A New Genocide Convention Case in the ICJ: DRC v Rwanda Version 3.0

[Melanie O’Brien is Professor of International Law and Deputy Head of School (Research) at the University of Western Australia Law School, and visiting scholar with the University of Minnesota Law School’s Human Rights Center.

Thomas Shacklock is the research director of Crane Center for Mass Atrocity Prevention, a research contributor at the Human Rights Research Center, and a nonprofit consultant at Dragonfly Consulting Group. He is soon starting a PhD in Politics at King’s College London, where he will focus on conflict and peacebuilding.]

In June 2026, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) started proceedings against Rwanda at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing its neighbour of responsibility for genocide and other crimes on its territory since the 1990s. This is the third ICJ case the DRC has brought against Rwanda since the 1990s, having filed unsuccessful cases in 1999 and 2002. This post will provide a background of the conflict in the DRC, and then an overview of the DRC’s ICJ cases against Rwanda, with a focus on this new application, aka DRC v Rwanda Version 3.0. 

Background

Conflicts in the DRC are complex. There are currently over 120 armed groups in eastern DRC, which is characterised by an absent state. These armed groups have tended to generate income through the extraction of natural mineral resources, among other income sources, since the Second Congo War (1997-2003). Yet, mineral exploitation is generally not the main driver of conflicts in eastern DRC, which often stem from a complex interplay of intercommunity land struggles, exclusionary politics, other ethnic-based grievances, and the security, geopolitical, or economic interests of neighbouring states. 

Various Congolese elites and neighbouring countries have been responsible for fuelling violent conflicts, committing serious atrocities, and exploiting resources, with numerous countries intervening in the Congo Wars (1996-2003). However, Rwanda’s interventions are a particularly salient issue in Congolese politics. Over the years, Uganda and Burundi have intervened due to their economic, security, or geostrategic interests. The current M23 conflict even appears to have been sparked by Rwanda seeing its economic interests threatened by Uganda expanding its own in eastern DRC. Burundi has also been supporting the Congolese military in the M23 conflict. 

Despite the complex roles of these different actors, the DRC’s case focuses on atrocities perpetrated by Rwanda, alleging that they have been aimed at destroying Hutu and other ethnic communities, particularly the Nyindu, at least in part. Other communities mentioned include the Bembe, Lega, Nande, Hunde, and Bashi. The case lists a range of atrocities, which may or may not be linked to “genocidal acts,” to which these communities have been subjected, including mass killings, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment.

Given the entrenched violence and insecurity in the region, eastern DRC has had a large and long-standing peacekeeping presence, first in the form of MONUC (1999-2010), and then in the form of MONUSCO (2010-present). Since 2023, a planned withdrawal of MONUSCO has been delayed by UN Security Council votes extending its mandate, but it has been formally completed in the eastern province of South Kivu. The UN still plays an important role in reporting on human rights abuses in the DRC, including those linked to Rwanda, having established an independent commission of inquiry to investigate atrocities in North and South Kivu in 2025. 

Since 1996, Rwanda has participated in cycles of conflict in the DRC either directly or through supporting armed rebellions. These rebellions include the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) in the First Congo War (1996-97) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) during the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Rwanda backed another rebellion from 2006 to 2009, and the M23 insurgency (named after a peace deal signed on 23 March 2009) emerged from 2012 to 2013. M23 reemerged in 2021, forming part of a broader alliance called the Congo River Alliance (AFC) from 2023, and established a parallel administrative system in its occupied territories in eastern Congo. Throughout these periods, the UN and NGOs have documented serious atrocities committed by these groups against communities mentioned in the ICJ case.

Rwandan interventions in the DRC are connected to the 1994 genocide committed by Rwandan Hutu extremists against Rwandan Tutsi (the Rwandan genocide). A primarily Tutsi rebellion, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), ended that genocide and seized control of Rwanda. However, the RPF/AFDL massacred tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees who had fled into neighbouring DRC (then named ’Zaire’) while pursuing exiled genocide perpetrators. Ethnic identity is a dimension connecting these contexts. Hutu and Tutsi live across the wider Great Lakes region of Central Africa, being the two main communities in Rwanda and Burundi and minorities in the more ethnically diverse provinces of eastern DRC. Rwandan-backed rebellions have historically recruited fighters from Congolese Tutsi communities, including Banyamulenge based in South Kivu, who have often experienced discrimination and persecution as perceived non-indigenous “Rwandan” outsiders. 

