General

Chuck Lane makes this case for rejecting a "cry fire" analogy on Koran burning, as suggested by Justice Breyer in a book-flacking recent interview with George Stephanopoulos.  The logic is pretty clear: that where an expressive act creates an immediate danger, it's not constitutionally protected.  If the burning of a Koran in Florida was going to cost lives in Afghanistan,...

Not infrequently, I have lamented what I perceive as the lack of due attention in the scholarly literature to the actual circumstances of international organizations, starting with the UN.  One of those fundamental issues concerns accountability, in the special sense that there is no obvious judicial forum for reviewing actions even of individuals alleged to have engaged in serious misconduct, such as fraud, embezzlement, etc. On the one hand, the treaties put the organizations and their civil servants beyond the reach of national courts - leaving at most in some cases the often highly unlikely possibility of a prosecution or civil action in the person's national jurisdiction, but that too seems put out of reach in many if not all cases.  On the other hand, such accountability as supposedly exists rests in various internal review processes.  These internal review processes vacillate between being tools by which senior managers are able to punish whistleblowers and protect themselves or their underlings or national confreres or what have you, or else being captured by the other side of the process through what amounts (in my jaundiced view, admittedly) to the world's strongest public employee union at the UN. I suppose I am not surprised that legal academics find it hard to get too interested in the hard material facts of UN budgets and fiscal accounting, although as Marx often advised, follow the money.  But it is more surprising to me that so little attention has been paid to the legal issues involved in whether and which courts might have jurisdiction in any of the remarkably varied cases that in an accountable domestic society might have attracted the attention of regulators or prosecutors or someone, by agencies and organizations also remarkably varied, and finally individual actors who also vary quite a lot in their legal situations, perhaps diplomats, perhaps not, and so on. At the height of the Oil-for-Food scandal at the UN, when the General Secretariat was at its politically weakest as the reach of the scandal went all the way up to Kofi Annan (whom the Volcker reports left seriously wounded, with clear implications of some level of culpability, while leaving a barely sufficient shred of cover to not force a fight over pushing Annan to resign), there were calls for someone to prosecute someone for something.  It was not just the Oil-for-Food scandal, as anyone familiar even superficially with the opportunities for fraud, self-dealing, and rent-seeking in a system at once as byzantine and unaccountable as the UN's would recognize.  As more rocks began to be overturned, evidence serious graft, embezzlement, kickbacks, and other serious financial fraud of a kind that would plainly be criminally prosecutable, if only there were someplace to prosecute it, began to emerge in other UN programs.  The procurement program for the politically crucial peacekeeping operations - in my view, one of the (very few) UN activities worthy of serious support by the US - was particularly at risk, for example, as its budget has ramped up in recent years, outstripping the regular organization budget.  Nor am I raising political or policy questions here - just "simple" fraud by well-placed officials. In the midst of this turmoil at the UN in 2005, the then-Manhattan DA, the legendary Robert Morgenthau, announced an investigation into the senior UN official in the Oil-for-Food scandal, Benon Sevan (who departed to his native Cyprus, and, if I recall correctly and I might not, following "internal reviews" at the UN, had his legal fees paid and saw no reduction in his pension benefits).  