Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...control over territory. Furthermore, States must ensure their cyber capabilities and operations comply with existing international obligations, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and treaty commitments. The extraterritorial application of human rights obligations takes on new dimensions when State surveillance technologies can monitor individuals globally or when State cyber operations affect critical infrastructure providing essential services. In December 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the Eleven Norms of Responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. Although these norms are voluntary, they are based on international law obligations. However, it is concerning...

...long held (if, in my view, unfortunate) position that ICCPR doesn’t apply extraterritorially (which the report acknowledges), this seems a bit of a tough legal case to make. Beyond the trial situation (to which it seems CA3 would surely apply), as long as we’re choosing between legal regimes the United States officially rejects, why not pick APII, or API by analogy, as the more useful standard? Truly asking here. Responses to that question produced an interesting exchange on and off-line between Gabor Rona and Marty Lederman. With the relevant permission...

...aggression by Germany and Japan. Israel’s obligations in the law of occupation and international human rights law (applicable extraterritorially), which govern how it exercises its military authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, oblige it to secure public order and protect human rights. However, even if these obligations, especially those in occupation law (specifically, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, part of occupation law) can be understood as a general matter to encompass an obligation to use force in occupied territory to neutralize threats emanating from there to...

...international efforts focus primarily on preventing the effects of such threats, rather than on addressing the threats themselves or sanctioning them. There may be an implicit understanding that deviates from the stricter conclusions of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Specifically, the threat of force in response to the extrajudicial and extraterritorial killing of a high-ranking individual within domestic settings (even if they are considered leaders of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU) might be viewed as a proportionate...

...Chief Justice Roberts stated that ““[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices [to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application].” The argument here is that although “mere corporate presence” is not enough, corporations with other, deeper connections might displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. (Since the Court in other places explicitly stated it was not reaching the corporate liability question, I am skeptical of this argument). Second, and more persuasively, you might argue that because the Supreme Court dismissed...

...world states violate human rights, rule-of-law-abiding weapons manufacturers in the first world respond to the conscience of humanity by adhering to their extraterritorial human rights obligations (see, EU Criterion Two). However, when benevolent and civilised states commit atrocities, these actions are often dismissed as the unfortunate consequences of war. The suspension of arms trade is not even considered until the scale of the atrocities becomes too significant to ignore. When it’s raining bombs, trade becomes a passive factor against carnages and barbarisms of weapon-yielding entities, states or non-state entities or...

...Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to a natural law approach, with all the attendant problems associated therewith. I argue that: “The Court’s references to comparative experiences are best understood as objective signposts in the Court’s search for constitutional limits grounded in natural law…. If Glucksberg defines the objective limitations on substantive due process, Roper defines the objective limitations on cruel and unusual punishment. It prohibits excessive sanctions based on the “objective indicia of [a national] consensus” confirmed by “fundamental rights” affirmed by “other nations.”… The difference of course is that Glucksberg looks...

...or prosecute Americans’ and thereafter the US issued an Executive Order targeting senior personnel of the ICC, including the prosecutor herself, Fatou Bensouda, from The Gambia  with serious financial and travel sanctions.  One of the first acts of Mr. Khan upon becoming Prosecutor in 2021 was to “deprioritize” the investigation into American forces crimes and instead focus on the crimes allegedly committed by the Taliban and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province , an act seen in many places as capitulation to US pressure.  Reprising the US playbook, Russia has...

...and sanctions regimes — in relation to going further than them to actual armed intervention or not.) C. Recognition of belligerency in a civil war Perhaps the most interesting legal view on how one might undertake humanitarian intervention in Libya was that offered by international law professor Jordan Paust. He suggested that there might be a recognition of belligerency in a civil war, and that the US and others could recognize the belligerency as a legal matter and then side with the rebels as the legitimate legal government of Libya....

The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office has released some further details on its agreement with Congress to incorporate international labor standards into future U.S. free-trade agreements. Here are a couple important new institutional innovations. (1) Violations of international and local labor standards will apparently be subject to the same international dispute resolution mechanisms as the rest of the trade agreement. This is big: Panels will for the first time be empowered to determine violations of international labor standards and countries will be authorized to impose trade sanctions to punish violations. (2)...

...an unnamed senior leader in the context of arrest warrants being requested for Israeli leaders that “this court is built for Africa and for thugs like Putin.” Of course, the fact that the ICC ultimately did proceed to issue arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant demonstrates that occasionally the wheels of justice move forward even in the face of resistance from key players in the West. Doing so, however, can come with a heavy price for those involved (see here, here and here regarding US sanctions on ICC...

...veto on Syria. This prevented the referral of Syria to the ICC in May 2014 as well as the adoption of numerous resolutions calling for cease fires and delivery of humanitarian aid. On Myanmar, China’s threatened veto blocked not only a referral of Myanmar to the ICC, but even Security Council debate over an arms embargo and sanctions following the upsurge of the ethnic cleansing campaign there in August 2017. For Myanmar this has left the ICC, intended to be the centerpiece of a “system” of international justice, restricted to...