defense, but also might trigger Pakistan self-defense under Article 51. Subsequent events would not appear to have taken us over the threshold...

entitled to act in self-defence against “bad dudes” no matter when — or even if — those “bad dudes” might launch an armed attack against the US. This isn’t even the Bush administration’s “anticipatory self-defence.” This is, for lack of a better expression, “hypothetical self-defence.” Apparently, the US government believes it is entitled to use force against a non-state actor anywhere in the world as long as it can imagine a future state of affairs in which that actor would attack it. The mind — and international law — reels....

...which self-defense and protection of U.S. nationals have been the most commonly invoked; and (ii) the operation cannot be anticipated to be “sufficiently extensive in ‘nature, scope, and duration’ to constitute a ‘war’ requiring prior specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause,” a standard that generally will be satisfied “only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period” (quoting from the Libya opinion). Largely for reasons explained by my colleague and Dean, Bill Treanor, I am...

...the relevant law. Any other interpretation of the defense — most relevantly, that relying on an official statement made by the appropriate public officer or body is per se reasonable — renders the word “reasonable” completely superfluous. Reliance itself would be enough to invoke the defense. Differently put, the reasonableness requirement in entrapment by estoppel only makes sense if we leave open the possibility — however slight — that reliance on official advice can be unreasonable no matter how authoritative the public officer or body that issues it. Lederman, however,...

...deny the power of Congress to legislate over Indian affairs or to curtail the scope of Indian self-government. But the Court declared that Congress had not done so in any clear fashion and thus found no congressional intent to limit Indian self-government. The Court stated that the tribes retained their right of "self-government [and] the maintenance of order and peace among their own members." Unless this power is limited by explicit legislation or surrendered by the tribe, Indian tribes retain exclusive judicial jurisdiction over reservation Indian affairs. Thus today most...

...statutory provisions. Even if preliminary examination were to constitute a “matter under consideration,” the Defense maintained, it would have no bearing on the question of whether the Court could open an investigation post-withdrawal under article 12, as the Defense contested an applicable linkage between 12 and 127. Finally, the Defense contested the finding that the object and purpose of the Statute permitted the authorization of an investigation post-withdrawal, arguing that the object and purpose of the Statute is served by the one-year period between notification of withdrawal and its effect...

...one person alone but from the rule of law itself. There are only two conditions in which a war is legal under international law: when force is authorized by the United Nations Security Council or when the use of force is an act of national self-defense and survival. The U.N. Charter, based on the Nuremberg Principles, prohibits war "as an instrument of policy." And the war in Iraq is just that — a war of choice. There is a common tendency among lawyers and military commanders to sneer at international...

...piece from me next week arguing something I’ve developed at Volokh Conspiracy and here at OJ blog: first, that the administration’s lawyers need to step up to the plate and defend targeted killing using Predators and, second, the proper legal basis on which to defend it to the full extent undertaken by the Obama administration is the international law of self-defense, rather than simply the law of armed conflict, targeting combatants. In another piece coming soon (this one a book chapter in a Hoover Institution online collection of essays from...

...immediate and immense subcontracting problems for any defense contractors relying on Claude, including Amazon Web Services, Palantir and Anduril, and could potentially, de facto, force the company out of the defense tech ecosystem. This would have repercussions not only in the US context, but also internationally as, for example, a number of European states, such as the UK, have large-scale contracts with these companies. Defense officials, including Secretary Pete Hegseth, have framed Anthropic’s safety conditions as operationally unrealistic. Military operations, they argue, unfold in grey zones. Therefore, DoD claims it...

...this stage. Then, the ICJ opined that it has treated the clean hands doctrine as a defense of merits with “utmost caution”. More importantly, the ICJ then analyzed the conditions where the clean hands doctrine could be applicable, as argued by the US in their counter-memorial. It is critical that we pause here first. This is the first time that the ICJ has delved into a substantial analysis of the clean hands doctrine as a defense on merits, and has taken into account the various considerations that attract its application....