The legal basis for this was never exactly clear to me.  Because the UN is located in Manhattan?  Because some of the conduct involved might have taken place in Manhattan but outside of the UN territory, or involved non-UN assets such as telephone lines, etc.?  This is, after all, an investigation by a state DA, and not even a federal prosecutor.  Although somewhat weirdly, given the politics at that moment, a local level investigation by a state DA of unimpeachable integrity and also a stalwart of the Democratic establishment - rather than a DOJ investigation by the then-Bush administration, turned out to be far more politically palatable. In any case, the weakened Annan did not do what might otherwise have been an inflexible and categorical response of the UN - quite naturally, to be sure, for any sovereign - to disclaim any jurisdictional basis for a Manhattan DA to get involved at all.  Benon Sevan had diplomatic immunity, but the General Secretariat indicated that it would waive it if requested by a prosecutor - clearly meaning Morgenthau.  Perhaps the senior UN management understand perfectly well that Sevan would depart to his native country which of course would do nothing; perhaps some small number of top UN leaders understood that this lack of accountability was a genuine problem and that Morgenthau was a decent option.  (I skip over some other Manhattan DA investigations, particularly involving corruption in UN peacekeeping procurement.)  (Update: see Jeffrey Meyer's correction in the comments - re indictment of Sevan, not just investigation, and also filling in other prosecutions in the procurement and other situations - thanks.) It is not hard to see, in other words, that international organizations such as the UN have massive agency failure problems.  That is a somewhat anodyne way of putting it; the problems range from rent-seeking to major criminal corruption and fraud.  They arise from a treaty structure deliberately designed to shield the organization and its agents from judicial accountability - for perfectly understandable reasons, to be sure.  And from the predictable "capture" of internal review mechanisms.  The result is to put the UN and international organizations and their agents in fundamental ways outside of the rule of law in the most ordinary sense.  That's not too strong a way of putting it.  But again, this receives remarkably little attention from academics.  The reflexive position of observers tends to be to define today's deviancy down, discounting today against the glorious, but always-receding, always-promised future of international institutions.  Mostly, I think, people just want to focus on the idealistic stuff about tomorrow and plug up their ears about anything that actually happens today. So let me welcome a new paper up on SSRN by Matthew Parish, of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, writing in the International Organizations Law Review, "An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations," offering a detailed look at the problems of legal accountability for a wide variety of international organizations and their agents.  It is a fine paper on a neglected topic.  I don't say this from complete agreement; I have reservations about the paper's proposals for accountability for national peacekeeping forces on missions in the field, for example.  Nor does Parish share my fundamental skepticism about the UN and its imagined mission; far from it, he is looking for ways to make it better on its own terms.  But overall I think it has many sensible things to say, and in any case offers a cogent account of the many agency failure problems at issue, from the standpoint of legal jurisdiction.  I've put the abstract from SSRN below the fold.

Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett and Virginia legislator William Howell lay out the case for a new "Repeal Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution in tomorrow's WSJ.  Such an amendment would permit repeal of any federal law if two-thirds of the state legislatures approved resolutions to do so.  I don't know what I think about this proposal, which would quite dramatically...

I have long enjoyed my association with Opinio Juris.  But what do you readers think of us?  Here in the United States, the ABA Journal is once again compiling a list of what it considers to be the 100 "best" law blogs.  Now, we can debate whether and how the ABA Journal is positioned to judge the "best" legal blogs. ...

Reading a justifiably nasty review of Meghan McCain's Dirty, Sexy Politics, I came across this unintentionally funny gem: The most obvious problem with Dirty, Sexy Politics is that grammatically, the book appears to be the work of a high school sophomore.  To be more accurate, it appears to be the first draft of an essay written...

Mike Scharf and Paul Williams have published an interesting collection of recollections and colloquys among all ten living State Department legal advisers, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State Department Legal Adviser, released by Cambridge UP earlier this year.  In addition to essays from each, recounting particular episodes from their tenures, there...

Columbia University historian Samuel Moyn has a new book out, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard/Belknap).  I haven't read it - but I have ordered it from Amazon! - and I'm sure I'll have more to say about it once I've read it.  However, it received a positive (and quite interesting in its own right) review from Brendan Simms, a well-known Cambridge international relations professor, in the Wall Street Journal.  And Professor Moyn has written a summary of the book's argument that appears as an article in this week's Nation.  The Nation piece is good reading on its own, and this part drew my attention:
Beginning in the 1990s, when human rights acquired a literally millennial appeal in the public discourse of the West during outbreaks of ethnic cleansing in Southeastern Europe and beyond, it became tempting to treat 1948 as a moment of annunciation, with large political consequences. Carter, and the 1970s, were rarely mentioned. It became common to assume that, ever since their birth in a moment of postgenocidal revulsion and wisdom, human rights had become embedded slowly but steadily in humane consciousness in what amounted to a revolution of moral life. In a euphoric mood, high-profile observers like Michael Ignatieff believed that secure moral guidance, born of incontestable shock about the Holocaust, was on the verge of displacing self-interest and power as the foundation of international relations. In Samantha Power's "A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (2002), Raphael Lemkin, who crafted the draft resolution of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, was dusted off as a human rights sage and hero, with Carter earning attention only for failing to intervene against Pol Pot's atrocities. In fact, when "human rights" entered the English language in the 1940s, it happened unceremoniously, even accidentally. Human rights began as a very minor part of a hopeful alternative vision to set against Adolf Hitler's vicious and tyrannical new order. In the heat of battle and shortly thereafter, a vision of postwar collective life in which personal freedoms would coalesce with more widely circulating promises of some sort of social democracy provided the main reason to fight the war. It's important to enumerate what human rights, in the 1940s, were not. Ignatieff was wrong. They were not a response to the Holocaust, and not focused on the prevention of catastrophic slaughter. Though closely associated with the better life of social democracy, only rarely did they imply a departure from the persistent framework of nation-states that would have to provide it. Above all, human rights were not even an especially prominent idea. Unlike later, they were restricted to international organization, in the form of the new United Nations. They didn't take hold in popular language and they inspired no popular movement. Whether as one way to express the principles of Western postwar societies or even as an aspiration to transcend the nation-state, the concept of human rights never percolated publicly or globally during the 1940s with the fervor it would have in the '70s and the '90s, including during negotiations over the Universal Declaration. What if the 1940s were cut loose from the widespread myth that they were a dry run for the post–cold war world, in which human rights began to afford a glimpse of the rule of law above the nation-state? What if the history of human rights in the 1940s were written with later events given proper credit and a radically different set of causes for the current meaning and centrality of human rights recaptured? The central conclusion could only be that, however tempting, it is misleading to describe World War II and its aftermath as the essential source of human rights as they are now understood. From a global perspective, the brief career of human rights in the 1940s is the story of how the Allied nations elevated language about human rights as they reneged on the earlier wartime promise—made in the 1941 Atlantic Charter—of the self-determination of peoples. Global self-determination would have spelled the end of empire, but by war's end the Allies had come around to Winston Churchill's clarification that this promise applied only to Hitler's empire, not empire in general (and certainly not Churchill's). The Atlantic Charter set the world on fire, but because similar language was dropped from the Universal Declaration, human rights fell on deaf ears. It is not hard to understand why. Human rights turned out to be a substitute for what many around the world wanted: a collective entitlement to self-determination. To the extent they noticed the rhetoric of human rights at all, the subjects of empire were not wrong to view it as a consolation prize.
Without, as I say, yet having read the book, I find this both intriguing.  No, more than that - it accurately captures in my own experience as an NGO person who first volunteered to do work for Human Rights Watch in 1983 when it was still two somewhat separate organizations, Helsinki Watch and Americas Watch.  This was a time when Aryeh Neier was operating out of a tiny dark office in the New York City Bar building, and the organization was not in its current position of glorious NGO hegemony and a $44 million annual budget - meaning, an offer from a Harvard Law student bringing his own funding was not an occasion to giggle at the presumption.  Ken Roth was still working as a Federal prosecutor.

No doubt many readers have seen the press articles announcing George Soros' gift of $100 million to Human Rights Watch.  Most interesting to me was that the gift is aimed, in part, at diversifying the organization, staff, and board away from its current US-centric arrangement.  As the AP puts it:

But the money also is meant to make its donor base as international as its outlook. Plans call for Human Rights Watch to draw at least half its income and most of its board members from outside the U.S. within five years. Now, about 70 percent of the money and 80 percent of the board members are U.S.-based.

Soros considers that a liability -- one he blamed on a frequent target of his, former President George W. Bush.

