Symposium on the CCW GGE LAWS: You Can’t Always Get What You Want–The (D)evolution of Responsibility and Accountability

[Jessica Dorsey is an Assistant Professor of International Law at Utrecht University School of Law and Managing Editor of Opinio Juris. This post is the sixth in a series of analyses on aspects of the recent adoption of the 2024-2026 CCW GGE LAWS report.]

Introduction

This post traces the trajectory of the concepts of responsibility and accountability across successive iterations of the GGE’s Rolling Text through the 2024-2026 final report. Work I have done in the past has conceptualized these terms, and Rain Liivoja and I have addressed their meaning and the need to keep them analytically separate during interventions at past GGE sessions.

From a legal perspective, responsibility refers specifically to forms of accountability grounded in law (e.g., State responsibility or individual criminal responsibility) including the attribution of breaches and the legal consequences that may follow in case of breach. Accountability is a much broader concept, encapsulating the processes in which actors are required to explain or justify their conduct against agreed standards, potentially with legal, political, social, operational or other consequences (cf. Keohane). This concept encompasses legal responsibility, but is not limited to it. In the context of LAWS, not every failure to comply with IHL will entail individual legal responsibility and, therefore, other mechanisms of scrutiny or correction may be necessary to hold actors to account. In short, as argued in our 2025 intervention, responsibility is one mechanism through which accountability can operate (see Chapter 1 here).

Against this conceptual distinction, the trajectory of these terms over several versions of the GGE LAWS text reveals two related shifts: the terms are separated from one another and narrowed, and the language governing the mechanisms through which accountability can be realized becomes progressively less prescriptive. This results in a diminished practical force for these two concepts in the final report. This is also a missed opportunity to elucidate tailored measures to respond to specific challenges posed by LAWS, instead largely resulting in a restatement of existing legal obligations (see Sally Longworth in this series on this issue here). Because of the complex questions LAWS raise in terms of how legal obligations are implemented, overseen, and enforced, elaborating on responsibility and accountability is particularly appropriate within the GGE context. The CCW has itself developed more specific responsibility- and accountability-related provisions in other instruments, such as Art. 14 of Amended Protocol II and Art. 11 of Protocol V. More broadly, IHL details provisions on responsibility and accountability (see, e.g., Arts. 85-91 API). The final report still preserves the bare-bones architecture of human responsibility, but also reflects a weakened institutional approach toward ensuring the means through which actors will be held to account.

The rest of the post will highlight areas of this textual shift offering some analysis of the implications thereof, before concluding with general remarks and considerations going forward toward the CCW’s Seventh Review Conference and beyond. The GGE produced several iterations of the text between July 2024 and September 2026, including Rolling Texts in November 2024, May 2025, December 2025 and June 2026. For brevity, I use the July 2024 text as a baseline and focus on the two most recent Rolling Texts and the September 2026 Final Report, which reflect the greatest degree of convergence amongst delegations.

Shifts in Responsibility and Accountability

Dec. 2025 Rolling Text (Box V.1): States, parties to armed conflict and individuals remain at all times responsible and accountable for their decisions with regard to LAWS since responsibility and accountability cannot be transferred to machines.

June 2026 Rolling Text (Para. 18): States, parties to armed conflict and individuals remain at all times responsible under applicable international law for their decisions with regard to LAWS since responsibility cannot be transferred to machines.

Sept. 2026 (para. 40 of the final report): States, parties to armed conflict and individuals remain at all times responsible under applicable international law for their decisions with regard to LAWS.

The first version of the Rolling Text (July 2024) contained a series of elements below a single heading: “Accountability,” and the concept of responsibility was included within this section. This text contained what might be called a general statement: human responsibility for decisions on the use of LAWS must “be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines,” an aspect that must “be considered across the entire life cycle of the weapon system.” Additionally, the text stipulated that accountability “for the design, development and use” of LAWS was to “be ensured in accordance with applicable international law.” A further element would have made it obligatory for States to “ensure internal mechanisms for the reporting of incidents that may involve violations of IHL” and to “take all appropriate steps…to prevent and suppress violations…by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”

The July 2024 Rolling Text reflected a conceptual conflation of these two notions. Unravelling them (something delegations and some of us intervening in the process pressed for over several sessions) was a significant improvement. Yet that conceptual clarification was not matched by a strengthening of the text’s substantive provisions: the measures giving effect to accountability became progressively diluted. In July 2024, for example, accountability was tied directly to “design, development and use,” showing a clear link to the entire lifecycle of the weapon system. By contrast, in the final report, accountability is only linked to use (para 41). The discussion her therefore shows not just the textual changes across the 2026 GGE sessions, but the outcome of a longer process of discussion, diplomacy and compromise.

