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Search: battlefield robots

13 Feb

...civilian (Additional Protocol I, Article 50(1)). Parties must take all feasible precautions in attack to minimise incidental harm (Additional Protocol I, Article 57; and customary IHL). A strategy that hints civilians should “press the advantage” works against these safeguards by encouraging precisely the visibility and proximity that increase misreading risks. And even when a civilian truly crosses the direct-participation line, IHL does not convert that person into a combatant with combatant privileges. When hostilities end, the forum shifts from battlefield to courtroom—but the exposure does not disappear. It changes shape....
13.02.26 | |

01 Aug

...ever change it will fundamentally alter how IHL regulates the use of such weapons. But we are a long way from having “untethered” drones loosed on the battlefield and I have found no appetite for such a development amongst operational military commanders. However this “stupidity” does not change the fact that, as a weapons system, drones are capable of more accurately discriminating between civilians and legitimately targetable individuals than any other weapons system we currently possess. This is because drones allow for a dispassionate assessment of each weapon employment by...
01.08.12 | |

10 Aug

...in stride. Why the change? The Olympics used to be a form of surrogate warfare. If we couldn’t beat the Soviets on the battlefield, we could best them in the rink. Athletes were soldiers, of a sort. As such, their nationality was serious stuff. For the most part states don’t stand in an adversarial posture any more. Their teams may, but more now in the way of the Phillies and the Mets, competitive but a healthy way. This should be counted as another welcome departure from the pathologies of Westphalia....
10.08.08 | |

19 Mar

...conduct with precision. Still, uncertainty at the margins should not obscure the core case. Where a cyber operation foreseeably causes death, injury, or serious disruption to protected civilian objects, the argument for legal relevance becomes significantly stronger. Once the operation resembles traditional battlefield harm in its consequences, doctrinal hesitation begins to look less like caution and more like inertia. The Accountability Gap is Becoming Harder to Defend What is emerging, then, is not a legal vacuum but an accountability gap. The law recognizes civilian protection. Expert guidance explains how it...
19.03.26 | |

13 Jul

...released on Friday. Colombia pledged on Sunday to de-escalate military action against leftist guerrillas if the rebels uphold their unilateral ceasefire, providing a breakthrough in peace talks that had been threatened by an escalation of battlefield violence. U.S.-led forces conducted 16 air strikes in Syria and 11 more in Iraq against Islamic State forces on Saturday, the Combined Joint Task Force leading the air operations said on Sunday. UN/World The United Nations said it expects an unconditional week-long humanitarian pause in the fighting in Yemen to start on Friday to...
13.07.15 | |

16 May

...For racialised and gendered scholars, the emotional labour in simply being, let alone belonging, is punishing.  On the battlefield, we need allies, creativity, resilience, and, perhaps most of all, we need victories. This symposium is a victory. It was hard fought, with various intervening factors delaying its release and altering its appearance. I tip my hat to those who spoke and do not judge those who did not. I also acknowledge those who, out of fear of reprisals, withdrew their submissions at later stages. There is neither harm nor disappointment....
16.05.22 | |

28 Nov

...giving undue weight to foreign policy goals or considerations. No actor, whether a government official, rebel commander, or business corporation, should be beyond the law if they substantially contribute to atrocities. Profiting from atrocity carries profound legal risks, and those who enable the worst crimes can themselves be called to account as architects of evil. The evolving nexus of international law and corporate accountability aims to ensure that “never again” applies not just to perpetrators on the battlefield, but also to those in boardrooms who would equip or finance them....
28.11.25 | |

12 Jul

...artificial distinction that simply does not exist on the battlefield. Analytically, on the one hand, far from a civil war between a government and nonstate actors within the territory of a state, the Afghanistan war is the invasion of the territory of a state by another state – the cuts against calling it an armed conflict “not of an international character.” On the other hand, if you conceive of the war against Al Qaeda as a conflict separate from the conflict against Afghanistan, then because Al Qaeda is a nonstate...
12.07.06 | |

10 Oct

...now have more combat experience than any Marines in the history of our Corps…. Biggest Hassle — High-ranking visitors. More disruptive to work than a rocket attack. VIPs demand briefs and “battlefield” tours (we take them to quiet sections of Fallujah, which is plenty scary for them). Our briefs and commentary seem to have no effect on their preconceived notions of what’s going on in Iraq. Their trips allow them to say that they’ve been to Fallujah, which gives them an unfortunate degree of credibility in perpetuating their fantasies about...
10.10.06 | |

15 Nov

...trial. Question is on what basis in an environment that claims to act under the “charge them or let them go.” One is simply to say, well, it’s down to less than twenty, so that’s pretty darn good! Another rationale on which to hold people, not inconsistent with the earlier one, is to say, well, we are in this situation because the Bush administration tortured people, messed up the evidence, didn’t collect it properly on the battlefield, etc. – but we have to hold them because of the security risk....
15.11.08 | |

25 Sep

...an IHL scholar to see the problems with that argument. IHL applies only if conflict is sufficiently intense and organized to qualify as a NIAC. Period. There is no “weak domestic law” exception to that fundamental requirement. And even if a NIAC exists, IHL applies to individuals located outside the battlefield only if they are members of an organization involved in that NIAC or are directly participating in hostilities there. The real question, in short, is whether individuals in the U.S. accused solely of materially supporting terrorism can be considered...
25.09.10 | |

26 Jul

...security…. The draft measure describes court-martial procedure as “not practicable in trying enemy combatants” because doing so would “require the government to share classified information” and would exclude “hearsay evidence determined to be probative and reliable…. Nor does the bill adhere to the military’s rules for the admissibility of evidence and witnesses at trial statements because “the United States cannot safely require members of the armed forces to gather evidence on the battlefield as though they were police officers,” the proposal says. The draft bill specifies that no matter how...
26.07.06 | |