The DRC’s case should be situated within decades of academic and public debates on competing claims of genocide concerning communities in Rwanda, eastern DRC, and Burundi, which are overshadowed by the 1994 Rwandan genocide. A 2010 UN report documenting human rights violations in the Congo from 1993 to 2003, known as the “Mapping Exercise” report, suggested that the RPF’s 1996-97 massacres of Hutu refugees in Congo may have constituted genocide, although it did not establish genocidal intent. Various scholars and observers have argued that, although the RPF atrocities in the 1990s were egregious, they cannot be equated with the genocide against Rwandan Tutsi in ways that reinforce a “double genocide” theory. In filing its case at the ICJ, the DRC is putting these arguments to the test in the legal realm while establishing a clear throughline linking Rwanda’s historic and ongoing atrocities in eastern DRC. The DRC even emphasises in the introduction of its case that its accusations against Rwanda do not aim to minimise the 1994 extermination of Rwandan Tutsi. 

The 1994 Rwandan genocide is generally considered a “textbook” case, as the Hutu extremists, driven by an exclusionary ideology, orchestrated a meticulously organised state campaign to annihilate the Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu following a period of anti-Tutsi persecution and hate speech. The RPF atrocities targeting Hutu were driven by distinct factors and occurred amid evolving conflict dynamics. At home, the post-genocide Rwandan government has promoted an ideology of interethnic unity that erases ethnic identity since the late 1990s, albeit in a repressive political environment reportedly characterised by anti-Hutu discrimination in practice. In Zaire, atrocities against Hutu in the 1990s appeared to be aimed at collective punishment and population control, and may have been further driven by a suspicion that the victims were associated with extremists and collectively posed an existential threat to Tutsi. This mentality appears to still inform M23 atrocities against Hutu civilians associated with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a DRC-based militia comprising former exiled Rwandan Hutu extremists. 

The resurgence of M23 has also led the DRC army to collaborate with abusive “Wazalendo” (“patriots”) militias and the FDLR (with which it has collaborated before) and triggered an exacerbation of violence and sometimes genocidal hate speech against Congolese Tutsi, which the DRC’s case ignores. Neither these complex dynamics of victimisation nor the one-sided nature of the DRC’s case discount its accusations against Rwanda. However, they underscore the limitations of relying on “textbook” understandings of contextual drivers of genocide when assessing the atrocities in question. These complexities also matter because Rwanda is likely to cite anti-Tutsi violence and the perceived threat posed by the FDLR in its legal defence. Rwanda and M23 have cited these issues throughout the conflict, with M23 claiming to defend Congolese Tutsi, even though these problems have been exacerbated by its resurgence. 

In June 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement. In August 2026 (after the DRC’s filing of the ICJ case discussed here), the DRC and M23 agreed to pursue peace negotiations and set up a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. It remains to be seen whether this is successful, given that fighting has continued in Eastern DRC despite the 2025 ceasefire agreement.

DRC v Rwanda Versions 1.0 and 2.0

The DRC has twice previously lodged claims against Rwanda in the ICJ. The first attempt was in 1999, brought under various treaties against Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. In 2001, the case was discontinued against Burundi and Rwanda. It is worth mentioning that the case went on to become the well-known Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) case, within which the ICJ held Uganda responsible for unlawful use of force and military intervention (occupation) in the DRC, and that Uganda had violated a variety of international humanitarian and human rights law obligations. This case was about the conduct of the Ugandan armed forces but also the military, logistic, economic and financial support that Uganda provided to non-state armed groups in the DRC, all of whom were responsible for the unlawful conduct. Like the Rwandan interventions, this case too was related to the abundant natural resources in the DRC. This was worth mentioning because the parallels with the case against Rwanda are substantial, and a strong indicator that the DRC is likely to be successful in the new case.

The second attempt at a case against Rwanda was lodged in 2002, alleging ‘massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’. This case was again brought under a number of treaties, all of which the Court denied jurisdiction for various procedural reasons. At the time of submission, Rwanda had a reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which the ICJ found to be still active and therefore Rwanda did not consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes under that treaty. The same reason was given for rejecting the claim under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD) (Rwanda’s reservation to Article 22). Both of those provisions were the compromissory clauses of those respective conventions. Jurisdiction under the other treaties in the claim, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), was likewise dismissed for the reason that none of the preconditions to the ICJ process required by those treaties had been met.

