Search: crossing lines

...“use of force” under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the need to interpret it in tandem with recent ecological violations. Although, there is a dearth of scholarship arguing on similar lines, the imminency of the issue cannot be over-emphasised. The need for a robust framework including state liability in cases of ecocide is imperative, otherwise the biggest perpetrators of ecological destruction i.e. nation states will go unpunished. As the climate crisis deepens and states continue to deploy environmental destruction as a weapon of war, the existing legal architecture,...

...even as planetary systems destabilise materially. This dynamic points to a deeper problem. Consent-based governance assumes that states can meaningfully choose the level of risk they are willing to accept. Climate change demonstrates that ecological risk is not divisible along national lines – one state’s lawful development choices may irreversibly undermine another’s physical survival. When rising sea levels threaten the very existence of some states, the notion that all parties are equal risk-bearers becomes both morally and analytically untenable. In this sense, climate change exposes the limits of sovereignty as...

...really emerged several decades later. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 6 (2010) (arguing that 1970s were the key period). We ourselves have no particular expertise in this area, but our emphasis on reciprocal interaction between the national and international levels of law-making provides evidence that might be deployed in sorting out these claims. Roberts helpfully suggests new lines of inquiry in which quantitative analysis can help to play a role. One might, he notes, apply our survey methodology to the various proposals articulated in the 1930s...

...But even after this admission, this report suggests Texas has changed its position and will contest the authority of the President to order it to comply with the ICJ order. According to its spokesman, [Texas] respectfully believe[s] the executive determination exceeds the constitutional bounds for federal authority. The State of Texas believes no international court supersedes the laws of Texas or the laws of the United States. This statement (thanks to Carlos Vazquez for the heads up) suggests two lines of resistance (further suggested by Lederman’s pointer): (1) that the...

...pose to U.S. foreign relations), while leaving open other potential applications of the ATS, such as to U.S. citizens and corporations (for which the United States may have some responsibility) and to foreign citizens residing in the United States (on the ground that the United States has an interest in not being a haven to human rights abusers). Although it is hazardous to make any predictions from oral argument, a number of the Justices during the reargument in Kiobel appeared to be searching for an intermediate approach along these lines....

...It is evident, from these lines, that Marshall (and the rest of the Court) were caught in the middle of an extremely delicate situation. A situation in which they justify the legal title acquired with conquest and, at the same time, recognise conquest as an inevitable fact which (even if they wanted) they would have had no competence to declare illegitimate. Taking into account the role of the Supreme Court in shaping US history, a different ruling could have had the potential to undermine the legal validity not only of...

...in special subject areas such as human rights or international trade, how to deal with time factors, whether particular considerations arise if international organisations are involved, whether there is a useful potential crossover from the originalist/constructionist debate in constitutional interpretation, and whether an evolutionary method of interpretation forms a distinct approach. The Guide takes up some of these issues but much of its consideration of the topic is set in the context of the VCLT provisions. Perhaps now is a good opportunity to take stock of new lines of investigation....

...the presumption to restrict ATS claims, then, it would have to introduce a new wrinkle or two. It could say that it applies to jurisdictional statutes (or at least to this one), or it could adopt the presumption as a prudential rule suitable for common-law claims. Once it found a basis for using the presumption, it could say that the presumption is overcome for the high seas but not for foreign territory, along the lines of the Kavanaugh dissent in Doe VIII. In itself, such an outcome wouldn’t be all...

...order and seeks ‘hard guarantees in the form of legal norms that protect the interests of the different actors’ as well as hierarchies with clear lines of authority. Otherwise, the necessary support for international cooperation would be undermined. De Boer is in good company here – not only in that of the many constitutionalists populating the field today, but also of those pluralists who, afraid of the potentially radical implications of their idea, opt for some ultimate relief through a common legal frame. Such a frame is indeed immensely appealing...

...to the concern that customary international law is anti-democratic: Indeed, customary international law bears the hallmark of democratic legitimacy. The U.S. is a key participant in the consensus-building process inherent in the creation of customary norms. Thus, these legal norms are fashioned with the input of U.S. elected and appointed officials, who represent and answer to their constituents at home. As Dean Koh acknowledges, Congress may override a customary international law norm where Congress’s intent is clear, thereby addressing any concern regarding democratic oversight. Across party lines, the Executive Branch...

...law (set out in Section 11.9.2) are also virtually identical to the 1956 version (§369): The Occupying Power may subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions: (1) that are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the GC; (2) to maintain the orderly government of the territory; and (3) to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. The Manual then lists...

...foundational principle of the international legal order. The authors skillfully point to the substantive values which are involved in the rule of law when adapting its content to the field of international peace and security: compliance, transparency, and accountability of international decision-making. These values, which constitute the qualities required for a normative order to be stable, certain and predictable, are therefore essential to the consolidation of the international community. Both formally and substantially, the rule of law encompasses authoritative guidelines to limit the discretion of the authorities who are called...