Regret Is Not a Defence: The Assembly of States Parties and the Sanctioning of the International Criminal Court

Regret Is Not a Defence: The Assembly of States Parties and the Sanctioning of the International Criminal Court

[Ezequiel Jimenez Martinez is an Adjunct Professor at the Pompeu Fabra Law Faculty, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Law Research and Policy. He is the author of Governing the International Criminal Court: the History and Practice of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (Brill, 2025).]

Introduction

On 9 October 2026 the United States designated the International Criminal Court itself under Executive Order 14203. The general licence permitting dealings with the Court to be maintained or wound down expires on 7 April 2027, and the State Department has presented that window as time for States Parties to make progress on resolutions addressing United States concerns. The Bureau of the Assembly said it “regrets” the measure and called for its revocation, eight foreign ministers of States Parties declared themselves committed to “constructive and inclusive dialogue with non-States Parties” ahead of the 25th session of the Assembly of States Parties, which opens in The Hague on 30 November. One can understand the difficult position diplomats are in when it comes to defending the International Criminal Court from the United States, the superpower. Yet, if States Parties will not defend the institution besides political solidarity, then their governance role which equips them to act in tangible ways, is at risk of becoming irrelevant. 

Powers and Commitments

The Assembly is the Court’s international judicial governance institution, or injugovin. Article 112(2)(b), (d) and (g) confer on it management oversight, the budget and any other function consistent with the Statute. Together they ground what Bergsmo and others have called a “non-waivable duty of care” towards the institution States Parties created. The Assembly has said so much itself when in December 2025 it reaffirmed “the incompatibility of the consequences of coercive measures against the Court” with States Parties’ obligations under the Statute, the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities and the Headquarters Agreement. Having said so, it cannot treat the response against the United States and other non-State Parties like Russia as optional.

When Executive Order 14203 was signed in February 2025, 79 of 125 States Parties endorsed a joint statement of support. By October 2026, only 35 States Parties voiced some concern. Nonetheless, at its 24th session in 2025, the Assembly adopted by consensus a Declaration that names no State and “encourage[s] dialogue between States Parties and Non-States Parties”. The undisputed Declaration was adopted as the President of the Court explained to States Parties that nine elected officials, “including one third of the Judges, as well as the totality of the ICC Presidency,” were subject to Russian arrest warrants. Yet only the Declaration was passed as a political decision on the matter. A few days later, on 12 December 2025, the Moscow City Court convicted the Prosecutor and eight current and former judges in absentia, and on 8 October 2026 Russia sent extradition requests for all nine to the Netherlands and other States. The Presidency of the Assembly had responded to earlier Russian measures under its previous President. I have found no statement on the verdict or the requests by the current Presidency. By August 2026 the United States had designated nine of the eighteen judges, the President among them, both Deputy Prosecutors and the former Prosecutor. While much protective work is rightly confidential, it that does not explain why public texts and statements only speak of concern, regret and dialogue in the face of such blatant attack on the rule of law.

In this context, recalling Recommendation 169 of the Independent Expert Review is key. The Recommendation asked the Assembly and States Parties to “develop a strategy for responding to attacks on the Court by non-States Parties.” What the Bureau adopted on 29 July 2022 is a procedure. The Presidency bears “the main responsibility” and, when it “considers, in consultation with the Court,” that an attack exists, must ensure an immediate response, “including issuing a statement, if appropriate,” and propose further measures that “may include” statements, outreach, good offices and diplomacy. The compilation of good practices proposed to the Bureau in December 2022 lists 14 measures, 13 of them heavy on communications and diplomacy with the 14th being “practical measures of a political, legal, security and/or financial nature,” qualified by “when appropriate.” The Bureau knew what a financial attack looked like yet it left such actions to one hedged line. In 2025 the Assembly again only “took note” of the Court’s guidelines on protecting former officials and of its concept note on “Protection as Cooperation” without any coordinated action.

Hope in the 25th Assembly Session?

Because US sanctions are now tied to progress on seeking common agreements with States Parties, any change that treats the Court’s investigations as a subject of “dialogue” with the sanctioning State would trade the independence guaranteed by articles 40 and 42 for relief from coercion. That would be appeasement, however it is worded. The session should adopt active counter-measures instead. To name a few, seven options could be considered. 

First, a resilient budget. The 2026 budget allows the Court to draw on the Contingency Fund for sanctions-related costs only as a last resort after the regular budget, from a Fund standing at €5.6 million against a €10 million ceiling. The Court now describes contingency arrangements as “an integral part” of its primary operating model. Thus, the Assembly should restore the Fund to €10 million and amend the Financial Regulations to create a resilience reserve free of the need to deplete the regular budget. This way, the Court would be enabled to react without the heavy bureaucratic process for approvals and political buy-in. Second, a stronger public stance is paramount. The Court needs declarations that condemn, name the States responsible, and state that the Court’s judicial and prosecutorial activity is not negotiable. Third, national coordination. Each State Party should designate a focal point in its finance ministry or central bank, issue guidance to banks and service providers on the Court’s privileges and immunities, and state publicly how they will protect the Court. Fourth, the EU Blocking Statute. All 27 EU Member States are States Parties. Spain and Slovenia have called for Regulation 2271/96 to be activated, the Netherlands has asked the Commission to prepare it, and fifty-eight MEPs renewed the call after 9 October. The Commission has not decided. Now is the time to pass an Assembly Declaration making the request formal. Fifth, leave New York. The Bureau moved this session to The Hague while insisting that the decision sets no precedent. It should be one. Article 112(6) already permits sessions at the seat of the Court, and for as long as Executive Order 14203 is in force every session, special session and Bureau meeting should be held outside the United States, with support for delegations without a presence in The Hague. Finally, the 2022 IER 169 protocol should become a resolution: automatic triggers on any designation of the Court or its officials, a Bureau meeting within days, a standing menu of financial and legal measures, and an annual public report on their use.

In sum, sanctions draw their force from control over finance and technology. How much damage they do depends on governance choices by the 125 States that govern the Court, and those choices have so far been largely rhetorical. States Parties are the masters of the Rome Statute, whether the Court comes through the months to 7 April 2027 depends less on Washington or Moscow than on whether the Assembly treats its duty of care as law.

Photo attribution: “Twenty-third session of the Assembly of States Parties opens in The Hague” by International Criminal Court / Cour pénale internationale

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Featured, General, International Criminal Law, Public International Law
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