Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...think that the text of Article 17 supports such efforts, but the efforts are there nonetheless. So one of the basic goals of my Article is to demonstrate that it may well be counterproductive to insist that states prosecute international crimes as international crimes, given their legal and evidentiary complexity. Second, although Carsten seems to concede that international crimes are more difficult to prosecute domestically than ordinary crimes, he points out that they have their advantages, such as to offer ‘”a broader basis for jurisdiction (i.e. prosecution of extraterritorial acts),...

...well, allowing for the possible interposition of procedural bars to the making of Alien Tort claims (as pushed by Sotomayor). He got in an effective IG Farben analogy and even a little human rights speechifying (see p. 55). Breyer gets the award for zinger of the day: “if Hitler isn’t a pirate, who is?” (Anyone want to do the legal math on that one?) So predictions of the ATS (extraterritorial) demise may be premature. On the other hand, recent experience demonstrates that predictions based on oral arguments are not especially...

Last week the Ninth Circuit issued a controversial opinion in Mujica v. Airscan, Inc., that sharply limits the scope of human rights litigation. The claims in Mujica arose in Colombia and allegedly implicate corporate collusion with the Colombian military. Following Kiobel the common consensus was that Alien Tort Statute litigation would be severely curtailed based on the presumption against extraterritoriality. Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims, finding that where the only connection to the United States was the Defendants’ nationality, the claims do not “touch and concern”...

...NGO activities in Egypt before being allowed to leave the country. I had always thought “diplomatic asylum” something of a misnomer, as often paired with the common misunderstanding that embassy premises are extraterritorial (as in, that the US embassy in Beijing counts as US territory, which in fact it doesn’t). Turns out that the term has some historical traction, even though the its operation now appears to turn on the inviolability of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and not any distinctive legal doctrine. Much of that...

...from the inside I “actually advised the Obama administration to change its interpretation and to recognize the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR;” I then argued with greater success both internally and externally for the view that the Convention Against Torture applies extraterritorially, a view that the Obama administration eventually adopted after I left. Given Eviatar’s recognition that I fought internally—with admittedly mixed success—for the United States to actually comply with international human rights law, I am bit puzzled by her suggestion that “prominent lawyers and legal scholars like [my]self could...

...fear for their life. These evolving extraterritorial control mechanisms raise profound questions about the circumvention of established protection frameworks that have traditionally governed asylum policy. A Continuum of Externalization To understand the significance of this new “staging expulsion” model in the U.S., we must place it within a broader trend in migration governance: the externalization of migration control. Externalization refers to policies by which countries like the U.S., Australia or EU countries shift their migration enforcement responsibilities onto third countries – often in exchange for financial support, visa waivers or...

...over who crosses U.S. borders, it’s not for the courts to decide otherwise absent some very clear authorization. So “what law authorized the district court to order the government to bring petitioners to the United States and release them here?” Not the Due Process Clause, says the D.C. Circuit. Immigration cases have always held that the Constitution doesn’t extend to non-citizens held beyond the “sovereign territory” of the United States. (Never mind, I suppose, that Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene majority no longer thinks sovereignty is the touchstone for the extraterritorial extension...

...resolved under the customary international law of jurisdiction. The Lotus and the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction The starting point when considering whether territorial states may or may not delegate their prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction by treaty to an international court over nationals of non-consenting states is of course The Lotus. With respect to the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, Lotus stands for the principle that ‘what is not prohibited is permitted’ (a prohibitive rule). This rule does not apply to the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction as Lotus holds...

...statements therein made) to opine on whether the practice of extraterritorial self-defense against non-State actors absent consent of the territorial State was permitted or not by article 51 of the UNC. In prospecting for opinio juris a richer vein could not be found: States used legal justificatory discourse, expressed their own legal views, and weren’t coy on articulating what they thought was the definitive meaning, extent, and significance on the customary rules purportedly expanding (or not) self-defense. This seems to be the indicative of certainty about the articulation of legality...

...substantive legal grounds. To this end, the prohibition on the imposition of nationality may mandate non-recognition in particular instances of passportization. A valid grant of nationality requires the consent of the naturalized individual. Coercing someone into naturalizing vitiates their consent, rendering the resulting grant of nationality invalid. Therefore, where Russian forces directly coerced Ukrainians into applying for Russian passports, either by threatening them with violence or prohibitive administrative sanctions, the resulting grant of nationality is invalid. In arguing for blanket non-recognition, as opposed to the unlawfulness of individual instances, states...

...fundamental problems with how lower courts have approached these suits. These problems center on five key issues: First, whether the ATS applies extraterritorially – that is, whether a U.S. court can properly apply U.S. federal common law under the ATS to conduct that occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign State. Second, even if such a cause of action could properly be recognized, whether exhaustion of adequate and available local remedies in that foreign country should be a prerequisite to bringing an ATS suit. Third, whether corporations or other...

...critical when it comes to doctrines like “unwilling or unable,” because its actual adoption by states would open the floodgates to the extraterritorial (ie, sovereignty-infringing) use of force against non-state actors. There may well come a time when the “unwilling or unable” test reflects customary international law, but that time is not now. Two states do not a customary rule make, however powerful those states may be. And we cannot simply ignore the states in the Global South, however inconvenient powerful states in the Global North may find their views....