Search: battlefield robots

...place in the Newseum in Washington DC. On January 10-11, 2013, The T.M.C. Asser Instituut and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, in cooperation with the International Humanitarian and Criminal Law Platform, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Municipality of The Hague, will host a symposium entitled “The Boundaries of the Battlefield: A Critical Look at the Legal Paradigms and Rules in Countering Terrorism” with the aim of discussing the contours of various approaches states take against non-state actors with the goal of countering terrorism. Specifically, the two-day...

...escalation jumps up further, this calculation may change. Hence, it will be useful to continue thinking about the elements a settlement would need to address, and how it would address them. This would depend on the constellation on the battlefield, the maintenance of international resolve in this matter, and the level of further civilian casualties Ukraine is willing to accept. In short, a settlement will only come about if both sides find themselves in a situation where they have no other, or better, choice. Let us be ready for that...

...unpredictable. More data does not automatically lead to clearer perceptions of the battlefield or a better understanding of the adversary. For instance, Karp stated that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) integrate Palantir’s software capabilities into their targeting practices. Yet, the mass destruction and genocidal violence in Gaza show that AI technologies have provided the IDF not with tools of precision to execute limited military operations, but rather with more potent means of surveillance and lethal violence. Second, by supporting the narrative that data-driven military targeting is automatically more efficient, tech...

...what a possible settlement for Ukraine might look like. The aim was to show that a relatively condensed settlement could be possible, despite the ever more complex nature of the situation in Ukraine. That contribution also attempted to demonstrate a few ideas on how one might address some of the more difficult issue areas in a potential settlement. Any specific settlement proposal will of necessity reflect the relative configuration of the sides on the battlefield and in the wider political arena. It is not possible to predict what this situation...

...advocates; full discovery versus secrecy provisions. While it is tempting to think of administrative detention as lying between the criminal and law-of-war models, depending on how these matters are resolved, an administrative system can be even less liberty-protective than traditional battlefield hearings or more liberty-protective than criminal prosecution (a point Monica makes on p. 409). And these are just variations of procedural or institutional design. I’d like to hear more discussion about substantive questions of administrative detention law. Monica is quite right when she says: The availability of meaningful legal...

...charges brought against him demonstrates that the jury weighed the evidence carefully. Unlike Senator Obama who voted against the MCA and favors giving Al Qaeda terrorists direct access to U.S. civilian courts to contest their detention, I recognize that we cannot treat dangerous terrorists captured on the battlefield as we would common criminals. Of course, that’s not quite Obama’s position. That campaign issued this statement: I commend the military officers who presided over this trial and served on the hearing panel under difficult and unprecedented circumstances. They and all our...

...of the law in other areas. To his credit, Prof. Watts points out that it is the attenuation from the traditional battlefield that in large measure justifies deviation from the traditional combatant civilian dichotomy and that his proposal should not be viewed as a general condemnation of that tradition. Nonetheless, I believe his proposal will beg the question: if state association should be the singular focus for determining who can engage in CNA operations when the operative is unlikely to be observed by the enemy and therefore will not implicate...

...Robert H. Jackson Center and other institutions, that takes place at the Chautauqua Institution in western New York. In doing this, he noted the historical link to von Suttner: On leaving the sessions this year, I discovered that Bertha von Suttner had come to Chautauqua in the summer of 1912 to speak in the same amphitheatre before a crowd of thousands… It is reported that von Suttner spoke at Chautauqua about the need to resolve disputes between nations in court and not on the battlefield, and about how the Permanent...

...have, for so long, actually reflected both States’ will and accounted for battlefield realities. My sense is that, in CNA, the criteria cannot operate long without provoking harmful distrust of the law’s efficacy. The Article set out to highlight what I perceived to be a threatening dissonance between that law and the realities of a rapidly changing and increasingly relevant realm of combat. It seems our discussion reveals potential normative and theoretical points about the evolution of the law of war as well. Professor Corn and I are perhaps like-minded...

...because there is zero chance that Bush will be detained anywhere (much less in Canada). In fact, the likely rejection of AI’s view on this by more and more states will undermine AI’s goals in the long run. In any event, I somehow doubt that in the spring of 2013, Amnesty will await (hopefully) then-former President Obama with a similar memorandum (following the legal opinions of folks like Mary Ellen O’Connell that Obama has committed violations of the laws of war) over his authorization of drone attacks outside the battlefield....

...Republic of China government declared sovereignty over the Islands in 1947; only France voiced objections. The Silent International Community after the Armed Conflicts in 1974 The law of occupation is a matter of jus in bello, but the sovereignty of the battlefield is not. As is also noted by Dr. Nguyen, the claim of reparation relies on a prior wrongful act of occupying foreign territories. The international community generally does not acquiesce to unlawful attacks of foreign territories. For example, the disputed Six-Day War in 1967 received a unanimous Security...

...be done “whenever circumstances permit and particularly after an engagement” but “without delay” from this moment on (CIHL Rule 112). Moreover, this is an obligation of means, which belligerents shall observe diligently, for example, by concluding arrangements to set up teams to look for and gather victims from the battlefield areas (API, art. 33 (4)) or by allowing humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC, to carry out this work (API, art. 17 (2)). In contexts where the dead have already been interred and it is suspected that their death results from...