Fishery Diplomacy: A New Concept for Analyzing Asia’s Maritime Order

[Dr Xudong Zhang is a lecturer at the School of Law, Shanghai Maritime University]

From the South China Sea to the East China Sea, Asia’s waters are witnessing an unprecedented intertwining of fisheries and geopolitics. When Chinese fishing vessels are detained by Japan’s Fisheries Agency in waters off southwest Nagasaki prefecture, when the Korea Coast Guard uses force against Chinese fishing boats in the Yellow Sea, and when Vietnamese fishing vessels clash with Indonesia’s Bakamla in the Natuna Sea—these are not merely isolated fisheries disputes. They represent a new form of diplomatic practice that I term “fishery diplomacy”, a concept essential for understanding the evolving maritime order in Asia.

While the term “fisheries diplomacy” has appeared in earlier contexts, such as in the 1999 Yearbook of International Environmental Law, its application has often been limited to technical cooperation on resource management. The concept introduced here differs by explicitly positioning fisheries as an arena for both competition and cooperation, encompassing the strategic use of fisheries activities to assert sovereignty and project power. Against the backdrop of fisheries enforcement becoming a tool of great power maritime competition, fishery diplomacy can be defined as a comprehensive diplomatic practice wherein a state utilizes fisheries-related activities—including resource management, maritime law enforcement, and international cooperation—as instruments to safeguard its maritime rights, constrain competitors’ interests, and reshape regional order. Unlike traditional fisheries cooperation, which emphasizes mutual benefit and resource sustainability, fishery diplomacy encompasses both cooperation and confrontation. It operates at the intersection of low-politics functional cooperation (such as resource conservation) and high-politics strategic competition (such as maritime power projection).

The South China Sea offers compelling evidence of this phenomenon. The Philippines has increasingly weaponized fisheries issues, encouraging “civilian” fishing fleets to venture into disputed waters while framing China’s enforcement actions as “bullying”. These civilian missions, often supported by the Philippine Coast Guard and funded through government programs, serve dual purposes: they maintain a Philippine presence in contested areas while generating international sympathy through media coverage of confrontations. China, for its part, has consistently deployed its coast guard and civilian vessels to assert its claims, enforcing what it considers its sovereign rights. Meanwhile, the proposed U.S.-Philippines Shiprider Agreement represents a further escalation. This agreement would delegate Philippine enforcement jurisdiction to the U.S. Coast Guard vessels, enabling them to operate in waters that China considers its own territory—effectively allowing the United States to project maritime law enforcement power deep into the South China Sea under the guise of fisheries regulation. Vietnam has systematically developed its maritime militia, transforming ordinary fishermen into instruments for asserting sovereignty. Through legislative frameworks and government support, Vietnamese fishing vessels increasingly operate as coordinated units capable of confronting the China Coast Guard’s law enforcement. Concurrently, China has expanded its own maritime militia and enhanced the capabilities of its coast guard, contributing to a cycle of tit-for-tat escalation in the region. These developments reveal that fisheries have become a battleground where sovereignty claims are reinforced daily without triggering direct military confrontation. The line between civilian fishing activity and state-sponsored assertion of rights has become deliberately blurred.

In the East China Sea, the same pattern repeats. The Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean fisheries agreements, while facilitating cooperation, have also become sources of perpetual tension. The Korea Coast Guard has employed increasingly aggressive tactics against Chinese fishermen, framing enforcement as necessary to protect Korean fisheries. In several tragic incidents, these confrontations have resulted in loss of life, demonstrating how fisheries disputes can rapidly escalate beyond resource competition. China Coast Guard vessels maintain constant patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where fishing activities carry profound sovereignty implications. A 2012 amendment to Japan’s Coast Guard Law, granting its officers police powers on remote islands, transformed fisheries enforcement into a direct tool for territorial control, a move that was met with strong opposition from China.

These disputes transcend resource allocation—they are about presence, jurisdiction, and the subtle assertion of sovereign claims. When the Korea Coast Guard intercepts Chinese fishing vessels, they simultaneously enforce domestic law and demonstrate Korea’s administrative control over disputed waters. When Japanese authorities detain Chinese fishermen, they reinforce Japan’s claim to exercise jurisdiction around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The fishing boat becomes a floating marker of sovereignty, and its treatment becomes a diplomatic statement.

Existing international legal frameworks, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provide mechanisms like exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and dispute resolution procedures, yet they leave significant gray areas when claims overlap. In the South China Sea, the absence of a regional maritime code of conduct has created a legal vacuum. The Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), currently under negotiation between ASEAN and China, seeks to fill this void, though its progress remains stalled. In the East China Sea, no equivalent multilateral framework exists to manage the trilateral tensions among China, Japan, and South Korea, leaving interactions to be governed by bilateral agreements and domestic enforcement actions.

The analytical value of fishery diplomacy lies in its recognition that today’s fishing vessels serve multiple functions. They are economic units, certainly, but also sovereignty markers, intelligence platforms, and instruments of Grey Zone competition. When Chinese fishermen operate near the Scarborough Shoals, they sustain livelihoods while simultaneously affirming historical presence. When Philippine fishermen receive government fuel subsidies to sail to contested waters, they become instruments of state policy while maintaining civilian cover. And when Vietnamese fishing vessels venture into areas patrolled by multiple claimants, they collect intelligence on foreign enforcement patterns. Understanding fishery diplomacy means recognizing this inherent duality—the impossibility of separating the fisherman’s economic motivation from the strategic implications of their presence.

For Asian states entangled in maritime disputes, fishery diplomacy presents both challenges and opportunities. The challenge lies in preventing fisheries-related maritime friction from escalating and undermining bilateral relations. The opportunity lies in harnessing fisheries as platforms for confidence-building. China’s joint patrols with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin demonstrate that functional cooperation can coexist with unresolved sovereignty disputes. The two nations have conducted annual joint inspections since 2006, coordinating enforcement in the Gulf of Tonkin without prejudice to their respective claims. Similarly, China’s participation in eight Regional Fisheries Management Organizations shows commitment to multilateral frameworks despite their imperfections. These cooperative mechanisms, while not resolving underlying sovereignty disputes, create channels for communication and mechanisms for preventing escalation.

The negotiation of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, though currently stalled, represents an effort to institutionalize restraint. Fisheries cooperation is often identified as a potential “low-hanging fruit” for multilateral cooperation—an area where shared interests in resource sustainability might transcend territorial disputes. Yet the very concept of fishery diplomacy reveals why such cooperation remains elusive: fisheries are never merely about fish.

As Asia’s maritime competition intensifies, understanding fishery diplomacy becomes essential. It explains why a fishing boat is never just a fishing boat, why an arrest at sea reverberates through diplomatic channels, and why fisheries management cannot be separated from sovereignty assertions. Fishery diplomacy provides a conceptual framework to navigate the turbulent waters where fish, flags, and power converge. In an era of intensified great power competition, recognizing the strategic dimension of fisheries is not optional—it is essential for comprehending the future of Asia’s maritime order.