Search: self-defense

...War Powers Resolution" and that "Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." But notice what the War Powers Resolution applies to (and only to) -- “the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities." Jordan There is insufficient attention here to the alternative self-defense paradigm. Covert action targeting persons in a manner that is lawful under the international law of self-defense (e.g., against a person who is DPAA, directly participating in armed attacks) is lawful whether or not it is permissible under Ttile 50, since...

...engage in "regional action" (in my opinion, such as NATO action in Kosovo) while the Security Countil is veto-deadlocked. Some prefer that "anticipatory" self-defense be permitted when an armed attack has not occured yet but the attack is "imminent." Hardly anyone argues that "preemptive" self-defense should be permissible way before an actual armed attack is "imminent." And the problem with anticipatory self-defense is that it does not fit within the actual text of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. For some of these reasons, when Israel took out a nuclear...

...to statehood -- particularly in the context of a people who, like the Palestinians, have a right to self-determination. el roam Kevin , Thanks for the comment . You may think and believe of course, that the Palestinians have the right to self determination, but this is rather a subjective criteria (not to be knocked down by itself of course). What I have been raising, are objective criteria, standing on their own ground, notwithstanding the subjective perception of no one involved or not. Look good at the map, try to...

since been able to adopt procedures to better monitor the detainees and better facilitate attorney visits. Therefore, we would have no objection to the court ordering more than the number of visits that were suggested back in August. Get that? The mass suicide attempt and successful suicides were caused by defense attorneys providing internees with information about the outside world, not by the brutal and dehumanizing conditions at Gitmo. So now that new rules have been enacted to keep the internees in line, unrestricted defense attorney visits are permissible again....

As Peggy’s earlier post indicated, MG Geoffrey Miller today asserted his privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid being questioned by the defense attorney representing a soldier pending trial for using military working dogs to abuse prisoners. Is this significant? First, as we know from press reports, MG Miller made this decision on advice of his military defense counsel, Major Michelle Crawford. According to her statement, MG Miller’s made this decision because he has been repeatedly questioned on this subject. However, he has never been questioned by the defense counsel...

In the comments section of an earlier post, GW lawprof Edward Swaine raises a really good point in defense of Koh’s CEDAW testimony. Since I highlighted Whelan’s very tough post, it is worth highlighting Swaine’s very good point in defense (I am paraphrasing, but this is the gist): In the context of a committee hearing where other folks, including Senator Boxer, have addressed the issue of the CEDAW committee, and where Koh also addressed the CEDAW committee in his answers to questions, it is unfair for Whelan to conclude that...

...where one party commits blatant violations, “continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil.” (Brahimi Report) Peacekeepers also cannot use force except in self-defense or in defense of mandate. “Defense of mandate” may accommodate offensive use of force in some circumstances (e.g., to protect civilians under imminent threat), but peacekeepers certainly cannot lawfully conduct offensive seek-and-disarm missions. Because peacekeepers are not “used outside the humanitarian function to conduct hostilities,” they...

[Adam Irish is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Chico.] President Donald Trump’s pronouncements that the United States needs to develop a “Space Force” were initially met with derision by national security establishment. In a letter to lawmakers, Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, wrote that he did not “wish to add a separate service that would likely present a narrower and even parochial approach to space operations.” However, three Space Policy Directives, one speech by the Vice President, and one report by the Department of Defense...

...of NIAC and a new interpretations of self-defense permitted the attack. If these two legal regimes (the law of self-defense and NIAC) are left rudderless, is human rights law strong enough to trump them both and correct this problem? And if not, is there reason to seriously consider 1) ensuring that an expanded concept of imminence does not gain international acceptability, 2) States coming together to explicitly prohibit the application of NIAC outside the territory of the State where the NIAC is occurring, and 3) ensuring that States conducting targeting...

...that a treaty is unnecessary. It instead advocates improved cooperation among international law enforcement groups. If these groups cooperate to make cyberspace more secure against criminal intrusions, their work will also make cyberspace more secure against military campaigns, American officials say. “We really believe it’s defense, defense, defense,” said the State Department official, who asked not to be identified because authorization had not been given to speak on the record. “They want to constrain offense. We needed to be able to criminalize these horrible 50,000 attacks we were getting a...

...not be reconciled easily, if at all, with the more restrictive view. But even in the face of that inconsistent practice, probably a majority of scholars and UN members continued right through the Cold War to insist that the only legal uses of force unauthorized by the Security Council were cases of self-defense against actual or imminent armed attack. In recent years, however, the Charter conceived as above all a formally hegemonic system of restraint on the use of military power to advance self-defined national interests has been buffeted from...

...of force include an element of political messaging. Whether they are routine exercises or exceptional maunvers, demonstrations of force send signals to specific adversaries or to general domestic or foreign audiences, or some combination thereof. Ultimately, whatever the content and political context of that signal, the purpose of demonstrations of force is to affect and shape the policy, preferences, and perceptions of the target state or audience. Demonstrations of force are not merely tools of self-defense and deterrence, but are also an exercise of political influence. As Thomas Schelling put...