Search: battlefield robots

...Hague conventions. Putting aside the fact that most of them had never read any of those treaties, the key fact that they all missed was that America’s Islamist enemies were not a party to these agreements. What’s more, the conventions strictly forbade combatants from hiding and attacking from within civilian populations. Lawful combatants were also required to appear on the battlefield wearing something, whether a uniform or even just an armband, identifying them as combatants — overgrown bears and high-water pants didn’t count. The long and short of it was...

...e.g. Vietnam and the 1991 Gulf War). All of these models have had issues, but some far far fewer than others. I got curious a few years back so finally did some digging and wrote up this little survey. Here, for example, is 1991 in sum. Between January 22, 1991, when the first prisoner was captured, and May 2, 1991, when the United States transferred the final prisoner from its custody, U.S. detention facilities processed nearly 70,000 detainees, including through the use of battlefield hearings on prisoner status pursuant to...

...the congressional authorization for a military response to September 11 remains good law. But the execution without trial and/or the denial of habeas corpus is much murkier. As it stands now, I don’t believe the President can execute (as oppose to kill on the battlefield) Bin Laden without sending him through the military commission system (which could take a while). Nor does the President control whether or not Bin Laden gets habeas corpus. The Court’s Boumediene decision makes that question tricky, but certainly there is good reason to believe that...

...‘impurists’; and, finally, an emerging category that, I and Michael Ratner (if no one else) discern, of purists-turned impurists-but protesting their purity. I’m told by reputable sources that this last category doesn’t actually exist, but Ratner does not seem to agree (see below). For my own part, I don’t recall those formerly urging try or release following up with me to offer anything like the detailed legal analyses of battlefield detention and the like that I seem to be offered today. But, I’m expressing this as a blogger, and will...

...a non-uniformed soldier using tactics in violation of the customary laws of war against U.S. military personnel. At least in this context, this doesn’t seem like some crazy idea cooked up by the U.S government. One can imagine its practical usage – especially on the battlefield. The individual in question here is alleged to be a Al Qaeda operative in Iraq. But U.S. courts’ skepticism of the enemy combatant concept is probably why the U.S. is transferring him to Iraq. Leaving him in U.S. custody means that he could bring...

...military operations abroad. In most cases, those rights have been developed and interpreted in peaceful democracies. Can they be applied to conflict zones abroad and if so, how? Will national courts have to develop exceptions to accommodate the law of armed conflict and the realities of the battlefield? The interaction of international human rights and the laws of war has caused much controversy and uncertainty, and national courts may be less than eager to subject their constitutions to the same stress test. Each court is also working within the constraints...

...of “lawfare”? The paper offers an analytical framework through which to examine these questions. It begins from the observation that the current system of international humanitarian law (IHL) builds on the principle of the equal application of the law—the uniform and generic treatment of all belligerents on the battlefield according to the same rules and principles, and regardless of any disparity in power.. Yet regulation has taken a different path in some other areas of international law—most notably, international environmental law (IEL) and international trade law (ITL)—by linking obligations with...

...and at greater scale under the promise of accuracy. However, the result is not necessarily less destruction, but differently organized destruction: faster, more distributed, and potentially harder to scrutinize. Shortened decision cycles shrink opportunities for deliberation, large target volumes jeopardize the possibility for careful review, and the authoritative impression AI outputs give can encourage human deference. These risks exist even without fully autonomous weapons and are evident in AI-DSS used on today’s battlefields, which only nominally preserve human control. Reports from the recent Israel-Hamas conflict show AI-DSS generating or processing...

...equipped to answer some international law questions than others. Rationalist accounts may be better equipped to make general predictions about “states” than to explain specific individual decisions. Anthropology, on the other hand, may be able to explain those individual decisions, but with its emphasis on deep description, may not yield many generalizable hypotheses. Controlled experiments will be easier to carry out in some contexts than others: it is easier, for example, to test the opinions of the general public than that of experts in negotiation or on the battlefield. Public...

...Afghanistan has put in place an exceptionally restrictive ROE for the purpose of minimizing civilian harm that goes beyond what the law itself would require – but that is a matter of discretionary counterinsurgency strategy, not a requirement of law. Review of strikes is by the military itself, in theatre. The CIA, up until recently at least, has had a different strategic role and mission – taking out high value targets far from battlefield action, on the basis of various intelligence sources. The use of force is far more focused,...

...these victims of Hitler’s empire “had an overly emotional outlook full of blind spots. Unable to think like occupiers, they produced texts, he argued, that would hamper their future ability to put down (anti-colonial) rebellions” (p. 38). It was the experience of war making that would according to the British delegate be conducive to making the future (colonial) battlefield. The wartime experience of victims was seen in this light as counterproductive. But stressing the importance of different war experiences for the project of shaping future wars, is a major contribution...

...close connection to the first rule, the dead should be buried individually, as far as possible, depending on the number of dead bodies to be interred. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions instruct parties to use individual graves to bury the dead of the adverse party, including the bodies of combatants, picked up on the battlefield—unless the situation does not permit it (art. 17 (1) GCI; 20 (1) GCII). This preference for the individual disposal of the enemy’s dead is even stricter regarding prisoners of war or civilian internees who may only...