Search: self-defense

“areas of active hostilities”) with the legal definition of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Gabor conceded that “areas of active hostilities” and NIAC are not synonymous, but pointed out that it nonetheless remained unclear where the US government considered itself at war. Ryan, together with Stephen Pomper, replied that such lack of clarity shouldn’t be a reason to distrust the DNI report since, in any event, national self-defense targeting in response to imminent armed attacks is more restrictive than IHL targeting. Simply put, I think that Gabor is more likely to...

...create space for anticipatory self-defense even though its plain language—which permits the use of defensive force only “if” an armed attack occurs—clearly states otherwise) this argument is by itself not likely to be a sufficiently sturdy foundation. As such, the best odds for the development of a legal theory to support the sort of test that Koh proposes may lie in a multi-step process, which begins with revisiting the history and text of the UN Charter itself, developing a credible interpretation based on the text and history of Article 2(4)...

...rarely encountered in war. What if the would-be defender was guilty himself of posing a threat? The likeliest case in war is that the combatant supposedly exercising self-defense at the same time poses a threat to his attacker. Normally, in this case we decide who actually has a right to self-defense by making a judgement about the difference in moral status. That the victim of an assault uses force to fight back does not give her attacker a moral right to defend himself. If we refuse to take moral status...

...round hole. As an interesting coincidence, I experienced this first hand on the day this online symposium began. Yesterday I testified (out of order) as the first defense witness in the Hamdan military commission trial. The defense requested that I offer my opinion on when the armed conflict with al Qaeda began. Interestingly, the defense is not (to my knowledge) challenging the government assertion that the terror attacks of September 11th initiated a state of armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda (which I realize and pointed out...

“an instrument of national policy.” As the International Military Tribunal for Germany (IMT) explained in its Nuremberg Judgment, the Pact made it illegal for any state to engage in armed conflict with another state except for purposes of self-defense. Under the U.N. Charter, that customary prohibition is codified in Article 2(4), which is subject to two treaty-based exceptions. Article 51 reiterates the core customary exception of self-defense. Article 42, however, further provides that states may lawfully utilize force against another state pursuant to UNSC authorization. This did not codify any...

...this site: If Israel is in an actual armed conflict in which Hamas is an adversary, then it is also entitled to maintain a blockade, and stop vessels suspected of being blockade runners at whatever distance the blockading nation deems military feasible. Again, there is no right of self-defense on the part of a blockade runner, resistance making the vessel liable to being attacked/sunk rather than merely captured. Which in terms of your observation, there is a legal right to do X, but no legal right to resist X in...

...conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. But the analysis is detailed enough in this iteration to accomplish something the White Paper, etc. in important ways did not: identifying key legal limits on the scope of U.S. targeting authority. Take the source-of-authority example. The earlier White Paper was remarkably successful in fudging whether the Administration was invoking the President’s Article II self-defense power under the Constitution, or the statutory AUMF, to support targeting operations. The White Paper likewise (notoriously) fudged whether it was invoking a UN Charter-based self-defense justification...

...my view, the proper legal frame is international law of self-defense – and it is what the US has traditionally viewed the exercise of these discrete uses of force by the CIA, covert or clandestine, as being anyway. These two legal rationales eventually lead to different legal conclusions, constraints and authority for the use of force. My view is that forcing CIA targeted killing in places that might range widely in the world into armed conflict rationales is bad for the CIA’s legal reasoning, and requires ever greater legal contortions...

expressed and expanded upon this view in several key strategic documents such as the 2013 “White Book on Defense and National Security” (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale), the 2017 “International Cyber Strategy” (Stratégie internationale de la France pour le numérique) and the 2018 “Strategic Review of Cyberdefense” (Revue stratégique de cyberdéfense) as well as two major speeches by Jean-Yves Le Drian, the then minister of defense (and later of foreign affairs), of 12 December 2016 in Bruz and 15 December 2017 in Aix-en-Provence. The new document...

...control” is absent. Security Considerations and Right to Re-enter Gaza The United Nations Charter (Art. 51) guarantees states the right to self-defense against armed attacks by state and non-state actors, and the Security Council affirmed that right after the attacks of September 11, 2001, encouraging states to combat terrorist acts which threaten international peace and security. Israel’s actions in self-defense reflect U.N. standards, and are reflected in the Agreements which grant Israel authority over its external security. The right to re-enter for security reasons is a common reservation made by...

...over the past several years. Influenced by the changing nature of defense and security (including examples such as US disengagement from Europe and Russia’s military assertiveness), the growing interest from individual countries and the emergence of collaborative projects like those mentioned above, Europe will likely see further drone proliferation in the coming years. Outlined in its 2016 EU Global Strategy Document, Europe is seeking a more strategic approach to security and autonomy. Part of this plan includes bolstering defense cooperation amongst member states and investing in defense industries. Two of...

...Such assistance would dramatically expand the military-industrial resources available to Russia and thus substantially improve its prospects for defeating Ukraine. Effective self-defense against indirect aggression may therefore require targeting the aggressor coalition’s military-industrial center of gravity by employing armed force against the indirect aggressor. For example, in 1972 the United States interdicted Soviet-North Vietnamese sea lines of communication by mining North Vietnamese harbors against Soviet shipping. Critically, such actions are far more likely to be viewed as lawful elements of a “war of self-defense” if it is recognized that a...