Archive for
July, 2014

Argentina Defaults (Again) and Issues a Frivolous Threat to Sue the U.S. For Causing the Default

by Julian Ku

According to Standard & Poor’s, Argentina has defaulted on at least some of its sovereign bonds, after last minute negotiations failed to reach a deal with its holdout bondholders, who had won a series of victories in U.S. court.  Although there are reports that some U.S. banks representing the rest of the bondholders are exploring ways to buy out the holdout bondholders on Argentina’s behalf (no doubt by having Argentina borrow even more money to do so), Argentina seems ready to go to the mattresses, so to speak. Or, at least in this case, to take the U.S. to the ICJ:

[Argentina Cabinet Chief] Capitanich said Argentina would denounce the “vulture funds” before the International Court of Justice at The Hague and the United Nations General Assembly.

Argentina has been going all out to try to convince other countries and the international community to support its cause including full page ads in major US newspapers, a diplomatic offensive at the recent Organization of American States meeting, and finally this threat to sue the U.S. government for failing to reign in its courts in the holdout creditor litigation against Argentina.

As far as the ICJ goes, this is a pretty idle threat. The ICJ would not have compulsory jurisdiction over the U.S. in this matter, so at best the ICJ would be asked to issue an advisory opinion.  But even in that case, what exactly is Argentina’s claim? That the U.S. has violated international law by blocking some of Argentina’s debt payments?  What international law obligation is being violated? Until someone explains what the legal theory is, I will classify this part of Argentina’s campaign to justify its latest default as just more hot air.

Guest Post: Israel’s Use of Law and Warnings in Gaza

by Janina Dill

[Janina Dill is a Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.]

In the ongoing military campaign ‘Protective Edge’ the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) consistently issues warnings before air strikes against targets in Gaza. The population is warned of impending attacks with phone calls, text messages or so called ‘knocks on the roof’ (dropping of non- or low-impact explosives on the intended target). The warnings play a central role in Israel’s claim that, contrary to Palestinian armed groups, namely Hamas; it obeys the strictures of international law. ‘While the IDF goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid civilian casualties, Hamas deliberately puts civilians in the line of fire, the IDF maintains on its official blog. The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, the relevant sections of which have the status of customary international law, in Article 57(2) c indeed prescribes that ‘effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit’.

Warnings, their frequency and form, are at the centre of a narrative that Israel does not simply comply with, but goes beyond the call of international law in its care for the civilians of Gaza. ‘Israel’s use in the Gaza Strip of non-lethal warning shots to the roofs of buildings which constitute military targets … is not legally obligated’, the Military Advocate General’s Corps holds. Media commentary commends Israel for giving civilians a way out without even being obliged to do so. This is a misunderstanding of Article 57. The provision establishes an unequivocal obligation to warn before attacks that implicate the civilian population – as air strikes against a territory as densely populated as Gaza will regularly do. Granted, it is not an absolute obligation. The law recognizes that sometimes it may not be possible to warn. Crucially the provision does not say ‘warn if possible’, but ‘warn unless impossible’. It is open to interpretation when that is the case and reasonable people may disagree, but the default is to issue a warning and it is a failure to do so that requires explanation. Warnings are not acts of charity.

But are the kinds of warnings issued as part of Operation Protective Edge manifestations of the IDF’s commitment to the laws of war? The practice raises two distinct concerns. The first is that the air strikes the IDF carries out after issuing warnings are indicative of a misunderstanding of the legal implications warning before an attack. It has none! The second is the concern that the practice itself violates international law. I discuss them in turn. Continue Reading…

Emerging Voices: The Rights of Women in Armed Conflict

by Jens Iverson

[Jens Iverson is a researcher at the Law Faculty of the University of Leiden.]

Imagine there is a potential peace agreement that would end a civil war, but only at the cost of leaving portions of the country in question in the hands of a group that systematically violates the human rights women and girls.  The government is backed by a foreign state who, in the past, effectively occupied the country.  Some policy considerations are obvious – continued armed conflict can be devastating to most involved, but resolving the armed conflict with a solution that denies at least half of the population their rights is deplorable.  But is this a purely pragmatic, policy question?

In this post, I assert that foreign states may be obliged to push for peace agreements that protect the rights necessary for a modern democracy, not only on the basis of a general concern for human rights but also based on a more ancient legal and ethical tradition.  The obligation emerges from a source one might not expect—the logic behind the exception to the prohibition of transformative occupation, and ultimately on self-interest.

Traditionally, radical transformation of the laws of occupied territory was prohibited.  There is, however, an exception to this rule, dating at least back to Immanuel Kant.  An occupying power is not obliged to protect a legal system that is itself geared towards war—it is acceptable to create a less war-like constitution for an occupied nation.  This is not a human rights argument, nor an argument based on sparing a civilian population, nor a purely pragmatic public policy argument.  Rather, the legitimate transformative role of an occupying power responds to the traditional justifications for going to war (satisfying the justa causa of the war).  If the war is being fought in response to aggression that has disrupted international peace, then the justa causa may be to restore a system of international peace.  But what does that have to do with the rights of women that would be protected in a modern democracy?

The general modern form of the hypothesis that democracy, including non-discrimination, is important for peace is the “democratic peace hypothesis.”  This hypothesis states that as the democratic nature of the two states increases, the probability for substantial armed conflict between those states during a given year decreases.  If this hypothesis is accurate, and should protecting and promoting the rights of women be an important component of the democratic nature of the state, then promoting and protecting the rights of women is not only important for its own sake but also because of the positive correlation with the sustainability of the peace.

Considered under this analysis, protecting the rights of women is not a side-issue or epiphenomenon that can be considered once the “primary” issues of national security and inter-state relations are resolved—rather such protection can be determinative as to whether the war was justified in the first place.

There are, of course, strong reasons to protect the rights of women based purely on a human rights analysis, and powerful points to be made in favor of protecting women’s interests purely on ethical and humanitarian grounds.  The argument in this post is not intended in any way to undermine such arguments or impugn their moral force.  It does suggest that there is a supplementary analysis that should be helpful in addressing the gap between the ideal of respect and promotion of women’s human rights in the transition to peace and the reality.  This supplementary analysis requires an analysis of the moral and legal justification of the foreign military intervention as a whole.  It is essentially rooted in a traditional framework for public international law-the legal relationship between sovereign states.

Protecting the rights of women during the transition out of armed conflict is critical for establishing a just and sustainable peace.  This is not a new insight.  The UN Security Council has passed several resolutions on women, peace, and security (UNSC Res. 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010)). These resolutions provide evidence of the seriousness of the issue, and provide but have proven unsuccessful in fully addressing the problem.  Women are frequently victimized during armed conflict, underrepresented at the peace table, and disserved by the peace.

So why is this need not being fully addressed?  One difficulty may be the foundations upon which efforts to protect the rights and interests of women are typically built.  During conflict, the main foundation is International Humanitarian Law.  During early peace, there is an increasing role for human rights law and public policy.  International Humanitarian Law has numerous protections for civilians generally and in certain cases for women in particular, but many of those interests are short-term, often simply avoiding death or damage.  Human rights concerns and public policy concerns may be at their weakest when the terms of the new peace are being resolved.  There is a need for an additional rationale that would align the long-term self-interest of powerful actors (such as foreign states) with the self-interest of those placed in an unequal situation by systematic discrimination.

This logic does not, of course, limit itself to women.  Protecting the human rights of children, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, and other minorities is important if the armed intervention is to be justified, and the peace is to be democratic and durable.

Sometimes grasping an immediate, imperfect peace will be ethically and legally preferable to ongoing armed conflict, even if continued conflict comes with the hope of a better peace later.  There is a rationale to say that a foreign state should be reluctant to get in the way should local elites desire peace.  But too often, the foreign state has been too ready to consolidate a peace around a new government that does not respect human rights.  Foreign states, if they continue to have any role, should weigh the obligations they have based on their prior acts, and not jump too quickly to compromise the rights of women.

Is Violating “Serious Obligations” of the INF Treaty the same as its “Material Breach”?

by Duncan Hollis

A few hours ago, the NY Times broke a story that the United States views Russian tests of a ground-launched missile as violating the 1987 INF treaty, formally (and lengthily) titled, “The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles”.  According to the story, the State Department will publicly issue a report that says, among other things:

The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the I.N.F. treaty not to possess, produce or flight test a ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles,”

In addition, President Obama has notified Russian President Putin of the U.S. charges in a letter delivered today.

The U.S. move adds a new brick to the wall of tensions building in the U.S.-Russian relationship (others include Crimea, Russian support for Eastern Ukrainian separatists, the MH17 tragedy, not to mention Edward Snowden’s continuing presence in Moscow).  I assume the timing of the U.S. accusations is no accident.  Moreover, I find it interesting that in so many of these recent crises with Russia, the United States has consistently relied on law and legal argumentation to push against Russia’s actions (or inaction).  This case may be the most extreme example of such an approach since the issue here is entirely one of international law and treaty interpretation.  As such, it’s very much in the wheelhouse of Opinio Juris and its readers. I thought I’d start the conversation with a few preliminary thoughts (emphasis on the “preliminary” since we don’t have too many details to go on as yet).

For starters, the precise language used to describe Russia’s tests — a violation of its obligations under the I.N.F. Treaty” — appears quite significant (especially where it comes after reportedly extensive deliberation). Certainly, the concept of a violation is easy to grasp and has important political implications. For treaty lawyers, however, the term “violation” is not the language we’d expect to see where there’s non-compliance with a treaty’s terms. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which sets the customary international law rules in these cases, describes violations in terms of a treaty’s “breach”  More specifically, it articulates a set of remedies where breaches are “material” (see VCLT Article 60 here).  In this case, however, that key adjective — “material” — is nowhere to be found, suggesting the United States is not looking to invoke this VCLT provision.  But even if it were, in a move that has stumped generations of international law students, the VCLT’s remedies for a treaty’s material breach are quite limited — they entitle the non-breaching party to suspend or terminate its own obligations under the treaty in whole or in part (the VCLT also adds some procedural hurdles but these are largely ignored in State practice). Of course, there’s no evidence suggesting that the U.S. has any intention of suspending or terminating the INF Treaty; on the contrary, U.S. interests seem to lie squarely on keeping Russia obligated by the treaty as long as possible and forestalling any Russian move to withdraw from the INF Treaty (which Article XV allows it to do).  Simply put, the United States does not appear to consider Russia’s behavior as a material breach of the INF treaty nor want the remedies that label conveys; such a path would actually undercut the stability of the INF treaty’s continued performance for which the United States is pushing.

Second, just because the VCLT remedies are undesirable does not foreclose the United States from all legal leverage in this case. By using the term “violation . . . of obligations” the United States may be invoking a different set of international law rules … those of State responsibility.  Although the United States has been ambivalent to the UN’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, those articles elaborate a detailed sets of obligations, rights and remedies where a State commits an internationally wrongful act (defined to include a breach of treaty obligations).  The offending State is required to cease (and not repeat) non-compliant behavior and the injured State(s) may engage in “counter-measures” to induce such a return to compliance. These counter-measures may include behavior previously categorized as a retorsion (lawful behavior such as canceling foreign assistance done in response to a prior breach) and a reprisal (behavior that would be unlawful but for the existence of the prior breach).  At present, the types of U.S. responses on offer described in Michael Gordon’s story are likely retorsions, but I assume other measures, including reprisals, could follow if Russia does not respond appropriately.

Taken together, these moves lend support to Bruno Simma and Christian Tams argument in my book that the law of state responsibility has proven more attractive to States than the VCLT’s remedies for treaty breach. That said, I do not mean to suggest that the VCLT is entirely irrelevant to this case.  On the contrary, its provisions on interpretation (Articles 31-33) are likely central to the U.S. claim of a Russian violation.  What’s more, I’d expect Russia to offer its own interpretation to the contrary employing the same interpretative framework (not to mention counter-claims of U.S. violations as described in tonight’s story).

All in all, there’s quite a bit here that should be of interest not just to those who care about arms control and nonproliferation, but international law and international relations more generally.  I’d be interested to hear what others think the U.S. claim suggests and how you see things playing out? Comments welcome.

What is The Common Law of War?  

by Jens David Ohlin

Since the recent al Bahlul en banc decision before the D.C. Circuit, I have been thinking a lot about the Common Law of War. As others have already analyzed in detail (Steve, Peter, JonathanMarty & Steve), the D.C. Circuit upheld Bahlul’s conviction for conspiracy but threw out his conviction for material support for terrorism and solicitation. Material support and solicitation are unavailable for pre-2006 conduct because they are neither international crimes nor historically charged before military commissions. Conspiracy, on the other hand, is a different story. While it seems pretty clear that conspiracy is not a stand-alone offense under international law, the government has relied on the argument that conspiracy is historically chargeable before a military commission as part of the “common law of war.”

The exact status of the common law of war theory remains unknown because the court’s majority applied “plain error” review and not de novo review on the merits. Some judges concluded that Bahlul waived his objections by not raising them at trial (when Bahlul was declining legal assistance). For his part, Judge Kavanaugh appeared sympathetic to the common law of war argument, which arguably departs from his previous notes of skepticism regarding the theory in Hamdan II.

Since the common law of war idea is still wide open, I’ve been trying to come to terms with it and articulate precisely why I’ve been uncomfortable with it in the past. Indeed, when I first heard the government’s assertion of this theory, I was deeply skeptical and found it almost outrageous. The law of war is international by definition—it is the same for everyone and that’s the whole point of it. The law of war is based on reciprocity and it makes no sense to think of it as a creature of domestic law.

That being said, I think the issue is more complicated than I initially assumed.  In particular, it is important to note that Lieber himself makes reference to the common law of war in article 13 of the Lieber Code. Also, Richard Baxter, in his famous article on spies and unprivileged belligerency, concludes that acts of belligerency by an unprivileged belligerent simply aren’t violations of international law at all – they are violations of domestic criminal law. That’s absolutely correct. The absence of the privilege means that the unprivileged belligerent cannot exempt himself from the demands of domestic law. That’s something far different from an international crime. Unfortunately, Baxter also says in the preceding sentence that the saboteurs in Ex Parte Quirin were “no doubt” triable under the statutes and “military common law of the captors” – though he never explains what he means by this. Presumably he felt that the saboteurs in Quirin were subject to military commission jurisdiction despite the fact that their crimes were domestic violations, though he never articulates his reasoning. Of course, I don’t want to parse Baxter’s article like it’s gospel; I find there’s too much of that already with people treating semi-authoritative Commentaries like treaties. But I still find it interesting that both Baxter and Lieber used the phrase or something close to it.

