Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...control over territory. Furthermore, States must ensure their cyber capabilities and operations comply with existing international obligations, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and treaty commitments. The extraterritorial application of human rights obligations takes on new dimensions when State surveillance technologies can monitor individuals globally or when State cyber operations affect critical infrastructure providing essential services. In December 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the Eleven Norms of Responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. Although these norms are voluntary, they are based on international law obligations. However, it is concerning...

...long held (if, in my view, unfortunate) position that ICCPR doesn’t apply extraterritorially (which the report acknowledges), this seems a bit of a tough legal case to make. Beyond the trial situation (to which it seems CA3 would surely apply), as long as we’re choosing between legal regimes the United States officially rejects, why not pick APII, or API by analogy, as the more useful standard? Truly asking here. Responses to that question produced an interesting exchange on and off-line between Gabor Rona and Marty Lederman. With the relevant permission...

...aggression by Germany and Japan. Israel’s obligations in the law of occupation and international human rights law (applicable extraterritorially), which govern how it exercises its military authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, oblige it to secure public order and protect human rights. However, even if these obligations, especially those in occupation law (specifically, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, part of occupation law) can be understood as a general matter to encompass an obligation to use force in occupied territory to neutralize threats emanating from there to...

...international efforts focus primarily on preventing the effects of such threats, rather than on addressing the threats themselves or sanctioning them. There may be an implicit understanding that deviates from the stricter conclusions of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Specifically, the threat of force in response to the extrajudicial and extraterritorial killing of a high-ranking individual within domestic settings (even if they are considered leaders of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU) might be viewed as a proportionate...

...Chief Justice Roberts stated that ““[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices [to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application].” The argument here is that although “mere corporate presence” is not enough, corporations with other, deeper connections might displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. (Since the Court in other places explicitly stated it was not reaching the corporate liability question, I am skeptical of this argument). Second, and more persuasively, you might argue that because the Supreme Court dismissed...

...world states violate human rights, rule-of-law-abiding weapons manufacturers in the first world respond to the conscience of humanity by adhering to their extraterritorial human rights obligations (see, EU Criterion Two). However, when benevolent and civilised states commit atrocities, these actions are often dismissed as the unfortunate consequences of war. The suspension of arms trade is not even considered until the scale of the atrocities becomes too significant to ignore. When it’s raining bombs, trade becomes a passive factor against carnages and barbarisms of weapon-yielding entities, states or non-state entities or...

...Kingdom, defense minister Michael Fallon said on Tuesday, as he defended the killing of a British Islamic State fighter; Prime Minister Cameron told parliament on Monday that he had approved an air strike against a vehicle carrying a British jihadist in Syria who he said was plotting attacks against Britain. The European Commission announced a 500 million euro ($557 million) package of measures on Monday to provide relief for farmers stung by slumping prices, triggered partly by the loss of exports to Russia due to EU sanctions against the country....

...ultimately complement the existing legal order, and is therefore “unlikely to undo the rules, norms, and structures that exist today.” Yet China’s greater legal role arguably now enables rather than constrains incentives to carve out zones of non-law in the maritime domain that are insulated against legal sanctions. Increasing geolegal power manifests as pressure on states to accede to China’s will, including its preference to resolve disputes bilaterally rather than through legal institutions. In 2012 the Philippines deployed navel assets to protect the disputed Scarborough Shoal, which provoked Chinese economic...

The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office has released some further details on its agreement with Congress to incorporate international labor standards into future U.S. free-trade agreements. Here are a couple important new institutional innovations. (1) Violations of international and local labor standards will apparently be subject to the same international dispute resolution mechanisms as the rest of the trade agreement. This is big: Panels will for the first time be empowered to determine violations of international labor standards and countries will be authorized to impose trade sanctions to punish violations. (2)...

...an unnamed senior leader in the context of arrest warrants being requested for Israeli leaders that “this court is built for Africa and for thugs like Putin.” Of course, the fact that the ICC ultimately did proceed to issue arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant demonstrates that occasionally the wheels of justice move forward even in the face of resistance from key players in the West. Doing so, however, can come with a heavy price for those involved (see here, here and here regarding US sanctions on ICC...

...veto on Syria. This prevented the referral of Syria to the ICC in May 2014 as well as the adoption of numerous resolutions calling for cease fires and delivery of humanitarian aid. On Myanmar, China’s threatened veto blocked not only a referral of Myanmar to the ICC, but even Security Council debate over an arms embargo and sanctions following the upsurge of the ethnic cleansing campaign there in August 2017. For Myanmar this has left the ICC, intended to be the centerpiece of a “system” of international justice, restricted to...

...the First, Second, Third and Fourth Oxford Statements to clarify rules of international law applicable in the use of information and communications technologies; Noting that ransomware (i.e. malware designed to encrypt data and render it unavailable unless a demand is met) is a global threat, having been employed at an escalating pace by a growing number of malicious actors, including states and non-state groups for financial or political purposes, often connected to criminal and other unlawful activities such as terrorism, human and drug trafficking, money laundering, sanctions evasion, and the...