Search: self-defense

reaction would have been permissible. The original post seems to suggest that the soldier, having acted in personal self defense, would be able to argue that he was entitled to ignore the ROE. (If I have misunderstood, I apologize, and please ignore the rest of this comment.) But that position seems to be inconsistent with the basic concept of self-defense as a tailored exception to the laws against killing. The right of self defense exists only to the extent the applicable law gives that right. It is not a carte...

the effort, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova pondered what kind of conception of ‘self-defense’ would drive one country to carry out an operation to bomb another without that country’s explicit permission. Earlier, Prime Minister Manuel Valls was cited by French media as saying that Paris’s bombing campaign constitutes self-defense. “We are acting in self-defense,” Valls noted, according to Reuters. In a post on her Facebook page, Zakharova pondered that “it would be nice to know more about this concept of self-defense, in the form of air strikes [on the...

that are not attributable to a state" Kevin points to "Art. 2(4) itself." Well, Article 2(4) speaks for itself--and it includes no such exception. Marty Lederman Sorry, meant to say in Point 6, of course, that Article 2(4) does not speak to the question of the scope of permissible self-defense; that Article 51 is an acknowledged exception to the prohibition in 2(4); and that *Article 51* includes no such distinction for armed attacks by nonstate actors: it recognizes “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack...

of self-defense was not fixed by the Charter in its pre-1945 form. Pre-Charter self-defense was the law of self-defense that existed under customary international law at the time -- and custom can always change. So regardless of the "inherent" right states might have had to use self-defense against unattributable NSA attacks in 1837 or 1937, state practice significantly narrowed the content of that right post-Charter, pre-9/11 to specifically require attribution. That's the evolution Ruys discusses at great length in his book -- and the evolution that no use of force...

...talking about "self defense" in the domestic criminal justice sense, but even in military law there are two levels of self defense. Strategic jus ad bellum self defense justifies the use of military force in a conflict that does not rise to the level of an armed conflict, like the exchange of fire across a DMZ. Tactical jus in bello self defense justifies the use of military force by a warship when an unidentified small boat is approaching and fails to stop when challenged. In force protection situations, one should...

cumbersome, but all of the account is included in the Google preview. The "unlawfully" discussion begins on p. 258. I will be curious to know what you think! Jordan I addressed "lawful" acts of self-defense, not "any" act of self-defense. Article 19(1) (addressing rights, etc. under the U.N. charter) is clearly relevant with respect to proper interpretation of the word "unlawful," even if the drafting history was silent about the right to engage in lawful measures of self-defense under the U.N. Charter and customary international law reflected therein. Further, the...

Aggression refers to cases of the “substantial involvement” of a state in the acts of non-state actors, thereby permitting the use of force in self-defense against that state. The question of what forms of state support of non-state actors satisfy the “substantial involvement” threshold is a controversial question in jus ad bellum. In the Nicaragua Case (para. 195), the ICJ declared that “assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support” does not constitute an armed attack that permits the exercise of self-defense....

must be permitted time to find him and then time to try to obtain consent of the govt. of Libya even though that is not required with respect to lawful measures of self-defense. E.g., 19 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 237 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717 Self-defense with respect to al-Shabab is certainly clearly permissible. Moreover, these efforts at self-defense capture may have been with the consent of the govt. of Libya (which it has reason domestically to not disclose --- but may come up at trial) and Somalia. Self-defense captures are recognizably...

approval of the U.N. Security Council, in self-defense, or with the permission of the country in which military force is to be used. The U.N. Security Council never authorized the drone war in Pakistan. Self-defense, traditionally defined to mean the use of force against an “imminent” armed attack by a nation-state, does not apply either, because no one thinks that Pakistan plans to invade the United States. That leaves consent as the only possible legal theory. In other cases, including current drone operations in Pakistan, the United States has invoked...

Jordan Response... Also, I find this interesting: in unresolved Q 1 Harold states that the U.S. view has long been that there is a right of self-defense against "any illegal use of force" but, "on the other hand, ... some governments and commentators" do not and that they view "armed attack" as triggering the right of self-defense [I have to include myself among such commentators, but I note that "armed" can include use of a "weapon," such as a cyber-"weapon", gas, chemical weapons, etc., at least if they have a...

...Self-defense is a justification, that is legally-warranted exception to a general prohibition. As such, it is a way out of illegality. The rules of engagement are authorization to use force in circumstances other than self-defense, issued by the military. ROE do not influence the right to self-defense, which is regulated by a different set of rules. During an attack or when an attack is imminent, ROE do not apply. They apply in case of hostile intent or a hostile act, which are situations other than attack. federico In a non-international...

...as “self-defense” does not provide a CIA interrogator — contra Yoo’s notorious 14 March 2003 torture memo — with a defense to torture. To be clear, that does not mean a CIA operative could not argue self-defense in a murder prosecution. The defense would apply — but it would be governed by the normal requirements, most relevantly that the operative must have reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary to prevent the imminent use of deadly force. The CIA operative would thus likely be entitled to the defense of self-defense...