Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...least to me. States do not generally assert a right to self-defense in certain circumstances out of "a sense of legal obligation." Now, I suppose a state might assert an obligation, perhaps a "responsibility to protect" its citizens from unlawful and unjustified harm emanating from an extraterritorial location...but that hasn't clearly happened, at least not yet. Ashley's article, and others, have noted a historically common state practice that is consistent with first principles of international law -- first principles that underlie the neutrality law of armed conflict and even the...

...I think it will be interesting to see how US arguments in opposition to Spanish jurisdiction will affect the interpretation and application of the US Extraterritorial Torture Statute (recently invoked to convict Chuckie Taylor). Greg Fox Can Mathias (or anyone else) provide a link to the complaint itself? Thanks much. Anthony Colangelo Greg, the complaint translated from Spanish to English via Google is available on-line here. Mary, as for the impact of this case on the Chuckie Taylor prosecution and other cases of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, I agree that it...

...be since the discussion was all over the map. Anthony Colangelo I recently published an article in the Virginia Law Review that address in large part the ATS and extraterritoriality, entitled A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1019 (fall 2011). I suspect the issue has taken on new significance in light of the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Morrison v. Nat'l Aust. Bank revitalizing the presumption against extraterritoriality. In the article, I argued that if ATS suits apply extant international law, the presumption should not apply. Rather,...

...authority. But there is absolutely nothing of which I am aware that limits Congress's constitutional authority to sanction extraterritorial acts that violate international law. Territorial acts more clearly depend upon the relationship and congruity of any applicable international and constitutional limitations on Congress's powers. Furthermore, it is debatable whether fundamental law of war principles require an attacker to meet formal IHL requirements for prisoner of war status and the combatant's privilege. On that point, I note that the perfidy prohibition is stated by some---incuding European experts and scholars that I...

...what otherwise (if engaged in by combatants) would have been lawful acts of war -- but such targetableness (word?) and lack of immunity do not create war crime responsibility. The lack of immunity is with respect to prosecution for any applicable domestic law (e.g., an extraterritorial U.S. federal statute that can apply because of compliance with one of four principles of jurisdiction under international law (like objective territorial, protective). After Hudson & Goodwin, there is no relevant federal "common law," much less some extraterritorial federal common law even if a...

...the government puts its imprimatur upon a killing, it becomes lawful, and cannot be murder and cannot be prosecuted under 1119. Kevin Jon Heller Greg, "Unlawful" refers to a killing that is neither justified nor excused, so the analysis is exactly the same. The torture analogy actually supports my argument, because the definition of torture in 18 USC 2340(1) specifically provides that "pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions" cannot qualify. If "lawful sanctions" meant nothing more than the government approved the pain or suffering, the statute would be a...

...use of force to the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and then expanded it to the enforcement of economic sanctions and of a no-fly zone. Later it included the use of force in defence of 'certain safe areas', which led to significant air strikes in 1995. In 1994, another large-scale use of force was authorized in order to ensure the return of the elected president to Haiti after economic sanctions and a maritime blockade had proved unsuccessful…towards the end of the 1990s, the SC again came to authorize...

Liz The term "collective punishment" doesn't usually apply to sanctions or blockades. For instance, I don't recall anyone claiming the sanctions on South Africa were 'collective punishment'. New term for a new era or does it selectively apply to Israel only? right. 2 Liz South Africa may have been under a blockade, but Gaza is under military siege, if not military occupation. There's a huge difference. Ali The sanctions against South Africa were not meant against the civilian population, where as Israel is actually intending to deprive the Palestinian population...

...sold parts of a chemical or biological weapon to a state-financed terrorist group such as al-Qaeda. The principle, however, is exactly the same. The principle isn't the same, in that the federal government made it illegal to do business with Al Qaeda, but not with the South African government at the time. As for what we "really want," do we "really want" 12 random jurors, rather than Congress, to decide whether to impose sanctions on a foreign government? Because the upshot of this decision is that a federal jury would...

...part of its obligations under UN Charter Article 56, point to the UN's own obligation to "promote...respect for...human rights," and then argue that these obligations take precedence over the US's own obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement. That's the winning argument, right? Wow. Jordan The U.S. permits some civil sanctions against human rights violators in its courts and there is no S/L in customary international law. I see no reason why a visa denial could not be a proper sanction response even if other sanctions might be more onerous. Tyler...

...that -- I haven't studied the history closely). I'm not aware of an example where the Clinton Administration took that view, although, again, I'm hardly familiar with every case where it might have come up. To clarify: Of course it is the case (and the Clinton Administration said so) that certain treaties do not establish binding rules of conduct (e.g., criminal sanctions) for private parties without further statutory or regulatory action. But the question in this case is whether the treaty imposes an obligation on the Executive branch itself (and,...

...again leaves international law at the mercy of powerful states. Why is it that the US, the EU, and Japan have been able to refuse to lift subsidies to their domestic industries in clear violation of WTO law? Because the aggrieved states are not powerful enough to impose retaliatory sanctions that would damage the violators sufficiently and make them change their ways. The US and EU are content to offer each other side payments so as to carry on with their patterns of subsidies, but when Cambodia or Mali wants...