Search: battlefield robots
16 Jan Law and Robotics Conference Seeking Paper Proposals, and HRW’s Tom Malinowski Releases Video That I Will Always Treasure
...is the link if you’re interested. Meanwhile, over at Lawfare, Human Rights Watch’s Tom Malinowski, Benjamin Wittes, Matthew Waxman, and I have been debating the recent HRW report calling for a ban on “Killer Robots.” Tom’s latest response – though mostly a serious discussion, well worth reading, though I’m afraid it doesn’t finally manage to persuade me – has a video at the end that I will always, always fondly treasure. It’s great. (It’s in Hindi, and though I didn’t know Tom knew Hindi, I’m going to trust his subtitles.)...22 Jul Sotomayor, International Law, Context, and the Confirmation Hearings Charade
...judges are akin to autonomous robots who mechanistically and abstractly apply inbred, dry legal principles to meticulously pruned fact patterns. To the contrary, good judging is an intensely human and dynamic experience. American Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke of this eloquently last century and Judge Richard Posner has done so in this one. And, on a macro level, good judging requires growth of the entire judicial collective conscience. Being aware of what is going on in the wider world is certainly an integral part of that. And it is, I...03 Oct Is There a Limit to the Crimes Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Military Commission?
...war. Congress does not seem to have perceived any limit to the range of non-law of war offenses that may be subjected to trial by military commission. Considering the military commissions are creatures of the laws and customs of war, or as some commentators have labeled them, “war courts”, I have a hard time reconciling this view of jurisdiction. I do not dispute that some offenses may be subjected to trial by military commission by statute, but I think this is a limited category of customarily accepted “battlefield” crimes that...13 Jul Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 13, 2015
...released on Friday. Colombia pledged on Sunday to de-escalate military action against leftist guerrillas if the rebels uphold their unilateral ceasefire, providing a breakthrough in peace talks that had been threatened by an escalation of battlefield violence. U.S.-led forces conducted 16 air strikes in Syria and 11 more in Iraq against Islamic State forces on Saturday, the Combined Joint Task Force leading the air operations said on Sunday. UN/World The United Nations said it expects an unconditional week-long humanitarian pause in the fighting in Yemen to start on Friday to...01 Oct The Folly of Comparing Al-Awlaki to Admiral Yamamoto (Updated)
It appears the right-wing has settled on a shiny new historical comparison to justify the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. Here is Jack Goldsmith in the New York Times: An attack on an enemy soldier during war is not an assassination. During World War II, the United States targeted and killed Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. And here is John Tobin in the American Spectator: Anwar al-Awlaki was actively recruiting terrorists to attack the U.S. He was, in effect, a battlefield commander, and...01 Aug Michael Lewis’ Response to Gabor Rona on Targeted Killing
...ever change it will fundamentally alter how IHL regulates the use of such weapons. But we are a long way from having “untethered” drones loosed on the battlefield and I have found no appetite for such a development amongst operational military commanders. However this “stupidity” does not change the fact that, as a weapons system, drones are capable of more accurately discriminating between civilians and legitimately targetable individuals than any other weapons system we currently possess. This is because drones allow for a dispassionate assessment of each weapon employment by...
13 Feb When War Bets on Protest: Iran’s Civilians in a Double Bind
...civilian (Additional Protocol I, Article 50(1)). Parties must take all feasible precautions in attack to minimise incidental harm (Additional Protocol I, Article 57; and customary IHL). A strategy that hints civilians should “press the advantage” works against these safeguards by encouraging precisely the visibility and proximity that increase misreading risks. And even when a civilian truly crosses the direct-participation line, IHL does not convert that person into a combatant with combatant privileges. When hostilities end, the forum shifts from battlefield to courtroom—but the exposure does not disappear. It changes shape....10 Aug Citizenship and the Olympics: The End of Surrogate Warfare
...in stride. Why the change? The Olympics used to be a form of surrogate warfare. If we couldn’t beat the Soviets on the battlefield, we could best them in the rink. Athletes were soldiers, of a sort. As such, their nationality was serious stuff. For the most part states don’t stand in an adversarial posture any more. Their teams may, but more now in the way of the Phillies and the Mets, competitive but a healthy way. This should be counted as another welcome departure from the pathologies of Westphalia....
19 Mar Cyber Warfare and the Limits of International Criminal Law: Can Digital Attacks Amount to War Crimes?
...conduct with precision. Still, uncertainty at the margins should not obscure the core case. Where a cyber operation foreseeably causes death, injury, or serious disruption to protected civilian objects, the argument for legal relevance becomes significantly stronger. Once the operation resembles traditional battlefield harm in its consequences, doctrinal hesitation begins to look less like caution and more like inertia. The Accountability Gap is Becoming Harder to Defend What is emerging, then, is not a legal vacuum but an accountability gap. The law recognizes civilian protection. Expert guidance explains how it...25 Sep Bobby Chesney Responds to My Post
...an IHL scholar to see the problems with that argument. IHL applies only if conflict is sufficiently intense and organized to qualify as a NIAC. Period. There is no “weak domestic law” exception to that fundamental requirement. And even if a NIAC exists, IHL applies to individuals located outside the battlefield only if they are members of an organization involved in that NIAC or are directly participating in hostilities there. The real question, in short, is whether individuals in the U.S. accused solely of materially supporting terrorism can be considered...