Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...the countries that offer near-universal healthcare. Cyprus has denied media reports that it had briefly arrested Iran’s foreign minister for violation of an EU travel ban when he arrived at Nicosia International Airport to meet with the Cypriot President. The US has granted exemptions to China and Singapore from financial sanctions over oil trade with Iran. The EU has signed a free trade agreement with Peru and Colombia. Following difficult negotiations, the eurozone leaders have agreed on a deal to bailout banks and develop a eurozone supervisory regime for banks,...

...vague. As we previously noted in HLP I, limiting the definition of the term “training” to the “imparting of skills” does not cure unconstitutional vagueness because, so defined, the term “training” could still be read to encompass speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment. For the foregoing reasons, we reject the government’s challenge and agree with the district court that the term “training” remains impermissibly vague because it “implicates, and potentially chills, Plaintiffs’ protected expressive activities and imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen years imprisonment without sufficiently defining...

...is a growing emphasis on the management of natural resources like oil, timber and diamonds. In Iraq, oil been a key issue in the constitutional debate; in many African countries it has been the source of increasingly sophisticated Security Council sanctions regimes that have resulted in market regulation schemes (which I will discuss in a forthcoming post). This emphasis on regulation is affecting the core content the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which many non-OECD countries have claimed is a jus cogens norm. Third, because economic development helps...

Russia is considering offering Western companies oil licenses in its Arctic waters. Reuters has an exclusive that the European Union is ready to ban imports of Iranian gas as a part of new sanctions in order to increase the pressure over the nuclear program in the Islamic Republic. A UN representative has told the Security Council there is little time to deal with rebels in the north of Mali and international assistance is needed. The European Union and several banks will stage a DDoS cyber-attack exercise in order to find...

...objectives are all valid and important. But is questionable whether they can be achieved best through a broadening of the options for military force. International law offers alternative paths to the use of force to achieve rationales, such as accountability, deterrence or sanctioning of jus in bello violations, i.e. preventive diplomacy, lawful countermeasures, international criminal justice, sanctions etc. Broadening the categories of the use of forces has trade-offs. It weakens these options and their underlying regimes (e.g. non-coercive and non-violent response measures under Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,...

...impacts would further complicate the adoption of some sort of IIS. Many executive branch activities with likely international impacts would be lodged in the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Defense, activity that has historically been sheltered from such administrative requirements as the EIS and the Administrative Procedure Act. There is something cognitively dissonant about the concept of an International Impact Statement for, say, sanctions on Iran or the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It’s even less likely that Congress would adopt a practice under which foreign stakeholder interests became...

...convinced. According to Professor Ku, nothing in the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act explicitly (or implicitly) authorize[s] the President to make an agreement with Iran that would go beyond the President’s existing constitutional powers to make sole-executive agreements or nonbinding political commitments.” This claim boldly ignores the Iran Act’s key operative provisions. The Act specifically defines “agreement” to include any accord with Iran “regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.” § 2610e(h)(1). It then authorizes the President to implement sanctions relief unless Congress enacts “a joint resolution stating...

...Conclusion President Trump represents an existential threat to the international legal order. In facing such challenges, small States–who lack the economic weight to exert countermeasures and reprisals against potential sanctions, as is the case of Panama– must resort to international law and multilateral diplomacy, particularly when dealing with threats against their own territorial integrity and political independence. In situations such as this, time is of the essence. Photo attribution: “ In the Panama Canal, 1994 ” from Family collection of Infrogmation of New Orleans is licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0...

...the request of President Assad. Although several states criticized this decision, none deemed it unlawful (160). Libya offers a similar example, where the Gaddafi government’s repressive and violent response to Arab Spring protests led the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions and refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Like with Syria, numerous states concluded that the Gaddafi government was no longer legitimate and had lost the consent of the Libyan people. And like the SOC in Syria, several governments recognized the National Transitional Council as the true representative...

...the panels left the interpretation of the term “essential security interests” open so as to accommodate various interests of the Members. However, the reliance on Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT would require an occurrence of an extreme form of deterioration of international relations. Certainly, this degree of gravity in international relations will be rarely met. Hence, this interpretation of the security exceptions significantly curtails the policy space for the WTO Members to impose trade-restrictive measures in the form of targeted unilateral sanctions or tit-for-tat measures under the aegis of Article XXI(b)(iii) GATT....

...however, these doctrines were expressions or applications of the broader concept of self-preservation, which Verdebout admits, was recognized as a fundamental right of states. To Verdebout, this confirms the core claim of the book, which is that pre-1914 international law was not indifferent towards the question of the use of force. For instance, on pages 204-205, Verdebout notes that in all the cases of intervention surveyed in her book, the use of force was “presented as sanctions of law – i.e., as the exercise of the right of self-preservation.” This,...

...obligations have direct relevance (see discussion Chapter 4.3.6.1) especially in light of the double veto by China and Russia of a resolution that would have condemned the crimes being committed in Myanmar (draft resolution S/2007/14).  Chapter 5.2 additionally discusses how veto threats in the face of alleged genocide, as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Darfur weakened the sanctions regime and weakened and delayed peacekeeping.  The vetoes and veto threats in both these situations appear the exact opposite of adhering to the due diligence obligation to “prevent”...