Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...and consideration of the JCPOA itself. Essentially, Chapter 7 of the book (also publicly accessible here on my SSRN page) is a full chapter-length review and analysis of the legal implications of the JCPOA, on issues including Iran’s safeguards obligations, and the economic sanctions levied against Iran by the U.N. Security Council and by the U.S. and E.U. acting unilaterally. The book thus follows the Iran case study through the period of confrontation between Iran and the West from 2002 through July 2015, setting this confrontation in its historical and...

...policy began with the Bush Administration’s [Bush Sr.] decision in 1991-92 to judicialize the Pan Am 103 matter rather than to use force, in effect treating this Libyan act of terror like a domestic murder case, rather than the political-military attack that it was. Ruth remarks in her article that the Lockerbie trial chamber was organized under pressure of Security Council resolutions (SC Resolution 731 (1992) deploring Libya’s lack of cooperation with investigators, and SC Resolution 748 (1992) imposing sanctions on Libya): In response to the bombing, the Americans mobilized...

...and liberal internationalists alike have appealed selectively to historical events and ideas as well as to legal decisions and standards to construct their case for the weakness and irrelevance (non-existence?) versus strength and importance of the international legal system in international affairs. One example is regularly countered by another. Mary Ellen claims that the existence of sanctions alone shows that actors who matter take international rules seriously. I suspect that Jack and Eric would retort that sanctions are yet another justification that the powerful clothe in some-time principle to further...

...system has collapsed. Lawyers, judges and prosecutors are also prime targets of militias. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has a mandate to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Libya yet the prosecutor has issued only one arrest warrant since 2011: against Mahmoud el-Werfalli, a commander linked to the LNA, for extrajudicial executions. The UN sanctions have been underused: only eight people have been listed for individual targeted sanctions since the 2011 revolution, including two militia commanders and six people involved in trafficking. Attempts to...

...either had to seek changes to the tax code or face sanctions through the WTO system. The President (and Congress) chose to change the tax code. The cost of non-compliance—trade sanctions with potentially significant economic effects—outweighed the cost of compliance—some companies being upset. These are the “hard cases” when it comes to compliance with international law because the mode of reasoning and decision-making is not primarily legal, but political (or diplomatic). In this form of decision making, the question of compliance is driven by an analysis of power: which is...

...of those seeking to threaten that stability. The Council had also established sanctions regimes, which played a critical role in stabilizing societies. There had been a good deal of discussion recently about whether to take steps to implement transparency in the targeting of sanctions. He wished to make those lists of targets as accurate as possible, and as transparent as was practicable. He looked forward to working with other Council members in the context of the “1267” Committee, to consider the proposals on the table and to ensure that sanctions...

...understandings, and derive from the morality of international behavior. The international community becomes most animated when it understands that a state’s activities amount to annexation, that they constitute territorial acquisition. Consider the following example: when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council immediately imposed sanctions. While the delegates from Canada and Zaire referenced the illegality of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the ten states that sponsored Resolution 661 repeatedly held that sanctions were a direct response to Iraqi aggression and the use of force. When, days later, Iraq...

...pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)) and their implementing regulations enforced by OFAC. A number of Executive Orders are part of the broader U.S. sanctions framework, and extend beyond counterterrorism; quite a few of them, nonetheless, impact humanitarian organizations, as was seen in January when the M23 (an armed group active in and around parts of the DRC in which humanitarian organizations operate) was listed under both the NDAA and Executive Order 13413. Though the sanctions framework, when compared to the material support statute, has different jurisdictional...

Jordan John: interesting, but I do not agree that he has immunity from a criminal sanctions process that involves custody, transfer, and prosecution before the ICC, especially since there is absolutely no immunity under any international criminal treaty for a head of state (e.g., Genocide Convention, art. IV; Geneva Conventions; CAT, arts. 1, 5-7 -- and the customary international law reflected in each) and Article 27(1)-(2) (which mirrors customary international law with respect to sanctions processes of international criminal tribunals) expressly denies immunity with respect to the ICC sanctions process....

...arrival of Ansar Dine/AQIM in Timbuktu; it was, Judge Mindua states, therefore allowed (Separate Opinion [58]). Amputation and flogging were, however, more problematic. They had not really applied in Mali [56] and, as Judge Mindua acknowledges, they appear as torture to many international lawyers [64]. Nevertheless, Judge Mindua points out, they are legal sanctions in states which belong to the United Nations.  As such, Judge Mindua will not state that these sanctions are necessarily illegal, even though he notes their incongruency with human rights and international law. He remains equivocal...

...president to now “dismantle” the deal in its entirety, the most significant international sanctions having been lifted by a binding resolution of the UN Security Council, a resolution all other veto bearing members of the Council remain committed to supporting. The United States could of course re-impose some or all of the national sanctions it had suspended in support of the deal. But at this point it is hard to see how the sanctions of any individual state, however powerful, would succeed in persuading Iran to abandon its decades old...

Don’t worry, this post is not about President Bush’s authority to exercise “unreviewable statutory authority” in the war on terrorism. Rather, it is about how President Bush does get to exercise “unreviewable statutory authority” in the administration of U.S. trade laws. Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Motion Systems v. Bush, a case challenging President Bush’s decision not to impose import sanctions on certain Chinese products despite an International Trade Commission decision supporting such sanctions. (The S.G.’s Brief opposing cert is here and the lower Court of Appeals...