The December 2025 text specified that States, parties to armed conflict and individuals were both responsible and accountable for decisions concerning LAWS, both notions unable to be transferred to machines (linking to human control elements outlined by Anna Andersson here). By the final report, responsibility remained in the general statement and accountability had been relocated to a narrower provision on individual accountability (para 41). Separating these two notions is not inherently problematic, given their distinct meanings outlined above. What is lost, however, is the general statement’s earlier recognition that States, parties to armed conflict and individuals are all accountable actors.

Individual Accountability

Dec. 2025 Rolling Text (Box V.2) and June 2026 Rolling Text (Para. 19) : States must ensure individual accountability for the means or methods of warfare involving the use of LAWS in accordance with their obligations under IHL, including through the operation of such systems within a responsible chain of human command and control.

Sept. 2026 (para. 41 of the final report): States must take measures to ensure individual accountability for the use of LAWS, in accordance with their obligations under IHL, including through the operation of such systems within a responsible chain of human command and control, since accountability cannot be transferred to machines.

The changes to the concept of accountability become more evident in the final report’s para 41. In this respect, two changes are significant. The first is that “must ensure” becomes “must take measures to ensure,” shifting the emphasis from accountability itself to measures States take toward it, and giving States more interpretive space for determining which measures might be deemed sufficient.

Second, the reference to “means or methods of warfare,” has been removed, weakening the connections between this accountability provision to the broader IHL regulation of means and methods, including compliance measures applying before and during their use. Specifically, as related to legal reviews (outlined here by Netta Goussac), the earlier versions of the text had a more direct link to these processes; the final report merely implicates accountability as it relates to LAWS’ use.

Dec. 2025 Rolling Text (Box V.3) and June 2026 Rolling Text (Para. 20): To promote human responsibility and accountability in the use of LAWS and to mitigate the risk of unintended engagements, States should provide:

1. Understandable human-machine interfaces;
2. Guidance and instructions […], consistent with applicable IHL, for personnel regarding the use of LAWS;
3. Training of personnel to understand such guidance and instructions and the capabilities and limitations of the autonomous functions of LAWS in the anticipated circumstances of their use.

Sept. 2026 (para. 42 of the final report): States should promote human responsibility and accountability in the use of LAWS and mitigate the risk of unintended engagements. They may do so through, inter alia: Understandable human-machine interfaces; Guidance and instructions […]; Training of personnel […].

A similar dynamic is on display regarding the provision on practical measures for promoting human responsibility and accountability. The December 2025 and June 2026 texts required States to take three concrete measures, namely to provide understandable human-machine interfaces, guidance and instructions, as well as training to promote the two concepts. In the final report, the three examples are still in the text, but their function in the sentence has dramatically changed. States “should promote” responsibility and accountability as before but the three measures are now framed as ways they “may do so through, inter alia.” This introduces a shift in the status of the measures themselves, from concrete measures that States were required to take to non-exhaustive examples of possible State conduct, mirroring the obligatory-to-optional movement we see elsewhere in the text.

Duty to Prevent and Suppress Violations

Dec. 2025 Rolling Text (Box V.4) and June 2026 Rolling Text (Para. 21): States must take all appropriate steps to prevent and suppress violations of international law, including IHL, relating to laws by persons or on territory under their jurisdiction.

Sept. 2026 (para. 43 of the final report): States must take measures necessary to prevent and suppress violations of their obligations under international law applicable in armed conflict, relating to the use of LAWS under their jurisdiction.

The final report reflects a weakening of the duty to prevent and suppress violations of law not only by changing what States are required to do, but also in terms of making it less clear when and in relation to what/whom they must do it. First, the language now departs from Article 14 of Amended Protocol II of the CCW, ratified by 107 of 128 High Contracting Parties, which requires States to “take all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.” The successive versions of the Rolling Text had largely followed this formulation until now; indeed the July 2024 version expressly covered both “jurisdiction and control.” The final report reflects a weakening of the duty to prevent and suppress violations of law not only through changes to what States are required to do, but also through making it less clear when the duty applies and to what conduct, persons or territory it extends.