So why is it so difficult to understand the common law of war? Here are four possible reasons:

1. We no longer live a common law world. Well not exactly. The U.S. is still part of the common law, in the historical sense, but really the common law doesn’t play the role it once did. It has substantially evolved. Statutes and regulations play a much larger role now – and this applies in almost every field of law. This certainly applies in the criminal law, where even the idea of a common law crime sounds just bizarre to today’s students. It’s just so far removed from how the law operates today.

2. Although state courts in the U.S. continue to evolve the common law in each jurisdiction in subject areas that are not covered by a particular statute (say tort law), this endeavor is temporally removed from its historical roots in common law England. Although the law in each jurisdiction can all be traced back to a common source, the doctrines have been developed in unique and different ways in each court. The common law – as something truly common across jurisdictions – has receded into history.

3. The law of war in general, and the jurisdiction of military commissions in particular, were woefully under-theorized in previous generations. This was certainly true in the Civil War, when other than Ex Parte Milligan as an enduring constraint on military jurisdiction, there was insufficient attention paid to developing a deep theory of military jurisdiction. Famously, Ex Parte Quirin was a rush decision, arguably fast-tracked because the Supreme Court was concerned that the administration might execute the prisoners before a decision was reached – which would have dealt a near-fatal blow to the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy and its self-asserted purview, announced in Madison v. Marbury, to say what the law is. It is no surprise that we now look back on Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour” (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Scalia J. dissenting). One way of putting the point is to follow Steve Vladeck and say that the Court has never fully rationalized why military commissions are exempt from the Article III requirement of trial before a regular court. Another way of putting the point is that during the Civil War the concept of military jurisdiction was under-theorized and we are only now playing catch-up.

4. There is something that unites our use of the terms “international law” today with how the term “common law” might have been used in previous generations. This might help explain why there is an international law of war today and a common law of war in the past.  Although they are different, what unites them is a shared participation in a larger legal culture. For international law, the larger legal culture is the international order, with its unique sources for lawmaking (treaties, custom, etc.) and international organizations. For the common law, the larger legal culture is the law that is “common” to many jurisdictions who are all participating in a common legal culture and apply its law together – the “common law.” Although the common law is not the same as international law, it is something larger than pure domestic law, and as such it could, in theory, and historically as well, fulfill some of the demands of reciprocity that the laws of war demand. The problem, of course, is that the common law doesn’t function that way in today’s world. The whole point of the law of war is that it has to be bigger than just domestic law. And maybe the common law in the past was just big enough to support the law of war in some limited sense. Whether that’s enough in today’s world, I really don’t know.

Emerging Voices: Sexual Violence As War Crime: Controversial Issues in the International Criminal Court

by Rosemary Grey

[Rosemary Grey is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales.]

The case of The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, which is currently before the International Criminal Court (ICC), is the latest of several cases in the ICC and Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to address the issue of sexual violence against female child soldiers by members of their own group.

The accused, Ntaganda, is the alleged former commander of the Union des Patriotes Congolais-Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (UPC-FPLC), an armed group which in 2002 and 2003 was involved in the non-international armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

On 9 June 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Ntaganda, including charges for the rape and sexual slavery of female child soldiers in the UPC–FPCL by their commanders and fellow soldiers, which the ICC Prosecutor characterized as war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute. This was the first time that Article 8(2)(e)(vi) had been used to prosecute sex crimes committed against child soldiers by members of the same armed group.

I recently discussed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on Beyond The Hague; here I will focus on the parties’ interpretation of Article 8(2)(e)(vi), and highlight some important gender issues raised by this case.
Continue Reading…

Yukos Shareholder Wins $50 Billion Arbitration Award Against Russia (Yes, that’s Billion With a “B”)

by Julian Ku

Some lawyers at Shearmen & Sterling are no doubt celebrating what may be the largest single arbitration award in history (text of award here). Their client, a shareholder of the expropriated Russian oil company Yukos, has won a $50 billion award against Russia in an investor-state arbitration (seated at the Permanent Court of Arbitration) under the Energy Charter Treaty.   Michael Goldhaber at the American Lawyer has the first and fullest coverage of this historic award.

There are lots of legal battles ahead. Enforcement is going to be challenging, as it always is against sovereign states. And the award has some very interesting observations on legal issues such as the “unclean hands” doctrine under international law.  But for now, this is quite a victory for the plaintiffs to savor and it is already taking a toll on Russia’s stock market.  (And it is a rough few months for the folks over at Cleary Gottlieb, who are also representing Argentina in its unsuccessful battle with its holdout bondholders).

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 28, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Americas

Oceania

UN/Other

Events & Announcements: July 27, 2014

by An Hertogen

Call for Papers

  • A conference on General International Law and International Economic Law: An (Un)Easy Relationship? will be held at the Lomonosov Moscow State University on April 17, 2015. The conference seeks to address the challenges created by application of the general international law to international economics context as well international economic law influence on evolution of general international law. Abstracts should be submitted by September 30, 2014. For further information please refer to the call for papers.

Events

  • On November 13-14, 2014, Ghent University (UGent) will be hosting an international two-day conference at the occasion  of the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The conference, organized in partnership with the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Université catholique de Louvain-Mons (UCL-Mons) and the Université Libre de Bruxelles, will bring together expert scholars from within and without Europe, as well as practitioners and civil servants (e.g., ITLOS, International Seabed Authority, FAO). Four different panels will address the importance of UNCLOS for the maintenance of international peace and security; its importance for the global economy; for the protection of the marine environment, and; the Convention?s compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. Detailed information (including programme, venue and registration details) can be found on the conference website.
  • On September 19-20, The Surrey International Law Centre of the University of Surrey School of Law, with the support of the Institute of Advanced Studies, the McCoubrey Centre of the University of Hull and the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, will host a two-day workshop on the identification of core standards of procedural fairness before international courts and tribunals. The workshop employs a comparative approach whereby participants will analyse the procedures and practices of various international courts and tribunals. It aims to identify patterns of commonality and divergence and to develop a holistic understanding of the nature of procedural fairness and of the challenges to its realisation in the international judicial system. More information can be found here.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us with a one-paragraph description of your announcement along with hyperlinks to more information.

Can Israel Cut Off Water and Power to Gaza?

by Kevin Jon Heller

That’s the question at the heart of a complicated debate between a variety of IHL scholars. The debate began with a legal opinion that Avi Bell submitted to the Knesset, in which he argued that nothing in international law prohibits Israel from cutting off the water and power it provides to Gaza. Although the opinion is dense — and has been updated in response to a document criticising an earlier published version — the bottom line is that Bell rejects the idea that Gaza is still occupied and believes it is thus impossible to find a positive obligation on Israel to continue to provide water and power (p. 5):

Some have argued that Israel is required to supply the Gaza Strip because Israel allegedly maintains control over Gaza. There are two versions of this claim: one version claims that Israel belligerently occupies the Gaza Strip; the other claims that Israel “controls” the Gaza Strip for purposes of human rights treaties or “post-occupation” duties even though it neither occupies nor exercises sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. When it controls territory through belligerent occupation, a state may have the duty supply certain goods to a civilian population if there is no other way to ensure access to the goods. Similarly, when it controls territory over which it has lawful sovereignty, a state may have the duty to supply certain goods when human rights treaties demand their provision to the civilian population. However, Israel does not control the Gaza Strip for purposes of the law of belligerent occupation or human rights  duties. Thus, Israel cannot be held to a duty to supply.

Bell’s legal opinion led a group of leading Israeli international-law scholars, including Eyal Benvenisti, Aeyal Gross (also at SOAS), David Kretzmer, and Yuval Shany, to submit a response to the Knesset. The essence of the response is that even if Israel is no longer occupying Gaza (on which the experts do not take an opinion), its ongoing control over basic features of Gazan life means that it is not free to completely ignore basic Palestinian humanitarian needs. Here is the key paragraph (pp. 10-11):

Israel and Gaza are not equal sovereign entities. Israel has controlled Gaza for decades, which resulted in significant dependence on Israeli infrastructure. Even after the disengagement, it still holds certain powers over the population in Gaza – including by its control over essential infrastructure. Since Israel does not allow, de facto, the development of independent infrastructure in Gaza, it cannot completely deny the responsibility to provide these essential supplies. Therefore, the interpretation suggested in the Opinion does not reflect a proper balance between the different objectives of IHL – even when considering the special challenges of asymmetric warfare. Chiefly, this is because it results in a legal “black hole” which deprives the civilian population of the effective protection of international law.

The debate between Bell and the other experts led Diakonia, a Swedish NGO, to commission a third report from Michael Bothe, one of the world’s foremost IHL experts. Bothe concludes, like the group of experts, that cutting off water and power to Gaza could (in certain circumstances) violate IHL. But he offers two independent bases for that conclusion…

Weekend Roundup: July 19-25, 2014

by An Hertogen

This week on Opinio Juris, our Emerging Voices symposium continued with a post by François Delerue on cyber operations and the prohibition on the threat of force, a comparison by Otto Spijkers of the Nuhanović and Mothers of Srebrenica cases, and Arpita Goswami’s analysis of the PCA’s recent Bay of Bengal Maritime Arbitration Case between India and Bangladesh.

We also welcomed Jens Ohlin for a guest posting stint. This week, Jens discussed competing theories of control in light of the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and two decisions by the European Court of Human Rights on Poland’s involvement in CIA Black Sites on its territory.

Other guest posts were by Jonathan Hafetz who discussed the D.C. Circuit’s en banc ruling in Al Bahlul and by Charles Kels who followed up on our recent symposium self-defence during armed conflict.

Of our regular bloggers, Kevin explained why comments by Moshe Feiglin, the Deputy Speaker of the Knesset in Israel, can be seen as advocating crimes against humanity, but not genocide, against Palestinians. He also summarized the al-Senussi admissibility decision in two quotes. Kristen discussed interesting questions about the increasing “jurisdictional overlap” between individuals designated on targeted sanctions lists and international criminal courts.

Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news and listed events and announcements.

Many thanks to our guest contributors and have a nice weekend!

Guest Post: Henderson & Cavanagh on Self-Defense During Armed Conflict

by Charles Kels

[Charles Kels is a major in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and an attorney for the Department of Homeland Security. He is writing in his personal capacity and his contribution is not meant to represent the views of the Department of Homeland Security, Air Force or Defense.]

Group Captain Henderson and Squadron Leader Cavanagh’s series of posts comparing and contrasting the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and self-defense under criminal law (first, second, third, and fourth parts, along with the responses to posts one and four) provides an excellent analysis of how the legal basis for the application of force impacts the conditions upon its lawful use.

It is hard to argue with the central premise of the discussion: simply put, self-defense is not a part of LOAC. As the authors note, it is a term applicable to specific scenarios—namely, as a defense under criminal law and as a justification for the resort to force by states—and has different meanings depending upon the context in which it is invoked. This, by the way, is why I think the concept of “naked self-defense” as a standard for targeted killings is misplaced: it impermissibly (and I would argue counterproductively) conflates the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello.

The same can be said about the related issue of imminence. It has one meaning under a state’s right of self-defense, and another meaning under the law enforcement “force continuum,” but I’m unaware of any relevance to status-based targeting under LOAC. This is why some of the Obama administration’s pronouncements regarding imminent threats in the midst of what it deems an armed conflict have at times been so confusing.

The inapplicability of self-defense to LOAC is aptly encapsulated by Professor Ohlin vis-à-vis its interplay with the combatant’s privilege: the latter trumps the former, thereby rendering reliance upon it both unnecessary and self-defeating. Claiming self-defense in the face of criminal or disciplinary proceedings is essentially an excuse, but a privileged combatant who has exercised lethal force in compliance with LOAC has no need for vindication. In fact, he or she may be in line for a medal.

Yet, I am left wondering whether the discussion thus far elides a larger issue, rooted not in LOAC per se, but in the moral framework that undergirds it. That is, to what extent does the internal logic of LOAC as a coherent legal regime rest upon a generalized notion of individual self-defense? To the extent this insight has merit, I of course can’t take credit for it, although I have tried to flesh out its implications for remotely-waged warfare. It stems from Walzer’s famous formulation  (p. 34) of the “moral equality of soldiers,” and has found perhaps its most eloquent expression in the writing of legal philosopher Paul Kahn.

Essentially, Walzer’s notion is that “the capacity to injure” is what makes combatants legitimate targets in war. Kahn takes that argument to its logical conclusion, claiming that “the internal morality of warfare” is based upon the principle of “self-defense within conditions of reciprocal imposition of risk.” As such, what we lawyers call the combatant’s privilege is at heart “the soldier’s privilege of self-defense.”

Of course, given the irrelevance of imminence to LOAC, the risk posed by the identified enemy need not be immediate—hence another of Walzer’s well-known examples, the “naked soldier” (p. 138). Presumably, however, when that soldier gets dressed, he just may try and kill you (and may even be obligated to do so). This is what differentiates him from those who are hors de combat. So better to shoot him now, while you have the chance. What Michael Ignatieff calls the “tacit contract” of “kill or be killed” (p. 161) is still intact, even if attenuated.

One way to respond to Walzer, Kahn, and Ignatieff, et al. is simply to say that they’re wrong. Mutual risk has nothing to do with LOAC. To the extent that LOAC is concerned with promoting reciprocity, it’s a reciprocity of compliance, not physical peril. The jus in bello principle of proportionality, of course, imposes no requirement whatsoever with respect to parity in casualty rates among opposing forces.

Even so, it’s hard to deny that the reductive notion of combat as self-defense has intrinsic appeal, if nothing else than for providing a conceptually digestible précis of LOAC for those who actually have to implement its tenets in less than ideal circumstances. After all, the true value of LOAC is not just that it forbids some inhumane practices, but also that it legitimates certain acts of violence so that soldiers can do their jobs “without resorting to their own personal moral codes” or becoming paralyzed by principled indecision. This is especially so where, as in today’s conflicts, exhortations to abide by LOAC in order to incentivize compliance by the enemy are likely to fall on deaf ears (not to mention fail the straight-face test). At the end of the day, adhering to LOAC is about preserving our own humanity, not performing a risk-benefit analysis.

None of this detracts from the cogency of Henderson and Cavanagh’s observations, nor does it obviate the importance of avoiding confusion with respect to both the different contextual meanings of self-defense and their divergence from wartime targeting rules. However, I’m not sure that it’s possible to get away completely from accounting for permutations of self-defense when we talk about war-fighting. Otherwise, we risk being legally correct in the technical sense, while losing sight of the larger discussion over what it means to fight honorably.

