Search: battlefield robots

...Hague conventions. Putting aside the fact that most of them had never read any of those treaties, the key fact that they all missed was that America’s Islamist enemies were not a party to these agreements. What’s more, the conventions strictly forbade combatants from hiding and attacking from within civilian populations. Lawful combatants were also required to appear on the battlefield wearing something, whether a uniform or even just an armband, identifying them as combatants — overgrown bears and high-water pants didn’t count. The long and short of it was...

...of weapons and soldiers through Rwandan territory”, and recruited Rwandan youths, demobilised ex-combatants and Congolese refugees as M23 fighters. It also offers evidence of “direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce M23” and “support to several other armed groups”. “RDF operational units are periodically reinforcing the M23 on the battlefield against the Congolese army,” it said. Many M23 members formerly served in another Rwandan-backed militia, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which was responsible along with other militias for widespread atrocities over...

...beyond an active battlefield or theater of operations, there are obviously diplomatic considerations that require caution. Should not the “sole organ” of our nation in international affairs (to quote the dicta most often cited by proponents of exclusive executive power in foreign affairs) consider them? In Yoo’s own words: “Poring over the files of kill-list nominees recalls Lyndon Johnson’s role in tightly controlling bombing strikes during the Vietnam War. During Operation Rolling Thunder, Johnson held Tuesday lunches when he and his advisers picked targets to avoid attacks that might provoke...

...has its origins in the 1929 Convention. What is the significance (if any) of the mixed practice under that Convention? Does the discussion at the 1999 Montreal Conference leave interpretative options open (other than for the plaintiff!). It looks as if this case could give the rules of treaty interpretation a good workout. Perhaps the failure of the Montreal Conference to resolve the issue (along with some other key issues in carriage by air) allows scope for what Jan describes as a “battlefield” and for continuation of unresolved political issues....

...should celebrate and which we should disapprove. We might analogize it to debates among various schools of art. Do we consider photorealism (i.e., textualism) to be better than abstract art (i.e., the New Haven School)? Or, is the answer somewhere in between a la impressionism (i.e., the VCLT rule)? Perhaps Prof. Gardiner’s point is simply that treaty interpretation has evolved to the point where the community of interpretators has agreed upon a single, acceptable technique for our art, namely the VCLT. It’s become, to use Jan Klabber’s phrase, our battlefield...

...would constitute such relevant materials) and, more importantly still perhaps: it would lead to all sorts of difficult negotiations on what exactly the record should reflect. Imagine the sort of record created if the UNCLOS travaux would have been thought to be decisive for future interpretations; the process would in all likelihood have taken twice as long. Still, any lawyer worth her salt will consult whatever record is available. The main function served by the Vienna Convention’s rules, then, is as something of a battlefield: the continuation of politics by...

...of Defense Report further outlined objectives, such as “deploy[ing] next-generation capabilities to support the warfighter”. While the reference to the ‘warfighter’ here does not necessarily allude to the USSF, the Report, in latter halves, blames the congestion and accumulation of rival militarization capabilities in space, specifically that of Russia’s directed-energy weaponry and China’s recent and recurrent anti-satellite (‘ASAT’) testing, for the need to militarize. It constantly refers to space as a ‘battlefield’ and advocates for the military leadership of a new independent armed corps. Additionally, the creation of the USSF...

...the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the evidence it gathered proved invaluable to the tribunal’s prosecutors as they commenced their investigations. One aspect of the commission’s work that has received relatively lesser attention was its role in shedding light on the use of rape as a weapon of war. The commission conducted interviews with hundreds of female and some male victims of rape, and documented patterns of sexual assault that were undertaken by belligerents to achieve tactical gains on the battlefield, to realize the...

“The story of Ahmed Timol is rooted in our brutal past. He was not cut down on the battlefield while in the line of fire. He was detained under pernicious security laws and sadistically tortured for more than 4 days. Timol’s tormentors were police officers who were meant to serve and protect, particularly those in their care. While in an utterly incapacitated and defenceless state, and to cover up their crimes, Timol was thrown from the 10th floor of John Vorster Square. Even though he survived the fall the police...

...questioning at intelligence hubs focused on conflict and battlefield developments – no doubt motivated by their intelligence value – but FSA commanders also said they were frequently questioned about allegations of misconduct or war crimes by their affiliates or other groups. Where FSA groups crossed a “redline” – to include allegations of war crimes or human rights abuses – they were not infrequently cut. The most infamous example was the blocking of the Al-Zenki group from both State Department and CIA support after repeated reports of rights abuses, including the...

...1979 for the top-secret test of a new missile system. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army took South African Defense Force chief Constand Viljoen and his colleagues to the front lines, and Viljoen routinely flew visiting Israeli military advisors and embassy attachés to the battlefield in Angola where his troops were battling Angolan and Cuban forces. There was nuclear cooperation, too: South Africa provided Israel with yellowcake uranium while dozens of Israelis came to South Africa in 1984 with code names and cover stories to work on...

...profoundly skeptical of HRW’s ability to effectively investigate them: In Gaza and elsewhere where there is no access to the battlefield or to the military and political leaders who make strategic decisions, it is extremely difficult to make definitive judgments about war crimes. Reporting often relies on witnesses whose stories cannot be verified and who may testify for political advantage or because they fear retaliation from their own rulers. Bernstein is talking here about the problems HRW faces in investigating Israel’s war crimes in Gaza, not Hamas’s war crimes. But...