Second, and more significantly, the formulation of the duty to prevent and suppress is now narrower, moving from a focus on violations “of international law, including IHL” to a State’s own “obligations under international law applicable in armed conflict.” This introduces greater uncertainty as to the temporal and substantive scope of the duty. In particular, “applicable in armed conflict” could be read as a limitation on the duty of obligations once an armed conflict has started, leaving less clear how the duty operates in earlier stages of the lifecycle of LAWS (including development, testing and procurement). Taken together, these two changes reflected in the final report weaken the steps States must take and the clarity regarding the obligations and jurisdictional circumstances to which the duty applies. The end result is greater interpretive space for States concerning the scope of their IHL compliance obligations in relation to LAWS. 

Internal Mechanisms for Incidents

Dec. 2025 Rolling Text (Box V.5) and June 2026 Rolling Text (Para. 22): States must ensure effective internal mechanisms for the investigation, reporting and appropriate action in response to incidents with the use of LAWS that may involve violations of IHL.

(Note: The June 2026 Rolling Text includes “involving the use of LAWS” to align it with the rest of the text, but is otherwise identical)

Sept. 2026 (para. 44 of the final report): States are encouraged to ensure that effective internal mechanisms for addressing incidents involving their use of LAWS, that may involve violations of applicable IHL are established.

Finally, the element on internal mechanisms provides the clearest example of weakening the architecture around accountability in the entire succession of texts to date. The December 2025 and June 2026 versions contained requirements for States to “ensure effective internal mechanisms” for “the investigation, reporting and appropriate action” in response to relevant incidents. The final report instead outlines that States “are encouraged to ensure” that such mechanisms “are established” for “addressing incidents.” Through this reformulation, the granular level of requirements (investigation, reporting, appropriate action) disappear; “addressing incidents” leaves it open-ended as to what those mechanisms ought to do.

The change to the operative verb is also significant. “Must ensure” establishes a clear obligation for States to guarantee that such mechanisms exist, whereas “are encouraged to ensure” makes this optional. The passive verb construction of the formulation that they “are established” makes the lack of specificity outlined above more problematic as it leaves open who is expected to establish them and what they must do. Notably, this is a provision that had undergone strengthening over time (December 2025, June 2026 addition of “effective” investigation and appropriate versus the July 2024 formulation of “reporting”), but the final report abandoned this obligatory formulation that had been included since the very first Rolling Text from July 2024.

These changes are hard to reconcile with the GGE’s mandate to strengthen the CCW in addressing LAWS. Instead of articulating mechanisms tailored to novel or distinctive challenges LAWS pose, the final report language as adopted does not strengthen the institutional means through which accountability for the use of LAWS can be investigated, overseen, or scrutinized.    

Concluding Thoughts and The Way Forward

The changes traced here show that the terms accountability and responsibility have not been abandoned completely, but have shifted significantly over time. Responsibility retains its status as a general legal proposition, but accountability has been narrowed considerably in the text, both in how it is framed and in the mechanisms through which it is to be given effect. The modal verbs across these provisions follow a similar path: individual accountability moves from “must ensure,” to “must take measures to ensure,” the practical measures provision from “should provide” to “should promote…may do so through,” and internal mechanisms from “must ensure” ultimately to the much weaker “are encouraged to ensure.” The result is a final report that retains the idea that human responsibility cannot be transferred to machines, but provides considerably less direction on how that can be translated into meaningful accountability mechanisms in the context of LAWS.

As States move toward the Seventh Review Conference and weigh whether to negotiate a legally binding instrument, this report should be treated as a foundation for those discussions, not the endpoint. If the objective remains to strengthen the CCW in addressing LAWS, the next step ought to be engaging with the granularity required for IHL compliance, oversight and accountability in the context of increasingly autonomous warfare. Discussions and certainly negotiations inevitably involve compromise. But compromise should not become a substitute for clarity about what States are actually committing themselves to do. In this sense, accountability is not something that should simply be encouraged; it is something States must ensure becomes a reality as these systems continue to be developed, acquired and used on battlefields around the world.