General

I am in transit and can’t comment on this now, but Ian Ayres offers this post via Freakonomics blog and Balkinization on war-time bribes to officers on the other side to switch sides or not fight.  Thoughts?  (Update:  I hope these links work now to the original articles.) I have a mildly technical and pedagogical question ... in what sense are these bribes “Coasean?”  If you wanted to use this as an example for a 1L class on law and economics, how would you explain this clearly and non-technically as being “Coasean”?  How might you formulate this as a final exam question for 1L Law and Economics.  No, I’m not going to use a question formulated on a blog post on the actual exam, but maybe as a sample question on how Coasean reasoning can be applied to things that 1Ls might not have imagined.  So I have this nagging pedagogical question — in what sense are these bribes “Coasean” — and that being so, what assumptions are being made about the nature of the bargaining situation to make it consistent with the three standard assumptions about Coase bargaining?
Kristof had previously suggested that the U.S. should assure safe passage for Libyan defectors. But the officer’s story reminded me of an alternative, more economic, incentive deployed in Iraq, where the U.S. offered defecting officers cash to lay down their arms. As reported by Fred Kaplan inSlate in 2003: A fascinating piece in the May 19 Defense News quotes Gen.Tommy Franks, chief of U.S. Central Command, confirming what had until now been mere rumors picked up by dubious Arab media outlets—that, before Gulf War II began, U.S. special forces had gone in and bribed Iraqi generals not to fight. “I had letters from Iraqi generals saying, ‘I now work for you,’ ” Franks told Defense News reporter Vago Muradian in a May 10 interview. The article quotes a “senior official” as adding, “What is the effect you want? How much does a cruise missile cost? Between one and 2.5 million dollars. Well, a bribe is a PGM [precision-guided munition]—it achieves the aim, but it’s bloodless and there’s zero collateral damage.” A “Smart Bribe” can be a lot cheaper than a “Smart Bomb.” Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman (friends and coauthors) have published a fascinating article detailing the pros and cons of bribing enemy combatants to switch sides.
Ayres includes a chart from the Parchomovsky and Siegelman article that walks historically through instances of such bribes in wars in the past and the results; I’ll stick it below the fold, but you can get a more readable view at Ayres’ original post.

I have some views, but they are not entirely solidified, so let me put this out as a question.  France has recognized the the rebels as the sole legitimate representatives of the Libyan people, and withdrawn its recognition of the Qaddafi government.  If that is so, what, if any, are the international law consequences of that recognition? I understand that many...

Although I support the Security Council referral of the Libya situation to the ICC, I do not have any degree of confidence that the ICC referral has not altered Moammar Qaddafi's negotiating or fighting posture at this time.  I have no idea whether Qaddafi's state of mind (if you can even refer to it in normal psychology terms) has or...

The Wall Street Journal reports that France "formally recognized Libya's main opposition group, the first country to do so." It is an excellent story and walks in brisk fashion through the latest moves in diplomacy and assessment of the military chances of the rebels.  However, it is prudent at this point not to over-interpret the implications of this report about France.  From...

I just received Anuradha Kumar's book "Human Rights: Global Perspectives" from interlibrary loan. Perhaps they should increase the salary for book binders. [caption id="attachment_15191" align="aligncenter" width="500" caption=""][/caption] ...

"Is Syria the next domino?"  That's an official source asking, the State Department's e-diplomacy unit, tweeting under the somewhat awkward handle eDipAtState. Tweets from eDipAtState run the gamut, mostly re-tweets from other sources, but they suggestively tilt towards the next freedom fight.  Iran, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Belarus -- these are places were the US is on record as supporting change.  But...

The UN has just released its comments on the ILC’s set of 66 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (“RIO”) as document  A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (available on the ILC website). The commentary is interesting both for what it says and what it doesn’t say. It should be noted that the comments take a more conciliatory view of the ILC’s enterprise than a number...

Having just read through the new order quickly, a few thoughts. First, as had been long rumored, the order essentially sets up a periodic review system for the Guantanamo detainees. The review system is discretionary in nature, but appears designed to supplement the already existing and fairly robust review available to Gitmo detainees through the federal courts since...

Opinio juris meaning the legal concept, not the blog.  The "Fact Sheet" (linked here to Lawfare) that went out with the new executive order on Guantanamo detainees that Deborah notes below has a final section on international law principles.  The points it makes are not related expressly to Guantanamo or detainees there, but about the broader context of laws of...

The President's much-anticipated executive order on Guantanamo was released today. I hope to read and comment on it shortly (not to mention figure out how to post a PDF). In the meantime, the press statement is here. It reads in its entirety as follows: Statement by President Barack Obama: “From the beginning of my Administration, the United States has...

A few days ago, I asked the question (here), what are the best legal arguments that would permit or preclude military intervention in Libya, by the US or some other party or parties, on humanitarian grounds (other than rescue of one’s own nationals)?  The question generated an illuminating array of responses, which I wanted to categorize and expand upon here, but starting with some observations on the law and politics of US policy on intervention, as touching on Libya and beyond.  (ps.  Also check out Jack Goldsmith's discussion of US domestic law and intervention at Lawfare.) I.  Intra-USG Politics So far as I can tell as an outsider to government, the appetite inside the administration, DOD, DOS, or anywhere else where I’ve been able to glean, for any military action on the ground is way, way, way less than zero.  Since that almost certainly mirrors US public opinion, that is not a surprise. But even limited to air action, my personal impression, fwiw, is that the appetite inside the administration to try and undertake a no-fly zone, by ourselves or in coalition, is also zero. The military is deeply opposed (and not just Gates).  I’ve informally spoken with a number of officer friends who think the US trying to do this, whether alone or with the blessing/participation of other parties — including, interestingly, even if blessed by the Security Council — is prudentially a terrible idea.    The idea of the US involved militarily in conflict in yet another Muslim country seems to them a very bad idea, resources are already stretched thin, and no fly zones lead to many unpredictable and unanticipated entanglements. Calls to create a no-fly zone have been expressed loudly by Republicans and “revived” neoconservatives; the Wall Street Journal has an editorial calling for exactly that this morning. As widely noted, it has revived a sharp debate over Bush-era neoconservative foreign policy idealism, grounded in pressing for democracy and liberty for the Middle East.  It is a position long ridiculed by conventionally realist conservatives including George Will, but more importantly also attacked by what I have sometimes called the Obama administration’s “New Liberal Realists.” (I explain these categories in more detail in a long review essay, “Goodbye to all that? A requiem for neoconservatism.”) There have been some calls for the creation of a no-fly zone by liberal American foreign policy idealists, notably former Obama administration DOS official, Anne-Marie Slaughter — now out of the administration and back at Princeton (and of course her views on this are evolving with the situation; this should not be taken as necessarily her last word). I am no expert on Libya and express no view at this point on the prudential or strategic aspect of this.  However, the most striking comment I’ve heard came from a military officer who (like numbers of officers I’ve known) has always been skeptical of the CIA using force, including Predators in targeted killing.  This officer said to me, somewhat tongue in cheek, but somewhat not:  “Where’s the CIA?  Isn’t this what we’ve got a CIA for?  Isn’t this what you think the CIA is supposed to do?  Covert or at least deniable ops? Why don’t they go support the rebels and not pull us into an overt conflict?”

“Karin Calvo-Goller has undoubtedly invested much time and effort into this book, which – but for regrettably sloppy editing – might well serve as a first systematic introduction to the procedural issues confronting the ICC. What is still missing is a book that might help to resolve these issues.” It’s not the best book review one could hope for, but neither...