Search: self-defense

...other small set of problems around Syrian intervention: international law. The UN Charter says that one state can use force against another in two circumstances: (1) if the UN Security Council authorizes it, or (2) in national or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council has time to act. In Libya, we had a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing military intervention. There is no such resolution here, and at the moment, slim prospect of obtaining one given Russia’s opposition to intervention. Is this plausibly self-defense, for...

...in the view of the judge, the case does not pertain to the question of whether the State’s current policy violates its international legal obligations but instead whether, and if so to what extent, the preliminary relief judge is allowed to assess the State’s foreign and defense policies (para. 4.9). In general, the government is presumed to enjoy wide discretion to shape its policy (beleidsvrijheid) in the areas of foreign policy and defense ‘where strongly political choices have to be made’. This explains why the ruling is largely void of...

...trade and non-proliferation as well. Finally, I found Obama’s response particularly interesting with respect to the use of force, where he lays out a traditional articulation of the U.S. right to self-defense plus a preference for multilateral action in other circumstances: I will not hesitate to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect the American people or our vital interests whenever we are attacked or imminently threatened. . . . There are some circumstances beyond self-defense in which I would be prepared to consider using force, for example to participate...

...case was an invaluable part of ensuring Milosevic had a fair trial. In interviews with the amici, they noted that they preferred the role of amicus to being assigned as defense counsel. They pointed out that had they been assigned to represent Milosevic from the start, they would have an ethical obligation not to act without instructions. Given that Milosevic would have refused to instruct assigned counsel, they would not have had the opportunity they had as amici to file motions helpful to the defense without conflicting with their obligations...

...other international legal doctrines: state self-defense and prohibition of terrorism. Neocolonial states consistently allege to be acting in self-defense or in the interest of global security when they massacre civilians in the global South. (The U.S. “war on terror” exemplifies this tactic.) These neocolonial states also allege that mass civilian deaths are “mistakes” or “collateral damage.” The state’s claim of self-defense is so sacred in the contemporary international legal system that the burden of proof falls on victims of massacres to prove civilian targeting. Neocolonial states consistently murder disproportionately more...

but I think unpersuasive. The United States today has its own troops on the ground in Syria – troops that were not present in 2013, troops stationed (at least some of them) as close as 50 miles away from the site of the chemical weapons attack. In the abstract, one might imagine this could lead the United States to offer some sort of self-defense justification (in defense of our own nationals). But given our troops are in Syria (to fight ISIS) without Syrian consent, and given Syria’s apparent determination since...

...this site: If Israel is in an actual armed conflict in which Hamas is an adversary, then it is also entitled to maintain a blockade, and stop vessels suspected of being blockade runners at whatever distance the blockading nation deems military feasible. Again, there is no right of self-defense on the part of a blockade runner, resistance making the vessel liable to being attacked/sunk rather than merely captured. Which in terms of your observation, there is a legal right to do X, but no legal right to resist X in...

...conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. But the analysis is detailed enough in this iteration to accomplish something the White Paper, etc. in important ways did not: identifying key legal limits on the scope of U.S. targeting authority. Take the source-of-authority example. The earlier White Paper was remarkably successful in fudging whether the Administration was invoking the President’s Article II self-defense power under the Constitution, or the statutory AUMF, to support targeting operations. The White Paper likewise (notoriously) fudged whether it was invoking a UN Charter-based self-defense justification...

...sufficiently intense protracted armed violence and organized armed groups, however, the applicable rules for the Rio operation is international human rights law. These standards, reflected in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, require lethal force to be a measure of last resort, only to be used in cases involving self-defense or the defense of others against a threat of death or serious injury – a standard known as “absolute necessity”....

and custom, which provides that a state may only use force pursuant to a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII or in self-defense. For this reason, a conflict also exists between the P5’s duty to engage in humanitarian intervention (if a member of the P5 breaches the duty not to veto) and the duty not to use force absent self-defense or Security Council authorization under the UN Charter and custom. Resolving the Conflict through Jus Cogens In Chapter 4, I note that the conflicts recognized in Chapter 3 must be...

“an instrument of national policy.” As the International Military Tribunal for Germany (IMT) explained in its Nuremberg Judgment, the Pact made it illegal for any state to engage in armed conflict with another state except for purposes of self-defense. Under the U.N. Charter, that customary prohibition is codified in Article 2(4), which is subject to two treaty-based exceptions. Article 51 reiterates the core customary exception of self-defense. Article 42, however, further provides that states may lawfully utilize force against another state pursuant to UNSC authorization. This did not codify any...

...my view, the proper legal frame is international law of self-defense – and it is what the US has traditionally viewed the exercise of these discrete uses of force by the CIA, covert or clandestine, as being anyway. These two legal rationales eventually lead to different legal conclusions, constraints and authority for the use of force. My view is that forcing CIA targeted killing in places that might range widely in the world into armed conflict rationales is bad for the CIA’s legal reasoning, and requires ever greater legal contortions...