The Iran IIFFM’s Unconvincing War Crimes Analysis

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (IIFFM), created by the Human Rights Council, has released a new report. It’s a depressing read, painstakingly cataloging Iran’s human-rights violations and analysing two airstrikes carried out by the United States on 28 February 2026 — the notorious attack on the the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, which killed at least 156 civilians, and the attack on a sports centre in Lamerd, which killed at least 22.

Predictably, given the large number of civilian victims, media attention has focused on the IIFFM’s conclusion that the attack on the Minab school not only violated international humanitarian law (IHL) but was also a war crime. (See, for example, this, this, and this.) Here is ¶ 126 of the report:

Based on the available evidence, which does not include responses by the United States to the Mission’s requests for information, or a full and public disclosure by the United States of the outcomes of itsinternal investigation into the air strike on the school, the Mission finds reasonable grounds to believe that the United States committed the war crime of launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.

I have said repeatedly that the US/Israel attack on Iran was an act of aggression and, for the responsible political and military leaders, the crime of aggression. I have no doubt that both the US and Israel (and Iran) have committed war crimes during the conflict. I find convincing the IIFFM’s conclusion (¶ 124) that the US attack on the Minab school violated IHL by failing to comply with the principle of precautions. And although the IIFFM’s analysis is very abbreviated, I think at least a prima facie case can be made for its conclusion (¶ 128) that, under customary international law, attacking the Lamerd sports centre with a pellet-dispersing Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) was the war crime of launching an indiscriminate attack.

I am much less convinced, however, by the IIFFM’s conclusion that the attack on the Minab school qualifies as the same war crime. At least on the evidence that the report presents, that conclusion seems difficult to justify.

The first issue is the characterisation of the attack as “the war crime of launching an indiscriminate attack.” That war crime normally refers to an attack that, following Art. 51 of the First Additional Protocol, takes one of five forms:

1. Is not directed at a specific military objective
2. Uses a means or method of warfare that cannot be directed at a specific military objective
3. Uses a means or method whose effects cannot be limited as IHL requires
4. Treats several clearly separated military objectives in a civilian concentration as one target
5. Is expected to cause civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated

The attack on the Lamerd sports centre is a classic example of the second type of indiscriminate attack, because the IIFFM claims (¶ 127) that “the airburst of a PrSM missile dispersing approximately 180,000 tungsten pellets over a wide area, under the prevailing circumstances, could not be directed at a specific military objective and its effects on civilian and civilian objects could not be limited as required by IHL.”

The attack on the school at Minab, however, does not fit within any of the five categories. The only conceivable one is an attack “not directed at a specific military objective,” but that normally refers to a situation in which a belligerent uses a discriminate weapon but makes no attempt to target military objectives — for example, randomly firing artillery into an area that contains both military and civilian objects. That is not what the IIFFM alleges concerning the Minab school. On the contrary, it claims that the school was specifically targeted as part of a larger attack on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval complex adjacent to it.

The appropriate potential characterisation of the Minab attack, therefore, would be as “the war crime of an unlawful attack on civilian objects” (ICTY) or the war crime of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian objects” (ICC). The actus reus of those war crimes is a deliberate attack on a civilian object — “deliberate” in the sense that the attacker chose to target the specific object in question.

The IIFFM states clearly in its report (¶ 123) that its war-crime analysis is based on customary international law, not the Rome Statute. That is important, because its conclusion (¶ 126) is that “when targeting the school building, the U.S acted wilfully, that is with the requisite mental element of recklessness (dolus eventualis).” Recklessness/dolus eventualis is sufficient for the customary war crime (see the ICTY Appeals Judgment in Galic, ¶ 140) but for the war crime in the Rome Statute, which requires knowledge — understood as “virtual certainty” that a particular circumstance exists. (See Art. 30.)

The key question, then, is whether the IIFFM is correct that US military personnel involved in the attack on the Minab school acted recklessly. Here is its analysis, in its entirety (¶ 125):

Taking into account the U.S. Government’s deprioritisation of civilian harm mitigation and of compliance with IHL; expressed through public statements by senior U.S. leadership, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, which dismiss binding obligations under IHL, including ahead of and in relation to the armed conflict in Iran; the apparent existence of and reliance on outdated targeting data; and the multiple features readily identifying the structure as an educational facility for young children, which were publicly available prior to the airstrike, the Mission considers that the U.S.’s failure to update information in relation to the school in its targeting databases and to verify that the building was a military objective before launching the attack went beyond mere negligence. Rather, the U.S. directed the strikes at the building of the school while being aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object and acting recklessly as regards the possibility that this would happen.

