Search: battlefield robots

...could only target military objects or soldiers already threatening the lives of others but not those about to be deployed to the battlefield at a later stage. Excluding the very first shot from the application of international humanitarian law becomes even more problematic in situations of pre-emptive self-defense. After all, one would have to extend the restrictive imminence-standard under human rights law to the right to self-defense. Only then it would be ensured that action taken in self-defense also conforms to human rights law et vice versa. Otherwise, the defending...

...without formal precedential value, it is predictable that other federal judges would reach the same result. The idea that military commission rules offer any legitimate advantage over federal courts is simply wrong. While Ghailani’s judge did exclude one witness the government desired to use on the basis that he had been identified through coercive interrogation, military commission rules should have produced the same result. In general, military commission rules for handling classified information are now very closely based on those used in federal courts, while issues such as battlefield intelligence...

...for perpetrating the acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib. That finding had been supported in the 12 other major reviews conducted by the Department of Defense, the delegation said. There had been a total of 120 deaths of detainees in Department of Defense control in Afghanistan and Iraq. There had been no deaths in Guantanamo. The vast majority of deaths were caused by factors such as natural causes, injuries sustained on the battlefield, or detainee-on-detainee violence. In only 29 cases had abuse or other violations of law or policy been...

Details here. Assuming that we’re talking foot soldiers, this seems a pretty thin argument for keeping the rest under wraps, even through a cost-benefit/national interests optic. The equation: How much does keeping Gitmo up and running hurt US interests v. how much damage can released detainees cause if they return to the battlefield. I’m betting that for all but the very few high-level detainees, the former presents a much more serious (if diffuse) continuing hit. The proportion of Gitmo recidivists (assuming that’s the right description) is much more favorable than...

...return of combatants to the battlefield during conflict.” International law, consistent with Charming Betsy, was imported into the statute in Hamdi, and now the plurality in Hamdi controls Padilla. The statute implicitly authorized detentions of enemy combatants consistent with the laws of war, and the Executive branch, the Fourth Circuit held, is acting consistent with those obligations. No meaningful distinction was made between an American and non-American enemy combatant. Nor was there any meaningful distinction made between the conventional war at issue in Hamdi (the ongoing war in Afghanistan) and...

...the foreign forces were still present in Afghanistan and party to the ongoing armed conflict at the time. What might be made of the remedial obligation – that is, if IHL duties of protection are not met, what follows – that the applicants raised? In short, we typically think of the protection of civilians as actions taken on the battlefield, but in such special circumstances where there is an acknowledged special connection between the civilians in question and the state, could bureaucratic actions taken at home such as the proper...

...of guidance as to the interpretation of the authorization of the use of military force in the Hamdi case, where the court interpreted that enactment and determined that the detention of an individual who was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan fell within the scope of that. And they relied there, I think, on customary practices in the conduct of warfare in determining what fell within the scope of the authorization. FEINSTEIN: Let me stop you right here, because that’s right. Because detention is a necessary following of an authorization...

...the Tadic test: the organization requirement. The White Paper simply assumes that “al-Qa’ida and its associated forces” constitute a single organized armed group for purposes of IHL — “a transnational, non-state actor” that is “one of the parties” involved in “the non-international armed conflict between the United States and al-Qa’ida that the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan” (emphasis mine). Indeed, the White Paper must make that assumption because, by its own admission, what justifies targeting a “senior operational leader” away from an active battlefield is precisely that, as a member...

Last year the British media entered into a voluntary agreement with the British Ministry of Defence to have a news blackout of Prince Harry’s deployment in Afghanistan. Harry had been serving there about ten weeks when the news broke on the Drudge Report of his whereabouts. The BBC is now defending the news blackout. From the sounds of it, in exchange for extensive filming of Harry on the battlefield, the British press would keep mum about his deployment to Afghanistan. “So, for the past ten weeks, the BBC, ITV and...

[Chanel Chauvet earned her Master of Laws in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. She also holds a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Georgia School of Law. This is a post in our joint blog symposium with ICRC’s Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog exploring the new ICRC Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention ( GCIII Commentary ).] This post will explore the challenges of armed conflict that extend beyond the battlefield and into detention camps for many prisoners...

[Dr. Thomas D. Grant is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge and a Visiting Fellow of the National Security Institute at George Mason University.] Remedy for the Breach: Seating Ukraine Part One of this blogpost proposed that the anomaly of Russia’s presence as a Security Council Permanent Member be addressed through Rule 17 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. To recall, Rule 17 provides that “[a]ny representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection...

...developed to regulate the conduct of States and individuals might extend to the use of AI as it starts assuming the tasks that human beings traditionally performed on the battlefield.’ (p.135). Whilst the general consensus of the international community, at this time, is that IHL should continue to be the applicable legal framework to regulate LAWS, given the additional concerns and difficulties associated with regulating artificial intelligence generally, revisiting how IHL will apply to the military use of this technology will very much remain a work in progress. In line...