Jurisdictional Overlap: Security Council Sanctions and the ICC

by Kristen Boon

A background paper for a High Level Review of Sanctions currently underway at the UN raises some important and interesting questions about the increasing “jurisdictional overlap” between individuals designated on targeted sanctions lists and international criminal courts.   In relevant part, the paper states:

Increasingly, the reach of sanctions has gone beyond those responsible for initiating and supporting threats to, or breaches of, international peace and security, to include perpetrators of conduct that could be crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC (especially violations of international humanitarian law, human rights, attacks against civilians, recruitment of child soldiers, sexual and gender based violence), thus increasing the overlap. Inevitably, in some cases the same individuals are or could be subject to both ICC proceedings and to UNSC targeted sanctions.

Even where their “jurisdiction” overlaps, sanctions and the ICC have different objectives (and evidentiary standards): sanctions applied to a particular individual seek to protect “the peace” or, more concretely, civilians, from future actions of the individual, by constraining the individual’s ability to act; an ICC proceeding seeks to determine the accountability of that individual for past actions.

 

This overlap is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it shows an important evolution in sanctions design, from comprehensive sanctions, to targeted measures against specific individuals which run the risk “criminalizing” certain behaviors without a judicial process.   I should be clear that from the work I have seen of sanctions committees, restraint rather than overstepping has been the norm.  Nonetheless, it does present issues of “individualization” (which have been analyzed by Larissa van den Herik in the context of human rights and the Kadi and Nada cases in Europe).  Second, it raises issues of how the ICC and Security Council and its subsidiary bodies cooperate.  The ICC – UN Relationship agreement is a framing instrument here, as is Part IX of the ICC statute on cooperation.  That said, the absence of a general policy at the UN to designate individuals on sanctions lists (where a relevant sanctions regime exists) is striking.  The most high profile (read: political) example of that involves Omar Al-Bashir – despite an outstanding ICC arrest warrant against him, ongoing sanctions regime against the situation in Sudan, and a Security Council referral of the situation to the ICC, Bashir has never been designated under the sanctions regime.  As I argued in this post last year, a travel ban would have been one way to restrict his efforts to attend the General Assembly meetings in New York in 2013.  Finally, write large, it presents the old “peace versus justice” debate because of the different goals of sanctions (conflict management) and criminal prosecutions (atrocity for past acts.)

Emerging Voices: The Old Woe of Contemporaneity and Cartographic Evidence in a New Bottle

by Arpita Goswami

[Arpita Goswami currently serves as an Assistant Editor to China Oceans Law Review, and is a Graduate Assistant at the South China Sea Institute, Xiamen University, P.R. China. The views expressed here are her own and have no connection whatsoever to the above mentioned organizations.]

The recently concluded Bay of Bengal Maritime Arbitration Case between India and Bangladesh offers interesting insights into the application of the judicial pronouncements to the factual situation contemporaneous with it for determining the boundary lines and the usage of cartographic evidence in the same. This post examines the section of the Award delimiting the riverine boundary between the two States. The reasoning given by Tribunal in this case makes an interesting read regarding the technicalities of demarcation of boundaries, challenges in the contemporaneous applications and the validity of cartographic evidence in such an application.

Background (para. 50-55 of the judgment)

The Indian Independence Act, 1947 of the United Kingdom, partitioned from India, the states of West Pakistan and East Pakistan. East Pakistan was carved out of the Bengal Province, with West Bengal remaining in India. In order to demarcate the boundary between East Pakistan and West Bengal, the Bengal Boundary Commission was set up in 1947 which was chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe. In Aug. 1947, the Commission submitted the report describing the boundary, and is known as “Radcliffe Award”. However, in 1948 the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Dispute Tribunal was set up by India and Pakistan to address the disagreement in the application of the Radcliffe Award. In 1950, the above mentioned Tribunal gave its Award, known as the “Bagge Award”.

In 1971, East Pakistan declared independence from West Pakistan, and succeeded as a new state of Bangladesh to the territory of East Pakistan and its boundaries.

The boundary between India and Bangladesh runs across the Sunderban Delta region. The southern section of the land boundary lies in the riverine features, which fall in the Bay of Bengal. Among its tasks of finding the land boundary terminus anddelimiting the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelves between the two States, the present Tribunal also had to concern itself with delimiting the boundary river between the two, which will be discussed in the passages below.

Delimitation of the Boundary River

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The al-Senussi Admissibility Decision in Two Quotes

by Kevin Jon Heller

Libya’s Foreign Minister, 21 May 2014:

There is a complete absence of the army and the police [in Libya], which are responsible for the security of the state. Armed groups are not under control…. State-building needs to build security institutions first and foremost because with no security there can be no investments, building a real state, nor an effective criminal justice system to protect rights and freedoms.

ICC Appeals Chamber, 24 July 2014:

The Appeals Chamber concluded that there were no errors in the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber that Libya is not unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute Mr Al-Senussi.

ECHR Rules Against Poland in CIA Black Sites Case

by Jens David Ohlin

In two decisions (here and here) handed down this morning, the European Court of Human Rights has found that Poland violated its obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights for its complicity in the United States’ running of a CIA black site and high-value detainees program on Polish territory.

One of the cases involved al-Nashiri, who was prosecuted before a U.S. military commission and the subject of protracted habeas litigation in the DC Circuit. He was accused of orchestrating the attack against the USS Cole in 2000. In federal court his lawyers raised the very interesting issue of whether there existed an armed conflict with al-Qaeda at that time (i.e. before 9/11), and whether a military commission could properly assert jurisdiction over a crime that was allegedly committed before (in their view) the commencement of the armed conflict.

Nashiri was captured in Dubai in 2002, transferred to a CIA prison in Afghanistan (called the “Salt Pit”), then to a CIA facility in Bangkok (called “Cat’s Eye”) where detainee Abu Zubaydah (the subject of the other case) also was held. Both were then transferred to the CIA black site in Poland. After his time in Poland, he was transferred briefly to Morocco on his way to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The decision goes into extensive detail of the CIA interrogation program, including a review of internal CIA documents explaining the interrogation methods that officers were authorized to use against detainees, as well as the unauthorized techniques that were sometimes used. The court concluded that (para. 417):

Assessing all the above facts and evidence as a whole, the Court finds it established beyond reasonable doubt that:

(1)  on 5 December 2002 the applicant, together with Mr Abu Zubaydah, arrived in Szymany on board the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU;

(2)  from 5 December 2002 to 6 June 2003 the applicant was detained in the CIA detention facility in Poland identified as having the codename “Quartz” and located in Stare Kiejkuty;

(3)  during his detention in Poland under the HVD Programme he was interrogated by the CIA and subjected to EITs and also to unauthorised interrogation techniques as described in the 2004 CIA Report, 2009 DOJ Report and the 2007 ICRC Report;

4)  on 6 June 2003 the applicant was transferred by the CIA from Poland on the CIA rendition aircraft N379P.

The ECHR then concludes that Poland was aware of (and complicit) in the CIA activities:

442.  Taking into consideration all the material in its possession (see paragraphs 418-439 above), the Court finds that there is abundant and coherent circumstantial evidence, which leads inevitably to the following conclusions:

(a)  that Poland knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory at the material time and that, by enabling the CIA to use its airspace and the airport, by its complicity in disguising the movements of rendition aircraft and by its provision of logistics and services, including the special security arrangements, the special procedure for landings, the transportation of the CIA teams with detainees on land, and the securing of the Stare Kiejkuty base for the CIA’s secret detention, Poland cooperated in the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its territory;

(b)  that, given that knowledge and the emerging widespread public information about ill-treatment and abuse of detained terrorist suspects in the custody of the US authorities, Poland ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA to detain such persons on its territory, it was exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention (see also ElMasri, cited above, §§ 217-221).

443.  Consequently, Poland was in a position where its responsibility for securing “to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined …. in [the] Convention” set forth in Article 1 was engaged in respect of the applicant at the material time.

The Court holds that Poland violated Article 3 of the Convention for its failure to adequately investigate the mistreatment, and for failing to ensure that “individuals within its jurisdiction were not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals .”  Again, here is the Court’s holding (para. 517):

Notwithstanding the above Convention obligation, Poland, for all practical purposes, facilitated the whole process, created the conditions for it to happen and made no attempt to prevent it from occurring. As the Court has already held aboveon the basis of their own knowledge of the CIA activities deriving from Poland’s complicity in the HVD Programme and from publicly accessible information on treatment applied in the context of the “war on terror” to terrorist suspects in US custody the authorities – even if they did not witness or participate in the specific acts of ill-treatment and abuse endured by the applicant – must have been aware of the serious risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 occurring on Polish territory.

Accordingly, the Polish State, on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the HVD Programme must be regarded as responsible for the violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention committed on its territory (see paragraph 452 above and El-Masri, cited above, §§ 206 and 211).

The Court also found a violation of the article 5 prohibition against arbitrary detention (para. 532), the article 8 prohibition against interference with family life for holding him incommunicado (para. 540), the article 13 requirement of an effective domestic remedy (para. 551), and the article 6 prohibition against an unfair trial (para. 569).

The last holding on article 6 required the Court to conclude that the petitioner’s trial before a U.S. military commission would be unfair — which is a substantial legal determination. Unfortunately, the Court’s analysis on this point is incredibly thin, and relies mostly on the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination in Hamdan that the creation of the tribunals was procedurally defective and violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, without much independent analysis. There is no discussion of post-Hamdan military commission reforms.

Finally, the Court concludes that Poland violated its Protocol 6 (abolition of the death penalty) obligations because of the risk that the petitioner would be subject to capital punishment before a U.S. military commission (para. 579).

Emerging Voices: Responsibility of the Netherlands for the Genocide in Srebrenica–The Nuhanović and Mothers of Srebrenica Cases Compared

by Otto Spijkers

[Otto Spijkers is an Assistant Professor of Public International Law at Utrecht University.]

Introduction

This post compares the recent judgment of the District Court in The Hague in the case of the “Mothers of Srebrenica” with the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of last year in the Nuhanović case. I will try not to repeat what Kristen Boon wrote about the case in an earlier post.

Facts

Both judgments deal with the legal responsibility of the Netherlands for the death of (some of) the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995. When the so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch UN peacekeepers all left the area. Hasan Nuhanović was permitted to leave with them, because he had worked for the UN, but the UN peacekeepers refused to take the relatives of Hasan Nuhanović as well. Hasan’s brother and father were subsequently killed, together with thousands of other Bosnian Muslims. Most of the victims were situated outside the compound over which the Dutch peacekeepers exercised effective control. Even those Bosnian Muslims that managed to enter the compound, just before the fall of Srebrenica was a fact, were later surrendered by the Dutch peacekeepers to the Bosnian Serbs. Almost all of them were killed.

Legal Question

Nuhanović argued that the refusal of the Dutch UN peacekeepers to save his relatives constituted a wrongful act, attributable to the State of the Netherlands. The Mothers of Srebrenica argued that the refusal of the Dutch UN peacekeepers to save all Bosnian Muslims within the so-called “mini safe area” constituted a wrongful act, attributable to the Netherlands. This is the area where most people fled to after the city of Srebrenica had fallen into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. This mini safe area consisted of the compound in Potočari and the surrounding area, where deserted factories and a bus depot were located (para. 2.35 of Mothers of Srebrenica judgment).

Attribution

In Nuhanović, The Dutch Supreme Court held that the same conduct could in principle be attributed both to the Netherlands and to the United Nations. In reaching this decision, the Court referred to Article 48 of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (2011, DARIO). In the Mothers of Srebrenica case, the District Court reached the same conclusion (para. 4.34)

Since the UN was not party to the Nuhanović-proceedings, the Supreme Court could look only at the rights and responsibilities of the Netherlands. The Mothers of Srebrenica initially involved the UN in the proceedings as well, but the Organization effectively relied on its immunity (this led to some landmark judgments by the Dutch Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights), and thus the case continued without the UN. In Mothers of Srebrenica, the District Court explicitly rejected the position of the Mothers that, given the immunity of the UN, the rules on attribution should be interpreted more “broadly,” as otherwise the Dutch UN peacekeepers would be placed “above the law” (para. 4.35). At the same time, one cannot help get the feeling that it played a role.

With regard to attribution, the Supreme Court in Nuhanović based its decision primarily on Article 7 DARIO. This provision states that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of an international organization by a State must be considered to be the conduct of that international organization, when the organization has effective control over the conduct. The Netherlands argued that Article 6 DARIO was the relevant provision, and not Article 7. Article 6 DARIO states that the conduct of an organ of an international organization is attributable to that international organization. The argument of the State was thus that the peacekeepers were a UN organ. This is also the view of the UN itself. But the Supreme Court followed the ILC Commentary to DARIO, according to which a battalion of peacekeepers is not a UN organ, because the battalion to a certain extent still acts as an organ of the State supplying the soldiers. Important in this assessment is the fact that the troop-contributing State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over its peacekeepers.

Interestingly, the Dutch Supreme Court also referred to Article 8 of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001, ARS). Strictly speaking, Article 7 DARIO says nothing about the attribution of conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of an international organization by a State to that State. The Article deals exclusively with the responsibility of international organizations, such as the UN. All it says is that, if the international organization does not have effective control over the conduct of the organ, then it is not responsible for that conduct. But that does not mean that, by definition, this makes the State responsible in such cases. In theory, it could very well be that neither of the two is responsible. And so to complete the picture, the Dutch Supreme Court relied on Article 8 ARS. According to this provision, the conduct of a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State if the group is in fact acting under the effective control of that State in carrying out the conduct. This provision was meant to make it possible to attribute acts of persons not formally part of the State system to the State in exceptional circumstances.

One may wonder why the Supreme Court did not instead make use of Article 4 ARS, according to which the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State. If peacekeepers are not UN organs, then it would be logical to consider the peacekeeping force as a State organ instead. Peacekeepers are not the mercenaries, militants or bands of irregulars for which Article 8 ARS has been designed. But if we follow the Dutch Supreme Court, the peacekeepers are nobody’s organ; and whoever happens to be in effective control of them at the relevant time, is responsible for their actions.

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Control Matters: Ukraine & Russia and the Downing of Flight 17

by Jens David Ohlin

The recent downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, apparently by an anti-aircraft missile fired from within rebel-controlled territory in the Ukraine, has raised the specter that Russia is covertly (or not so covertly) supplying arms and assistance to the pro-Russian separatists operating within eastern Ukraine. Obviously, the facts here are somewhat contested and I have no insider or independent information about the firing of the missiles. What I say here is based on news reports in The New York Times and elsewhere, and our understanding of the situation is rapidly evolving.

But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that this story (or something similar) turns out to be true. Let’s assume that the “BUK” anti-aircraft missile system was either provided to the Ukrainian rebels by Russian operatives, or that it was stolen by the rebels from the Ukrainian military, and then operated with assistance from Russian operatives and military advisors. It seems more likely that the missile system was provided directly by Russia, but even if the rebels stole it from the Ukrainian military, it seems unlikely that the untrained militia-members would have been capable of deploying it without Russian assistance. (Again, let’s just take this as an assumption, because alternate hypotheses exist, including the contention that the militia members are trained in anti-aircraft missile deployment because they are local defectors from the Ukrainian military).

