Search: battlefield robots

...focused on how cyber warfare might require new rules, or new interpretations of rules, regarding the conduct of hostilities, or the jus in bello, once armed conflict has begun. The Internet in Bello seminar will provide an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to explore issues such as intelligence-gathering and other means of ‘preparing the battlefield’; neutrality before and during cyber war, starting with how to interpret in the Internet era the traditional requirement that neutral States not participating in a given armed conflict not allow the movements of troops or...

...should celebrate and which we should disapprove. We might analogize it to debates among various schools of art. Do we consider photorealism (i.e., textualism) to be better than abstract art (i.e., the New Haven School)? Or, is the answer somewhere in between a la impressionism (i.e., the VCLT rule)? Perhaps Prof. Gardiner’s point is simply that treaty interpretation has evolved to the point where the community of interpretators has agreed upon a single, acceptable technique for our art, namely the VCLT. It’s become, to use Jan Klabber’s phrase, our battlefield...

...would constitute such relevant materials) and, more importantly still perhaps: it would lead to all sorts of difficult negotiations on what exactly the record should reflect. Imagine the sort of record created if the UNCLOS travaux would have been thought to be decisive for future interpretations; the process would in all likelihood have taken twice as long. Still, any lawyer worth her salt will consult whatever record is available. The main function served by the Vienna Convention’s rules, then, is as something of a battlefield: the continuation of politics by...

...of Defense Report further outlined objectives, such as “deploy[ing] next-generation capabilities to support the warfighter”. While the reference to the ‘warfighter’ here does not necessarily allude to the USSF, the Report, in latter halves, blames the congestion and accumulation of rival militarization capabilities in space, specifically that of Russia’s directed-energy weaponry and China’s recent and recurrent anti-satellite (‘ASAT’) testing, for the need to militarize. It constantly refers to space as a ‘battlefield’ and advocates for the military leadership of a new independent armed corps. Additionally, the creation of the USSF...

...close connection to the first rule, the dead should be buried individually, as far as possible, depending on the number of dead bodies to be interred. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions instruct parties to use individual graves to bury the dead of the adverse party, including the bodies of combatants, picked up on the battlefield—unless the situation does not permit it (art. 17 (1) GCI; 20 (1) GCII). This preference for the individual disposal of the enemy’s dead is even stricter regarding prisoners of war or civilian internees who may only...

“The story of Ahmed Timol is rooted in our brutal past. He was not cut down on the battlefield while in the line of fire. He was detained under pernicious security laws and sadistically tortured for more than 4 days. Timol’s tormentors were police officers who were meant to serve and protect, particularly those in their care. While in an utterly incapacitated and defenceless state, and to cover up their crimes, Timol was thrown from the 10th floor of John Vorster Square. Even though he survived the fall the police...

...questioning at intelligence hubs focused on conflict and battlefield developments – no doubt motivated by their intelligence value – but FSA commanders also said they were frequently questioned about allegations of misconduct or war crimes by their affiliates or other groups. Where FSA groups crossed a “redline” – to include allegations of war crimes or human rights abuses – they were not infrequently cut. The most infamous example was the blocking of the Al-Zenki group from both State Department and CIA support after repeated reports of rights abuses, including the...

...has its origins in the 1929 Convention. What is the significance (if any) of the mixed practice under that Convention? Does the discussion at the 1999 Montreal Conference leave interpretative options open (other than for the plaintiff!). It looks as if this case could give the rules of treaty interpretation a good workout. Perhaps the failure of the Montreal Conference to resolve the issue (along with some other key issues in carriage by air) allows scope for what Jan describes as a “battlefield” and for continuation of unresolved political issues....

...by this approach, omission liability ensures accountability at the level of operationalisation of LAWS in the battlefield. Thus, despite the silence of the ICCSt. in this regard, the ICC could fill this gap by drawing from the various sources of applicable law. On balance, it appears that reliance on customary international law might be misplaced as the elements of State practice and opinio juris cannot be strongly established. A more viable route to institute general omission liability is through general principles, with care being taken to avoid the sampling biases....

...profoundly skeptical of HRW’s ability to effectively investigate them: In Gaza and elsewhere where there is no access to the battlefield or to the military and political leaders who make strategic decisions, it is extremely difficult to make definitive judgments about war crimes. Reporting often relies on witnesses whose stories cannot be verified and who may testify for political advantage or because they fear retaliation from their own rulers. Bernstein is talking here about the problems HRW faces in investigating Israel’s war crimes in Gaza, not Hamas’s war crimes. But...

...when speaking at the Pentagon, Vice President Pence backed the President’s view, asserting, “…our adversaries have transformed space into a warfighting domain already. And the US will not shrink from the challenge.” The pivot to use of force becomes clear when you compare the 2011 and 2018 DoD reports. The former report advocates for interagency cooperation while the latter calls for military leadership of a new military branch. Perhaps most striking is the 2018 DoD report’s repeated references (some two dozen) to the “battlefield” of space or “warfighting” in space....

...world we live in, not the world we wish we lived in. Such rules should not provide greater protection than we would provide to American citizens held as enemy combatants in this conflict; and they must assure that court proceedings are not permitted to interfere with the mission of our armed forces. In other words, soldiers fighting the war on terror, for example, should not be required to leave the front lines to testify as witnesses in habeas hearings. Affidavits prepared after battlefield activities have ceased should be enough. And,...