Search: extraterritorial sanctions

short of authorizing the prosecution of acts of piracy or armed robbery in Somalia’s territorial waters. Notwithstanding these provisos, the interest in preventing “unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” (Morrison) that lies at the heart of the presumption against extraterritoriality, is greatly diminished in these piracy cases. Justice Kennedy notes in his concurrence in Kiobel that in disputes not involving solely extraterritorial conduct, “the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.” Although...

Jordan Response... And what would be the Exec. attempted justification for the extraterritorial reach of a so-called "U.S. common law" that quite obviously could not be binding under customary laws of war or treaty-based laws of war or other customary or treaty-based law on the foeign accused? No jurisdiciton still. John C. Dehn Jens and Jordan, I have never finished the companion article to my JICJ article explaining the U.S. "common law" approach to punishing war crimes. However, Jordan is on track regarding the focus of the article -- which...

...or the law governing the resort to force, hinders the development and implementation of the law going forward, and risks complicating or even weakening enforcement of the law. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first essay by an American scholar that carefully distinguishes between the two potential violations of international law involved in an extraterritorial targeted killing: (1) a violation of the attacked state’s sovereignty; and (2) a violation of the attacked individual’s right to life. As Blank shows, “self-defense” is relevant only to the first violation;...

also overcome the presumption in particular ATS cases: “claims that touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.” The Court’s new presumption—which is, in effect, a “presumption against recognition of extraterritorial causes of action under the ATS”—thus appears to be different from the standard Morrison-style presumption against extraterritoriality in at least three ways: (1) the presumption’s coverage (the new presumption applies narrowly to recognition of extraterritorial causes of action by federal courts under the ATS, whereas the...

pirates on the high seas, and therefore should apply to modern day analogues to pirates (“Hitler, Inc.”); 2) The ATS was applied extraterritorially in Filartiga or similar cases, and therefore should continue to be read to do so. The second argument doesn’t get you all that far, since the extraterritoriality issues weren’t raised in those cases, or in Sosa. Only the first argument offers a theory of the ATS’ purpose, but that theory fails to draw on actual historical evidence about the ATS. The best evidence is not any case...

...of human rights of home states, Buser suggests that the incorporation of extraterritorial obligations of human rights can guide the reform of international economic law to the direction of achieving better global justice. This extraterritorial human rights-based approach is helpful to persuade great powers, including emerging powers to balance the pursuit of their own state interests and the promotion of welfare of individuals around the world. I wonder, however, that it can serve as a major approach towards delivering more global justice. First, as Buser notes, the work of the...

...extraterritoriality, the statute itself “would need to evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality” . . . and surely it’s difficult to read the language of the ATS to draw the sorts of distinctions that would “displace” the presumption in such categories of cases. Moreover, the Court at several places indicates that the question it is addressing is whether causes of action can be brought “for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad.” To be sure, a future court could certainly point to such passages in the Kiobel opinion as...

...court would be based on extra-territorial jurisdiction. In the event that the ambit of the constitutive facts is understood in this way, not extending to the activities of the Lafarge corporation and its executives initiated in France, this leave open the possibility that defendants would argue for ne bis in idem on those charges.   Alternatively, a French court might consider that its jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is inherently extraterritorial and therefore those charges can be subject to the transnational ne bis in idem principle. This could be the case...

...arbitrarily limited in this way, then it invites combatants to use territory outside of the “armed conflict” as a haven. Under some circumstances, for diplomatic or other political reasons, a state might choose not to attack even though participants are taking haven, but the reason is not a matter of the law of war jus in bello. To begin with, this is a caricature of Melzer’s position. He does not claim that combatants can be lawfully targeted only when they are on the battlefield; his discussion of the extraterritorial reach...

...district courts for money damages in the event of harm to their persons or property when the United States had expressly or implicitly promised the aliens that no such harm would come to them. The ATS both provides a right of action and original jurisdiction in federal district court to aliens injured under circumstances implicating U.S. sovereign responsibility; it is therefore a federal law for purposes of Article III arising-under jurisdiction. Translated to a modern context, the ATS would plausibly be available to “extraterritorial” tort actions by alien detainees at...

...could hardly have been foreseen when the 1951 Refugee Convention was drafted. The US interdiction program in the 1990s constitutes a prime example. By geographically shifting migration control to block Haitian refugees on the high seas, it was argued that neither US nor international law applied. The majority of the Supreme Court in Sale not only upheld the government’s claim, it set off a proliferation of extraterritorial migration control practices. High sea interdiction programmes have since been introduced both in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Migration control has further become...

...involve targeted killings. The first scenario is one of extraterritorial killing, and the territorial state (Pakistan) has not consented to the use of force within its boundaries. The second scenario is also extraterritorial, but the territorial state has in fact consented. The third scenario is likewise extraterritorial, but the killing does not take place on the territory of any state. Finally, the fourth scenario is intraterritorial. So, what does international law have to say about these scenarios of targeted killing, again all of which take place outside armed conflict? I...