Search: battlefield robots

...crafting and implementing AI strategies for battlefield use and beyond, and the ICRC is right to include AI and machine learning for use in armed conflict as a key challenge in our contemporary landscape. Those states that have published specific military AI strategies, such as France or the US, typically stress two aspects from the outset: first, that AI is set to change the way wars are fought in a significant manner, and second, that AI will yield tremendous benefits to military organisations across a range of domains, such that...

...as they are for local, tactical, battlefield use to shred opposing infantry) at villages with large concentrations of the wrong ethnicity, in order to drive them out. On the Abkhaz side, the Russians had supplied plenty of clandestine fighters. We met some of them staying in the Abhaz capital – they described themselves as ex-KGB, which is to say, they had gone out of formal government service and were being paid as private contractors, in dollars into foreign bank accounts. They called themselves defenders of the ethnic-Russian villages in Abkhazia,...

...“He should remove himself when there is a reasonable doubt of his impartiality,” said Father Robert Drinan, a professor of law at Georgetown University and long-standing human rights campaigner, who teaches judicial ethics. “It should logically be a reason for his recusal but I don’t think he’ll do it … he’s so stubborn” said Drinan. Scalia is also reported as saying: “If he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is where he belongs. I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son,...

...stake (say, protecting the interest of regional stability), and so long as the strikes were limited in scope and duration (i.e. less than “war”), all of these actions could be said to fall within the scope of Article II, whether defense of battlefield allies was among the expressly named interests or not. Yet there are at least three ways in which this ‘third party defense’ notion may be said to go beyond even the broad 2011 OLC conception of presidential power: (1) I am not aware of any previous practice...

...coalition has participated. While by no means diminishing what ANZAC day means to Australia and New Zealand, all countries have their holidays commemorating wartime service and sacrifice. But what makes ANZAC day so compelling to me is how the relationship between former battlefield enemies has evolved. Flash forward from the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign to 1934. Attaturk, President of Turkey, purportedly authored a tribute to the ANZACS who fought, and died, in Turkey: Those heroes that shed blood and lost their lives…. you are now lying in the soil of a...

...version of this Hoover Institution article on the evolution of the debate over whether there is a “legal geography of war.” I extended it a bit to cover the latest twist in the debate, noted by Charlie Savage in his New York Times coverage. This is the internal debate between State and Defense lawyers over whether there is a legal notion of a “hot battlefield,” outside of which not even members of “associated forces,” such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that are belligerent with respect to the United...

...of a prohibited use of force. This distinction is central to assessing the legal consequences of alleged Ethiopian support to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. Even absent direct battlefield control, structured military training provided to an armed group fighting a foreign government may fall within the scope of prohibited intervention. Even if structured military training were to cross the threshold into a prohibited use of force, the further question arises whether it would amount to an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the...

...this sense, possible interferences with privacy rights should also be part of the “legal review” Article 36 AP I requires for the introduction of new weapons, means, or methods of warfare. ERT could be considered as an equipment/system ‘used to facilitate military operations’ – i.e. a means of warfare, whose compatibility with ‘any […] rule of international law’ has to be verified. However, leaving aside these issues for a moment, other reasons could instead justify the deployment of ERT on the battlefield. As suggested by cinematographic advertising videos on advanced...

...that international companies are complicit in an ‘economy of genocide’, including the provision of cloud services to the IDF for use in Gaza by Microsoft, Amazon Web Services and Google, as well as Palantir, which is involved in providing Artificial Intelligence Platform for real-time battlefield data integration in predictive identification of Palestinians to be detained. Lawfulness of Targeting Data Centres Concern over digital spaces in IHL have traditionally been explored in relation to cyberwarfare and hacking. Indeed the Tallinn manuals have made great strides to consider the application of IHL...

...interpretations, and value judgments into their hardware, software, and user interfaces.” These embedded decisions shape how a tool will operate under battlefield conditions—and, more troublingly, whether it can be audited or constrained when it veers off course. If, as Rebecca Crootof and BJ Ard have suggested, technology “regulates through its ‘architecture’,” then the Code must shift upstream. It should impose obligations not merely on how technologies are used, but how they are conceived, developed, and trained throughout the lifecycle of a product or service. The existing text already offers a...

...of Artificial Intelligence systems for targeting operations in Gaza by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has shocked many and reignited fears of a dystopian future of AI warfare. As the Guardian wrote on December 1, 2023, the IDF’s likely deployment of an AI platform in the current conflict, evocatively named the ‘Gospel’, “has significantly accelerated a lethal production line of targets that officials have compared to a target production ‘factory’”. The volume and character of such violence raises important questions about Israel’s increasingly criticized approach to battlefield targeting. It should also,...

...use by private parties (description here and the US case).  Second, although the ICC Statute does contain the prohibition on emblem misuse (Article 8(2)(b)(vii)), it reaches only conduct tied to an international armed conflict, and no virtual firefight qualifies (Heller, 2006). The liability is purely domestic, and older than the Rome Statute—Article 27 of the 1906 Geneva Convention already required states to criminalize emblem use as a matter distinct from wartime perfidy (Heller, 2006). The two regimes run on parallel tracks. The peacetime statute does not punish a battlefield betrayal;...