Search: battlefield robots

...ever it comes, will reflect the balance of power on the ground at the time of its conclusion, among other factors. Hence, offering this text is risky, as it either offers too many concessions to the one or other side, and sacrifices for the other, or not enough of them, depending on how the situation on the battlefield and other factors develop.  Inclusion of any particular step or possible solution in this document should not be taken to suggest that it must be included in a settlement. Indeed, the sides...

...therefore is considered a primary rationale for compliance with this law. However, in the context of the modern battlefield, this rationale may no longer be as persuasive as in the past. In fact, for at least a decade, U.S. military strategists have studied the concept of “asymmetrical warfare”, which is characterized by an enemy seeking to exploit U.S. commitment to compliance with the law of war to gain a tactical advantage. This is exactly the dynamic our forces confront in Afghanistan and Iraq. Asserting encouragement of reciprocity as the primary...

...purpose. While the company has previously licensed tech to the U.S. Military, it has never crossed the line into weapons development. With this contract, it does. The application of HoloLens within the IVAS system is designed to help people kill. It will be deployed on the battlefield, and works by turning warfare into a simulated “video game,” further distancing soldiers from the grim stakes of war and the reality of bloodshed. Intent to harm is not an acceptable use of our technology. Not surprisingly, Microsoft has defended the contract. Here...

...a platform for timely analysis, debate and commentary around legal challenges arising from the contemporary battlefield. We aim to identify practical issues, provide clarity on the law, and bring operational perspectives into the U.S. and international discussions around the law of armed conflict. Through this operational focus and open dialogue among leading scholars and practitioners we strive to create greater understanding to ensure that the law of armed conflict retains its relevance in contemporary times and to empower global combat leaders and government advisors with relevant information and discussion. Our...

...from the military hospital in which he was staying. The US is dispatching army planners to Jordan but is wary of direct American intervention in Syria. Human Rights Watch has urged Libya to allow access for Al-Senussi, char For readers who follow the US’ current conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces closely, you may recall two guest posts (here and here) about a recent symposium entitled The Boundaries of the Battlefield. The organizers of that symposium (full-disclosure: I was one of them) have written a summary report on the symposium....

...target is planning a terrorist attack; what, if any, the battlefield limits are; and what, if any, is the basis in law. . . . . . . On balance, President Obama, who campaigned against the “dark side” of the war on terror and has insisted that America must lead by example as a nation of laws, owes Americans an accounting of his targeted killing program. Revenge killings don’t pass the test for me. They’re unacceptable under international law. I want to know that any target is selected because there...

...for perpetrating the acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib. That finding had been supported in the 12 other major reviews conducted by the Department of Defense, the delegation said. There had been a total of 120 deaths of detainees in Department of Defense control in Afghanistan and Iraq. There had been no deaths in Guantanamo. The vast majority of deaths were caused by factors such as natural causes, injuries sustained on the battlefield, or detainee-on-detainee violence. In only 29 cases had abuse or other violations of law or policy been...

...status is due. Thus, for example, if we catch Osama Bin Laden running from the battlefield, there would be no doubt that he is not entitled to POW protections and the Conventions would not mandate an Article 5 review. As I stated in my last post, in response to Ken Anderson, we have in any event provided those detained at Guantanamo more extensive procedural protections in the CSRT process than in a typical Article 5 tribunal, including the opportunity to be heard from, to present reasonably available evidence, to obtain...

Details here. Assuming that we’re talking foot soldiers, this seems a pretty thin argument for keeping the rest under wraps, even through a cost-benefit/national interests optic. The equation: How much does keeping Gitmo up and running hurt US interests v. how much damage can released detainees cause if they return to the battlefield. I’m betting that for all but the very few high-level detainees, the former presents a much more serious (if diffuse) continuing hit. The proportion of Gitmo recidivists (assuming that’s the right description) is much more favorable than...

...return of combatants to the battlefield during conflict.” International law, consistent with Charming Betsy, was imported into the statute in Hamdi, and now the plurality in Hamdi controls Padilla. The statute implicitly authorized detentions of enemy combatants consistent with the laws of war, and the Executive branch, the Fourth Circuit held, is acting consistent with those obligations. No meaningful distinction was made between an American and non-American enemy combatant. Nor was there any meaningful distinction made between the conventional war at issue in Hamdi (the ongoing war in Afghanistan) and...

...the foreign forces were still present in Afghanistan and party to the ongoing armed conflict at the time. What might be made of the remedial obligation – that is, if IHL duties of protection are not met, what follows – that the applicants raised? In short, we typically think of the protection of civilians as actions taken on the battlefield, but in such special circumstances where there is an acknowledged special connection between the civilians in question and the state, could bureaucratic actions taken at home such as the proper...

...of guidance as to the interpretation of the authorization of the use of military force in the Hamdi case, where the court interpreted that enactment and determined that the detention of an individual who was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan fell within the scope of that. And they relied there, I think, on customary practices in the conduct of warfare in determining what fell within the scope of the authorization. FEINSTEIN: Let me stop you right here, because that’s right. Because detention is a necessary following of an authorization...