The DRC v Rwanda Version 3.0 Application

On 26 June 2026, the DRC lodged a third application with the ICJ. This application alleges violations of the Genocide Convention, ICERD, CEDAW, and, unlike the 2002 application, the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The DRC is not invoking other treaties that were part of the previous claim (which includes claims under a wide variety of subject-matter treaties). This claim is much more focused and thematically structured. In this third case, the DRC claims that Rwanda, through the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and multiple militias working in collaboration with the RDF and Kigali’s leadership, is responsible for multiple violations of the listed treaties. Applying the Nicaragua test (Nicaragua paras. 109-110), the DRC’s claims are based on the structural dependence of the non-state actors on Kigali and on the effective control that Rwanda has over these armed groups (para. 144).

The application sets out some basic facts (section II, pp. 6-34), noting that a full argument with more details will be provided if the case progresses to the merits stage. The facts set out the different phases of the conflict in the DRC, separating the facts across five periods of time from 1996 until today. This demonstrates the changes in non-state armed groups as participants in conflict. It also manifests the consistency of the types of violence across the periods. Massacres, sexual violence, forced displacement and torture in particular stand out as consistently committed across the decades. This section extensively references reports by UN bodies and NGOs, which indicates the type of evidence that the DRC will undoubtedly use to make its argument at the merits stage.

The application then engages in its arguments about the Court’s competence, which in this case is crucial, given the 2002 application was rejected in full for competence reasons. Indeed, the DRC has been strategic with this case. In the years since the 2006 rejection of their second claim, the DRC acted to ensure that the procedural barriers that prevented the Court’s jurisdiction in the 2002 claim under the human rights treaties were overcome. Under Article 29 of CEDAW and Article 30 of CAT, a dispute concerning each convention ‘which is not settled by negotiation’ must be submitted to arbitration. If the arbitration cannot be agreed upon within six months, then one of the parties can refer the dispute to the ICJ. The DRC has ensured that this procedure has been followed. It has clearly raised issues of dispute, including publicly in various UN bodies, and these steps are outlined in this application. This includes holding a Human Rights Council side event at the Palais des Nations calling on the international community to mobilise against these crimes, including genocide (para. 109). It also includes diplomatic actions: a series of three note verbales to the Rwandan Foreign Minister across 2025 and 2026, including attempts to launch negotiations, to which the DRC received no response (paras. 111, 122-125, 132-135, 139-142). All these note verbales engaged with allegations of violations of all four treaties at issue in this claim. Therefore, the DRC has, for this third iteration of its case, ensured that procedural barriers to the ICJ’s competence are overcome.

In addition, Rwanda withdrew without conditions its reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention and to Article 22 of ICERD in December 2008, thus eliminating the procedural obstacle to the ICJ’s jurisdiction under those treaties.

The application then progresses to the specific claims under each treaty. The most space is given to the claim under the Genocide Convention (paras. 149-156): that Rwanda, from 1996 until the present day, through non-state actor intermediaries as well as the RDF and through omissions of conduct, through a lack of any measures to prevent or repress genocidal acts committed in eastern DRC, has been and is committing violations of the Genocide Convention.  The DRC’s claim alleges comprehensive violations of the Genocide Convention, across Articles I to VI, covering failure to prevent and punish; the commission of, attempt and complicity in genocide; special intent to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to genocide; failure to adopt legislative and judicial measures to facilitate application of the Genocide Convention and to repress and punish crimes of genocide; and hindering inquiries from international entities such as the UN.  The application argues that the dolus specialis of genocide can be inferred from circumstances, that indirect proof can demonstrate such intention. With reference to International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICJ cases, the DRC argues that multiple criteria can potentially be evidence of genocidal intent, such as the systematic character and disproportionate nature of attacks.  These allegations of genocide specifically refer to the targeting, with intent to destroy, of ethnic groups, particularly Rwandan refugee Hutus and the Nyindus. Based on the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention, the DRC argues that the case is relevant but even stronger because it is the state in question that has been affected by violations of the Genocide Convention, which is perhaps a reference to the fact that other cases currently before the ICJ under the Genocide Convention are predominantly brought by states who are themselves not directly affected by the genocide(s) they are alleging.

