A Digital Architecture of Disruption and Silence: The Internet Shutdown in Pakistan-administered Kashmir

[Mohammad Zayaan Asmi is a D.Phil. candidate in socio-legal studies at the University of Oxford.]

Introduction

Internet services in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Kashmir) were severely restricted since 5th June 2026 after widespread protests in the region linked to electoral reforms and other socio-political demands of the people. More than forty people were killed, and hundreds were wounded after the army and police forces in Pakistan opened fire on unarmed protesters and used lethal force to disperse the protests. Pakistan-administered Kashmir, along with its Indian-administered counterpart (and Aksai Chin administered by China), form a part of an internationally recognised disputed territory. The United Nations Security Council has passed multiple resolutions concerning the region, affirming that the political future of the region must be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite under the United Nations auspices. 

Digital rights groups have previously pointed out how arbitrary internet shutdowns violate Pakistan’s international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). For example, Access Now has pointed out how internet shutdowns in Pakistan violate Article 19 of the ICCPR by curbing freedom of expression. In this piece, I argue that such shutdowns highlight a systemic failure on part of Pakistan’s Government to create a clear and consistent legal architecture based on due process. As such, internet shutdowns continue to substantially impact several human rights, such as the right to protest, through an arbitrary and opaque legal process. This has given effect to an architecture of control and surveillance bereft of any mechanisms of transparency and accountability. Until such structural issues are resolved, internet shutdowns will inevitably infringe human rights. While a legislation may not stop the practice of internet shutdowns entirely, it will, at the very least, provide more transparency around the process and create scope for challenging the shutdowns on substantive grounds before judicial forums.

The 2026 Protests and The Struggle for Autonomy in Kashmir 

The protests that erupted in June 2026 were not a new phenomenon but rather a continuity of the struggle for autonomy and human rights in Kashmir. In May 2023, a series of protests had erupted in the region over mismanagement of food and supplies by the Government of Pakistan. These protests in Kashmir are being led by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a coalition of multiple civil society organisations, traders, and activists from belonging to the region. The JAAC has been mobilising on issues of social justice, representation, food shortage, tariffs, etc. and has been successful in negotiating with the Government on multiple issues from 2022.

In 2026, amongst other electoral reforms, the JAAC demanded the abolition of 12 refugee seats reserved for migrants from Indian-administered Kashmir in the Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Pursuant to this demand, the Government of Azad Kashmir proscribed JAAC as a ‘terrorist organisation’ under the First Schedule of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014 (Act) and ruled out any scope for future negotiations with the organisation. Under Section 15 of the Act, a proscribed organisation’s offices, publications, bank accounts, and properties are liable to be seized and/ or frozen, and its members are denied passports and access to financial resources in the country. 

Despite the crackdown, JAAC continued to organise and mobilise in Kashmir and called for a complete boycott of local elections in July amidst police brutality, state sponsored surveillance, and human rights violations across the region. Their members were termed to be ‘in the same category as India’ and accused of ‘inciting violence’ to help an enemy country. These discourses were used by the State to legitimise and justify the violence perpetrated against the people in Kashmir.

Arbitrariness as a Design Choice: The Practice and Politics of Internet Shutdowns in Pakistan

The legal architecture of internet shutdowns in Pakistan is inherently flawed and operates in a highly opaque manner. Internet shutdown orders are usually issued by the army or other police agencies to the National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC), based in the Interior Ministry, which then scrutinises the order and decides whether to impose the shutdown. Once this is done, the order is sent to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), which is a regulatory body responsible only for implementation of orders. The PTA communicates the orders to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the country, which are forced to comply with them or face punitive consequences. The PTA gives legal effect to an internet shutdown under Section 54 of the Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act, 1996, (Telecommunications Act) that gives a wide range of powers to the PTA to intercept communication. However, the PTA is merely a regulatory body and cannot interfere with the order. As such, they are bound to comply with it by ensuring compliance from ISPs. 

Aside from NCMC, other bodies within the Interior Ministry such as National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) also issue orders of internet shutdowns. However, empirical evidence suggests that it is mostly the NCMC which imposes the shutdowns. Further, such evidence also highlights that the practice of imposing internet shutdowns in terms of legality has become a checkbox exercise based on a mechanical process where the NCMC rarely challenges or interferes with orders of the army. 

The legal architecture, or the absence of one in Pakistan, has created a situation where internet shutdowns have become an ad-hoc and arbitrary exercise of authority without a clear legal mandate. While individuals have challenged internet shutdowns on procedural grounds, it remains difficult to challenge the substantive elements of the shutdown orders as they are never published in the public domain. In CM Pak Limited v. The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, the Islamabad High Court held that a policy directive allowing internet shutdowns on vague grounds such as ‘national security’ is illegal. However, this order was stayed on appeal to a division bench. Nonetheless, the problem in these issues is not the arbitrariness per say, but a design choice that provides for and enables such arbitrariness. 

