Search: self-defense

...rarely encountered in war. What if the would-be defender was guilty himself of posing a threat? The likeliest case in war is that the combatant supposedly exercising self-defense at the same time poses a threat to his attacker. Normally, in this case we decide who actually has a right to self-defense by making a judgement about the difference in moral status. That the victim of an assault uses force to fight back does not give her attacker a moral right to defend himself. If we refuse to take moral status...

...trade and non-proliferation as well. Finally, I found Obama’s response particularly interesting with respect to the use of force, where he lays out a traditional articulation of the U.S. right to self-defense plus a preference for multilateral action in other circumstances: I will not hesitate to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect the American people or our vital interests whenever we are attacked or imminently threatened. . . . There are some circumstances beyond self-defense in which I would be prepared to consider using force, for example to participate...

...after all.) Perhaps it is not surprising that the ILC’s commentaries justify its rule on countermeasures by citing the comments it received from the WHO and UNESCO, both of which saw no reason to deny them such powers. One can only imagine the countermeasures that organizations like the WHO or UNESCO now see themselves as licensed to impose on the rest of us. Equally mysterious are the preconditions that the ILC appears to envision with respect IOs’ “self-defense” or their invocations of the defense of necessity. One wonders precisely what...

...create space for anticipatory self-defense even though its plain language—which permits the use of defensive force only “if” an armed attack occurs—clearly states otherwise) this argument is by itself not likely to be a sufficiently sturdy foundation. As such, the best odds for the development of a legal theory to support the sort of test that Koh proposes may lie in a multi-step process, which begins with revisiting the history and text of the UN Charter itself, developing a credible interpretation based on the text and history of Article 2(4)...

...control” is absent. Security Considerations and Right to Re-enter Gaza The United Nations Charter (Art. 51) guarantees states the right to self-defense against armed attacks by state and non-state actors, and the Security Council affirmed that right after the attacks of September 11, 2001, encouraging states to combat terrorist acts which threaten international peace and security. Israel’s actions in self-defense reflect U.N. standards, and are reflected in the Agreements which grant Israel authority over its external security. The right to re-enter for security reasons is a common reservation made by...

...with Resolution 1973.  There is however one caveat to this conclusion. The Ukrainian government has already signaled that it would invite other states to implement a no-fly-zone over its territory. As Ukraine is currently exercising its right to self-defense under Art. 51 UNCh against Russia’s aggression, states can furnish military assistance to Ukraine as a measure of collective self-defense. The GA could welcome such action in accordance with the Ukrainian government’s invitation. This would fall short of an authorization and have no legal effect. However, it could bestow legitimacy to...

“areas of active hostilities”) with the legal definition of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Gabor conceded that “areas of active hostilities” and NIAC are not synonymous, but pointed out that it nonetheless remained unclear where the US government considered itself at war. Ryan, together with Stephen Pomper, replied that such lack of clarity shouldn’t be a reason to distrust the DNI report since, in any event, national self-defense targeting in response to imminent armed attacks is more restrictive than IHL targeting. Simply put, I think that Gabor is more likely to...

...this site: If Israel is in an actual armed conflict in which Hamas is an adversary, then it is also entitled to maintain a blockade, and stop vessels suspected of being blockade runners at whatever distance the blockading nation deems military feasible. Again, there is no right of self-defense on the part of a blockade runner, resistance making the vessel liable to being attacked/sunk rather than merely captured. Which in terms of your observation, there is a legal right to do X, but no legal right to resist X in...

and custom, which provides that a state may only use force pursuant to a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII or in self-defense. For this reason, a conflict also exists between the P5’s duty to engage in humanitarian intervention (if a member of the P5 breaches the duty not to veto) and the duty not to use force absent self-defense or Security Council authorization under the UN Charter and custom. Resolving the Conflict through Jus Cogens In Chapter 4, I note that the conflicts recognized in Chapter 3 must be...

...round hole. As an interesting coincidence, I experienced this first hand on the day this online symposium began. Yesterday I testified (out of order) as the first defense witness in the Hamdan military commission trial. The defense requested that I offer my opinion on when the armed conflict with al Qaeda began. Interestingly, the defense is not (to my knowledge) challenging the government assertion that the terror attacks of September 11th initiated a state of armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda (which I realize and pointed out...

...conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. But the analysis is detailed enough in this iteration to accomplish something the White Paper, etc. in important ways did not: identifying key legal limits on the scope of U.S. targeting authority. Take the source-of-authority example. The earlier White Paper was remarkably successful in fudging whether the Administration was invoking the President’s Article II self-defense power under the Constitution, or the statutory AUMF, to support targeting operations. The White Paper likewise (notoriously) fudged whether it was invoking a UN Charter-based self-defense justification...

...case was an invaluable part of ensuring Milosevic had a fair trial. In interviews with the amici, they noted that they preferred the role of amicus to being assigned as defense counsel. They pointed out that had they been assigned to represent Milosevic from the start, they would have an ethical obligation not to act without instructions. Given that Milosevic would have refused to instruct assigned counsel, they would not have had the opportunity they had as amici to file motions helpful to the defense without conflicting with their obligations...