The claim under ICERD is brief (paras. 157-8), alleging the commission of racial discrimination, with the facts detailing specific targeting of Hutus and Congolese minority groups. The DRC alleges violations of multiple provisions of the ICERD, crossing the obligations to eliminate racial discrimination, prohibit racial superiority propaganda, eliminate racial discrimination in all areas of access to rights (across a wide variety of rights), provide effective remedies for violations, and adopt measures to combat prejudices. This claim is that Rwanda is systematically violating the rights under ICERD of ethnic Congolese communities.

Under CEDAW, the claim (paras. 159-164) is that violence against women amounts to a violation of the prohibition of discrimination against women (which is consistent with the CEDAW Committee’s interpretation of the treaty in General Recommendation 19). The particular focus of this claim is on the systematic sexual violence committed against ethnic minority women by non-state armed groups. The sexual violence is presented as a weapon of war and domination, which constitutes a ‘grave, systematic and continuing violation of the Convention’. The DRC also alleges a context of ‘submission of women in conditions of a discriminatory and inhumane existence’. 

Finally, the allegations under CAT (paras. 165-170) claim the systematic commission of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, specifically by complicity in providing support for non-state armed groups. The claim lists a non-exhaustive list including summary executions, simulated executions, death threats, public humiliation, beatings, arbitrary detention, gang rapes, mutilation, forced labour and use of child soldiers, carried out in North and South Kivu. The DRC also alleges the obstruction or lack of cooperation with international inquiry mechanisms.

A claim across all alleged treaty violations is the failure of Rwanda to prevent, investigate and punish allegations of crimes, and to provide reparations. This also specifically includes references to the obligation aut dedere aut judicare, found across Articles 5-8 of CAT. The DRC provides the example of Laurent Nkunda, who Rwanda refuses to extradite to the DRC for acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

This third attempt at bringing a case against Rwanda by the DRC finally has a chance at success. Given the Court’s findings in 2005 of international law violations against Uganda in essentially the same context, and given that this time, the barriers to the Court’s competence have been removed through removal of reservations or the DRC ensuring that precursor acts are complete, it can be surmised that this case will not only reach the merits stage but the DRC is likely to succeed in achieving a ruling against Rwanda at least with regards to some aspects of this case. What is different in this case from the DRC v Uganda case is the inclusion of claims under the Genocide Convention, the specific focusing of the case on human rights treaties, and the exclusion of claims of breaches of IHL and claims under other various treaties relating to regional or aviation obligations. Therefore, the case is not a direct parallel with the DRC v Uganda case. The narrow scope of the case, with the facts relating to overlapping claims across the four treaties, is also what provides the DRC with a good chance of success in its claim. 

While it is outside the scope of this blog post to go into detail, it is worth mentioning that in 2023, the DRC brought a case against Rwanda in the African Court of Human Rights (ACtHR) (the first inter-state case before the ACtHR). This case has differences from the ICJ case. Firstly, it alleges breaches of different treaties: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Women’s Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Secondly, the ACtHR case is only based on conflict from 2021, focusing on M23 and Rwanda. Thirdly, in a 2025 decision on admissibility and jurisdiction, the ACtHR determined that there was no need for the existence of a prior dispute, as required with the ICJ, therefore there was no procedural barrier to the case. A judgment in this case will be rendered well before one at the ICJ, so no doubt the ICJ will draw on the ACtHR finding in its deliberations. 

In both cases, the DRC has requested each court (inter alia) hold Rwanda responsible for violations of international law, to end the violations or withdraw its troops and support, and to provide reparations for damage. In the ICJ, the request to provide reparations for damages is focused on the state (para. 171) (as it was in DRC v Uganda); in the ACtHR, the request is to repair the damage to the state and the populations who are victims of the alleged violations. Therefore, the cases may have similarities in their findings, but also differences given the distinct treaties on which the claims are based and that the reparations structure will no doubt diverge between cases.

The DRC is covering its bases with multiple claims in multiple courts, and with a likelihood of success in both these cases. DRC v Rwanda Version 3.0 is also another case now before the ICJ dealing with human rights treaties and the Genocide Convention, a growing trend that we are witnessing as the Court becomes more involved in human rights and international crimes (particularly genocide) disputes. The ICJ’s role as an interpreter and enforcer of laws designed to protect people is increasing. These cases will create a strong new body of jurisprudence around state accountability for human rights abuses and international crimes, and this new DRC v Rwanda case (along with the ACtHR case) will most likely contribute to that.

Photo attribution: “International Court of Justice” by Dennis G Jarvis is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0