Search: self-defense

“an instrument of national policy.” As the International Military Tribunal for Germany (IMT) explained in its Nuremberg Judgment, the Pact made it illegal for any state to engage in armed conflict with another state except for purposes of self-defense. Under the U.N. Charter, that customary prohibition is codified in Article 2(4), which is subject to two treaty-based exceptions. Article 51 reiterates the core customary exception of self-defense. Article 42, however, further provides that states may lawfully utilize force against another state pursuant to UNSC authorization. This did not codify any...

...over the past several years. Influenced by the changing nature of defense and security (including examples such as US disengagement from Europe and Russia’s military assertiveness), the growing interest from individual countries and the emergence of collaborative projects like those mentioned above, Europe will likely see further drone proliferation in the coming years. Outlined in its 2016 EU Global Strategy Document, Europe is seeking a more strategic approach to security and autonomy. Part of this plan includes bolstering defense cooperation amongst member states and investing in defense industries. Two of...

...case was an invaluable part of ensuring Milosevic had a fair trial. In interviews with the amici, they noted that they preferred the role of amicus to being assigned as defense counsel. They pointed out that had they been assigned to represent Milosevic from the start, they would have an ethical obligation not to act without instructions. Given that Milosevic would have refused to instruct assigned counsel, they would not have had the opportunity they had as amici to file motions helpful to the defense without conflicting with their obligations...

...sufficiently intense protracted armed violence and organized armed groups, however, the applicable rules for the Rio operation is international human rights law. These standards, reflected in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, require lethal force to be a measure of last resort, only to be used in cases involving self-defense or the defense of others against a threat of death or serious injury – a standard known as “absolute necessity”....

...round hole. As an interesting coincidence, I experienced this first hand on the day this online symposium began. Yesterday I testified (out of order) as the first defense witness in the Hamdan military commission trial. The defense requested that I offer my opinion on when the armed conflict with al Qaeda began. Interestingly, the defense is not (to my knowledge) challenging the government assertion that the terror attacks of September 11th initiated a state of armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda (which I realize and pointed out...

Related to Ken’s earlier post, Amos Guiora has a piece up at Foreign Policy describing the legal analysis he applied when advising the Israeli Defense Forces on targeted killings of terrorists. He argues that international law permits targeted killing when certain conditions are met: The decision to use targeted killing of terrorists is based on an expansive articulation of the concept of pre-emptive self defense, intelligence information, and an analysis regarding policy effectiveness. According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a nation state can respond to an armed attack....

...after all.) Perhaps it is not surprising that the ILC’s commentaries justify its rule on countermeasures by citing the comments it received from the WHO and UNESCO, both of which saw no reason to deny them such powers. One can only imagine the countermeasures that organizations like the WHO or UNESCO now see themselves as licensed to impose on the rest of us. Equally mysterious are the preconditions that the ILC appears to envision with respect IOs’ “self-defense” or their invocations of the defense of necessity. One wonders precisely what...

...trade and non-proliferation as well. Finally, I found Obama’s response particularly interesting with respect to the use of force, where he lays out a traditional articulation of the U.S. right to self-defense plus a preference for multilateral action in other circumstances: I will not hesitate to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect the American people or our vital interests whenever we are attacked or imminently threatened. . . . There are some circumstances beyond self-defense in which I would be prepared to consider using force, for example to participate...

...in the view of the judge, the case does not pertain to the question of whether the State’s current policy violates its international legal obligations but instead whether, and if so to what extent, the preliminary relief judge is allowed to assess the State’s foreign and defense policies (para. 4.9). In general, the government is presumed to enjoy wide discretion to shape its policy (beleidsvrijheid) in the areas of foreign policy and defense ‘where strongly political choices have to be made’. This explains why the ruling is largely void of...

...other small set of problems around Syrian intervention: international law. The UN Charter says that one state can use force against another in two circumstances: (1) if the UN Security Council authorizes it, or (2) in national or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council has time to act. In Libya, we had a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing military intervention. There is no such resolution here, and at the moment, slim prospect of obtaining one given Russia’s opposition to intervention. Is this plausibly self-defense, for...

but I think unpersuasive. The United States today has its own troops on the ground in Syria – troops that were not present in 2013, troops stationed (at least some of them) as close as 50 miles away from the site of the chemical weapons attack. In the abstract, one might imagine this could lead the United States to offer some sort of self-defense justification (in defense of our own nationals). But given our troops are in Syria (to fight ISIS) without Syrian consent, and given Syria’s apparent determination since...

...create space for anticipatory self-defense even though its plain language—which permits the use of defensive force only “if” an armed attack occurs—clearly states otherwise) this argument is by itself not likely to be a sufficiently sturdy foundation. As such, the best odds for the development of a legal theory to support the sort of test that Koh proposes may lie in a multi-step process, which begins with revisiting the history and text of the UN Charter itself, developing a credible interpretation based on the text and history of Article 2(4)...