If this story is true, it reveals how important the debate is, in international jurisprudence, between competing theories of control. This might seem like an obvious point, but the current situation in the Ukraine (vis-à-vis Russian influence) may stand at precisely the fault line between “effective control” and “overall control” – the two competing doctrines of attribution in international law.

As most readers already know, the effective control test was articulated in the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment and offers a fairly robust set of standards for attributing the actions of an armed group to a particular state, essentially requiring that the armed units are operating on the instruction, or at the direction of, the foreign state. In these circumstances, the actions of the armed group can be attributed to the foreign state.

In contrast, the ICTY in Tadic declined to follow the ICJ’s Effective Control Test, and instead formulated and applied the broader Overall Control Test. The test was originally designed to determine in Tadic whether the armed conflict was an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict. If the conduct was attributable to a foreign state, then the armed conflict was international in nature. Subsequently, Cassese argued (correctly) that the test was, in fact, a general test for state responsibility. The test allowed for state responsibility in situations where a foreign power helped to coordinate the actions of an organized and hierarchically structured armed group by equipping, financing, or training the paramilitary force.

The dispute between these two tests is crucial because they really do give different answers in important cases. It seems to me that the Ukrainian situation falls directly on the fault line between the overall and effective control tests. If the Effective Control test applies, then it is not clear whether the shooting down of the airliner can be directly attributed to the Russian government (although that conclusion depends on which facts are unearthed in the investigation). On the other hand, if the Overall Control test applies, then there is a plausible argument that the shooting of Flight 17 can be attributed to Russia because their operatives probably helped train and equip, and coordinate, the activities of the pro-Russian militia. The Overall Control test supports the attribution of responsibility to Russia, while the Effective Control test probably does not.

Either way, one important insight about both tests is their black-and-white nature. Instead of a spectrum of control yielding different degrees of responsibility, the tests act as an on-off switch. Either there is state responsibility or there is not; either the acts are attributed or they are not. There is no sliding scale of responsibility based on the degree of foreign involvement or entanglement in the local affairs of the militia or paramilitary organization.

A final note on a related but distinct topic. It also seems pretty clear that pro-Russian militia were acting incompetently in shooting down the plane, assuming incorrectly that they were shooting down a military aircraft. How should one understand their level of culpability here? Recklessness comes to mind as the appropriate mental state since they probably did not engage in the appropriate due diligence to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft.

Although it is unclear whether this should be treated as an international crime (killing of civilians during an armed conflict) or a domestic crime (murder), I have to say that I have never found international criminal law’s treatment of crimes of recklessness particularly satisfying. Under domestic law, reckless killings are either classified as manslaughter or as the lowest degree of murder (such as depraved indifference to human life) depending on the jurisdiction and depending on the severity of the recklessness. Domestic law therefore produces a grading of the offense based on the lower mental state. In contrast, international criminal law has no lower offense for crimes of recklessness. Unlike the distinction between murder and manslaughter, a defendant is either convicted or acquitted of the war crime of killing civilians (with nothing in between).

Guest Post: The D.C. Circuit’s En Banc Ruling in Al Bahlul: Legal Innovation, Tradition, and America’s Domestic Common Law of War

by Jonathan Hafetz

[Jonathan Hafetz is Associate Professor of Law at Seton Hall Law School.  He has represented several Guantanamo detainees and has filed amicus briefs in previous legal challenges to military commissions.]

On July 14, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its long-awaited (and deeply fractured) opinion in Al Bahlul v. United States (.pdf), addressing the scope of military commission jurisdiction over offenses—material support for terrorism, solicitation, and conspiracy—that are not crimes under international law.  In a nutshell, the D.C. Circuit vacated Bahlul’s conviction for material support and solicitation, but affirmed his conviction for conspiracy against an ex post facto challenge.  While the ruling takes material support and solicitation off the table for commission prosecutions (at least for prosecutions of current Guantanamo detainees), it does not resolve the viability of charging conspiracy as a stand-alone offense because the en banc holding is based on the application of plain error review to Bahlul’s case (due to its conclusion that Bahlul failed to preserve his ex post facto challenge below).  The decision thus leaves open the fate of conspiracy under de novo review.  By implication, it also leaves open the viability of the U.S. government’s domestic war crimes theory not only with respect to other commission cases charging conspiracy (including the ongoing prosecution of the 9/11 defendants), but also with respect to Bahlul’s other legal challenges to his conspiracy conviction, which the en banc court remanded to the original D.C. Circuit panel.

This post will examine the multiple opinions in Bahlul addressing the U.S. government’s domestic war crimes theory, which posits that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA) retroactively authorizes, and that the Constitution allows, the prosecution by military commission of conduct that is not a crime under the international law of war.  (For excellent summaries of the Bahlul decision, see posts at Just Security by Steve Vladeck here and by Steve and Marty Lederman here).  The theory’s viability is central to the retroactivity arguments addressed by the en banc court as well as to the additional arguments under Article I and Article III that will be considered on remand.
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Welcome to Guest Blogger Jens David Ohlin

by Chris Borgen

Professor Jens David Ohlin of Cornell Law School will be guest blogging with us over the next two weeks. Many readers may know Jens from his blogging at Lieber Code and from his many articles on international criminal law, the laws of war, cyberwar, and comparative criminal law, among other topics.

Jens is also the author or editor of four books, including his forthcoming The Assault on International Law (Oxford) and Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford 2012), for which he was a co-editor.

We are very happy to have Jens participating on Opinio Juris for the next couple of weeks and look forward to the conversation!

Emerging Voices: Cyber Operations and the Prohibition of the Threat of Force

by Francois Delerue

[François Delerue is Ph.D. researcher in International Law at the European University Institute (EUI – Florence, Italy) and visiting scholar at Columbia University (fall term 2014)]

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter was revolutionary in its extension to the explicit prohibition of the threat of force, alongside the prohibition of the use of force. No cyber operation has ever been qualified as a threat or use of force by any States or international organizations; commentators are more nuanced and some consider certain cyber operations as likely to qualify as actual uses of force (see generally: Tallinn Manual p. 45; Marco Roscini pp. 53-55; Duncan Hollis). Most of the literature applying Article 2(4) to cyber operations focuses on the use of force and, therefore, the threat of cyber force remains understudied.

In this blog post I endeavor to fill this gap by analyzing inter-state cyber operations according to the prohibition of threat of force. My main argument is that for most inter-state cyber operations the qualification as the threat of force is arguably more suitable than trying to qualify them as an actual use of force at any cost. I will develop successively the two main forms of threat of force: open threat of prohibited force and demonstration of force.

A Threat of Prohibited Cyber Force As a Prohibited Threat of Force

The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, confined the prohibition of the threat of force to the prohibition of the threat of the use of the prohibited force (para. 47). In other words, an unlawful threat is a conditional promise to resort to force in circumstances in which use of force would itself be unlawful. This form of threat of force is the most obvious one and can be implied directly from the wording of the UN Charter. Formulated by Ian Brownlie in 1963 (p. 364), this approach is nowadays the prevailing one on the threat of force.

Applied to cyber operations, a threat of cyber force will violate the prohibition of Article 2(4) only if the threatened cyber force amounts to an unlawful use of force in the same circumstances. This is the contemporary leading approach among scholars and is, for instance, the approach followed by rule 12 of the Tallinn Manual:

A cyber operation, or threatened cyber operation, constitutes an unlawful threat of force when the threatened action, if carried out, would be an unlawful use of force.

Is a general threat to resort to force enough to constitute a violation of the prohibition of Article 2(4)? The answer is unequivocally yes. Most verbal or written threats of force constitute a general threat of force, without specification on which kind of force might be use. It seems most likely that threat of force will remain mainly general, and cyber force will be one of the possible options to be used by the threatening State.

Demonstration of Cyber Force As a Prohibited Threat of Force

Demonstration of cyber force constitutes the second form of threat of force. In contrast to an open threat of force, a demonstration of force is constituted by acts instead of words performed by a State. Force may be demonstrated in many ways: notably in military acts – such as deployment of troops, manoeuvres, nuclear arms build-ups or testing – showing the readiness of a State to resort to force against another. In the literature on the threat of cyber force, demonstration of force is sometimes analyzed but remains for the most part neglected and understudied.

Most cyber operations fail to qualify as an actual use of force; however, could they constitute a demonstration of force amounting to a prohibited threat of force? I will use recent examples of cyber operations to answer this question.

Large-Scale Distributed Denial of Service Attacks As a Demonstration of Force

A distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a cyber attack, which aims to make a machine or network resource unavailable by flooding it with requests from compromised systems. Could such a large-scale DDoS attack amount to a demonstration of force? The answer seems to be positive under certain conditions.

In April 2007, Estonia faced violent street protests by a minority group of Russian descent objecting to the removal of World War II bronze statue of a Soviet soldier. Simultaneously, the country experienced multiple cyber operations, notably large-scale DDoS attacks on the websites and servers of private and public institutions. The Estonian government accused Russia of the cyber attacks; Russia, however, denied any involvement. As Estonia is highly connected and extremely dependent on its computer infrastructure, these cyber operations were able to paralyze a large part of the Estonian economy, media and government. Could these cyber operations constitute a use of force? Estonia explored initially the possibility to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and thus to treat these cyber operations as an ‘armed attack’[1] triggering ‘the right of individual or collective self-defence’; however, this solution was quickly ruled out (see e.g. Mary E. O’Connell pp. 192-193; see also: here and here).

While neither Estonia nor other States considered those cyber operations as a use or threat of force, could these cyber operations constitute a credible threat of force? Their consequences resulted in the partial paralysis of the State, limiting the ability of the country to respond in case of military action. Moreover, they occurred in fractured relations between the targeted State and the presumed threatening State, rendering any threat of force more credible. It seems, as a result, that those cyber operations could be considered as potential preluding measures to a use of force. They could thus be considered as a demonstration of force violating the prohibition of threat of force of Article 2(4).

The Estonian example demonstrates that a large-scale DDoS attack against an Internet-dependent State could constitute a threat of force. However, not all DDoS attacks might be that easy to qualify as a demonstration of force. In the case of similar cyber operations faced by Georgia before the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the conclusion might be more nuanced. Unlike Estonia, Georgia is not highly dependent on the Internet; therefore the consequences of cyber operations were limited and resulted mainly in the inability for the Georgian Government to access its websites and use them to communicate. As a result, the qualification of a threat of force seems difficult and probably excessive for this situation. Continue Reading…

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 21, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Americas

UN/Other

Events and Announcements: July 20, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Announcements

  • A one-day conference on the UN Migrant Workers Convention will be held at the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation in Venice on Monday, 28 July. The conference, which boasts a stellar line-up of speakers, will take place in the 12th century monastery of San Nicolò and is free and open to the public. 
  • Workshop: Foreign Investment in the Services Sector. A workshop – organized by Andreas R. Ziegler and Michael Hahn (University of Lausanne), Eric de Brabandere (Grotius Centre, Leiden University) and Tarcisio Gazzini (UNIL – Foreign Services in Africa Project) – will take place on 19 September 2014 at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) in the context of the opening of the academic year of the LLM Programme on International and European Economic and Commercial Law, and it will explore the specific problems relating to foreign direct investment in services sector and thus the overlap of International Investment Law and Trade in Services.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us with a one-paragraph description of your announcement along with hyperlinks to more information.

Feiglin Is Advocating Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Not Genocide

by Kevin Jon Heller

Twitter is abuzz with claims that Moshe Feiglin, the Deputy Speaker of the Knesset in Israel, has called for the commission of genocide against the Palestinians. Here is what he said, in relevant part:

Conquer – After the IDF completes the “softening” of the targets with its fire-power, the IDF will conquer the entire Gaza, using all the means necessary to minimize any harm to our soldiers, with no other considerations.

Elimination– The GSS and IDF will thoroughly eliminate all armed enemies from Gaza. The enemy population that is innocent of wrong-doing and separated itself from the armed terrorists will be treated in accordance with international law and will be allowed to leave. Israel will generously aid those who wish to leave.

Feiglin’s comments are vile, horrifying, and unfortunately all too common in Israel’s increasingly toxic right-wing political culture. As awful as they are, though, they do not amount to incitement to genocide, because Feiglin is advocating the forcible transfer or deportation of the Palestinians — commonly referred to as ethnic cleansing — not genocide. There are five types of genocidal acts: (1) killing members of a group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The actions Feiglin advocates come closest to (3), but he makes clear that he is not advocating displacing Palestinians into a location where they could not physically survive, which would be genocide. (A pre-Genocide Convention example is the Armenian genocide, in which the Ottoman empire not only ethnically cleansed the Armenians, but drove them into the Syrian desert to die.) In short, Feiglin is advocating that Israel commit not genocide but crimes against humanity.

Feiglin is also, it’s worth noting, urging Israel to commit war crimes against the Palestinians. Here is another one of his suggestions:

Defense – Any place from which Israel or Israel’s forces were attacked will be immediately attacked with full force and no consideration for ‘human shields’ or ‘environmental damage’.

It is ICL 101 that it is a war crime to intentionally launch an attack knowing that it will — in the words of the Rome Statute — “cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians… which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” In making that determination, an attacker must take into account any civilian who will be incidentally killed in an attack, even one who is serving as a human shield. Two wrongs do not make a right in ICL. By urging Israel to ignore the presence of civilians, therefore, Feiglin is urging Israel to launch attacks that are highly likely to be disproportionate.

Weekend Roundup: July 12-18, 2014

by An Hertogen

This week on Opinio Juris, we kicked off the second edition of our Emerging Voices symposium with a post by Zachary Clopton on the horizontal and vertical dimensions of international law in U.S. Courts, followed by Abel Knottnerus’ post on rule 134quater.

Julian clarified last week’s post on Taiwan and argued that “lawfare” will not deter China in the South China Sea. He also posted an obituary for William T. Burke.

Kevin gave his take on the most important issues in international criminal justice today, while Kristen commented on the Mothers of Srebrenica judgment in the Netherlands.

Chris looked at the international legal argument behind the story about the dad who claimed a kingdom for his little girl.

Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news and I listed the events and announcements.

Have a nice weekend!

Emerging Voices: Extraordinary Exceptions at the ICC–What happened with Rule 134quater?

by Abel Knottnerus

[Abel S. Knottnerus is a PhD Researcher in International Law and International Relations at the University of Groningen.]

In November 2013, the Assembly of States Parties adopted Rule 134quater. Under the pressure of African States, the ASP agreed that the Trial Chamber should be able to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial, when the accused “is mandated to fulfil extraordinary public duties at the highest national level”.

