Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...system has collapsed. Lawyers, judges and prosecutors are also prime targets of militias. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has a mandate to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Libya yet the prosecutor has issued only one arrest warrant since 2011: against Mahmoud el-Werfalli, a commander linked to the LNA, for extrajudicial executions. The UN sanctions have been underused: only eight people have been listed for individual targeted sanctions since the 2011 revolution, including two militia commanders and six people involved in trafficking. Attempts to...

...either had to seek changes to the tax code or face sanctions through the WTO system. The President (and Congress) chose to change the tax code. The cost of non-compliance—trade sanctions with potentially significant economic effects—outweighed the cost of compliance—some companies being upset. These are the “hard cases” when it comes to compliance with international law because the mode of reasoning and decision-making is not primarily legal, but political (or diplomatic). In this form of decision making, the question of compliance is driven by an analysis of power: which is...

...be a UN-mandated force under OSCE guidance, or a force with a delegated UN mandate supervised by the Group of Supporting States. Should any side resume the conflict, an arrangement for the automatic snap-back of sanctions could be constructed. While this might be difficult to accept for the Russian Federation, Ukraine and its allies could insist that the UN Security Council Resolution that would endorse the settlement under Chapter VII provides for sanctions that would be brought into force automatically, and universally, should a further armed attack occur. As confirmed...

The Brits are looking to strip Asma al-Assad of her UK citizenship, this in the wake of the imposition of various sanctions on her and family members of other Assad associates. Familial sanctions are an increasingly common practice, on the theory that you really get at the bad guys when you deprive their spouses of shopping trips to world capitals. (In Mrs. Assad’s case, the theory seems pretty plausible, in light of the recent email cache revealing her attention to trivial luxury purchases while Homs burned.) But so long as...

...State responsibility norms to cover an extensive range of accountability mechanisms at the international and domestic level. International Criminal Justice may potentially benefit from the conceptualisation of a duty to end impunity lying with the States and associated with appropriate consequences for the failure to fulfil this duty. It is important to note that this obligation may not only fall upon the States. The Security Council may also have an impact on ending impunity through targeted sanctions and other accountability measures. Due to the limited length of this post, this...

...Oil for Food scandal for the institution’s long-term survival. Petty corruption is one thing, but petty corruption that directly undermines the U.N.’s administration of sanctions against Iraq is quite another. If the U.N. cannot effectively administer sanctions against Iraq without succumbing to rather easy and blatant corruption by an unsavory figure like Saddam Hussein, it is hard to see why the “international community” should “trust” the U.N. to deal effectively with other serious threats to international peace and security. It is also hard to see why, for instance, the U.N.’s...

[William S. Dodge is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. One of his articles on extraterritoriality was cited in Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion.] There is no doubt that Morrison v. National Australia Bank is a landmark opinion, not just because the Supreme Court addresses here, for the first time, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities law, but also for what the opinion tells us more generally about the presumption against extraterritoriality. As Margaret Sachs has already recounted, the Courts of Appeals, under...

...extraterritorial jurisdiction over many of these individuals or many of their activities." If these individuals did in fact violate the law of war, which is the predicate for a legitimate exercise of jurisdiction by a military commission of the type established by the President, then doesn't the War Crimes Act establish the requisite "extraterritorial" jurisdiction for trial in Federal Court? I recognize that there may be other pragmatic arguments in favor of trial by military commission, but the jurisdictional predicate for use of the War Crimes Act or trial by...

...in his seminal War, Aggression and Self-Defence, at least in the context of international armed conflict. So here are my questions: [1] Does anyone know where the US might have defended/explained its position at more length, whether in a legal brief or elsewhere? [2] Does anyone know of scholars other than Dinstein who take the position that once a state acts in self-defence, none of its (extraterritorial) acts in the resulting armed conflict are subject to the jus ad bellum? Any suggestions or citations from readers would be most appreciated....

...vague), then I’m not sure I have any categorical objections (though the devil will be in the details). In all events, the CCR view that somehow this kind of detention is not already authorized by law, and is in some way historically novel – that view is, I believe, wrong. And if litigated, I believe it will lose. The other examples are more complicated. What about the guy who “received extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps”? Receiving training at a terrorist camp is now a crime (with extraterritorial...

...action under humanitarian law would remain unrestricted. It is likely that cases in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law might prove to be important will more and more frequent. For example, the Al-Skeini case, which deals with the extraterritorial application of the ECHR in Iraq, is currently pending before the UK House of Lords. The most enduring quality of the Targeted Killings judgment might actually be that it shows how the relationship between these two branches of international law can be a two-way street, and how...

...members be prosecuted for intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population because “intentionally” includes lower mental states such as dolus eventualis or recklessness? I worry about this argument. And here’s why. If intent = recklessness, then all cases of legitimate collateral damage would count as violations of the principle of distinction, because in collateral damage cases the attacker kills the civilians with knowledge that the civilians will die. And the rule against disproportionate attacks sanctions this behavior as long as the collateral damage is not disproportionate and the attack...