"They're basically an American organization advocating human rights all over the world. But the United States has lost the moral high ground, during the Bush administration, and, therefore, it runs into opposition because there's resentment of American interference," Soros said in an interview in his sleek office in a midtown Manhattan high-rise. " ... It's a drawback, to be American in this context."

HRW agrees, although it already believes it is seen as independent of the US government.

"But it is helpful for our organization to personify the global values we promote," Executive Director Kenneth Roth said.

I wonder if it is quite so easy to personify global values in that way, however.  Multinational corporations, for example, often talk about how global they are, in outlook, in values, in all those ways.  Query whether it actually works that way in MNEs.  The Daimler-Benz model, for example, in which it was supposed to be a merger of equals between the American car company and the German one.  Under a surface veneer of the "global" company, in fact the true owners of the enterprise, Daimler, quickly asserted itself, and for a simple reason - the post-merger was turning into a disaster, and the immediate response was for management to seek to reduce its internal transaction and agency costs by asserting a command and control decisionmaking model that relied upon one side of the enterprise.  That is, a "mixed" culture inside an enterprise is a costly one in terms of many decisionmaking factors, because it invites much more negotiation inside.  

Re the Volokh post to which Kevin refers below. Fear not, I was not trying to withhold content from OJ readers, but it did seem to me that I was days late in arriving at the issue that Ben and Kevin had already been discussing, whereas my VC post went into a lot of other stuff that didn't strike me as relevant to OJ readers.  Although we are pretty eclectic in our tastes here, as my personal drone post shows, I've sometimes had email complaints from readers wondering what the connection to international law is re some post of mine.  Am I wrong about that among our readers?  But anyway, my fundamental motivation in posting it to VC and then linking back to the OJ discussion was blog-strategic - drive some traffic over to OJ from Volokh.  I'm not trying to deprive OJ or its readers of my 'invaluable' thoughts. Very quickly as to substance in one matter of Kevin's response.  Kevin says I'm offering a caricature of Nils' view on territoriality and armed conflict.  Maybe.  But what Kevin calls caricature, I'd say is a reasonable statement in a couple of paragraphs on a blog of the center of Nils', and the ICRC's, views.  That's not a criticism.  There is a lot to be said for the view that armed conflict has geographical limits on it.  The ICRC, if I may summarize, or caricature, as you will, reached this view on the perfectly sensible and understandable grounds of its alarm over the Bush administration's Global War on Terror claims.  I think that the GWOT reached too far - as I have said many places, in my view - once again, a summary or caricature, as you will - what the Bush administration sought was the tail of law wagging the dog of war, the ability to use the law of war anywhere in the world with or without actual hostilities. The ICRC unsurprisingly became alarmed at this, and has - including through Nils' work - moved to a largely geographically based view of armed conflict.  I understand and sympathize with the reasons, in part because I share them and in part because even where I don't share the final conclusion and come to a different view, I do try to start with a sympathetic view to the argument and understand it on its own terms.  The sympathetic read of that argument is that the Bush administration wanted a global war in order to invoke the law of armed conflict anywhere, at any time, but without any connection to actual hostilities.  As I say, I reach a different view - different from the GWOT view or Nils' view, but I think I am starting from a position of seeking to understand it.  And for that matter, one of the reasons I think I understand it as a "large" view in the law of war is that some of the senior ICRC staff deliberately reached out to me for exactly the same reason - they heard what Koh was saying, what I was saying, what different people were saying, and they were admirably trying very hard to understand the positions and how they differed from their own.

Thanks to the independence of two independents -- Tony Windsor and Rob Oakeshott, who come from conservative electorates.  That, my friends, is putting the good of the country ahead of short-term political interest. Go Julia!  And thank you, Tony and Rob, for sparing us from three years of Tony Abbott....

The day approaches when everyone will have their own drone.  I think I'd like this a Christmas present.  Behold the Parrot.AR ipod-itouch-ipad controlled drone - available for pre-order at Amazon, coming out later this year. [caption id="attachment_13277" align="alignnone" width="300" caption="The Parrot Drone"][/caption]...