Search: self-defense

...been interesting to analyse this change of view. In relation to the second question, on the potential exercise of self-determination by these rebel groups on behalf of the Libyan and Syrian people, the answer does not seem to be easy, as Redaelli observes. On the one hand, in its external dimension, most authors have stated that the right to self-determination cannot be exercised outside the context of colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes. On the other hand, in its internal dimension, the right to self-determination involves the right to...

...Mindua emphasises, was an exercise of the right of self-determination, which he describes as a pillar of international law [15]. In this way, Judge Mindua begins his analysis by focusing on a jus ad bellum in which the fight for self-determination is a legitimate and justified struggle.  Judge Mindua then engages in a theoretical discussion about why non-state actors, such as Ansar Dine/AQIM, are subjects of international humanitarian law. Again, this theoretical question is not at issue in the case. The Prosecution only had to show that Ansar Dine/AQIM demonstrated...

...broad definition of such an attack, does not necessarily establish a basis for the use of force against a non-state actor. This assertion is based on three considerations. First, the term collective action in Article 6(1) likely refers to, at least in part, “collective self-defence” (discussed below). This is also directly established when considering that an armed attack may give rise to a right of collective self-defence; conversely, collective self-defence may be taken in in response to an armed attack. Second, arguments favoring Article 6(1) as a legal basis would...

...State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.’ Obviously, this provision was created in the context of decolonization, but if the right to self-determination is applicable...

entitled to determine their political fate in accordance with the right to self-determination. Furthermore, this prohibition applies to all territories occupied by force, even if it is claimed that force was initially used in an act of self-defense. The West Bank was taken by force in 1967. It has been consistently recognized by the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the International Court of Justice as an occupied territory, in which the Palestinian people is entitled to fulfill its right to self-determination. This remains so even if bilateral...

...are divested of the right to renew military operations even if the agreement does not introduce peace in the full extension of the term, as questions of title to territorial sovereignty may remain outstanding. When the parties to a conflict reach a ceasefire agreement, the absence of an impending harm frustrates the ratione temporis requirement of immediacy in self-defense as a feature of the broader requirement of necessity in lawful uses of force, pursuant to Article 51of the UN Charter. In other words, a ceasefire agreement creates a new objective...

...was delivered by a 13-1 majority: According to the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice in the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, self-determination had emerged as a norm of customary international law between the years 1965 and 1968. These years coincided with the PLO’s self-determination claim to Palestine. And in the colonial context self-determination claims were also claims about sovereignty. It could, of course, be argued that the Palestinian people did not need to base their self-determination claim on customary international law, since the UN had already...

...argument that the declarations actually constitute inadmissible reservations or are otherwise unacceptable). Second, from a U.S. law stand-point there’s the question of the Senate’s ability to make a declaration of self-execution, which I don’t think it has ever done before, at least not in the resolution of advice and consent itself (past SFRC reports have, of course, expressed opinions on whether the SFRC understood the treaty to be self-executing in one or more senses of that term, or otherwise dependent on ex-ante or ex-post legislation in some way). At a...

...the lawyers’ pre-raid analysis – meaning that even if one did not buy the “unwilling or unable” theory, or anything else about the raid, it wouldn’t have mattered. The UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing treaties under U.S. law, the theory is, so the President is not legally bound. This view embraces a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine of self-execution, before and even after the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin. A non-self-executing treaty under U.S. law is one that is not automatically enforceable under U.S. law without...

...consequently, there will be no international crime of killing those peacekeepers (provided other IHL violations, such as a disproportionate attack, did not occur). Yet, aside from the purely evidentiary challenges and factual complexity of these cases, the Prosecutor’s investigation is also bound to raise more fundamental legal questions about the nature of peacekeeping. Given that many attacks occurred in different locations in the space of a few days (para. 164 and 176), the question is when individual self-defense (allowed for peacekeepers) reaches the threshold of direct participation in hostilities (not...

...a radically disruptive act that sought to test the usefulness of international law in advancing the causes of anti-colonial self-determination. Yet, as Siba Grovogui explained, the dreams of post-colonial states are only permitted when they do not threaten entrenched hierarchies. In the case of Palestine, this has translated into four decades of European opposition to Palestinian self-determination. Europe’s belated recognition of Palestine will not alter the structuring logic of domination that continues to impede Palestinian freedom. On this occasion, three questions would be more useful and demand investigation and reflection....

...this approach. In that decision, the Supreme Court interpreted a key provision of the U.N. Charter obligating the U.S. to comply with International Court of Justice as non-self executing, thus relieving U.S. courts from any obligation to implement an ICJ’s judgment. In my view, the relevant language could have been interpreted as either self-executing or non-self-executing, but the structural tensions created by a self-executing interpretation tipped the balance. The decision of whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment was rightly left to either the State of Texas or...