Search: extraterritorial sanctions

Distracted by #ComeyDay and other international crises, I missed this recent U.S. federal court decision in Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, dismissing an Alien Tort Statute lawsuit on Kiobel extra-territoriality grounds. While using unusually critical language to denounce U.S. pastor-defendant Scott Lively’s involvement in Uganda’s anti-homosexual laws and actions, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts held: …Defendant’s status as an American citizen and his physical presence in the United States is clearly not enough under controlling authority to support ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction. The sporadic trail of emails sent by...

If someone sexually assaults a woman in Canadian territorial waters, where would you expect that person to be prosecuted? Why, in Alaska of course. Earlier this week the Alaska Supreme Court rendered an unusual decision in State v. Jack addressing the question of whether a state criminal statute against sexual assault could be applied extraterritorially to prosecute someone who committed the act in the territorial waters of Canada. I’m all in favor of prosecuting persons who commit sexual crimes in Canadian territorial waters. But the question is, by whom and...

...(para. 432). An Extraterritorial Duty It should be noted that the duty to take measures to prevent genocide, as an erga omnes obligation, is an extraterritorial task that exists regardless of territory or a specific link to the state in question. Therefore, all states party to the Genocide Convention, which also have influence on Israel through political and economic connections, have a well-established duty to prevent the commission of genocide in Gaza. One may argue that the current situation in Gaza does not definitively constitute the crime of genocide. However,...

...and requests rejected by the Commission (and its gargantuan workload) by sheer virtue of more readily available knowledge and less room for educated guesswork among its users. A few weeks ago, a scholar and practitioner I greatly admire (and whose knowledge of international law is exceptional) expressed their doubts as to the reasons why a petition against the US at the IACHR had being rejected. The petition itself -from what was disclosed- had to do with claimed responsibility for extraterritorial violation of human rights as a consequence of military/law-enforcement activities...

...and seek justice. However, to open the Cause, Argentina had to resolve several preliminary issues: the characterization of the crimes, the prevalence of Spanish courts’ jurisdiction, and the possibility to prosecute the crimes according to domestic law. In this regard, Argentina stated that the facts constituted international crimes covered by the principle of universal jurisdiction. It established that no investigation was being carried out in Spain for the same facts or crimes; thus, other countries could prosecute those responsible. It explained the need for extraterritorial jurisdiction, referring to the obligations...

...breakaway region of South Ossetia in August 2008 (More on the facts here). Even though the Court found numerous violations of human rights committed by Russia after the cessation of active hostilities and signing of a ceasefire agreement on 12 August (the right to life, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to property and housing rights, the right to liberty and the freedom of movement), the judgment has been criticised (e.g. here and here) due to the Court’s determination that Russian Federation did not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction during...

...public ethic of that community. As Howse and Langille put it, “public morals” may be justified either as “instrumental regulation designed to counter certain social ills, or as expressive regulation designed to express or give force to intrinsic moral intuitions or shared values.” The fact that there is not universal concern for seal welfare, or that Canada and Norway do not share EU’s concerns, is irrelevant for WTO purposes. Second, the public moral concerns may derive from conduct that is wholly extraterritorial to the Member State. Under this reasoning, a...

...States does not accept the extraterritorial application of the canonical human rights treaties with respect to its own conduct and those of its agents outside of the territorial United States, so from the US point of view, that distinction is legally neither here nor there. In order to give the geographical distinction content, Koh’s argument says not that human rights law applies with respect to the US, but instead that the requirements of self-defense independently require an imminence of threat analysis even within an armed conflict that includes AQAP as...

...to substantive criminal law. Contrast what it says about the principal/accessory distinction with what it says about extraterritoriality as an aggravating factor, which the defence (correctly) alleged in its appeal brief lacks any foundation whatsoever in customary international law (and has never been applied by any international tribunal): The Appeals Chamber considers that it was unnecessary for the Trial Chamber to refer to public international law in order to take into consideration the extraterritorial nature and consequences of Taylor‘s acts and conduct. The Appeals Chamber accepts the Trial Chamber‘s finding...

...is the most obvious: pursuing criminal prosecutions or civil tort suits against contractors who commit abuses. With regard to criminal prosecution, our current system of enforcement is seriously flawed in a number of respects. To begin with, there are gaps in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), the primary law that gives U.S. courts the power to try contractors when they are accused of committing serious abuses. That statute does not clearly govern contractors who work for agencies other than the Defense Department, such as the State Department contractors involved...

...which it is not really dead-on, however, though sometimes referenced in relation to it. Reid is the question of the extraterritorial application of the US Constitution, and whether a civilian US citizen lawfully present on a US military base in time of peace, with a SOFA in operation (ie, 1950s Germany), is entitled to a regular US civilian trial with all Constitutional protections in a capital murder case rather than trial in military court under the UCMJ – answer, yes. But, if that’s Reid, what about a US citizen who...

[Tomas Hamilton is an Assistant Professor in International Criminal Law at the University of Amsterdam. Marina Aksenova is an Assistant Professor in International and Comparative Criminal Law at IE University in Madrid.] In the ongoing civil suits in Mexico v Smith & Wesson & others and Mexico v Diamondback Shooting Sports Inc. et al, the Mexican government has brought claims against US gun manufacturers in Massachusetts and gun dealers in Arizona for extraterritorial harms suffered by the Mexican State in the context of cartel violence. The US district court judge...