Rule 134quater

1. An accused subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties at the highest national level may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel only; the request must specify that the accused explicitly waives the right to be present at the trial.

2. The Trial Chamber shall consider the request expeditiously and, if alternative measures are inadequate, shall grant the request where it determines that it is in the interests of justice and provided that the rights of the accused are fully ensured. The decision shall be taken with due regard to the subject matter of the specific hearings in question and is subject to review at any time.

While this amendment was welcomed by the international community – and most notably by the UK, the US and the AU – several commentators questioned its consistency with the Statute, and in particular with Articles 27.1 (“irrelevance of official capacity”) and 63.1 (“the accused shall be present during the trial”). An amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) may not extend the scope of Statute (Articles 51.4 and 51.5), but that is exactly what Rule 134quater seemed to do by deviating from the conditions that the Appeals Chamber (25 October 2013) had laid down for the Trial Chamber’s discretion to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial. For this reason, Kevin Jon Heller predicted that the new Rule would “probably not” survive judicial review.

So what happened? Did Rule 134quater pass the scrutiny of the Court’s Judges?

Submission Prosecution

Almost immediately after the ASP, Ruto submitted an excusal request under the new Rule, which essentially said that the Trial Chamber should excuse him for as long as he would be Vice-President. Rule 134quater would allow the Chamber to excuse an accused who fulfils extraordinary public duties from all trial hearings, because it would omit a restriction to the duration of an excusal.

The Prosecution responded by questioning the consistency of this interpretation of Rule 134quater with the Statute. Remarkably, the Prosecution did not challenge the validity of the amendment, but argued that the new Rule could not “overrule the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation” (para. 30). In applying Rule 134quater, the Trial Chamber would have to respect all the conditions that the Appeals Chamber had listed, including that an excusal must be limited to what is strictly necessary.

In addition, the Prosecution claimed that Ruto’s interpretation of Rule 134quater would be inconsistent with the equal treatment principle, which is set down in Articles 27.1 and 21.3 (the Statute shall be interpreted and applied “without any adverse distinction”). If the new rule would allow an accused to skip all hearings for as long as he or she is (Deputy-) Head of State, it “would create a regime under which two accused seeking the same relief … would be treated differently, based only on official capacity” (para. 3). The Prosecution argued that Rule 134quater would only be consistent with the equal treatment principle, if the amendment would be read as emphasizing the duties of the individual instead of the office that the accused fulfils.

Finally, the excusal request would fail to distinguish Ruto’s extraordinary public duties from the “normal, day-to-day duties” that the Kenyan Vice-President has to perform. The Prosecution maintained that dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack (like the Westgate Mall bombing) would be an extraordinary public duty, but “opening new roads or welcoming a foreign dignitary would not be” (para. 41).

For all these reasons, the Trial Chamber would have to decline Ruto’s request for a “blanket excusal” (para. 38).  Continue Reading…

Mothers of Srebrenica Decision: Dutch Court holds The Netherlands Responsible for 300 Deaths in 1995 Massacre

by Kristen Boon

On Wednesday, a Dutch Court handed down a hotly anticipated decision on the Mothers of Srebrenica case, finding the Dutch state responsible for the deaths of 300 people who were sheltering with Dutchbat in July 1995, when the safe haven at Srebrenica fell.  The English translation is available here.

This ruling means the relatives of those 300 Bosniaks will be entitled to compensation.  Significantly, however, The Netherlands was cleared for the deaths of the more than 7000 other victims who were in and around Srebrenica, such as those who fled to the woods nearby.

This case follows a related decision, in which the UN was found immune from process for the deaths at Srebrenica.   See the 2012 decision of the Dutch High Court here.   And a subsequent decision by the ECHR confirming the UN’s immunity.

In the present decision, the concept of effective control was central to the Court’s findings.  In para. 4.33 the Court cited the Nuhanovic decision and DARIO Art. 7, and defines effective control as “factual control” of the State over Dutchbat’s specific actions. (Later, in para. 4.46 the court suggests that effective control is “actual say over specific actions whereby all of the actual circumstances and the particular context of the case must be examined.”) In Para. 4.37 the Court noted that command and control of Dutchbat was transferred from the Dutch state to the UN, which took place for the purpose of a UN peacekeeping operation based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The court found the Netherlands responsible for the deaths of those 300 because they were within its effective control.   See paras. 4.87 – 88.    In contrast, the 7000 who “fled to the woods”, and according to several claimants, did so on the basis of hand signals by Dutch soldiers, were not under the effective control of the Dutch state and hence not attributable to the Dutch state. The majority of those individuals then fell to Bosnian Serbs. Paras. 4.101 – 4.106.

The ruling also indicated that the Netherlands was responsible because the Dutch peacekeeping force, outnumbered by raiding Bosnian Serb forces, had handed over the same 300 Bosnian Muslim men and boys of fighting age after Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the forces, ordered that they be screened for war crimes. Para. 4.212. The District Court ruling said the peacekeeping force should have known that the Muslims were likely to be killed by the Serbs.

In my view, this decision will have three implications:

  • First, it will be of interest to Troop Contributing Countries, in that the determination of a national court that a state is responsible for the failure to prevent an atrocity and might be found liable for wrongs committed during a peacekeeping mission, despite an overarching UN Mandate, broadens the spectre of legal liability significantly.  In this vein, it should be considered alongside the Nuhanovic decision of 2013, also rendered by the Dutch Supreme Court, in which the Netherlands was found responsible for the deaths of 3 individuals during the 1995 massacre. I blogged about this case here.   On the relationship of the Nuhanovic decision to the Mothers of Srebrenica decision, see paras. 4.10 – 4.12.
  • Relatedly, it indicates the relevance of shared responsibility scenarios in international law. It develops the doctrine of attribution and related concept of effective control proposed by the ILC in the Articles on the Responsibility of IOs, and indicates that both a state and an IO can share effective control, and hence, potentially, responsibility, despite the UN’s presumptive immunity. See e.g. para. 4.45 in which the Court decides it does not need to examine whether the UN also had effective control, given the possibility of dual attribution. For magisterial treatments of this topic, see the work of the SHARES research project at ACIL, Amsterdam, run by Professor Andre Nollkaemper.   I note that I have a research interest in effective control, and have a forthcoming article on the topic to be published in the Melbourne Journal of International Law later this year.
  • Third, the decision brings us back to a very hot topic: the scope of UN immunity. Questions of UN immunity are front and center these days because of the three pending cases against the UN involving the introduction of cholera in Haiti. An important distinction between the Srebrenica decisions, and the Haiti Cholera cases, however involves operational necessity.   In the Srebrenica case, courts have been clear that the decision not to evacuate some of the Bosniacs near the safe haven fell within the context of operational necessity, which is central to the Security Council’s mandate under Chapter VII. Questions of operational necessity are considered “public” matters, which do not trigger the Art. 29 obligation to provide alternative means of settlement.   The idea behind the disctinction of public / private it that immunities are meant to protect the UN from vexatious litigation. By way of contrast, operational necessity has never been raised in the Haiti Cholera cases. To see my take on this distinction see my blogs here and here.

Most Important Issues in International Criminal Justice Today?

by Kevin Jon Heller

That’s the question asked by the blog of Oxford University Press. All of the short answers, provided by scholars ranging from Ruti Teitel to Bill Schabas, are worth a read. Here’s mine:

In my view, it is time to begin to question whether the International Criminal Court will ever play a major role in the fight against impunity. This is not an issue of bad management, poor decision making, or anything else epiphenomenal and potentially fixable. Instead, it’s a question of institutional design: it is simply unclear whether the Court, by aiming to keep watch over both the victors and the vanquished, will ever be able to muster the kind of international support – from states, and most importantly from the Security Council – that it needs to conduct credible investigations and prosecutions. There is reason for scepticism, given the Court’s inability to prosecute both rebels and government officials in even one conflict. Indeed, it’s difficult to avoid wondering: for all its flaws, is victor’s justice the only international criminal justice possible? Is selectivity an inherent part of an international criminal tribunal that works?

You can find all of the answers here.

The Man Who Would Be King, Daddy’s Little Princess, and their Territorial Claim

by Chris Borgen

There are many dads who have played make-believe with their little girls, perhaps taking the part of kindly king to his daughter’s princess.  Not many people have turned this game into an international legal incident concerning state formation.  But  at least one man has. According to the Washington Post:

Jeremiah Heaton was playing with his daughter in their Abingdon, Va., home last winter when she asked whether she could be a real princess.

Heaton, a father of three who works in the mining industry, didn’t want to make any false promises to Emily, then 6, who was “big on being a princess.” But he still said yes.

“As a parent you sometimes go down paths you never thought you would,” Heaton said.

Within months, Heaton was journeying through the desolate southern stretches of Egypt and into an unclaimed 800-square-mile patch of arid desert. There, on June 16 — Emily’s seventh birthday — he planted a blue flag with four stars and a crown on a rocky hill. The area, a sandy expanse sitting along the Sudanese border, morphed from what locals call Bir Tawil into what Heaton and his family call the “Kingdom of North Sudan.”

There, Heaton is the self-described king and Emily is his princess.

Wow. Heaton just upped the ante for all non-royal dads. The Washington Post also reports:

Heaton says his claim over Bir Tawil is legitimate. He argues that planting the flag — which his children designed — is exactly how several other countries, including what became the United States, were historically claimed. The key difference, Heaton said, is that those historical cases of imperialism were acts of war while his was an act of love.

“I founded the nation in love for my daughter,” Heaton said.

That’s sweet. Really. But let’s turn to the international legal argument… Continue Reading…

Emerging Voices: Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of International Law in U.S. Courts

by Zachary Clopton

[Zachary Clopton is the Public Law Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School.]

For decades, scholars and practitioners of international law in the United States have focused on the federal courts.  The combination of diversity, alienage, federal question, and Alien Tort Statute (ATS) jurisdiction largely justified this focus.  But in the wake of decisions such as Morrison and Kiobel, some of these scholars and practitioners have turned to state courts and state law to vindicate international norms (1, 2).  To give one example, New York state courts are adjudicating foreign-law claims against the Bank of China arising from its alleged facilitation of Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad attacks in Israel.

The attention to states may prove to be a positive development, but notably it has tended to rely on judicially created rights—common law claims under state or foreign law, or customary international law.  What about state political branches?  Is there is a role for governors and state legislatures, and should internationalists spend some of their energy lobbying these state-level political actors?

From a policy perspective, as well as from a doctrinal and constitutional one, international litigation in U.S. courts raises both horizontal (separation of powers) and vertical (federalism) questions.  Although some judges and scholars object to international law in all of its forms, and others applaud any expanded role for international law, acknowledging the independent horizontal and vertical dimensions opens up more nuanced options.

Continue Reading…

Emerging Voices 2014 Kicking Off Today

by Jessica Dorsey

Last year’s inaugural Emerging Voices symposium was a big success, so today we’re kicking off our second annual edition. Through mid-August, we will be bringing you a wide variety of posts written by graduate students, early-career practitioners and academics.

Tune in over the next several weeks if you’d like to read more about litigation of international law in domestic courts, interstate arbitration, statelessness, and rape as a war crime–to name just a few of the topics some of our contributors will cover. Please feel free, as usual, to weigh in on the discussion. Thanks for following us here on Opinio Juris–we hope you enjoy this second edition of our Emerging Voices Symposium!

R.I.P., Professor William T. Burke, Leading Law of the Sea and International Fisheries Scholar

by Julian Ku

Professor Yann-huei Song of the Academia Sinica here in Taipei has notified me of the recent passing of his friend and fellow Law of the Sea scholar William T. Burke of the University of Washington.  His Seattle Times obituary is here.  Professor Burke’s academic publications included The Public Order of the Oceans (coauthored with Myres S. McDougal), published in 1962 and revised in 1987, and The New International Law of Fisheries(1994; translated into Japanese, 1996).  Before joining the UW faculty in 1968, Professor Burke taught at Yale Law and Ohio State Law.  There is a nice 2008 profile of him in the UW alum magazine here.  The following is a personal note from Professor Song: 

We both are students of the New Haven School for the legal studies, where I met Professor Myres S. McDougal when attending the annual policy science meeting held at Yale Law School. His book entitled THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) is one of the most authoritative textbooks for students who are interested in studying the international fisheries law. In addition, the book he co-authored with Myres S. McDouglas, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS, A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (Yale University Press, 1962), is a classic writing on law of the sea issues with the application of the new policy-oriented approach to the law of the sea. This book is one of four volumes in which McDougal and his associates approached the entire field of international law.  I met Professor Burke also at the UC-Berkeley’s Law of the Sea Institute’s meetings. As far as I can remember, he was critical to the US government’s position and policy of fisheries and law of the sea issues at the time.
 
Students of international law, in particular, international fisheries law, have been influenced by his writings. If I have the honour, on behalf of the international law of the sea community, in particular, the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, I wish to express our heartfelt condolences to the family of Professor Burke for their sad loss. 

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 14, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

  • In Nigeria, Boko Haram-style violence radiates southwards.
  • Ebola continues to spread in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, with a combined 44 new cases and 21 deaths between July 6 and 8, the World Health Organisation has said.

Asia

Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Americas

UN/Other

Let Me Be Clear: Taiwan Should Be Defended, Even Though the Defense is Illegal

by Julian Ku

So I managed to anger lots of folks (mostly on twitter) with my post Friday (republished in the Diplomat and RealClearWorld yesterday) on the international legal problems created by any Japanese intervention to defend Taiwan from an attack by China.  I don’t mind angering people (especially on twitter), but I do want to make sure they are angry with me for the right reasons. Many readers seem to think I want China to invade Taiwan, which is in fact the complete opposite of my policy goal.   So let me offer some clarifications of my position on policy, and a few rebuttals of legal responses to my arguments.

1) Policy: I am squarely in favor of U.S. military intervention to defend Taiwan against any PRC military attack. I am even in favor of intervention in the case of a declaration of independence by Taiwan as long as Taiwan acts in a responsible way so as not to threaten China’s national security.(My only hesitation on this is the cost to the US, but not on the merits of Taiwan’s case). Given how strong China is these days, I am pretty sure Taiwan could not be a real military threat to China (nor would it want to be).  Whether the US would actually protect Taiwan is the zillion dollar policy question that I don’t have the answer to.  I hope it does, but I don’t know if it will.