Even the legal challenges to the internet shutdown in Kashmir rely more on procedural law than they do on substantive grounds as the orders are not available to be challenged. For example, a petition has been filed in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court which argues that suspension of services under the Telecommunications Act for an indefinite period across an extensive area can only be done after an emergency is proclaimed under Article 53 of the Interim Constitution of the region. Similarly, people have claimed that they were not given reasonable notice by operators as required by Telecom Consumers Protection Regulations, 2009. However, challenging the orders on substantive grounds remains a difficulty due to the lack of a clear legal mandate and procedure. 

The Right to Protest under Article 21 of the ICCPR: A Hollow Promise 

Given the arbitrary legal framework governing internet shutdowns, such shutdowns inevitably infringe on basic human rights such as right to free speech and expression, right to trade, right to education, etc. In Kashmir, they also affected the right to protest and voice legitimate political concerns and aspirations through sit-ins, demonstrations, and public rallies. The communicative rupture caused due to such shutdowns affected the ability of people to first express their opinions and mobilise online, and second to organise collective action against policies of the Government. 

Pakistan is under an obligation to uphold the right to protest under Article 21 of the ICCPR which recognises the right to peaceful assembly and obligates States to protect it without any discrimination. The General Comment No. 37 (2020) extends this to communication technologies, recognising the role of internet services in public mobilisation. It requires the State to ensure that ‘the activities of Internet service providers and intermediaries do not unduly restrict assemblies or the privacy of assembly participants’. Further, such restrictions or interferences must conform with the legal thresholds and tests for restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR. These grounds, enshrined in Article 19(3) include respect of the rights and reputation of others (Article 19(3)(a)) and national security, public order, public health or morals (Article 19(3)(b)).

While Pakistan has entered reservations to eight of the 27 substantive articles of the ICCPR, there is no such reservation expressed in relation to Article 21 by the State. As such, it is bound by established law under Article 21. A blanket ban on peaceful assemblies is presumptively disproportionate as stated in the General Comment (paragraph 38). Reading this with paragraph 34 on the importance of internet services for assembly leads to a conclusion that a blanket ban on the internet will also be presumptively disproportionate and unnecessary in democratic societies.

The issue in Pakistan’s case is not just that internet shutdowns affect the right to protest, but that there is no way of scrutinising the extent to which such restrictions are articulated through the law. To understand whether such shutdowns meet the substantive standards under, for example, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, one needs to first access the shutdown orders which are not made available in the public domain. 

This argument also extends to other rights impacted by internet shutdowns, such as right to free speech and expression, right to education, etc guaranteed by both the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and international law through instruments such as the ICCPR. Given the absence of a transparent procedure, there is no scrutiny of such decisions on their substantive merits, therefore hollowing out such the legal obligations of the State.

Building a Concrete Legal Architecture 

The first step to addressing the human rights implications of blanket internet shutdowns is to have a clear and precise legal framework which restricts the arbitrary exercise of power and draws the legal boundaries within which internet shutdowns can be permissible. Such regulatory framework must give effect to a consistent and democratic internet regulation regime to replace the current draconian, arbitrary, and opaque system controlled by the army. 

Such a legal framework must address important safeguards for internet shutdowns: duration, grounds for imposition, available mechanisms for appeal, internal review process, and judicial review. Only when these safeguards are articulated can one meaningfully challenge the internet shutdowns before judicial forums. Additionally, it would help in creating some form of accountability through a process which is transparent. Currently, the orders of internet shutdowns are opaque not just in terms of the substance but also in how they are communicated and by what authorities within the military or police apparatus. A proper regulatory framework should address exactly this question: who is authorised to impose an internet shutdown? 

This is not to say that a concrete legal framework will automatically curb the practice of internet shutdowns in Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed a rapid erosion of human rights and civil liberties in the country. As such, internet shutdowns have become merely one more tool to suppress a dissenting group. Further, many countries, such as India, have imposed indefinite internet curbs and shutdowns despite there being a legal framework for their governance which provides procedural and substantive safeguards. However, such a framework will be the first step towards at least scrutinising the substantive grounds on which blanket internet shutdowns are imposed. 

As of now, the people of Pakistan do not know the particulars of internet shutdowns, why they are imposed, or who orders and authorises them. A legal framework addressing such questions may or may not lead to increased accountability but will at least fill an information vacuum created by lack of transparency. 

Conclusion 

The indefinite and blanket internet shutdown in Pakistan-administered Kashmir prima facie violates basic human rights such as the right to peaceful assembly of the people of Kashmir guaranteed under Article 21 of the ICCPR. Earlier this year, it allowed the State to prevent mobilisation and conduct elections with allegations of large-scale rigging. However, this is emblematic of a broader and systemic issue within the domestic legal framework governing internet shutdowns, one that permits such arbitrary restrictions by design. As such, these structural issues need to be addressed and fixed to ensure, at the very least, that the process of imposing internet shutdowns is more transparent.