This is, as the kids say, weak tea. One issue should be immediately apparent: the IIFFM doesn’t identify which US military personnel it believes acted recklessly. Was it the soldier(s) who launched the two Tomahawks at the school? The commander who ordered the attack? The intelligence analysts and validation authoirty involved in selecting the target? The identity of the alleged perpetrators matter, because the criminal-law analysis is different depending on the role they played in the attack.

That problem becomes more glaring when we consider the factors the IIFFM cites in support of its conclusion that the attack on the Minab school was a war crime. That conclusion requires evidence that at least one perpetrator was subjectively aware the school might be a civilian object instead of part of the IRGC naval complex and nevertheless either attacked, ordered the attack, or contributed to the attack. Do any of the cited factors suggest as much? Let’s look at each of them, not quite in order.

“[T]he U.S. Government’s deprioritisation of civilian harm mitigation and of compliance with IHL; expressed through public statements by senior U.S. leadership.”

Such deprioritisation is indefensible and has clearly made civilian harm more likely to occur. But deprioritising civilian harm is unlikely to have encouraged US military personnel to target Iranian objects despite being aware they might be civilian. Instead, it would seem to have made it more likely the military would attack civilian objects either negligently or purely by accident — which could be enough to make the US responsible as a state for violating IHL, but is not sufficient for individual criminal responsibility even under customary international law.

“[T]he apparent existence of and reliance on outdated targeting data.”

This factor directly contradicts the idea that any of the possible perpetrators acted recklessly. If a Tomahawk operator or commander relied on the outdated targeting data, he or she would have honestly believed the Minab school was a military objective. That belief might have been negligent, even grossly so. But even an unreasonable mistake of fact negates a subjective mens rea like recklessness.

It would also not be enough to show that an intelligence analyst or validation authority was aware the data for the school might be outdated. Failing to act on such awareness would clearly be negligent (and a blatant violation of the principle of precautions), but individual responsibility for contributing to a war crime would require more: (1) evidence that the analyst or validator inferred from awareness the target data was outdated that the Minab target might,be a civilian object; and (2) evidence that the analyst or validator nevertheless provided the outdated target data to a commander, thus making a substantial contribution to the war crime. The IIFFM report provides no such evidence concerning any specific perpetrator — or even any specific category of perpetrator.

“[T]he U.S.’s failure to update information in relation to the school in its targeting databases and to verify that the building was a military objective before launching the attack.”

The failure to update the outdated targeting data similarly makes it more likely, not less, that the attack on the Minab school was negligent or a pure accident. If the data was not updated, it could not have indicated to a Tomahawk operator or commander that the target might be a civilian object.

The failure to verify the military nature of the targeted object prior to the attack also contradicts idea that the attack was a war crime. That failure seems clearly negligent and a violation of the principle of precautions. By definition, though, someone who believes a target is a military objective and fails to verify that fact before attacking did not launch the attack with subjective awareness the target might be civilian.

“[T]he multiple features readily identifying the structure as an educational facility for young children, which were publicly available prior to the airstrike.”

This is the only factor that even remotely supports the IIFFM’s conclusion that the attack on the school at Minab was a war crime. And indeed, the features of the school are troubling. Here is ¶ 83 of the report:

Photographs and videos depicting the school before and after the strike show many readily identifiable features associated with an educational facility for young children. These included child-oriented murals painted on exterior walls, school signage, and playground areas. According to public reporting, satellite imagery of the school before the strike also appears to show human figures, readily identifiable as children, gathered in its courtyard.

This is not nothing — but it is also nowhere near enough.  The problem is that nothing in the public record indicates either that any US military personnel personally observed the school prior to or during the attack — the Tomahawks were launched from surface ships or submarines — or that any of the intelligence used to plan the attack contained recent imagery of the school or otherwise mentioned the school’s civilian features. Indeed, the IIFFM itself acknowledges that the US military was relying on outdated data that described the target as part of the IRGC naval complex. So once again the attack seems more negligent than reckless.

That problem likely explains why the report emphasises the public availability of information about the Minab school. Such availability makes it somewhat more likely that one or more US military personnel — particularly the intelligence analysts or validation authority — were, in fact, aware that the target might be civilian. Proof of recklessness, however, requires more than public availability of information. A prosecutor would also have to be able to show that a potential perpetrator actually came into contact with the information during the planning of the attack, and the report provides no evidence to that effect. (Understandably, of course, given the US’s refusal to respond to the IIFFM’s requests for cooperation.)

As is standard practice in such investigations, the IIFFM applied the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof when determining whether the US violated IHL and/or committed war crimes (¶ 9). Such grounds clearly exist to consider the US attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School a violation of IHL. But it fails to establish similar grounds to consider the attack a war crime — and I say that as an academic who is anything but soft on the US military. I hope a future report will either strengthen the IIFFM’s conclusion about the attack or withdraw the claim that it was a war crime.