2) Law: However, my favored US policy is in deep tension with, or even direct conflict with, traditional understandings of the international law governing the use of force.  For those of us who love and cherish Taiwan, it is no use pretending as if the law supports a US or Japanese military intervention to defend Taiwan. It doesn’t. It would be better for all concerned if we faced this legal problem head-on rather than try to come up with complicated not-very-persuasive workarounds.  Here are the two most obvious workarounds, raised in this very angry and excited post by Taiwan-expert J. Michael Cole:

a) Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention
Here is a simple response: R2P are non-binding principles that, even if they were binding, seems to require Security Council consent.  Humanitarian intervention remains deeply contested and doubtful in international law, and would not apply to Taiwan in any case until it was probably too late. Kosovo is a great example of how contested this doctrine is. Syria is another.

b) The ROC is a separate legal entity.
I get that this is a complicated issue, but I don’t think I am “misreading” historical documents when I write that i) the US recognizes the PRC as the government of China and that the US accepts that Taiwan is part of China; 2) Japan recognizes the PRC as the government of China, and Japan accepts that Taiwan is a part of China.  Sure, neither country recognizes that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, but both the US and Japan have made clear that China is a single legal entity that includes Taiwan, and that the PRC is the sole government in charge of this entity. We can futz around the details, but there is a reason why neither the US nor Japan (nor almost anyone else) have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Here is one interesting and unexpected policy consequence of Taiwan’s current legal position: it would be safer from a legal perspective for Taiwan to declare independence, since that would protect it from this legal problem I’ve identified. Of course, that legal position would probably be the least safe from a policy perspective, since it is the mostly likely to spark a Chinese attack.

Which brings me to my real point: the increasing irrelevance of Article 51 of the UN Charter to decisions by major powers on whether to use military force. The decision on whether to defend Taiwan should not depend on workarounds for Article 51. It should depend on the combination of moral values and national interests the US and Japan consider worth protecting here in Taiwan. I think Taiwan is worth protecting, but it is important to recognize that the law is not on Taiwan’s side.

Why “Lawfare” Won’t Deter China in the South China Sea

by Julian Ku

Harry J. Kazianis, the managing editor of The National Interest, has a smart post discussing the risk that the U.S. is taking if it tries to take more aggressive action to counter China in the South China Sea.  Essentially, he argues the U.S. has no effective strategy to counter China’s “non-kinetic” strategy to subtly alter the status quo by using non-military assets to expand control and influence in the region.  I agreed with Kazianis all the way until he offered his own solution:

There only seems one solution to the various territorial disputes in the region—specifically, what some are calling “lawfare.” All of the various claimants that have disputes with China in the South China Sea should appeal collectively to any and all international bodies that could possibly hear their claims. Only together can they hope to get Beijing to halt its aggressive actions.

He goes on to cite the Philippines claim against China in the UN Law of the Sea arbitration system as a possible model for other nations.

“Lawfare” or international law litigation is not going to be an effective counter to China here for at least two reasons (one legal, one policy-based):

  • 1) China has opted out of any “compulsory” system of international dispute resolution that would rule on its territorial claims in the South China Sea (or anywhere, for that matter).  This “opt-out” is perfectly legal and may very well prevent the Philippines from even making their full case to the UNCLOS arbitration tribunal.  There are no other legal institutions that have jurisdiction.  So the only way “lawfare” can work here is if China consents to arbitration. But if Kazianis is right that this is a strategy by China’s neighbors to block its expansion, then why would China ever agree to arbitration?
  • 2) Even if compulsory jurisdiction were somehow found in one of these international bodies, there is very little chance that China would feel compelled to comply with any negative ruling.  This is not a China-specific problem, but rather a problem almost every country faces when considering arbitration over territorial disputes.  The effectiveness of tribunals in these contexts is highly limited since they depend for enforcement on the individual state-parties.  This is why voluntary arbitration tends to work better than compulsory arbitration in these kinds of territorial disputes.  The U.S. and Canada, for example, have managed to settle (most of) their often contentious land and maritime borders through a combination of non-arbitral commissions, and then special bilateral arbitrations.  In the famous “Gulf of Maine” case, the U.S. Senate actually approved a special treaty with Canada to send a maritime dispute to a special chamber of the ICJ.  Although clunky, this model is far more likely to succeed in getting state compliance.

So while I agree with Kanianis and other commentators that China needs to be deterred from its current strategy in the South China Sea, I am fairly confident the use of “lawfare” will not be a way to accomplish this goal.

Events and Announcements: July 13, 2014

by An Hertogen

Calls for papers

  • Yale Law School is hosting its 4th Doctoral Scholarship Conference on November 14-15, 2014. The theme for this year’s conference is ‘law and responsibility’. The conference is open to current doctoral candidates, both in law and law-related disciplines, and those who graduated during the previous academic year. The deadline for the submission of abstracts is August 1, 2014. More information is available here and on Facebook.
  • The Board of Editors of Trade, Law and Development [TL&D] is pleased to invite original, unpublished manuscripts for publication in the Winter ‘14 Issue of the Journal (Vol. 6, No. 2) in the form of Articles, Notes, Comments, and Book Reviews. Manuscripts received by September 17, 2014 pertaining to any area within the purview of international economic law will be reviewed for publication in the Winter ‘14 issue. TL&D has the distinction of being ranked the best journal in India across all fields of law for three consecutive years and the 10th best trade journal worldwide by Washington and Lee University, School of Law. For more information, please go through the submission guidelines available at www.tradelawdevelopment.com or write to the editors.
  • The Utrecht Journal of International and European Law,  is issuing a call for papers in relation to its forthcoming 80th edition on ‘Privacy under International and European Law’. More information can be found here.
  • Melbourne Law School will host the seventh annual Melbourne Doctoral Forum on Legal Theory on December 1–2, 2014. The Forum brings together research students from all academic disciplines to engage with social, political, theoretical, and methodological issues raised by law and legal theory. This year’s workshop challenges participants to think about law legal theory in its transnational and domestic orders and forms through the concept of the borderline. Borderlines constitute the boundaries between and within legal orders. While borders assert their permanency and inviolability, guarding who the law protects and who it disregards, we know that they are contingent, moveable, transient and above all human creations. The word ‘borderline’ evokes many conflicting meanings — sharp divides, permeations and transgression, centre and periphery, the invisibility of some distinctions and the starkness of others, abnormality and a lack of normalcy, and the imprecision and vagueness of resting ‘on the borderline’ — each of which speaks to the relations between different legal orders that take on many forms, all of varying permanency. Where do the borders fall between and within the transnational and domestic, and why? How should we theorise the way the interactions between these orders take place? And how are these borders dealt with in different legal traditions and cultures? More information can be found on the Forum’s website, in the call for papers or on Twitter.

Announcements

  • During a Round Table on 23 May 2014 organized by the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL) and the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG) of the University of Amsterdam a number of experts have presented their thoughts on key aspects of Secession within the Union. This has resulted in a collection of think pieces that identify and outline a number of outstanding issues of both public international law and EU law. The integral booklet and/or the individual short essays can be downloaded here.

Last week’s events and announcements can be found here. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact us with a one-paragraph description of your announcement along with hyperlinks to more information.

Weekend Roundup: July 5-11, 2014

by An Hertogen

This week on Opinio Juris, we hosted a symposium on Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh’s paper on Military Members Claiming Self-Defence during Armed Conflict. In a first post, Ian and Bryan discussed when self-defence applies during an armed conflict, while their second post dealt with collateral damage and “precautions in attack”. Their third post addressed prohibited weapons, obedience to lawful commands, and a ‘duty’ to retreat, and summarized the main points of their paper. In their final post, they focused on the concept of unit self-defenceJens Ohlin and Kinga Tibori-Szabó commented.

In our regular posts, Kevin posted Yuval Diskin’s comments on the escalating situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories and pointed out a misrepresentation in ABC’s reporting on the conflict. Julian argued why a Japanese intervention in Taiwan would violate international law, but should still be done if it came to defending Taiwan against a Chinese attack. Peter pointed out three distortions behind July 4 naturalization ceremonies

Finally, Jessica wrapped up the news.

Many thanks to our guest contributors and have a nice weekend!

Guest Post: Remarks on Henderson & Cavanagh Guest Post on Unit Self-Defence–Perspectives from the Courtroom

by Kinga Tibori-Szabó

[Kinga Tibori-Szabó currently works for the Legal Representative of Victims at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. She is also a New York attorney. In 2012, she won the ASIL Lieber Prize for her book Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence.]

What could be more straightforward than a unit commander’s right to defend his unit, or other specified units against hostile acts and hostile intent? But as obvious this right may seem in the military sense, as eclectic and elusive its legal nature can be.

Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh rightly point out that unit self-defence, in the legal realm, can be thought of both as a unit-level derivate of states’ inherent right of national self-defence and as a form of the criminal law concept of personal self-defence. It is also viewed as a corollary of the fundamental human right to life.

Indeed, as pointed out by the authors, if the defensive action taken at the unit level ends up being litigated at the International Court of Justice, it will be the responsibility of the state that will be in question and the legal issue will be whether the right of national self-defence applies.

Equally, Article 31(c) of the ICC Statute and ICTY jurisprudence have approached the question of unit-level action from the perspective of personal self-defence, as a ground excluding criminal liability. The ICTY stated that the “notion of self-defence may be broadly defined as providing a defence to a person who acts to defend or protect himself or his property (or another person or person’s property) against attack” and applied that definition to questions regarding the legality of forceful action taken by military units (Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, 2001, para. 449).

Add to that the fact that many domestic jurisdictions do not recognize unit self-defence as an independent legal concept, albeit its substance is acknowledged, usually in the form of collective personal self-defence, as a right of a unit commander (have a look at the General Report 19th Congress ISMLLW, Quebec). Even in jurisdictions where unit self-defence is explicitly acknowledged, its content might not be identical. For instance, the US SROE define hostile acts to include force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel and vital US government property, while other states define the term more narrowly.

Against this background, it seems sensible to aver that unit self-defence should be viewed as a ROE concept that has underlying law and legal consequences, but is not a legal term of itself. Or as Kalshoven and Fontein noted, “the true significance of the right of unit self-defence may lie in its cohesive power”.

Then again, as a lawyer trapped in the courtroom most of the time, I cannot help thinking of that odd situation, at the international judicial level, when none of the mantles we just bestowed on unit self-defence would fit. Every operational term, if it ends up playing a role in (international) courts, will have to be associated with a legal term or drawn from a legal basis. Take, for instance, one of those quintessential on-the-spot-reaction scenarios of a naval vessel under sail, being attacked while transiting between the harbours of allied nations. If the attack, because of its nature and scale, reaches the threshold of an armed attack, the inherent right of national self-defence can be invoked and force may be used within the limits of that right. In such a case, unit self-defence would be absorbed within the jus ad bellum concept. If the use of force triggers an armed conflict, the law of armed conflict will become applicable, in which case, as discussed by Henderson & Cavanagh as well as Jens David Ohlin, the concept of self-defence (unit or personal) becomes arguably redundant. But what if the attack on the vessel does not reach the threshold of an armed attack and the response does not trigger an armed conflict? In that nebulous territory, where neither jus ad bellum nor the law of armed conflict applies, we are left with personal self-defence, in its collective form. Obviously, if the operational term on which the unit’s action is based can be easily linked with provisions similar to those contained in Article 31(c) of the ICC Statute, then the problem is solved. But such provisions might not be readily available (the ICTY, ICTR and STL statutes do not expressly assert an exception of personal self-defence), and the court will have to rely on its case-law or develop relevant jurisprudence. But what if the ROE of the vessel’s nation state allows for a unit self-defence that is more permissive than the personal defence case-law of the international court? Or what if the definition of a unit in the domestic operational term is different from how the court’s jurisprudence defines defence of others or defence of property? Or what if there is no such definition in the case-law? Or what if other gaps, stemming from the different nature of the two terms (unit self-defence as a permissive rule authorising the use military force v. personal self-defence as a narrowly interpreted exception to criminal responsibility) would make it cumbersome to convert the operational term into the legal? Wouldn’t these situations warrant the acknowledgment of an independent legal term of unit self-defence, with its own elements and limits, rather than fiddling with personal self-defence, to fit a purpose it was not primarily meant to fulfil?

The odd situation, however, may never arise. It may as well be that unit self-defence will make more sense as an operational term, capable of being morphed into various, related legal terms. In any case, the debate should be kept alive and, if pertinent, room should be left for an independent legal term of unit self-defence to develop.

Guest Post: Unit Self-Defence

by Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh

[Ian Henderson is a group captain in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as the Director Military Law Centre and Deputy-Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. Bryan Cavanagh is a squadron leader in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as a legal training officer at the Military Law Centre and Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. This note was written in their personal capacities and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence. This is the third in a four-part series. The first post can be found here (along with a response here), the second here and the third here.]

In this final post, we briefly discuss the concept of unit self-defence. Unit self-defence is a term used in rules of engagement (ROE) and can be defined as ‘the right of unit commanders to defend their unit, or others units of their nation, and other specified units against hostile acts or hostile intent’ (see the annex D of the San Remo ROE Handbook). In some militaries, along with being described as a right, it is also described as an obligation (see CJCSI 3131.01B, U.S Standing Rules of Engagement). In other words, a commander is positively required to act in unit self-defence and can be held accountable for not doing so.

In our view, and with due respect to those who have argued that unit self-defence has an independent legal basis, the better approach is to view unit self-defence purely as an ROE concept (much like the terms observed indirect fire and unobserved indirect fire) that has underlying law and legal consequences but is not a legal term in and of itself. Considered that way, unit self-defence can be thought of as:

a) a form of delegated authority from the national command chain of a State to exercise a State’s right of national self-defence in limited circumstances and in a constrained fashion;

b) a reminder of the criminal law authority to act in self-defence to protect oneself and protect others, (recalling that the criminal law concept of self-defence allows a person to not only defend his or herself, but also to defend another person where the person to be aided is in a situation where the law would allow that person to act in self-defence); and

c) an order or command to use military force when certain ‘triggers’ are present.

We believe deconstructing unit self-defence in this way is helpful as it focuses on the legal basis for any given use force (or non-use of force if a commander failed to act in unit self-defence) based on the jurisdiction in which the issue would be litigated. For example, if the matter is being litigated in the International Court of Justice, it will be the State that is the party. As such, the legal issue is likely to be whether the State had a right to use force. Conversely, in a criminal proceeding in a domestic court or international tribunal, it will be individual military members who are being prosecuted; and so, combatant’s privilege aside, the issue is more likely to be whether the individual had the right to use force. And finally, through ROE a commander (or for that matter, any other military member) can be ordered to use force (and held accountable for not doing so) where the circumstances are such that under the law of self-defence they would be legally permitted but not compelled to use force in defence of another.

We are very thankful to the editors of OpinioJuris for giving us this opportunity, as well as for the useful comments and discussion from the readers.

