[This is the third day in our discussion of Professor Dickinson’s book Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs. Links to the related posts can be found below.]
The dean-emeritus of US government law of war lawyers, Hays Parks, spoke in passing a year ago about private security contractors and the law of war at a conference in honor of Michael Walzer. Parks noted that for better or worse there was no going back to a world in which even the use of force, let alone other matters, was confined to formal government military forces - that bridge had been crossed with such things as State Department security and much else. But he expressed concern with the way in which it had come about, with insufficient attention to the issues of accountability. And also regret, from the standpoint of the laws of war, that certain of these functions had ever been allowed to be privatized.
Because, as Parks says, the bridge has been crossed, I'm fundamentally in agreement with the concerns that Laura Dickinson's splendid book raises about accountability. Point being that one can be a government laws of war lawyer and share these concerns, as Parks does; and equally share concerns for establishing mechanisms that lie within the realistic possibilities of legal policy for addressing the accountability concerns. Contractual mechanisms are a very important category of that, and the questions raised below are less about principle than cautions about the limits of contractual mechanisms. Like Chris and several other OJers, my teaching day-job is in business, finance, contracts, and law and economics, and I also draw here on experience as the board chair and general counsel for several NGOs engaged in much cross border development finance and related contracting - microcredit and all that. So let me run through a standard set of law and economics issues that might arise in these attempts to regulate via contract:
1.
Might contract mechanisms under-deter or over-deter the use of private contractors for particular functions (or under some circumstances, might they do both)? One of the things I most like about Dickinson's nuanced approach to the possibilities and limits of contracting mechanisms is the awareness that contract enforcement in our civil court system is not well suited to the kinds of situations that would most concern us in the situation of private contractors, for example, using force in some foreign situation of high insecurity if not straight up conflict. This is so, I think, for contract claims as well as tort claims. For example, the possibility of wrongful death of a foreign national in some not-exactly-quiet-not-quite-war-zone by a security contractor is not very well suited to the social setting in which the US civil litigation system of wrongful death has meaning - which is a settled domestic legal system in which the participants all share certain expectations about what is okay and not okay in the circumstances. Moreover, much of that settled, legitimate, domestic system has to do with situations of risk in which we as a society accept that there are crucial social benefits that lead us to accept risks to life and limb, even ones that implicate wrongfulness.
I am skeptical that those shared social assumptions, which deeply inform and legitimate our domestic civil legal system, can be applied well in all these other situations. I doubt that the adjudicators think they can do so, either, even if tasked to do so. The tendency is either to hold contractors to a stricter standard than one might think is efficient to the ends - ends, however, which in quasi-war zones are themselves contested - for which some modicum of force is justified. In that case, contractors will be over-deterred once they understand the costs they must internalize. Or else the adjudicatory system, concerned that it is being asked to apply purely domestic standards to highly contingent and fundamentally different conditions of conflict, will excuse too much, whether overtly or indirectly, for fear of penalizing unfairly something where command and control, and ultimately accountability, ought to have rested with the government agency, not the contractor.