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Search: extraterritorial sanctions

28 Sep

...as special adviser on public international law for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. That court, as is well known, has issued indictments against high level officials of the government of Sudan, including its chief of state. The Security Council has, to date, ducked all pleas by the ICC Prosecutor to assist the Court in enforcing these indictments, even though the Council could easily do so under its Chapter VII authority, including its existing sanctions regime for the Sudan under Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005). What would TWAILERs’ advice...
28.09.10 | |

27 Mar

...term (p. 282). The books states that sanctions are measured by “substantially equivalent” trade concessions (p. 283), but does not explain where the term “substantially” comes from as it is not a term from the treaty or the jurisprudence. In addition, the book posits that the WTO dispute system provides gap fillers for an incomplete bargain that approximate what WTO members would have negotiated had they been able to address the contingency in the treaty text (p. 284). But the book fails to note that the WTO judges do not...
27.03.13 | |

28 Sep

...of a regime of classified information that is at once far too sweeping but, for precisely that reason, largely incapable of having the teeth necessary to keep secrets. It is a classification regime that serves as nip for the cat, and a marker of access rather than a lockbox for necessary secrets. A better system – not likely in our lifetimes, presumably – would be far less ability to classify things, including a classification system clearly tied to a range of sanctions from loss of job to prison. But the...
28.09.10 | |

20 Nov

[Piet Eeckhout is a Professor at University College London and a leading authority in EU Law and international economic law. He notes that he has been involved in the Kadi litigation on the side of Sheikh Kadi.] Devika Hovell’s paper is an excellent attempt at conceptualising the relationship between the domestic judge and the UN Security Council (UNSC). That relationship has come about as a consequence of the UNSC’s smart sanctions policies, which intrude in the daily lives of those which are subject to them. Most of the significant case...
20.11.13 | |

22 Nov

[Mona Ali Khalil is an internationally recognized public international lawyer with 25 years of UN and other experience dealing with the rule of law and international peace and security efforts including peacekeeping, sanctions, disarmament and counterterrorism.] In the face of a veto by any permanent member of the UN Security Council blocking enforcement action against the mass atrocities in Palestine, Myanmar, Syria and Yemen and elsewhere, is the international community helpless to help – failing to fulfill its responsibility to protect? Proponents of the use of force for purposes of...
22.11.18 | |

17 Oct

South Sudan’s Parliament has ratified a border and oil deal with Sudan, which includes a demilitarized zone between the two states. The EU has placed new sanctions on Iranian oil, gas and tanker companies, the effects of which Iran calls futile. In related news, A NYTimes article describes the impact of European sanctions on Iran’s ability to keep the money printing presses going. Invoking humanitarian reasons, the UK government has blocked the extradition of Gary McKinnon to the United States where he is wanted for hacking into military computers in...
17.10.12 | |

14 Jun

...what might satisfy this due diligence obligation. Dormann and Serralvo offer examples of states enforcing sanctions against other states not in compliance (an approach that might also arguably be applied to nonstate actors), or the panoply of regulations and restrictions attached to arms export. Domestic and international frameworks governing arms export, trade, and assistance tend to be at least partly motivated by the responsibilities invoked under Common article 1 as well as other treaty obligations to prevent weapons transfers that might contribute to serious violations of IHL or human rights...
14.06.21 | |

29 Sep

...the IAEA refused to recognize in 1982 the credentials of Israeli delegates in the aftermath of the raid on the Osiraq reactor; Myanmar was deprived of ILO technical cooperation in 1999 as a result of its practice of forced labor; the OAS suspended Cuba from membership in 1962; Egypt was suspended from the Organization from the Islamic Conference in 1979. (These examples are cited as the kind of countermeasures anticipated by the ILC’s articles by Frédéric Dopagne, “Sanctions and Countermeasures by International Organizations: diverging Lessons for the Idea of Autonomy,”...
29.09.10 | |

21 Mar

...a matter of intense bilateral concern. When President Barack Obama and Argentine President Christine Fernandez met for the first time in November 2011, the two heads of state spent the majority of their time discussing Argentina’s obligation to pay the arbitration awards, and the consequences that would flow from its failure to do so. The United States is clearly calculating that such trade sanctions will alter Argentina’s cost-benefit analysis. Buenos Aires is set to pay approximately $18 million annually in increased duties as a result of the GSP suspension, far...
21.03.14 | |

18 Apr

...dispute between China and the Philippines? And why exactly wouldn’t this cause a trade war with China and why wouldn’t it violate the WTO Agreement? And when exactly did the International Court of Justice get involved given that China has not consented to that court’s compulsory jurisdiction? Not only is this not a plausible mechanism for sanctions against China (the world’s second largest economy), but it is not a plausible mechanism for sanctions against almost any country in the world. It has never been done before outside of the trade...
18.04.16 | |

14 Jun

...joint report, “Regulating Irregular Actors: Can Due Diligence Checks Mitigate the Risks of Working with Nonstate and Substate Forces?” The study explores due diligence and risk mitigation mechanisms in seven US partnerships with nonstate or substate armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (from 2009 to the present), including provision of training, regular monitoring, establishing rules and standards, threatening or applying sanctions, and other mechanisms. There are a few important caveats to make up-front. Despite their legal-esque tenor, most of these measures were adopted by the US on a policy...
14.06.21 | |

20 Jan

...producing changes in state behavior. For example, states may not trust information produced by other states or international institutions. Epistemic institutions can take steps to increase the perceived legitimacy of information, but in some instances credible commitments may be more effective. Second, even with improved information, states may still lack an incentive to coordinate their behavior in the absence of the threat of sanctions. Certain public goods problems, like fisheries, raise this issue. Knowing what constitutes a sustainable fish catch does not by itself provide an incentive for a state...
20.01.15 | |