Recent Posts

[Jens Iverson is a Researcher for the ‘Jus Post Bellum’ project at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, part of the Law Faculty of the University of Leiden.] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have recently published reports (AI, HRW) regarding drone strikes.  They are admirable.  They further the debate on the legality of drone strikes.  (This debate continues on Opinio Juris and elsewhere by Deborah Pearlstein, Ryan Goodman, and Kevin Jon Heller amongst others.)  Each report provides unique reporting and strong legal arguments on an important issue.  There is at least one subject, however, where they, at a minimum, overstate the clarity of the law—namely, the status of members of organized armed groups who are not directly participating in hostilities in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). AI and HRW effectively state that members of an organized armed group (party to the NIAC) who are not presently directly participating in hostilities are protected from direct attack.  Both reports rely strongly on the ICRC’s landmark volume Customary International Humanitarian Law.  This volume does not fully support them on this issue. AI states:
Speeches by US officials suggest that the Administration believes that it can lawfully target people based merely on their membership in armed groups, rather than on the basis of their conduct or direct participation in hostilities. Membership in an armed group alone is not a sufficient basis to directly target an individual. (pp. 45-46, emphasis added)
HRW states:
US statements and actions indicate that US forces are applying an overly broad definition of “combatant” in targeted attacks, for example by designating persons as lawful targets based on their merely being members, rather than having military operational roles, in the armed group. Individuals who accompany or support an organized armed group, but whose activities are unrelated to military operations, are not lawful military targets under the laws of war. Thus members of an armed group who play a political role or a non-military logistics function cannot be targeted on that basis alone. (p. 86, emphasis added)
In contrast, Customary International Humanitarian Law states in the commentary to Rule 5 (Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians): 

[Marty Lederman is an Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel from 2009 to 2010, and an Attorney Advisor in OLC from 1994-2002. Lederman and  law professors David Golove and John Mikhail filed an amicus brief in Bond.]   Some preliminary reactions that occurred to me as I was listening to the...

Lyle Denniston is first out of the gate with his take on the oral argument in the much-anticipated U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Bond.  His general take: The argument in Bond v. U.S. (docket 12-158) reached the grand constitutional scale that has been its potential all along.   At the end of an hour-long hearing, it appeared that the government might just have...

November 5, 2013 is U.S. National Treaty Day.  Well, not really, but it might as well be given how much treaties are going to be in the news tomorrow.  For starters, the United States Supreme Court hears oral argument in the case of Bond v. United States (for the pleadings, see SCOTUS blog's as-always-excellent round-up).  As we've blogged previously (a lot), the case...

Has the federal government ever put Missouri v. Holland to work? I don't think so, though I always hesitate to state it categorically. The Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Holland squarely held that the Treaty Power adds something to other enumerated federal authorities. But there appears to be no instance in which the federal government has actually used a treaty...

The Association of Defence Counsel at the ICTY is organising a Conference on November 29 at the Bel-Air hotel in The Hague on the Legacy of the ICTY from the perspective of the Defence function. More information is here. The ASIL's International Legal Theory Interest Group and Cornell Law School are organizing an event on the Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human...

In my previous post, I mocked Scotland Yard's assertion that David Miranda, Glenn Greenwald's partner, committed an act of terrorism by transporting documents stolen from the US government by Edward Snowden. Mockery remains the appropriate response, given the vast chasm that separates Miranda's actions from any defensible conception of terrorism -- such as the one I quoted from UN General...

No, not actual terrorism, "[c]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes." That's still going strong. I'm talking about the concept of terrorism, which has officially lost all meaning whatsoever: British authorities claimed the domestic partner of reporter Glenn Greenwald was involved in "terrorism" when he tried to...

This week on Opinio Juris, we held a symposium on Chevron and the rise of arbitral power introduced here by Michael D. Goldhaber. Comments were by Christoph Schreuer, Anthea Roberts, and Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Michael's response is here. In follow up on earlier symposia, Anupam Chander posted his reply to the comments in last week's book symposium on The Electronic Silk Road and Anne van Aaken responded to...

The ICC's Public Affairs Unit has brought to my attention that the Sudan Tribune erroneously reported what Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji said to Ruto concerning his public statements about his case. The unofficial transcript makes clear that although the Judge warned Ruto not to make additional statements, he did not suggest that Ruto would be arrested if he did so: 7 It has...

[Michael D. Goldhaber serves as Senior International Correspondent and "The Global Lawyer" columnist for The American Lawyer and the ALM media group. His writes widely on human rights and corporate accountability, international arbitration, and global multiforum disputes. His e-book on Chevron will be published next year by Amazon. His first post can be found here.] I'm grateful for the very gracious and insightful comments shared by the eminent arbitrator Christoph Schreuer, the scourge of eminent arbitrators Muthucumaraswamy Sornarjah, and the wunderkind of arbitration scholarship, Anthea Roberts. Having solicited a wide range of commentary on my Article, I now must defend myself from friendly jabs on both flanks. Dr. Schreuer and Professor Roberts both argue thoughtfully that the relationship between tribunals and courts should be understood in a broader context. Along the way, Dr. Schreuer questions my realist view that arbitrators effectively review judges. In the course of a bracing systemic critique, Professor Sornarajah calls my desire for proportionality analysis and a plenary appeal within arbitration naive. I stand by my position that arbitrators are increasingly at odds with judges, and that they functioned like reviewing judges in several of the final awards surveyed (although I perhaps could have been more attentive to terminology). Dr. Schreuer helpfully distinguishes between vacating a decision (in an annulment) and replacing it (in an appeal), and argues that arbitrators do neither. But consider the results. When the treaty tribunal in Saipem v Bangladesh reinstated a contract arbitration award that had been nullified by a national court, it effectively vacated the court decision, and replaced it with a decision confirming the commercial arbitration. In White v. India, the tribunal stripped the national courts of jurisdiction because they were too slow, and effectively stepped in to confirm a commercial arbitration award. In Chevron v. Ecuador I, the tribunal stripped the courts of jurisdiction for being too slow, and expressly decided the court cases de novo under Ecuadorian law. Surely these results were functionally equivalent to appellate review. Likewise, when ATA v. Jordan finally terminated an ongoing court proceeding, it emphatically resolved the case in ATA's favor. I'm not sure how such a remedy should be categorized, but I cannot agree with Dr. Schreuer that it's "much weaker" than appellate review. I readily agree with Schreuer and Roberts on their main point: that judges and arbitrators interact in multifarious ways. My Article's opening passage acknowledged as much, and explained that I would dwell on arbitral review because it is the most neglected facet of their relationship Professor Roberts astutely observes that the relationship between tribunals and courts is triangular -- in the sense that arbitrators tend to review judges from poor nations, but to be reviewed by judges from rich nations. What she leaves unsaid is that judges in rich nations have historically deferred to arbitrators (whether out of ideology, correct interpretation of the law, or sensitivity to cross-border competition among the arbitration elites). I would therefore predict that the U.S. Supreme Court will overturn the D.C. Circuit's encroachment on arbitrators' turf in BG v. Argentina. If not, arbitration will simply flow away from UNCITRAL tribunals sited in the U.S., toward tribunals that are governed by either ICSID or the laws of arbitration-friendly European states. But either way, if they wish to sustain their power, arbitrators should take the hint: At least some courts in rich nations are deferring less because they perceive arbitrators as overweening. A lack of internal review may lead to external review. Although Professor Sornarajah and I share many perceptions -- for instance the need for transparency --, he views me as any self-respecting revolutionary views a reformer. He cannot understand why I would wish to fix an edifice with rotten foundations, rather than to blow it up.