Search: UNCLOS

...the entirety of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, having articulated its position through a series of White Papers and its Law of the Sea adopted in 2012. The Philippines remains the only country whose claims are compliant with the UNCLOS. It has, through a series of legislations, ensured that its baselines have been brought in conformity with the legal stipulations in the Convention. This includes areas such as the Scarborough shoal, which also double as its traditional fishing grounds and have been adjudicated as such by the Permanent Court of...

...dispute with Chile. This may or may not be a good strategy for Peru. It does puncture one misconception about UNCLOS. Just because a state does not sign the treaty, doesn’t mean it can’t delimit territorial seas and continental shelves by agreement with its neighbors. It might make it easier to settle borders, but UNCLOS is not necessary to do so. This doesn’t mean the U.S. Senate shouldn’t ratify UNCLOS. But it shouldn’t do so thinking that UNCLOS is the only way to settle U.S. claims in the Arctic, etc....

...by journalists how Russia will react to the Tribunal’s ruling. Russia ratified the convention based on which this Tribunal acts with a number of reservations, which prevented it from entering these particular proceedings, Ivanov said. “The issue will be handled not politically but legally, based on Russian law rather than someone’s political wishes,” he added. Russia will probably stick to its legal position, which is contained in its note verbale to the Netherlands, arguing that this matter lies beyond the jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute settlement since it is an exercise...

...the sea may indeed have been different (in a number of undesirable ways), but she also adds that if one examines other relevant historical factors – such as “new discoveries, techno-optimism, and fears of resource scarcity” – UNCLOS “might resemble what it did become in many respects” (p. 244). Her contribution thus implores us to go beyond settled and instrumentalised understandings of contingent moments in the history of UNCLOS, to recognise instead the constitutional contingency of UNCLOS that is “desirable in our time” (p. 245): namely, one that rejects the...

Wim Muller "I would have appointed a Chinese national and a Philippines national..." I was thinking the same thing, but then I took another look at Annex VII to UNCLOS (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex7.htm). Article 3(e) provides, inter alia, that "[t]he members so appointed shall be of different nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinarily resident in the territory of, or nationals of, any of the parties to the dispute." (emphasis added) Appointing a Chinese and Philppine national was therefore never an option....

...abiding by the rules for freedom of navigation set forth in UNCLOS, while disagreeing dramatically on what each side is allowed to do. From the U.S. perspective, its navy should be allowed to enter the 12 nm territorial seas around China’s “islands” as long as they abide by the rules of innocent passage. But the Chinese will say that freedom of navigation doesn’t permit this activity. Most states agree with the U.S. definition of freedom of navigation. But some states (including neighboring South China Sea coastal states) do agree with...

...alone - not to get recognized by the UN. We certainly don't plan to ignore international law. Rather, we will try to carve out as much freedom as we can get within international law. This probably means being outside EEZs (> 200nm from any land). This means UNCLOS 60 doesn't apply, nor does UNCLOS 89 (we aren't claiming sovereignty, we are just a ship with a flag). Since the flagging nation is unlikely to protect us, it behooves any seastead to avoid doing things which will piss off existing countries....

that arbitral tribunal has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. This is just semantics in my view. What if China phrases it as something like: Arbitration is an option when mutually agreed to. Absent mutual agreement, the primary means for resolving disputes under UNCLOS is through negotiations (Article 279), exchange of views (Article 283), and conciliation procedures (Article 284). The right to opt-out of UNCLOS provided maritime boundary arbitration at any time is guaranteed by Article 298. Many nations have explicitly exercised that right include Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark,...

...of international climate law, reflexivity appears in two interlinked ways. First, through the cross-fertilization among international courts. International climate opinions listen, cite, incorporate and reinforce each other. For example, in interpreting the UNCLOS, the ICJ ascribed great weight to ITLOS’ finding that greenhouse gas emissions constitute “pollution of the marine environment” (ICJ Opinion, paras. 336–354). With respect to the adverse effects of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights, the ICJ took extensive account of the views and reports of United Nations human rights bodies and expert organizations (paras...

...therefore unlikely that there will be one legal definition that fits all USVs. How USVs are classified under the law of the sea impacts on where, when and how they are used in armed conflicts. Only warships have belligerent rights in naval warfare, according to which only warships can use armed force. Warships are defined in Article 29 UNCLOS as:  a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the...

...Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a party to UNCLOS, Canada is strictly limited by Article 311 of the Convention in the extent to which it can attempt to alter the effect of UNCLOS by bilateral treaties. Any attempt to do so would have no effect on the navigation rights of Russia, the EU member-states, or any other state. Moreover, any such bilateral agreement would likely be viewed by the other coastal state members of the Arctic Council as inconsistent with the spirit of the 2008 Ilulissat...

...attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Part two will explore how the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and the laws of naval warfare (LoNW) will (or more possibly should) treat submarine data cables for the purposes of targeting in military operations. Wilful or Negligent Damage by Vessels While Article 2 of the 1884 Paris Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (Paris Convention), and Article 113 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) create an obligation for a state to criminalise wilful or...