Search: battlefield robots

...the congressional authorization for a military response to September 11 remains good law. But the execution without trial and/or the denial of habeas corpus is much murkier. As it stands now, I don’t believe the President can execute (as oppose to kill on the battlefield) Bin Laden without sending him through the military commission system (which could take a while). Nor does the President control whether or not Bin Laden gets habeas corpus. The Court’s Boumediene decision makes that question tricky, but certainly there is good reason to believe that...

...‘impurists’; and, finally, an emerging category that, I and Michael Ratner (if no one else) discern, of purists-turned impurists-but protesting their purity. I’m told by reputable sources that this last category doesn’t actually exist, but Ratner does not seem to agree (see below). For my own part, I don’t recall those formerly urging try or release following up with me to offer anything like the detailed legal analyses of battlefield detention and the like that I seem to be offered today. But, I’m expressing this as a blogger, and will...

...a non-uniformed soldier using tactics in violation of the customary laws of war against U.S. military personnel. At least in this context, this doesn’t seem like some crazy idea cooked up by the U.S government. One can imagine its practical usage – especially on the battlefield. The individual in question here is alleged to be a Al Qaeda operative in Iraq. But U.S. courts’ skepticism of the enemy combatant concept is probably why the U.S. is transferring him to Iraq. Leaving him in U.S. custody means that he could bring...

...military operations abroad. In most cases, those rights have been developed and interpreted in peaceful democracies. Can they be applied to conflict zones abroad and if so, how? Will national courts have to develop exceptions to accommodate the law of armed conflict and the realities of the battlefield? The interaction of international human rights and the laws of war has caused much controversy and uncertainty, and national courts may be less than eager to subject their constitutions to the same stress test. Each court is also working within the constraints...

...of “lawfare”? The paper offers an analytical framework through which to examine these questions. It begins from the observation that the current system of international humanitarian law (IHL) builds on the principle of the equal application of the law—the uniform and generic treatment of all belligerents on the battlefield according to the same rules and principles, and regardless of any disparity in power.. Yet regulation has taken a different path in some other areas of international law—most notably, international environmental law (IEL) and international trade law (ITL)—by linking obligations with...

...Hague conventions. Putting aside the fact that most of them had never read any of those treaties, the key fact that they all missed was that America’s Islamist enemies were not a party to these agreements. What’s more, the conventions strictly forbade combatants from hiding and attacking from within civilian populations. Lawful combatants were also required to appear on the battlefield wearing something, whether a uniform or even just an armband, identifying them as combatants — overgrown bears and high-water pants didn’t count. The long and short of it was...

...of weapons and soldiers through Rwandan territory”, and recruited Rwandan youths, demobilised ex-combatants and Congolese refugees as M23 fighters. It also offers evidence of “direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce M23” and “support to several other armed groups”. “RDF operational units are periodically reinforcing the M23 on the battlefield against the Congolese army,” it said. Many M23 members formerly served in another Rwandan-backed militia, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which was responsible along with other militias for widespread atrocities over...

...these victims of Hitler’s empire “had an overly emotional outlook full of blind spots. Unable to think like occupiers, they produced texts, he argued, that would hamper their future ability to put down (anti-colonial) rebellions” (p. 38). It was the experience of war making that would according to the British delegate be conducive to making the future (colonial) battlefield. The wartime experience of victims was seen in this light as counterproductive. But stressing the importance of different war experiences for the project of shaping future wars, is a major contribution...

...1979 for the top-secret test of a new missile system. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army took South African Defense Force chief Constand Viljoen and his colleagues to the front lines, and Viljoen routinely flew visiting Israeli military advisors and embassy attachés to the battlefield in Angola where his troops were battling Angolan and Cuban forces. There was nuclear cooperation, too: South Africa provided Israel with yellowcake uranium while dozens of Israelis came to South Africa in 1984 with code names and cover stories to work on...

...should celebrate and which we should disapprove. We might analogize it to debates among various schools of art. Do we consider photorealism (i.e., textualism) to be better than abstract art (i.e., the New Haven School)? Or, is the answer somewhere in between a la impressionism (i.e., the VCLT rule)? Perhaps Prof. Gardiner’s point is simply that treaty interpretation has evolved to the point where the community of interpretators has agreed upon a single, acceptable technique for our art, namely the VCLT. It’s become, to use Jan Klabber’s phrase, our battlefield...

...would constitute such relevant materials) and, more importantly still perhaps: it would lead to all sorts of difficult negotiations on what exactly the record should reflect. Imagine the sort of record created if the UNCLOS travaux would have been thought to be decisive for future interpretations; the process would in all likelihood have taken twice as long. Still, any lawyer worth her salt will consult whatever record is available. The main function served by the Vienna Convention’s rules, then, is as something of a battlefield: the continuation of politics by...

...of Defense Report further outlined objectives, such as “deploy[ing] next-generation capabilities to support the warfighter”. While the reference to the ‘warfighter’ here does not necessarily allude to the USSF, the Report, in latter halves, blames the congestion and accumulation of rival militarization capabilities in space, specifically that of Russia’s directed-energy weaponry and China’s recent and recurrent anti-satellite (‘ASAT’) testing, for the need to militarize. It constantly refers to space as a ‘battlefield’ and advocates for the military leadership of a new independent armed corps. Additionally, the creation of the USSF...