Search: self-defense

[Adam Irish is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Chico.] President Donald Trump’s pronouncements that the United States needs to develop a “Space Force” were initially met with derision by national security establishment. In a letter to lawmakers, Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, wrote that he did not “wish to add a separate service that would likely present a narrower and even parochial approach to space operations.” However, three Space Policy Directives, one speech by the Vice President, and one report by the Department of Defense...

...proposed test diverges from its justificatory origins. The test’s first stage is described as mandatory and requires: “a humanitarian crisis [that] creates consequences significantly disruptive of international order – including proliferation of chemical weapons, massive refugee flows, and events destabilizing to regional peace and security – that would likely soon create an imminent threat to the acting nations (which would give rise to an urgent need to act in individual and collective self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51) [emphasis added].” The test’s second stage – described as a criterion that...

...of force include an element of political messaging. Whether they are routine exercises or exceptional maunvers, demonstrations of force send signals to specific adversaries or to general domestic or foreign audiences, or some combination thereof. Ultimately, whatever the content and political context of that signal, the purpose of demonstrations of force is to affect and shape the policy, preferences, and perceptions of the target state or audience. Demonstrations of force are not merely tools of self-defense and deterrence, but are also an exercise of political influence. As Thomas Schelling put...

In the comments section of an earlier post, GW lawprof Edward Swaine raises a really good point in defense of Koh’s CEDAW testimony. Since I highlighted Whelan’s very tough post, it is worth highlighting Swaine’s very good point in defense (I am paraphrasing, but this is the gist): In the context of a committee hearing where other folks, including Senator Boxer, have addressed the issue of the CEDAW committee, and where Koh also addressed the CEDAW committee in his answers to questions, it is unfair for Whelan to conclude that...

...not be reconciled easily, if at all, with the more restrictive view. But even in the face of that inconsistent practice, probably a majority of scholars and UN members continued right through the Cold War to insist that the only legal uses of force unauthorized by the Security Council were cases of self-defense against actual or imminent armed attack. In recent years, however, the Charter conceived as above all a formally hegemonic system of restraint on the use of military power to advance self-defined national interests has been buffeted from...

As Peggy’s earlier post indicated, MG Geoffrey Miller today asserted his privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid being questioned by the defense attorney representing a soldier pending trial for using military working dogs to abuse prisoners. Is this significant? First, as we know from press reports, MG Miller made this decision on advice of his military defense counsel, Major Michelle Crawford. According to her statement, MG Miller’s made this decision because he has been repeatedly questioned on this subject. However, he has never been questioned by the defense counsel...

...where one party commits blatant violations, “continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil.” (Brahimi Report) Peacekeepers also cannot use force except in self-defense or in defense of mandate. “Defense of mandate” may accommodate offensive use of force in some circumstances (e.g., to protect civilians under imminent threat), but peacekeepers certainly cannot lawfully conduct offensive seek-and-disarm missions. Because peacekeepers are not “used outside the humanitarian function to conduct hostilities,” they...

...that a treaty is unnecessary. It instead advocates improved cooperation among international law enforcement groups. If these groups cooperate to make cyberspace more secure against criminal intrusions, their work will also make cyberspace more secure against military campaigns, American officials say. “We really believe it’s defense, defense, defense,” said the State Department official, who asked not to be identified because authorization had not been given to speak on the record. “They want to constrain offense. We needed to be able to criminalize these horrible 50,000 attacks we were getting a...

...of NIAC and a new interpretations of self-defense permitted the attack. If these two legal regimes (the law of self-defense and NIAC) are left rudderless, is human rights law strong enough to trump them both and correct this problem? And if not, is there reason to seriously consider 1) ensuring that an expanded concept of imminence does not gain international acceptability, 2) States coming together to explicitly prohibit the application of NIAC outside the territory of the State where the NIAC is occurring, and 3) ensuring that States conducting targeting...

...Mindua emphasises, was an exercise of the right of self-determination, which he describes as a pillar of international law [15]. In this way, Judge Mindua begins his analysis by focusing on a jus ad bellum in which the fight for self-determination is a legitimate and justified struggle.  Judge Mindua then engages in a theoretical discussion about why non-state actors, such as Ansar Dine/AQIM, are subjects of international humanitarian law. Again, this theoretical question is not at issue in the case. The Prosecution only had to show that Ansar Dine/AQIM demonstrated...

...this approach. In that decision, the Supreme Court interpreted a key provision of the U.N. Charter obligating the U.S. to comply with International Court of Justice as non-self executing, thus relieving U.S. courts from any obligation to implement an ICJ’s judgment. In my view, the relevant language could have been interpreted as either self-executing or non-self-executing, but the structural tensions created by a self-executing interpretation tipped the balance. The decision of whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment was rightly left to either the State of Texas or...

...State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.’ Obviously, this provision was created in the context of decolonization, but if the right to self-determination is applicable...