Search: battlefield robots

...are prominently platformed because they are “the ones applying IHL during real-life battlefield situations”. Centering operational considerations is what is considered necessary to ensure that the legal analysis is not “divorced from what is happening on the ground”. The perspectives of those at the receiving end of bombs, bullets, or exploding pagers are immaterial for a legal analysis that aims to be realistic. At best, the experiences and losses of war victims are a tragic reality that needs to be accepted as inevitable, without being seriously reckoned with or examined...

...“He should remove himself when there is a reasonable doubt of his impartiality,” said Father Robert Drinan, a professor of law at Georgetown University and long-standing human rights campaigner, who teaches judicial ethics. “It should logically be a reason for his recusal but I don’t think he’ll do it … he’s so stubborn” said Drinan. Scalia is also reported as saying: “If he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is where he belongs. I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son,...

...may be held accountable for their actions.) Chemical weapons on the other hand are entirely indiscriminate. It is simply not possible, particularly in an urban environment like the suburbs of Damascus, to use them in a way that is by any standard legal. Further, the risk that the Syrian battlefield may turn into one where chemical weapons in a region that is already incredibly unstable from sectarian rivalries, the fallout of the Arab Spring and, yes, the 2003 intervention in Iraq, raises very real security concerns. Is having open chemical...

...coalition has participated. While by no means diminishing what ANZAC day means to Australia and New Zealand, all countries have their holidays commemorating wartime service and sacrifice. But what makes ANZAC day so compelling to me is how the relationship between former battlefield enemies has evolved. Flash forward from the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign to 1934. Attaturk, President of Turkey, purportedly authored a tribute to the ANZACS who fought, and died, in Turkey: Those heroes that shed blood and lost their lives…. you are now lying in the soil of a...

...objection that drone strikes away from a battlefield constitute unlawful extrajudicial killing. Not so, Koh replies—a state “that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defence is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force.” The suggestion here is that a state that is the subject of sustained threat from an armed group may use lethal force when necessary to defend the lives of its citizens, even outside the context of a recognisable armed conflict. And furthermore that this right of...

...war. But Mr. Warsame was not picked up on any recognized battlefield. The administration claims continuing authority for military detention, interrogation and trial. This applies not just to battlefield detentions, where it is often appropriate, but to detentions anywhere, and not just to personal involvement in violent attacks, but to a broad range of offenses directly or indirectly related to terrorism. That is far too broad a claim. This paragraph is absolutely correct. The US and al-Qaeda are not engaged in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Somalia, nor is...

...careful to distinguish between the promotional visions of these companies and the actual deployment of new military AI tools on the battlefield, the overall direction is clear: towards more datafication, automation, and the further systematization of killing in warfare. The software provided by companies such as Anduril, Palantir, and Scale AI – or developed in collaboration with them – is thereby crucial as they offer the broader infrastructure for collecting, fusing, and analyzing data and making it actionable. These tools, in turn, embed and fixate ideas of perfect knowledge, a...

...that: (1) the Scorpions Unit was deployed in Trnovo from late June through at least the end of July 1995; (2) on 1 July 1995, Borovcanin reported on activities on the Trnovo battlefield, including on an attack involving the Scorpions Unit; (3) Borovcanin was in Trnovo on the Sarajevo front until he was resubordinated on 10 July 1995; (4) a mixed company of joint Republic of Serbian Krajina (“RSK”), Serbian and RS MUP forces was among the units under Borovcanin’s command when he was resubordinated and that during the night...

...interpretations, and value judgments into their hardware, software, and user interfaces.” These embedded decisions shape how a tool will operate under battlefield conditions—and, more troublingly, whether it can be audited or constrained when it veers off course. If, as Rebecca Crootof and BJ Ard have suggested, technology “regulates through its ‘architecture’,” then the Code must shift upstream. It should impose obligations not merely on how technologies are used, but how they are conceived, developed, and trained throughout the lifecycle of a product or service. The existing text already offers a...

...this sense, possible interferences with privacy rights should also be part of the “legal review” Article 36 AP I requires for the introduction of new weapons, means, or methods of warfare. ERT could be considered as an equipment/system ‘used to facilitate military operations’ – i.e. a means of warfare, whose compatibility with ‘any […] rule of international law’ has to be verified. However, leaving aside these issues for a moment, other reasons could instead justify the deployment of ERT on the battlefield. As suggested by cinematographic advertising videos on advanced...

...version of this Hoover Institution article on the evolution of the debate over whether there is a “legal geography of war.” I extended it a bit to cover the latest twist in the debate, noted by Charlie Savage in his New York Times coverage. This is the internal debate between State and Defense lawyers over whether there is a legal notion of a “hot battlefield,” outside of which not even members of “associated forces,” such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that are belligerent with respect to the United...

...stake (say, protecting the interest of regional stability), and so long as the strikes were limited in scope and duration (i.e. less than “war”), all of these actions could be said to fall within the scope of Article II, whether defense of battlefield allies was among the expressly named interests or not. Yet there are at least three ways in which this ‘third party defense’ notion may be said to go beyond even the broad 2011 OLC conception of presidential power: (1) I am not aware of any previous practice...