Search: self-defense

...an opportunity to explore those differences and find common ground. The symposium, co-sponsored by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, IHCL Platform, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, City of The Hague, and the Dutch Foreign Ministry, was especially valuable against the backdrop of former UK Legal Adviser Daniel Bethlehem’s new AJIL piece (see Ashley Deeks’ discussion here) on self-defense against non-state actors. This first post will flag the debate at the conference on targeted killing and what Ken Anderson has called “naked self-defense.” A second post (posted over at Lawfare) analyzes another issue...

...http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718548 )Moreover, the President has constitutional authority to engage in permissible measures of self-defense and collective self-defense under international law under Art. II, sec. 3 of the Const. -- which is also addressed in part in the preamble to the AUMF in general terms, not limited to the application of the laws of war in a given context. (see http://ssrn.com/abstracgt=2061835 ) I suspect that in the future there will be more detailed attention to the legitimacy of measures of self and collective self-defense. p.s. it does not seem that international...

...change in the law governing anticipatory self-defense.” At most customary international law permits self-defence in response to armed attacks that are temporally imminent. It does not permit self-defence in response to armed attacks that are not temporally imminent, even if a threatened state believes it is about to lose the “last window of opportunity” to defend itself. Should “Last Window of Opportunity” Be Lex Ferenda? Although the “last window of opportunity” test is not currently lex lata, one day it might be. That is for states to decide — all...

...J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 237, 249-57 (2010); 39 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 569, 569-71 (2011). Moreover, "unable or unwilling" is not a limit of lawful measures of self-defense against ongoing armed attacks. See 39 Denv. J. at 580-81. Additionally, Pakistan would be "unable" (at least) if the armed attacks continue to be planned and coming from Pakistani territory. Michael W. Lewis Jordan, I agree with your self-defense analysis, but I think self-defense in that context has a much narrower, more Caroline-like definition of immediacy than the US...

and the armistice has ended at the hands of North Korea, and under the laws of war North Korean missiles and nuclear warheads can be targeted at any time. The patience of the U.S. is remarkable. Roger: more generally under the law of self-defense there is no relevant "imminence requirement," as noted above either with respect to claims to use anticipatory self-defense because it is not authorized under Article 51 or in terms of actual selection of targets for self-defense purposes when the right of self-defense has been tirggered when...

...legal language may constitute a key stone in constructing (future) claims of self-defense. The construction of possible self-defense claims and its hurdles The conditions for a State to exercise self-defense have generated much debate – especially as States typically refrain from direct attacks against each other (as was the scenario envisioned by the Charter’s drafters), but use force rather indirectly through support of “proxy forces”, typically non-state actors. It is in this spirit, that the US and Saudi-Arabia do not build their allegations against Iran to destabilize the region, and...

...international law—to self defense. This is not news, or controversial. See, e.g., U.N. Resolution 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). There is no such self-defense rationale available as a matter of the jus ad bellum with respect to all international terrorist groups.) But what about Brennan’s references, early in his speech, to al-Qaida “adherents” and “affiliates”? Although Brennan explains that “adherents” of al-Qaida–including “individuals . . . with little or no contact with the group itself”–have become a serious national security challenge because they can and do conduct attacks in the United...

...would a CIA drone operator be entitled to a public-authority defense? I don’t see how. I won’t spend much time explaining why “national self-defense” does not provide the requisite public authority; as I explain in my signature-strikes article (and as Marko Milanovic explains here), a legitimate act of self-defense may justify the US violating another state’s sovereignty, but it does not — and cannot — justify depriving the target of his right to life. That deprivation would have to be independently justified either by IHL (if the killing took place...

what is the effect of the Europ. Conv. on H.R., art. 2(2)(a) (self-defense -- "in defence of any person from unlawful violence"). Is there a human right to self-defense? Ian Henderson Jordan, We agree that the international law rules and domestic self-defence rules are different. Indeed, that is the very point of our article. Having trained a soldier to understand and comply with the LOAC, we foresee potential problems if that soldier then relies on ‘self-defence’ as the relevant legal justification. And all the more so as it may not...

...self-defense targetings on its soil does not dissipate the right of the U.S. under UN art. 51 to engage in self-defense targetings of those who are direct participants in armed attacks (DPAA). Its the self-defense paradigm that controls here, as noted in my article in FSU's J. of Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 2010, particularly with respect to Yemen. Moreover, under human rights law, he had no relevant human right unless he was in the "effective control" of the U.S., which was not the case. And if he had a relevant...

Regular readers of the blog know that one of my hobbyhorses is the “unwilling or unable” test for self-defense against non-state actors. As I have often pointed out, scholars seem much more enamored with the test than states. The newest (regrettable) case in point: my friend Claus Kress, who is one of the world’s best international-law scholars. Here is what he writes in an otherwise-excellent contribution to Just Security about the use of force against ISIL in Syria (emphasis mine): It therefore follows not only from the right of self-defense’s...

not field military units is sustained hostilities, and so forth. The interesting question is not targeting persons who are DPH in a real theatre of war or DPAA in self-defense, but detention when an armed conflict does not exist. What will be the authority of the U.S. to detain terrorist suspects without trial? Will it relate to an expanded notion of self-defense? Can it? I have written (like Abe Sofaer) that since we can kill in self-defense we should be able to capture. I had in mind capture for trial....