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Over at Lawfare, I've flagged a fine new article in the Military Law Review, "The Case of the Murdering Wives: Reid v. Covert and the Complicated Question of Civilians and Courts-Martial," by Captain Brittany Warren (Vol. 212. 2012, p. 133; link goes to jagcnet.army.mil.) The article goes into fascinating detail about the actual facts and circumstances of Reid v. Covert, as well as a discussion of historical practices dating back to 17th century Britain and the application of the Articles of War to "camp followers."  It then comes back to the present to discuss the circumstances of civilians in courts-martial in US law. Let me add a comment that goes far afield of Captain Warren's article, but one raised in my mind by the detailed discussion she offers of the "murdering wives case" in its own context and time.  (I don't want to suggest that my discussion reflects her views in that article, so I've decided to make it a separate post here at OJ.)   Reid v. Covert is a case sometimes raised in a different context - one for which it is not really dead-on, however, though sometimes referenced in relation to it.  Reid is the question of the extraterritorial application of the US Constitution, and whether a civilian US citizen lawfully present on a US military base in time of peace, with a SOFA in operation (ie, 1950s Germany), is entitled to a regular US civilian trial with all Constitutional protections in a capital murder case rather than trial in military court under the UCMJ - answer, yes. But, if that's Reid, what about a US citizen who has fled the US to places not controlled in law or fact by the US, and is engaged in violent operations against the US from abroad as part of a terrorist group - is that US citizen nonetheless entitled to trial in a regular civilian court, or at least some form of judicial due process, and at least an implication that this US citizen can't be lethally targeted in the way that a non-citizen lawful target could be?

I wanted to flag for readers one more international law related Federalist Society Teleforum, which will be starting shortly. On the call, which starts at 1 p.m. Eastern at  888-752-3232,  Professor Jeremy Rabkin of George Mason University School of Law and Paul Rosenzweig will discuss the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh's recent address on cyberwarfare.  Please feel free to call...

Russia is considering offering Western companies oil licenses in its Arctic waters. Reuters has an exclusive that the European Union is ready to ban imports of Iranian gas as a part of new sanctions in order to increase the pressure over the nuclear program in the Islamic Republic. A UN representative has told the Security Council there is little time to deal with rebels...

Aryeh Neier, recently retired president of the Open Society Institute (and former head of Human Rights Watch and the ACLU), has an opinion piece in Project Ricochet this week calling for a no-fly zone over Syria. He calls for it to be imposed by a regional force and NATO.  The US would not lead the effort, though presumably it would...

Turkey has struck back at Syria, after a mortar attack killed five Turkish civilians in a city close to the Syrian border. In an urgent meeting, NATO has urged Syria to respect international law. Turkey has also requested a response by the UN Security Council, but Russia asked for a day delay. Four UN Peacekeepers were killed in an ambush in West...

[Thomas H. Lee is Leitner Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. He is currently a visiting professor of law at Harvard.] I agree with Meir that piracy is a “red herring”  and am writing to elaborate on his thoughtful remarks.  The thing that troubles me most about how the Court is thinking about this case is that it continues to accept the Sosa statement...

[Beth Stephens is Professor of Law at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey-Camden.] Monday’s oral argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Inc. focused on the search for a coherent limit to the reach of the Alien Tort Statute. The need for some limit is uncontroversial: even the most ardent advocates of human rights accountability agree that not all cases...

[Doug Cassel is Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School] If Alien Tort Statute suits to redress human rights violations committed abroad are upheld in Kiobel, the Supreme Court is likely to require that plaintiffs first exhaust their foreign and international remedies (or show good cause for not doing so).  If so, it is important that the Supreme Court get right the contours of the exhaustion doctrine under international law.  The Court should require exhaustion only in ATS cases brought exclusively under universal jurisdiction, and not in ATS suits against US companies.  Even in purely universal jurisdiction cases, the Court should respect exceptions to exhaustion recognized by international law. An exhaustion requirement seems likely.  In the Kiobel oral argument on the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, three Justices likely to support extraterritorial reach -- Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor -- asked questions sympathetic to an exhaustion requirement (Tss. at 8, 13-15).  In response, Paul Hoffman, plaintiffs’ counsel, appeared open to an exhaustion requirement (Tss. at 13-14).  No Justice or counsel spoke against an exhaustion requirement; even two Justices generally hostile to the plaintiffs – Alito and Scalia – seemed friendly to an exhaustion requirement (in the event extraterritorial ATS suits are allowed) (Tss. at 15, 31). The most substantial brief on the exhaustion issue, favorably cited by Justice Sotomayor (Tss. at 12-13), is the amicus brief of the European Commission on behalf of the European Union.  The EU brief is generally excellent.  It correctly limits an exhaustion requirement to ATS cases whose exclusive jurisdictional basis under international law is universal jurisdiction (part A below). However, its articulation of the exceptions to exhaustion in universal jurisdiction cases is imprecise (Part B below).  There is a resulting risk that the Court may saddle plaintiffs with a vague and overbroad exhaustion requirement.  This would undermine the very purpose of universal civil jurisdiction – to ensure that grave international crimes do not go unredressed.

Georgia's President Mikhal Saakashvili has conceded defeated in Monday's parliamentary elections. Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have softened his stance on military action against Iran, allowing more space for sanctions to take effect until at least mid-2013. The territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is blamed for the decision of major Chinese banks to pull out of the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings that are...

Rather than dwelling further on any prediction of what kind of opinion the Court is likely to produce following oral arguments in Kiobel (FWIW, I thought arguments went better for plaintiffs than I’d anticipated), I wanted to highlight what I thought was a particularly interesting exchange on whether the State Department’s views on the ATS were entitled to some deference by the Court. Background first. I’d read the U.S. Government’s latest brief as arguing for something like a case-by-case approach on the question of which extraterritorial ATS cases might be appropriate for federal adjudication. In the U.S. view, Filartiga (involving Paraguayan parties disputing the legality of conduct in Paraguay) presents a paradigmatic example of the kind of ATS suit that would be permissible, while Kiobel (involving non-U.S. multinational parties disputing the legality of conduct in Nigeria) presents a contrary example. The distinction between the cases, on this view, seems to turn on a combination of factors, including, but not limited to, the defendant’s presence in the United States (favoring jurisdiction in Filartiga), and the nature of the claim of aiding and abetting a foreign sovereign (disfavoring jurisdiction in Kiobel). But central to the justification for all such distinctions, according to the argument, is the interest of the U.S. government in avoiding conflicts in foreign relations, and the superiority of the executive over the courts in any given case in identifying what those foreign relations conflicts might be. (Again FWIW, I didn’t have the impression from yesterday’s arguments that any justice much liked this position.) So here’s the exchange that struck me (between the U.S. Solicitor General and Justice Scalia).

The Japanese Prime Minister made clear in remarks yesterday that he has no intention of proposing international arbitration to settle or mediate the ongoing Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute with China.  Indeed, China's government-controlled English language paper, noted the inconsistency of Japan's position given its willingness to send its similar dispute with South Korea to the ICJ. (A point I noted here). Noda...