Search: self-defense

...fall within the scope of the NPM clause from the substantive protections of the BIT and thereby preclude liability. Professor Franck is correct to note that in most cases the affirmative defense of necessity in customary international law should be unnecessary where a BIT contains an NPM clause. More specifically, where a treaty contains an NPM clause of comprehensive scope, the narrow necessity defense under customary law will generally not become relevant. NPM clauses are generally drafted to provide states greater flexibility to respond to emergency situations than would have...

...each group acquired rights which it could not be forced to renounce.” (UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.127, 27 April 1948, p. 108). The Palestinian state established over the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza strip, is in exercise of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination as recognized by the international community. The right of self-determination is widely acknowledged as a peremptory norm of international law. Only the Palestinian people and their political representatives have a legally valid claim to any part of these territories....

...The odd judge out is Vice-President Sebutinde, who in her dissenting opinion opines (para. 1; see also paras. 67, 69): the Court has not received arguments or evidence on the territorial scope (i.e. borders) of the State of Israel as on the eve of independence; nor of Israel’s competing territorial claims in relation to the disputed territory. These are issues that must first be addressed before the legal consequences of the alleged occupation of territory by Israel, or the territorial scope of Palestinian self-determination, can be determined. She then complains...

...because of effective control, or if the State of sojourn offers the terrorist actor protection and is unwilling or unable to take effective action against it (cf. once again BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/16, paras. 50–51). In this case, an international armed conflict may even arise between the attacking State and the State of sojourn (ICRC Commentary, para. 511). A prerequisite for invoking self-defence, however, is that the use of force against which the attacking State is defending itself exceeds the threshold of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article...

...effect and a very difficult one to achieve at that. This is a book that insists on its style, or the sylishness of is prose, and not only that, insists that we read this surface as the ‘thing itself’. And the style is, in turns, ironic, self-deprecating, cosmopolitan, wearing its hard earned learning lightly, self-aggrandizing. It is arch, self-conscious, always aware of the moves and counter-moves; how the game of the academic is played. And yet, also somehow gently nudging itself beyond the certainties of the doctinalist and the ironic...

Actually, I am not quite sure, since all I have is this report on the recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Circuit of Massachusetts holding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations gives foreign nationals legal rights to the notification of their consular officials if they are arrested by Massachusetts authorities: Massachusetts, Cordy wrote, will take steps now to bring the state into compliance: “In order to enable the full effect to be given to [the Vienna Convention], we conclude that the notifications it requires must be incorporated...

...described apologies as Apologies are speech acts that have the power to, in the words of Barkan, “amend the past so that it resonates differently in the present for those who feel aggrieved by it or responsible for it.” For the magic of these speech acts to be realized, however, it must be preceded by an internal process of critical self-examination and self-interrogation that makes the political event of an apology possible. For colonial states, this usually means reckoning with significant parts of their history, their self-image and their political...

...on its own is already difficult to determine in practice, even before adding self-determination – another difficult to grasp principle of international law with its own contradictions, particularly in a context involving Russia and Ukraine –  into the mix. However, the argument in favour of reconceptualising non-intervention in line with self-determination points to the core of why it seems dissatisfactory that non-intervention does not apply to many forms of foreign election interference: even where activities in question do not digitally alter the result, the ability of voters to independently and...

...Foreign States Second, the Rome Statute is an international treaty that supplements, but does not supplant each State Party’s right to exercise jurisdiction over criminal suspects who are either their nationals or who commit crimes in their territory. As such, every State Party can choose to exercise that jurisdiction itself or to delegate that jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court. This EO, if implemented, would directly interfere in all 123 State Parties’ own sovereignty by penalizing their right to make that choice. Hypocritically, the US itself is not a State...

of your book appears to be a little “determinist” to me. You are saying certain trends are inevitable and there is nothing that we can do about it. This sounds like a negation of free will and democratic self-government. You appear to be saying that there is nothing that a free people (who would be upset) by the decline in the meaning of citizenship can do about reversing this negative trend. We are not free, we can not exercise democratic self-government appears to be the message. This is the opposite...

I’m delighted to announce the publication of two new essays. The first is “The Use and Abuse of Analogy in IHL,” which is a chapter in Jens’s edited book for CUP, “Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights.” I’m very proud of the essay — and all of the contributions to the book are excellent. The second publication is my article “Radical Complementarity,” which has just appeared in the Journal of International Criminal Justice. Here is the abstract: In March 2015, a domestic court in Côte d’Ivoire...

...grant protected person status even to its own nationals if they have differing allegiance. Kubo claims that this interpretation is both in line with the spirit of humanization and also practical (or at least not completely unpractical), while attempting to refute a number of disagreeing authors, including myself (which probably explains why I chose this somewhat arcane topic). In the post I will first summarize the Tribunal’s position, then the arguments defending the ICTY jurisprudence, and I will try to demonstrate why I don’t find them particularly convincing. Needless to...