Why Japan Would Violate International Law If It Militarily Intervened to Defend Taiwan (But Why Japan Should Do So Anyway)

by Julian Ku

I’ve been swamped with various projects and distractions here in Taiwan (mostly food-related), so I didn’t notice until today this very interesting Zachary Keck post about how Japan’s recent decision to re-interpret its constitutional provision to allow expanded overseas military activities would enable Japan to help defend Taiwan against an attack from China.  It’s a fascinating post, but it also made me think of an interesting wrinkle that cuts against his argument.  It is almost certainly true that international law prohibits any military action by Japan (or the US) to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.

In his post, Keck notes that Japan’s decision to reinterpret its constitution does NOT allow Japan to fully exercise its rights to collective self-defense under international law, but it does allow Japan to provide military support to allies where Japan itself is threatened.  But he then argues that even under this more narrow “collective self-defense” right, Japan could  (and probably would) intervene to assist Taiwan in a military defense against a Chinese invasion.

I think this could be right as a matter of Japanese constitutional law if an invasion of Taiwan could be plausibly construed as a threat to Japan, but there is a strange international law flaw to this argument.  Under black-letter international law, Japan cannot use military force in Taiwan absent China’s consent, even if the Taiwan government requests its assistance.  Why? Because the UN Charter’s Article 51 only authorizes an act of “collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and to make matters worse from Taiwan’s perspective, Japan recognizes the government in Beijing as the rightful government of China, and Japan further recognizes that Taiwan is part of China. 

So unless Japan is able to plausibly claim that an attack on Taiwan triggers Japan’s own inherent self-defense right (and I think this is a non-starter as a legal argument), and unless a Chinese invasion could be said to justify humanitarian intervention (another very difficult argument), Japan would violate the U.N. Charter if it used military force in a way that violated the territorial integrity of another UN member (China).  Japan could not invoke its collective self-defense rights unless it recognized Taiwan as an independent nation.  And even that would probably not be enough to satisfy international law requirements, since Japan’s unilateral recognition of Taiwan as an independent state would necessarily satisfy international law either.  And good luck, Taiwan, getting U.N. membership.

By the way, this analysis applies equally (or even with greater force) to the United States.  The U.S. quasi-defense guarantee to Taiwan has it completely backwards (from a legal point of view):

  • If Taiwan declares independence, the U.S. has signaled it would not consider itself bound to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Yet that would be (at least in theory) one state (China) committing aggression against another state (Taiwan), and almost certainly illegal.
  • If Taiwan keeps the status quo and does not declare independence, and China still invades, the U.S. has signaled that it would come to Taiwan’s defense. But that would be one state (China) using force within its own territory to put down secessionists (a la Ukraine) and almost certainly legal.

So the U.S (and maybe Japan) are now committed to defend Taiwan only in a situation that would require the US and Japan to violate the U.N. Charter.  It’s international-law-bizarro world!

Of course, this bizarro-from-a-legal-point-of-view policy suits U.S. purposes, since it is the policy most likely to avoid military conflict with China.  But it also reveals how use of force rules in the U.N. Charter have little relevance to shaping the behavior of the U.S., Japan (and probably China) in any conflict over Taiwan.  Japan and the US should (and probably are) ready to ignore these legal rules when making their determinations about whether to defend Taiwan.  And all in all, that’s a good thing (especially while I am still here in Taipei!).

Guest Post: Self-Defence – Weapons, Lawful Commands, Duty to Retreat and Summary

by Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh

[Ian Henderson is a group captain in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as the Director Military Law Centre and Deputy-Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. Bryan Cavanagh is a squadron leader in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as a legal training officer at the Military Law Centre and Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. This note was written in their personal capacities and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence. This is the third in a four-part series. The first post can be found here (along with a response here) and the second post here.]

This is the third in a series of four posts that address the relationship between self-defence and LOAC.  In this post we compare how LOAC and the law of self-defence deal with a number of discrete issues like use of prohibited weapons, obedience to lawful commands, and a ‘duty’ to retreat. It also provides a table which summarises the main points in the first three posts.

Can you use a poisoned bullet to protect yourself in self-defence?

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) prohibits the use of certain weapons. Under the Rome Statute and the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code, it is a war crime to employ poison or poisoned weapons, prohibited gases, or prohibited bullets.In contrast, the law of self-defence does not specifically address the means of response to a threat, but rather merely requires the response to be necessary, reasonable and proportional.

Under the Australian Criminal Code and the Rome Statute, there is no limitation on pleading self-defence only to crimes relating to the use of force. Therefore, the use of a prohibited weapon would be consistent with self-defence analysed under the Australian Criminal Code and the Rome Statute provided that a person’s actions were a necessary, reasonable and proportionate response to the threat.

In some jurisdictions, for example New Zealand, self-defence operates to exclude criminal responsibility for use of force. It is possible in these jurisdictions a combatant could not successfully plead self-defence in relation to weapons offences which are separate and distinct to offences relating to the actual use of force. We did not come to any conclusion on this issue.

Nowhere to run

Under LOAC, not unsurprisingly there is no requirement to retreat from an attack. The position under self-defence varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We found Leverick’s categorisation of the different approaches useful:

a) An absolute retreat rule. The accused must make an attempt to retreat before using force in self-defence regardless of the circumstances.

b) A strong retreat rule. The accused must make an attempt to retreat before using force in self-defence only if an opportunity to do so actually exists.

c) A weak retreat rule. Retreat is not treated as an independent variable, but rather as one factor that is taken into account in deciding whether the accused’s actions were necessary or reasonable.

d) No retreat rule. There is no duty on the accused to take an opportunity to retreat. The victim of an attack has the right to stand their ground and meet force with force.

Continue Reading…

Meanwhile, over at ABC News…

by Kevin Jon Heller

BsJXdWkCYAEhdi_Diane Sawyer had a hard-hitting report tonight at ABC News on the recent hostilities between Israel and Palestine. The segment opens with her saying, “We take you overseas now to the rockets raining down on Israel today as Israel tried to shoot them out of the sky.” As she speaks, a video box next to her shows explosions on an urban landscape. Sawyer then shows a still photo of two haggard men carrying clothes in front of a destroyed building and says, “here is an Israeli family trying to salvage what they can.”

There’s only one problem with Sawyer’s report: the explosions are in Gaza, the result of IDF airstrikes, and the men are Palestinian, not Israeli.

Welcome to the mainstream media’s even-handed coverage of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

Name That Pinko!

by Kevin Jon Heller

What Israel-hating, Hamas-loving lefty said the following on Facebook?

Dear friends: Take a few moments to read the following words and share them with others. I see the severe and rapid deterioration of the security situation in the territories, Jerusalem and the Triangle and I’m not surprised. Don’t be confused for a moment. This is the result of the policy conducted by the current government, whose essence is: Let’s frighten the public over everything that’s happening around us in the Middle East, let’s prove that there’s no Palestinian partner, let’s build more and more settlements and create a reality that can’t be changed, let’s continue not dealing with the severe problems of the Arab sector in Israel, let’s continue not solving the severe social gaps in Israeli society. This illusion worked wonderfully as long as the security establishment was able to provide impressive calm on the security front over the last few years as a result of the high-quality, dedicated work of the people of the Shin Bet, the IDF and the Israel Police as well as the Palestinians whose significant contribution to the relative calm in the West Bank should not be taken lightly.

However, the rapid deterioration we’re experiencing in the security situation did not come because of the vile murder of Naftali, Eyal and Gil-Ad, may their memories be blessed. The deterioration is first and foremost a result of the illusion that the government’s inaction on every front can actually freeze the situation in place, the illusion that “price tag” is simply a few slogans on the wall and not pure racism, the illusion that everything can be solved with a little more force, the illusion that the Palestinians will accept everything that’s done in the West Bank and won’t respond despite the rage and frustration and the worsening economic situation, the illusion that the international community won’t impose sanctions on us, that the Arab citizens of Israel won’t take to the streets at the end of the day because of the lack of care for their problems, and that the Israeli public will continue submissively to accept the government’s helplessness in dealing with the social gaps that its policies have created and are worsening, while corruption continues to poison everything good, and so on and so on.

But anyone who thinks the situation can tread water over the long run is making a mistake, and a big one. What’s been happening in the last few days can get much worse — even if things calm down momentarily. Don’t be fooled for a moment, because the enormous internal pressure will still be there, the combustible fumes in the air won’t diminish and if we don’t learn to lessen them the situation will get much worse.

The pinko in question would be Yuval Diskin, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet from 2005 to 2011. Further proof that being outside of government is conducive to honesty — especially when the government in question is overseen by someone like Netanyahu.

Guest Post: Self-Defence, Collateral Damage and Precautions in Attack

by Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh

[Ian Henderson is a group captain in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as the Director Military Law Centre and Deputy-Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. Bryan Cavanagh is a squadron leader in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as a legal training officer at the Military Law Centre and Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. This note was written in their personal capacities and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence. This is the second in a four-part series and the first post can be found here along with a response here.]

This is the second in a series of four posts that address the relationship between self-defence and LOAC. Yesterday we looked at when self-defence does and does not apply during a period of armed conflict. Today we discuss whether it is lawful under the criminal law concept of self-defence to cause incidental injury (aka, collateral damage) and whether self-defence imposes requirements similar to the ‘precautions in attack’ under article 57of Additional Protocol I (API).

Killing and injuring people that are not the object of the attack

Under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the rules relating to collateral damage are fairly easy to state – but difficult to apply. LOAC permits expected incidental loss of civilian life and injury to civilians (collateral damage), provided that the collateral damage is not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated to be gained from the attack. What then is the law relating to causing collateral damage when acting in self-defence?

A response in self-defence must be reasonable – so the question becomes – when (if ever) is it reasonable to kill or injure people who are not attacking you when responding to those who are? We had some difficulty in tracking down authority on point — in fact we could not find any reported Australian case law that addressed the issue — but domestic law of the US does. Case law in the US has held that while acting in self-defence can excuse injury or even death to a bystander in certain circumstances (eg, when not acting carelessly), self-defence does not excuse knowingly or recklessly injuring or killing a bystander (see Henwood v People, 54 Colo 188 (1913) [8]). Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that reasonableness under the law of self-defence imposes a higher standard of care on a military member than LOAC to avoid causing any injury or death to civilians. In other words, where a person acts ‘lawfully’ in self-defence, self-defence would operate as a successful defence to a charge relating to injuring or killing the attacker but not to a charge relating to injuring or killing a bystander.

To remove some confusion around this topic, we spelt out what ‘proportionality’ means under LOAC and self-defence. Proportionality under LOAC is used as a reference to the collateral damage equation mentioned above. Proportionality under self-defence is about the degree of force used in response to a threat. Proportionality under self-defence does not directly address the issue of collateral damage.

Precautions in attack

Article 57 of API sets out a number of precautions applicable to those who plan, decide and execute attacks. For example, they must do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives; take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing collateral damage, and to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or that the attack may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage.

We concluded that it is unclear whether the requirement of reasonableness under the law of self-defence would extend to requiring a military member to take all of the precautions set out in article 57. Even if it could be said that these requirements are relevant to the reasonableness assessment, they are unlikely to be as effective as protecting the civilian population as the explicit requirements set out in the article. We view this as unsurprising, as the law of self-defence was not developed to specifically address these types of issues that are unique to military operations.

In tomorrow’s post, we will compare how LOAC and the law of self-defence deal with a number of discrete issues like use of prohibited weapons, obedience to lawful commands, and a ‘duty’ to retreat.

Guest Post: Henderson & Cavanagh on Self-Defense & The Privilege of Combatancy

by Jens David Ohlin

[Jens David Ohlin is Professor of Law at Cornell Law School.]

Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh have hit the nail on the head in identifying a crucial and under-theorized question that goes right to the basic structure of the laws of war. I am in complete agreement that invocations of self-defense during armed conflict are both confused and confusing.

There is already the frequent problem of conflating individual self-defense (in the criminal law sense) with collective self-defense (jus ad bellum and article 51 of the UN Charter).  In addition, one often hears talk of a soldier’s right of self-defense – a claim that is mostly redundant since soldiers hold the privilege of combatancy and have no need to invoke a separate justification for their behavior. A justification like self-defense serves to negate the wrongdoing of the act, but a privileged soldier who kills a legitimate target has committed no wrongful act that requires negating.  Consequently, the justification of self-defense is only relevant during armed conflict when the defender is unprivileged, such as a civilian who has no right to participate in armed conflict.  If the civilian is challenged by an enemy combatant who refuses to obey the principle of distinction, then the civilian is entitled to kill the soldier in self-defense. If a soldier is attacked by a civilian, the soldier can legitimately kill the civilian because he is directly participating in hostilities; no claim of self-defense is required because the privilege applies.

Understanding self-defense from a civilian’s perspective is more difficult.  Consider the complicated problem of a civilian who kills an enemy soldier who is in the process of killing the civilian as collateral damage during a lawful attack against a military objective. In that scenario, does the civilian have the right of self-defense? In the criminal law we usually view the right of self-defense as only applicable against unlawful attacks, but in this case the attacking soldier’s original assault is lawful under LOAC as long as the anticipated collateral damage is not disproportionate to the value of the military objective. If the envisioned collateral damage is disproportionate, then the attack is unlawful.  So, in that case, the right of the civilian to exercise self-defense would depend entirely on the civilian making the correct assessment of not only the collateral damage, but also the anticipated collateral damage viewed — not from his perspective – but rather from the perspective of the person attacking him!  A greater conceptual riddle I cannot fathom.  This would be a nightmare for a criminal court, international or domestic, to adjudicate.

The deeper issue imbedded in Henderson and Cavanaugh’s research is the application of the privilege of combatancy to non-international armed conflicts.  The standard textbook answer is that the privilege is inapplicable to NIAC because the very concept of “combatant” is part of the legal architecture of IAC.  Under this view, a NIAC can only have government forces and rebels – never combatants per se.

To my mind, this statement is often reflexively repeated in the literature without due consideration for whether it is always and universally true.  Few individuals have challenged it, though Henderson himself is one of the few to have seriously studied the issue, writing articles suggesting that government forces in NIACs are privileged belligerents and that prosecuting them domestically would violate the laws of war.  Henderson is to be commended for tackling an understudied but vital topic.

Continue Reading…

Guest Post: Military Members Claiming Self-Defence During Armed Conflict–Often Misguided and Unhelpful

by Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh

[Ian Henderson is a group captain in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as the Director Military Law Centre and Deputy-Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. Bryan Cavanagh is a squadron leader in the Royal Australian Air Force and is currently posted as a legal training officer at the Military Law Centre and Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. This note was written in their personal capacities and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence.]

We would like to thank the editors of Opinio Juris for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our draft book chapter on the how the concept of self-defence under criminal law operates in relation to military members during an armed conflict. We would also like to thank the ASIL Lieber Society and the judges who kindly awarded our paper a Certificate of Merit (second prize) in the 2014 Richard R. Baxter Military Prize for ‘a paper that significantly enhances the understanding and implementation of the law of war’.

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) reflects a balance between military necessity and humanity. Potentially upsetting this balance is an apparent trend towards relying on self-defence under criminal law as a justification for the use of force by military members during armed conflicts. We argue that this trend is based on a misunderstanding of the scope self-defence when applied in light of the combatant’s privilege.

As the relevant law that would apply to a claim of self-defence depends upon the jurisdiction, we limited our analysis to the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code and the Rome Statute. We would be very interested to hear about how our analysis might apply in other jurisdictions.

We have split the issues up into four discrete posts. In this post, we discuss the circumstances where self-defence does and does not apply during an armed conflict. This also entails discussing the combatant’s privilege.

In our next post, we will deal with whether it is lawful under the criminal law concept of self-defence to cause incidental injury (aka, collateral damage) and whether the law relating to self-defence imposes requirements similar to the ‘precautions in attack’ under article 57 Additional Protocol I.

The third post will be a comparison of how LOAC and the law of self-defence deal with a number of discrete issues like the use of prohibited weapons, obedience to lawful commands, and ‘duty’ to retreat.

And in the final post we will briefly address the rules of engagement (ROE) concept of unit self-defence.

You say tomato, I say tomahto

Self-defence is not a unitary concept, but rather has different legal and operational meanings. It is vital to distinguish between the different meanings and ask in what context is the term ‘self-defence’ being used. Our chapter is about an individual claiming self-defence when facing potential criminal (or disciplinary) charges. It is not about a State’s right of self-defence under article 51 UN Charter (or customary international law).. Whether or not a State has a right to use force in national self-defence is a separate and distinct issue from whether an individual is not guilty of crime under the relevant self-defence provisions pertaining in a particular criminal jurisdiction. Continue Reading…

Behind July 4 Naturalization Ceremonies, Three Distortions

by Peter Spiro

The naturalization ceremony is now a part of the July 4th ritual, right up there with picnics, parades, and fireworks. The script is faithfully recounted in newspapers across the country. Dignified surroundings (courtrooms, historic sites, ballparks) with presiding local luminaries (judges, office holders, public intellectuals), celebratory family members in tow. US flag-waving applicants from [fill-in-the-blank] number of countries. Short summaries of patriotic speeches, interviews with newly-minted citizens overjoyed by their new status. Perfect assignment for a cub reporter working the holiday weekend, a piece that practically writes itself.

This year was no exception, with the accelerant of President Obama’s presiding over a naturalization ceremony for active-duty military personnel (who, by the way, can pretty much become instant citizens — no residency requirement applies).

I don’t want to detract from the accomplishment that naturalization can represent (especially for those with less education, who are forced to pass tests on civics, history, and facility in the English language to attain full equality in their place of habitual residence, as well as for those with refugee status). The sentiments voiced are no doubt genuine, and for some naturalization remains a transformative experience.

But the picture these reports paint distorts the reality of naturalization today in at least these three ways:

1. Naturalization ceremonies are always so dignified. Hardly. More than half of all applicants are sworn in ceremonies at local Department of Homeland Security offices. These can be drab affairs, the proceedings supervised by lower-level USCIS bureaucrats following a strict operating-manual protocol. Think one-step up from the DMV. In some cities, deportation proceedings are being held across the hallway. (Not that court-presided ceremonies are always so dignified. See page 8 of this 2008 DHS ombudsman report for some less-than-inspiring examples; note also the use of “oathed” as a transitive verb.)

2. Applicants are mostly naturalizing for sentimental reasons. Naturalization is not about being proud to be an American. A Pew Research poll found that only 6 percent of naturalization applicants are motivated by “their sense of identity as an American or their love of the U.S.” Eighteen percent cite civil and legal rights as the primary reason for naturalization (that more closely aligns with a conventional trope that naturalization is about getting the vote). Sixteen percent are interested in the “benefits and opportunities” of citizenship, including the value of travelling on a US passport, being able to apply for certain public sector jobs, and acquiring eligibility for public benefits. In other words, many who naturalize are (quite rationally) doing it for instrumental reasons.

3. Naturalization applicants are transferring their allegiance to the United States. The vast majority of naturalizing citizens are also keeping their citizenship of origin. A clear majority of countries allow dual citizenship — according to one survey, 19 out of the top 20 source states for immigrants to the US allow naturalizing citizens to keep their citizenship. Others that don’t recognize the status fail to police against it (China for example). Only a few take dual citizenship bans seriously — Japan is probably the best example. When it comes to the July 4th accounts, it’s hard to know whether this is an implicit distortion or whether it’s just not reported on. My guess is that most native-born Americans would be surprised to discover that dual citizenship is the new normal among naturalized Americans.

So why the continuing convention of July 4th naturalization accounts? USCIS keeps up the pace, this year with more than 100 ceremonies across the country in the week leading up to and including the 4th. From a PR perspective, this is money well spent. From the reporters’ perspective, why rain on the parade? They probably understand this isn’t a battle to pick with their putatively patriotic readership (an assumption that may be thinning on a generational basis, according to this NYT report). For others, finally, it may be politically risky business to challenge naturalization tropes. For proponents of immigration reform, highlighting a less-than-pure path to citizenship is hardly going to help move the ball forward. Political and other elites, even on the progressive side, are still nationalists. So no one has much of an interest to leave the script, even if it no longer jives with circumstances on the ground.

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, July 7, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Americas

UN/Other

Weekend Roundup: June 28 – July 4, 2014

by An Hertogen

This week of Opinio Juris, Chris discussed the significance of Ukraine’s, Moldova’s, and Georgia’s signing of Association Agreements with the European Union. Peter, meanwhile, pointed out two provisions in Canada’s citizenship-stripping legislation of questionable compatibility with international and human rights law, and explained how the US Supreme Court’s Recess Appointments case speaks to foreign relations law.

Jessica wrapped up the news and I listed events and announcements. For further interesting reading over the holiday weekend, the US Department of State has just released the 2013 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law.

And if you have enough of the FIFA World Cup, maybe Chris’s post on the ConIFA—the competition for teams from unrecognized entities and would-be states may provide an antidote.

Have a nice weekend!

 

For Unrecognized Entities and Would-Be States, the World Cup is Already Over

by Chris Borgen

While awaiting the FIFA World Cup quarterfinal matches to begin, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Tim Howard taking a well-deserved rest, I thought it might be useful to check-in on the status of the ConIFA World Cup, the tournament among teams from unrecognized entities and would-be states.  The New York Times has just published a great pictorial of that tournament, which was held in June.

ConIFA, the Confederation of Independent Football Associations, explains on its website that it:

… is a global umbrella organization for all the football teams outside FIFA. There are more than 5 500 ethnicities around the world and hundreds of sportingly isolated regions that doesn´t have an international arena to play international football.

CONIFA welcome all registered Football Associations and teams to play. We organize the official World Championship for teams outside FIFA, Continental Championships, International tournament and Cups combined with Cultural Events and Youth Exchanges. The Football World outside FIFA is fast growing and millions of dedicated fans follow the scene – this is happening now…

Why aren’t these teams in FIFA, the international federation of football associations? Membership in FIFA is not based on being a state, but rather on being a football association.  Thus, if you look at a list of FIFA member associations, England and Wales are separate associations, and thus separate World Cup teams. However, joining FIFA can be subject at times to some of the same political tensions as the recognition of a state.

According to FIFA’s statutes (.pdf), to be eligible to become a member of FIFA, an applicant must first be a member of one of the six main football confederations: the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL), the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), or the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC). Without going into all the statutes of these individual confederations, it is likely that some vote among the existing member associations in a given confederation will be a first hurdle that an aspirant FIFA-member must pass. (See, for example, UEFA’s rules (.pdf).)

Once a member of a confederation, an association may then apply for FIFA membership. Admission is based on a vote of the FIFA Congress, which is comprised of a representative of each member association. Article 10 of FIFA’s Statutes states:

Any Association which is responsible for organising and supervising football in all of its forms in its Country may become a Member of FIFA. Consequently, it is recommended that all Members of FIFA involve all relevant stakeholders in football in their own structure. Subject to par.5 and par.6 below, only one Association shall be recognised in each Country.

Paragraph 5 allows for separate membership for the British associations and paragraph 6 explains:

An Association in a region which has not yet gained independence may, with the authorisation of the Association in the Country on which it is dependent, also apply for admission to FIFA.

Thus, although membership in FIFA is technically not based on statehood, the process is based on statehood and defers to recognized national organizations. Consequently, unrecognized secessionist entities such as South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh have no real chance of having their football associations become part of a confederation, let alone FIFA. The New York Times further describes some of the results of FIFA’s membership process:

For many teams, membership confers legitimacy and a shot at reaching the World Cup finals, a huge stage from which to wave their nation’s flag.

Palestine — recognized as a “nonmember observer state” by the United Nations and a member of FIFA since 1998 — now has a national stadium near Ramallah and has attempted to qualify for four World Cup finals. Other teams, like Kosovo, have been unable to join European soccer’s governing body, UEFA, because of political lobbying from Serbia. When Gibraltar, a British overseas territory on the Iberian Peninsula claimed by Spain, tried to join FIFA, Spain threatened to pull all of its teams — including the powerhouses of Barcelona and Real Madrid — from the European Champions League and international football. Despite the political pressure, Gibraltar became a member of UEFA in 2013 and hopes to join FIFA next.

While not all the associations in the ConIFA World Cup are from entities that are attempting to become states, the politics of statehood nonetheless is one of the variables defining this World Cup among the unrecognized. If statehood is the gold standard of the international system, then being accepted by such a state-centric organization as FIFA is viewed by some as a mark of legitimacy. At the very least, it is a benefit that existing states may wish to deny to unrecognized separatists.

And so we get the ConIFA World Cup, which gets into the legitimacy game by calling itself the “official” tournament of associations not in FIFA.

Some results of note: South Ossetia beat Abkhazia on penalties in quarterfinals. Nice beat defending Padania (the defending champs, I believe)  in quarterfinals and then the Isle of Man in the finals. You can see the full ConIFA tournament results here. You can also read more about a previous World Cup among unrecognized entities in this post.

 

2013 U.S. Digest Now Available

by Duncan Hollis

Just a quick note for those of you who, like me, have a fondness for the Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law; the 2013 volume is now available on the State Department’s website (see here).   I find the Digest to be one of the great resources on U.S. views of international law; it regularly includes letters, reports, and other documents that are hard (if not impossible) to locate elsewhere. In doing so, it also offers a contemporary glimpse of where the Executive Branch stands on manifold questions of international law and practice. Here’s how the accompanying press release describes this year’s Digest and the series as a whole:

The Department of State is pleased to announce the release of the 2013 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, covering developments during calendar year 2013. The Digest provides the public with a record of the views and practice of the Government of the United States in public and private international law. The official edition of the 2013 Digest is available exclusively on the State Department’s website at: www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm. Past Digests covering 1989 through 2012 are also available on the State Department’s website. The Digest is edited by the Office of the Legal Adviser.

The Digest traces its history back to an 1877 treatise by John Cadwalader, which was followed by multi-volume encyclopedias covering selected areas of international law. The Digest later came to be known to many as “Whiteman’s” after Marjorie Whiteman, the editor from 1963-1971. Beginning in 1973, the Office of the Legal Adviser published the Digest on an annual basis, changing its focus to documentation current to the year. Although publication was temporarily suspended after 1988, the office resumed publication in 2000 and has since produced volumes covering 1989 through 2012. A cumulative index covering 1989-2006 was published in 2007, and an updated edition of that index, covering 1989-2008, was published in 2010.

How the Recess Appointments Case Speaks to Foreign Relations Law

by Peter Spiro

Not much surprise that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the recess appointments case NLRB v. Noel Canning would draw on historical practice, since there wasn’t much else to draw on. Breyer’s opinion in the case sets out a notable defense of practice as precedent:

[I]n interpreting the [Recess Appointments] Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice. For one thing, the interpretive questions before us concern the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government. Long ago Chief Justice Marshall wrote that

“a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819).

And we later confirmed that “[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions” regulating the relationship between Congress and the President. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929) ; see also id., at 690 (“[A] practice of at least twenty years duration ‘on the part of the executive department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, . . . is entitled to great regard in determining the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is in any respect of doubtful meaning’ ” (quoting State v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 264, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904))).

We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual liberty, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417–450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and that it is the “duty of the judicial department”—in a separation-of-powers case as in any other—“to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). But it is equally true that the longstanding “practice of the government,” McCulloch, supra, at 401, can inform our determination of “what the law is,” Marbury, supra, at 177.

That principle is neither new nor controversial. As James Madison wrote, it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily used in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.” Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908). And our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 401 (1989) ; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 686 (1981) ; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579–611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, supra, at 689–690; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87–119 (1925); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459–474 (1915); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892) ; McCulloch, supra; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (1803).

These precedents show that this Court has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era. See Mistretta, supra, 400–401 (“While these [practices] spawned spirited discussion and frequent criticism, . . . ‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution” (quoting Youngstown, supra, at 610) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Regan, supra, at 684 (“[E]ven if the pre-1952 [practice] should be disregarded, congressional acquiescence in [a practice] since that time supports the President’s power to act here”); The Pocket Veto Case, supra, at 689–690 (postfounding practice is entitled to “great weight”); Grossman, supra, at 118–119 (postfounding practice “strongly sustains” a “construction” of the Constitution).

There is a great deal of history to consider here. Presidents have made recess appointments since the beginning of the Republic. Their frequency suggests that the Senate and President have recognized that recess appointments can be both necessary and appropriate in certain circumstances. We have not previously interpreted the Clause, and, when doing so for the first time in more than 200 years, we must hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached.

Strike another blow against constitutional formalism. For proof, see Scalia’s dissent cum concurrence in the judgment, which plays heavily to Chadha. Scalia sees in the majority opinion’s use of history an “adverse possession theory of executive power” (though Scalia himself is forced to play on its turf and engage the practice, including modern practice). Perhaps, such is life.

The use of history is obviously prominent in the foreign relations context, given the dearth of judicial precedent for so many foreign relations law questions (though the courts have been busy trying to fill many gaps in recent years, there are still many left unfilled). Next year’s engagement with the recognition power in Zivitovsky will surely be looking to practice, including practice post-dating the founding era, and the Noel Canning methodology gives it a recent launching point. For those who need the Court’s imprimatur on what qualifies as constitutional authority, this decision reminds us that it’s on board with history-as-law, too.

Weekly News Wrap: Tuesday, July 1, 2014

by Jessica Dorsey

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

Asia

Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Americas

UN/Other